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ABSTRACT: War on its Head demonstrates that the public understandings of the 
last thirty-four years of conflict in Helmand province, Afghanistan, have been poor 
descriptors and predictors of the conflict’s dynamics. Examples of these public 
understandings include the holy mujahidin defeating the atheist Soviets, or the 
United States and Britain attempting to support a transition to democracy whilst 
being resisted by a fundamentalist insurgency: the Taliban. Drawing on extensive 
experience in Helmand province, one hundred and fifty anonymous interviews with 
Helmandi notables and Taliban commanders, and detailed secondary research in 
English and Pushtu, this thesis explores the Helmandi view of the last thirty-four 
years of their conflict, through three eras of external influence: Soviet, Pakistani and 
Western. It clearly shows that the same Helmandi private actors, feuds and 
narratives are driving the conflict, rather than the changing era-specific public 
narratives. The evidence presented here shows that this is because external actors 
have failed to understand the local, interpersonal nature of conflict in Helmand. The 
consequences for policymakers and scholars are discussed in the conclusion. 
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Note on referencing and footnotes 
 
The ‘boxes’ that people are placed in (i.e. their public narratives) are at the heart of this 
thesis. The two main types of personal classification that I have used—by tribe and jihadi 
party—are problematic. To aide future scholars, I have included these details in parentheses 
after a person’s first occurrence in the text. This should be treated with some caution, as 
many of my interviewees habitually manipulated the labels that they applied to others. I 
accept that in ‘fixing’ them in this thesis, I am adding to them more weight than I should; 
however, I decided that the benefits of clarity outweigh the costs inherent in their 
arbitrariness. For example, if there are three Hamids, then often the best way of 
differentiating between them is to indicate tribe or jihadi affiliation. 
 
With regards to tribe, many in Helmand re-interpret tribal lineage in order to reflect the 
current political situation. ‘Tribe’ is both genealogical and political and this ‘untrue’ depiction 
of ‘history’ is one way in which Helmandis explain the present. People change tribe.1 In the 
text ‘tribal hierarchy’ is shown as Tribe/Sub-tribe/Clan/Sub-clan 
e.g.Barakzai/Nasratzai/Khanzai/Arabzai. Jihadi party is even more problematic. Several 
individuals depicted here changed jihadi party affiliation multiple times during the jihad, as 
well as working concurrently for the government. I indicate their contemporaneous party 
affiliation at that point in the text. I also accept that some government organisations—such 
as Khad—changed names several times. For simplicity, I have used the main name that 
Helmandis use for that organisation. Finally, I have gone against the usual practice of 
italicising foreign names in the text because of their ubiquity, instead reserving italics for 
emphasis.  
 
Footnotes: Due to the variety of different sources used, I use a shorthand system of 
interview and secondary source codes, depicted over the page. For interviewee descriptions 










                                                          
1
 Benjamin Hopkins and Magnus Marsden, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier (London, 2011): 44. 
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Three-digit code beginning 0 (i.e. 
001)  
Anonymous interview of Helmandi notable. 
Three-digit code beginning 1 (i.e. 
101) 
Anonymous interview of ISAF officer. 
Three-digit code beginning 2 (i.e. 
201) 
Anonymous interview of Taliban commander. 
Three-letter code or name (i.e. 
MMW) 
On-the-record interview of senior Helmandi or 
westerner. 
Three-digit code with a ‘G’ (i.e. 
G102) 
Refers to a Helmandi Guantanamo prisoner number. 
Source documentation and more details given in 
Appendix 6. 
PersExp (i.e. PersExp, Bolan, 
2008) 
Refers to my personal experience.  
Wiki (i.e. Wiki: ‘…’ (05 June 2009) From Wikileaks. Followed by cable subject and date. 
Archive available at http://cablegatesearch.net/ 
Redacted 
 
An interview conducted by me where I have withdrawn 
the code to protect the interviewee. 
Shorthand system of interview and secondary source codes 
 
I have made great efforts to be accurate in my referencing; however it is inevitable that I may 
have made mistakes. If you feel that you have not been adequately referenced, the please 










Map 1: Afghanistan showing Helmand (map produced by Alcis Holdings Ltd).  
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Map 2: Helmand indicating District Centres (map produced by Alcis Holdings Ltd).  
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Map 3: District boundaries of Helmand (public domain image). 
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Map 5: Soviet defensive cumberbands around Lashkar Gah and Gereshk (map produced by 















Map 6: Tribes and clans in Sangin—simplified (map produced by Alcis Holdings Ltd).  
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Map 10: Haji Kadus’ militia CPs—in red (map produced by Alcis Holdings Ltd).  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
The supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that a statesman and 
commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are 
embarking, neither mistaking it, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its 






             They place before them the Qur’an 
They read aloud from it 
But their actions not a one 







Insurgency is a pejorative term, useful to governments in establishing their own or their 
allies’ legitimacy and in defining their enemies. This thesis will argue that the current 
western4 view of the Helmand conflict as an insurgency is completely different from how 
Helmandis themselves perceive the conflict. Further, it will argue that the previous eras of 
the same conflict have also been mischaracterised both in popular understanding and the 
scholarly literature. War on its Head challenges tired clichés about this most individualist5 of 
lands. 
 
The Helmandi conflict since 1978 may be defined according to three periods, each by main 
external foreign actor. The first period, running from 1978 to 1992, encompasses Soviet 
influence. The second period, running from 1992 to 2001, represents increasing and then 
dominant Pakistani influence. And the third period, from 2001 to present, has been one of 
American, and to a much lesser degree European, influence. This thesis will conclude that 
consecutive mischaracterisation across these three eras has exacerbated the Helmandi 
conflict. The epigraph demonstrates that this is not new thinking. However, in the context of 
the conflict in Afghanistan, and Helmand, it appears to be. 
 
The violence in Helmand is currently viewed by non-Helmandis through the narrative of the 
International Community (IC)—I term this the ‘insurgency narrative’. It is widely espoused by 
western governments,6 western militaries fighting in Afghanistan,7 western8 and Afghan9 
                                                          
2




 century Pushtun poet. 
4
 Hereafter taken to mean America and European countries. 
5
 When I first went to Helmand, my 93-year-old grandmother wrote to me to wish me luck, whilst wondering how I 
would get on with the Afghans who were, she wrote, ‘unrepentant individualists’.  
6
 House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Operations in Afghanistan: Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, 
vol. 1 (London, 2011): 31. 
7
 Farrell and Giustozzi (forthcoming) quoting COMISAF Initial Assessment: 2-6. 
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media and a broad variety of scholarly works10 and states that the IC supports the 
‘legitimate’ Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and that there is a 
movement of insurgents called the Taliban, who have sanctuary in Quetta, Pakistan and 
violently oppose GIRoA. From this perspective, the Taliban are seen as religiously inspired 
insurgents who are, for example, against the women’s rights and democracy offered by 
GIRoA. This is all true, and will not be refuted here. However, it will be argued that the 
Taliban are not the main drivers of violent conflict in Helmand. This thesis will also show that 
the Soviet era, and the civil war/Taliban era, have been similarly misconstrued. In the current 
era, much of the observed violence in Helmand is mischaracterised as ‘Taliban’ insurgent 
violence, when in fact it is not linked to the Taliban or GIRoA, but driven by micro-dynamics 
between groups and individuals on the ground. 
 
The ‘insurgency narrative’ of the Helmandi conflict did not fit my experiences in Helmand 
whilst serving as a British Army officer. I went several times to Helmand, with appropriate 
gaps between visits for study and reflection, and each time I returned this analysis of the 
conflict seemed further from the events that I was observing and participating in. As I 
witnessed the conflict, it appeared to be shaped and driven by (mainly) Helmandi individuals 
and their personal motivations. This thesis was born from my disquiet at that discordance. 
Over the last four years in Helmand, I have watched many foreigners (including myself) 
struggle with the portrayal of this conflict as an ‘insurgency’. Often the words ‘Taliban’, or 
‘government’, would often be caveated with ‘but of course there are many different types of 
Taliban’ or ‘but government officials also smuggle drugs’.11 This thesis is about the ‘but’. I will 
show, for example, that the reason the ‘policeman’ is in the ‘government’ is to protect his 
other business. ‘Government’ is a temporary label, nothing more. In the outsiders’ world, 
however, once caveated, we would continue to use the words and concepts of ‘government’ 
and ‘Taliban’ as units of functional analysis around which strategy could be planned, or 
ideologies computed. We became victims of our own labels for the phenomena that we were 
observing, because we had retreated to easy constructs that would support us in our 
attempts to plan, analyse and act.  
 
This thesis will not assert, nihilistically, is that the Taliban do not exist. There is a movement, 
based loosely around the leadership of the ousted Taliban government, based somewhere in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8
 ‘Afghan Insurgency ‘clearly on back foot’, BBC News (1 Feb 2012); ‘Taliban attacks show Afghan insurgents’ 
resilience’, The Guardian (21 Jan 2013). 
9
 ‘ISI accused of backing Taliban’s [sic] insurgency’, Pajhwok (13 Feb 2012). 
10
 e.g. Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop (London, 2008); Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason, 
"Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan" Orbis 51, no. 1 (2008); Farhana Schmidt, "From 
Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords: The Evolution of the Taliban Insurgency" Mediterranean Quarterly 21, no. 2 
(2010). 
11
 ‘Is Afghanistan a Narco-State’, NY Times (27 Jul 2008); PersExp, Helmand, 2008-12. 
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Pakistan. Similarly, this thesis does not seek to question that there was a Soviet-backed 
government in Kabul, or several mujahidin parties based in Peshawar. But the fact that the 
Helmandi conflict has been continuing for thirty-four years—involving, as documented here 
for the first time, the same individuals, family networks and clan disputes—yet has been 
described as a succession of different conflicts, demonstrates that something is amiss with 
this commonly-held public understanding. This concept of intergroup dynamics driving 
violence has led me to the civil war literature in the hope that it may offer more explanatory 
power than the insurgency literature when studying Helmand. 
 
Following on from Rob Johnson’s ground-breaking The Afghan Way of War, this thesis is a 
modest attempt to articulate the idea that the views generally espoused in the West of the 
Afghan war, and specifically the Helmandi war, have not been the views that Helmandis 
subscribe to, or even recognise, as the primary explanation for the violence that is occurring 
around them.12 To them, more often than not, ‘communist’, ‘government’, ‘Hizb-e Islami’ (to 
choose a mujahidin party at random), ‘Taliban’ and so on are merely labels that are chosen 
and discarded depending on circumstances or context, and imply little presumption of 
genuine ideological affiliation. This thesis is going to explain how Helmandis view their own 
conflict. 
 
This chapter has so far discussed the ‘insurgency narrative’ in Helmand and proposed an 
alternative: that the concept of ‘civil war’ offers more utility in understanding the Helmandi 
conflict than the concept of ‘insurgency’. To that end a review of the theoretical literatures on 
insurgency and civil war is next presented. This review will conclude that the differences 
between the two literatures are slight, yet the terms ‘insurgency’ and ‘civil war’ mean 
different things etymologically. This is particularly important when/if foreign leaders decide to 
intervene in another country’s internal war. I conclude by exploring the work of Stathis 
Kalyvas, upon whose work is based the theoretical framework for this thesis: his work 
echoes my observations whilst serving in Helmand province as an army officer.  
 
This will be followed by reviews of the anthropological and historical literatures. Then I will 
discuss my antithesis and thesis, before offering the research methodology, caveats and 
limitations. The chapter will conclude with a brief outline of the rest of the thesis. In sum, this 
first chapter shows where this research sits both theoretically, anthropologically and 
historically, and describes how it was conducted. 
 
                                                          
12
 Rob Johnson, The Afghan Way of War (London, 2011): x & 2. 
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1.1a - Insurgency and civil war 
Insurgency and civil war are generally analysed and written upon by different types of 
people. Insurgency theory primarily derives from the writings of either insurgents or 
counterinsurgents; ergo first or second hand. Civil war theory is mainly written by academics; 
ergo third hand.13 They are looking at the same process from different viewpoints—
insurgents and counterinsurgents generally participate in and study the process from the 
beginning, so even when combatants take control of territory and move in regular 
formations, they are still classified as insurgents, guerrillas or rebels.14 On the other hand, 
civil war scholars usually take a more temporally removed, theoretical viewpoint where 
insurgents are but an expression of the asymmetric stage of the civil war dynamic.15  
 
The etymology of these two terms allows another way of analysing the difference, and offers 
clues as to the different connotations that people draw from them, should they not be well 
versed with the theoretical nuance. The word insurgent is defined in the Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary as a ‘person who rises in active revolt against authority; a rebel, a 
revolutionary [author’s italics]’, and comes from the Latin insurgere, meaning to rise up. A 
civil war is defined in the same dictionary as ‘a war between citizens of the same country’; 
the word civil comes from the Latin civilis, meaning relating to citizens. The word 
‘revolutionary’ firmly associates the practice of insurgency with politics and ideology, whilst 
‘rebel’ bestows the romantic notion of small groups of men fighting for a cause, hopelessly 
outnumbered. The words ‘civil’ and ‘relating to citizens’ imply wars fought between groups 
that are more equal in standing and in form; it is a conflict fought between defined groups 
whereas an insurgency is about forming groups.  
 
There are two crucial differences in the etymologies and their respective evocations. First, 
the concept of legitimacy. Thus, an insurgent will be seen to have a different level of 
legitimacy to the government that he is fighting, either higher or lower. Intuitively, this is 
linked to the degree of preference for the espoused insurgent ideology by an ‘objective’ 
outsider. So, if a western government intervenes to support another government, then the 
insurgents must have a lower legitimacy, by definition; and this may differ from how 
                                                          
13
 Of course, there are academics who write on COIN (see, for example, David Ucko, The New 
Counterinsrugency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars (Washington DC, 2009)), but more widely 
read (i.e. the ‘classics’) are those works by counterinsurgents (for example, David Galula or David Kilcullen, 
discussed later in more detail) or those works by former practitioners of COIN (for example, John Mackinlay or 
John Nagl). Moreover, those insurgency tomes written purely by academics rely heavily on the writings on 
insurgents and counterinsurgents (for example, David Betz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," in The 
International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert Denemark (Oxford: Blackwell Reference, 2010)). Conversely, for 
example, whilst the British Army has a COIN doctrine, it does not have a counter-civil war doctrine. 
14
 Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency (New York, 2009): 79-80. 
15
 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, 2006): 67. 
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members of the population in that country may feel. Conversely, in a civil war, where 
everyone is a citizen, legitimacy of the two sides will be perceived as commensurate, either 
high, or more likely, low. The second difference is that if there is an insurgency, there must 
be a government (‘…against authority’); this need not be the case in a civil war, although it 
usually is. Figure 1 shows a representative spectrum of these differences; the spectrum 
does not list absolute qualities of an insurgency or a civil war, but illustrates those qualities 
that the two types of warfare will tend to, as conceptualised in the expert and non-expert 
mind. 
Figure 1: Spectrum of the etymologically based connotations of the words ‘insurgency’ and ‘civil war’. 
 
The common understanding is that insurgency and civil war are two very different forms of 
conflict, and personal involvement has led insurgents and counterinsurgents to elevate 
insurgency into a separate type of warfare, rather than a different stage of the same conflict, 
as the theory will now demonstrate.  
 
1.1b - Insurgent theorists 
Insurgency is as old as conventional warfare,16 but traditionally they have been studied 
separately.17 Much has been written about insurgency, especially recently,18 and although 
there has been a clear developmental trend in understanding over the last century, the 
theory is neater than the object of study would have us believe. That is the nub of the issue: 
every ‘insurgency’ is different and there is a danger of imposing a generalised narrative on 
specific events. 
                                                          
16
 Here defined as “a form of warfare conducted by using conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics 
between two or more states in open confrontation. The forces on each side are well-defined, and fight using 
weapons that primarily target the opposing army”. 
17
 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London, 2006): 1-3. 
18
 The publication of new US COIN doctrine (US Army, "Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency," (Washington 
DC: Department of the Army, 2006) sparked an almost evangelical rush to rediscover the ‘lost’ tenets of COIN, 
even amongst the general public. 
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Insurgency can be defined as ‘an organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent 
political control, as a challenge to established authority’.19 This is a broad definition that 
covers almost all types of non-interstate warfare—as will be discussed in greater detail when 
insurgency and civil war theory are compared. The final introductory point to make about 
insurgency theory is that much of it is written by counterinsurgents: insurgents generally only 
publish books once they have achieved success, and most insurgencies are unsuccessful.20 
Therefore, special attention will be paid to the work of Lawrence, Mao, Che Guevara and 
Gerry Adams—all insurgents, albeit of different types. These insurgents have been selected 
because they epitomise developments that are pertinent to the ‘insurgency narrative’ 
discussed above: insurgent military tactics, ideology/revolutionary politics, prominent events 
and counterinsurgent overreaction, and the importance of the diaspora safe haven and the 
counterinsurgent’s home population.21 
 
The four insurgents and the methods they espouse are not unique in the literature: the 
military tactics discussed by Lawrence were used, for example, by the Spanish guerrillas in 
the peninsular war of the early 1800s,22 and he emphasises the virtue of propaganda,23 
something one might associate with later writers like David Galula or Mao. Mao, for his part, 
is perhaps the most copied insurgent in the whole of history: his ideology and modus 
operandi were a fortuity in the de-imperialistic cold war context. Che Guevara’s methods 
were considered unsuccessful by many at the time,24 yet his idea of encouraging the people 
to fight through explicit deeds and provoking overreaction has found resonance in 21st 
century terrorism. Furthermore, many other insurgencies are reliant upon these themes, or a 
combination of them: the French maquis used insurgent (military) tactics during the run up to 
Operation Overlord, or D-Day, in 1944, but had no unified ideology save for anti-Nazism;25 
the Tamil Tigers rely (relied?) heavily on their diaspora for supplying funding in their struggle 
for a Tamil homeland, but were less able to use the counterinsurgents’ home population 
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against them;26 conversely, al-Qaeda understood very well the importance of the 
counterinsurgent nation’s home audience and provoking counterinsurgent overreaction.27  
 
Lawrence would most likely not have been successful in China or even Belfast: each of the 
insurgents, and the tactics that they chose to use, were a product of personality and 
conditions. Lawrence, Mao, Guevara and Adams have been chosen as all four developed 
successful insurgencies, and then wrote about their experiences. Their success stems from 
choosing the correct application of strategy and tactics to their idiosyncratic situations. In 
choosing these examples, and those developments outlined by counterinsurgents such as 
David Kilcullen, I will lay the foundations for a modern understanding of insurgency relevant 
to Afghanistan and Helmand. We are unlucky in that 21st century insurgents such a Mullah 
Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, or Osama Bin Laden,28 the late leader of al-Qaeda, 
have not written detailed accounts of their experiences as insurgents.29  
 
Before the 20th century, ‘insurgent’ warfare was seen primarily as a military form of conflict 
and it is only since the 1930s and 1940s that it has been theoretically understood as 
‘revolutionary’ or ‘political’,30 although in practice it has been ‘political’ since Lawrence (see 
below). This is perhaps the result of its separate treatment from conventional warfare, which 
Clausewitz described as ‘a continuation of politics by other means’.31 Arguably, revolutionary 
insurgency is a continuation of war by political means.32 The addition of revolutionary politics 
has allowed insurgency to become much more potent and an offensive form of warfare, 
taking ground and achieving objectives, rather than the defensive form, focussed on 
preventing the enemy taking ground, that Clausewitz saw.33 
 
This addition of politics to insurgency began with perhaps the most influential western 
insurgent theorist of all time34—T E Lawrence—who catalysed Arab forces to defeat the 
Turks during World War 1. In his seminal work, The 27 Articles, he outlined what he saw as 
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the characteristics of insurgents. They were ‘an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, 
without front or back, drifting about like a gas’. In attempting to achieve a political goal 
against a military force, they were going to use ideas to generate power, rather than the 
factories and parade grounds so beloved of conventional commanders: ‘the printing press is 
the greatest weapon in the army of the modern commander’.35 
 
Although he recognised the importance of psychology, and what we would call propaganda, 
T E Lawrence was a British officer and much of his writing focused on military non-
conventional tactics, for example, the composition of raiding parties. Thus, he often 
contrasted himself to Marshal Foch, the French military theorist and general, who had fought 
original, but conventional, battles in Flanders during the period when Lawrence was in the 
desert. Foch advocated massing strength at the critical moment of attack and attempting to 
destroy the enemy army by destroying its will;36 Lawrence, by contrast, saw that: 
 
‘The Arab war should be a war of detachment…not disclosing themselves till the moment 
of attack. This attack need be only nominal, directed not against his men, but against his 
materials: so it should not seek for his main strength or his weaknesses, but for his most 
accessible material. In a railway cutting this would be usually an empty stretch of rail. 




Time was always on the side of the insurgent. Lawrence was advocating what Mao Tse-tung 
would call ‘innumerable gnats biting a giant…[to] ultimately exhaust him’.38 Writing twenty 
years after Lawrence, Mao helped lead the Red Army to victory against the Chinese 
Nationalist government. He put political and psychological action at the heart of his strategy 
and it is hard to overstate Mao’s influence on the theory of insurgency. For him, the first 
fundamental step leading to victory was ‘arousing and organising the people’.39 Whereas 
Lawrence had discussed the political dimensions of guerrilla warfare as being important, for 
Mao it was a sine qua non—the essence of insurgent warfare was revolutionary.40 The 
population was a ‘sea’ and the insurgent was a ‘fish’.41  
 
Mao advocated a three sequentially–phased process in effecting political control over a 
state. First, organisation and consolidation: where political cadres would be formed and sent 
forth to ‘persuade’ and ‘convince’ the populace, attempting to ensure their support for 
insurgent actions. The people would not be forced to support the insurgency.42 Military 
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operations would be sporadic. During the second phase, military activities using insurgent 
tactics would increase including sabotage, assassination and ambush. It is of note that the 
military activities of phase two were entirely contingent on intelligence drawn from the people 
whose support was garnered during the first phase. Whereas Lawrence recognised the 
importance of intelligence,43 he did not explicitly link it to political action in his writings. For 
Mao, political activity was the insurgency and once complete, the political agents could move 
to other areas, restarting the process. Once sufficient military advantage had been obtained, 
the third phase would begin, which was a transitional phase to open warfare and involved 
the establishment of military formations to contest the state conventionally.44  
 
Mao’s writing was so influential that his ideas have shaped tens of movements around the 
world, including in the present era.45 When scholars and practitioners talk about ‘classical’ or 
‘popular’ insurgency, they mean Maoist insurgency.46 Arguably, the Afghan mujahidin 
completed phases one and two fighting against the Soviets, but failed to make the transition 
to conventional war when they tried unsuccessfully to capture Jalalabad from the post-Soviet 
communist regime in 1989. Few manage all three phases and Mao’s success in this was 
down to his relationship with the population.47 Che Guevara was one of the few. 
 
Born in Argentina, Guevara played a pivotal role in the communist insurgency in Cuba. His 
theory of insurgency—foco48—was Maoist in outlook and relied on the support of the 
people.49 The critical difference was that phases one and two were concurrent, or even 
inverted: a group of insurgents could create the conditions for revolution militarily and did not 
need to rely solely on political action for preparatory work.50 Fighting, and leading by 
example, were enough to spark an insurgency, particularly if an oppressive government 
could be provoked to overreact against the population by the foci. 51 This combination of 
military and political action would then lead to Mao’s third phase of a regular conventional 
army challenging the state on its own terms.52  
 
The foco model was put forward by Guevara as the reason for the success of the revolution 
against the US–backed Batista regime in 1959, however some have since argued that the 
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social and political conditions for insurgency already existed in Cuba prior to the start of 
Guevara’s development of foci.53 After a brief period of international diplomacy, Guevara 
tried the foco method of insurgency in the Congo and Bolivia. Both were unsuccessful 
insurgencies and the latter led to his death. The failure can be seen as a vindication of Mao’s 
assertion that ‘the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people’.54 This 
was something that Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, understood 
instinctively. 
 
Irish republicanism has a long history, but by focussing on the period from the 1960s to the 
1990s, developments in insurgency theory clearly stand out. Throughout, the politics of 
freedom from perceived British oppression had been the driver and Adams saw it as the 
basis of support for Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Indeed, following Mao, 
Adams began to represent people on issues—such as social housing—that really mattered 
to them, always presenting them within a republican ideological framework.55 Thus under 
Adams, Sinn Féin became a political party rather than a protest movement. This was 
common to other movements of the era, such as Hezbollah in the southern Lebanon. The 
degree to which armed struggle was seen as a useful way of progressing the ideological 
framework has fluctuated over time: in the period under focus it was once again seen as a 
potential way forward.56 This was particularly true during the ‘troubles’ when, according to 
Adams, the IRA protected Catholic communities from state– or protestant–led ‘pogroms’,57 
and the British Army inflamed nationalist tensions with its deployment to Belfast.58  
 
Adams was a thoroughly modern insurgent, at least to begin with. He held down a job and—
this point is controversial—claims he did not become involved directly in large scale violence 
or murder.59 Certainly, what is uncontested is that as time progressed, Adams became more 
of a politician and less of an insurgent political activist. Whilst members of Sinn Féin and the 
IRA did read and learn from their contemporary Guevara,60 they did not adopt his foco 
strategy. Against a strong, if not always effective, British counterinsurgency effort, the IRA 
came to epitomise the major developments of insurgent groups in the 1970/80s. First, they 
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leveraged the US diaspora for funding and support,61 and second, they attempted to 
influence the home audience of the intervening (British) troops and the global audience, 
particularly through the use of hunger strikes.62 These are major theoretical stepping-stones 
on the way to global insurgency (a point expanded upon in the following section) and were 
also practiced by other contemporaneous groups such as the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation. 
 
Through looking at four insurgents, major developments in insurgency that are potentially 
relevant to the Helmandi conflict, have been traced. First, that of guerrilla military tactics, as 
opposed to conventional military tactics; second, the centrality of ideology as a motivator. 
Third, the role that prominent events and counterinsurgent overreaction can play, and finally, 
the role of diaspora funding and support. These elements all led into the development of 
modern insurgency theory where, due to a lack of insurgent texts, the narrative is authored 
by counterinsurgent theorists. 
  
1.1c - Counterinsurgent theorists 
A study of insurgency would not be complete without considering what counterinsurgents 
have written about the subject as part of their discussion on how to counter the problem. 
Studying counterinsurgent theory allows us to categorise those aspects of insurgency not 
explicitly mentioned by insurgents in their texts. Woven through the writings of the eminent 
theorists Robert Thompson,63 David Galula64 and Frank Kitson65 are descriptions of 
insurgency taken from those they faced in Malaya, Algeria and Kenya during the 1950–60s. 
These countries all faced nationalist insurgencies that took advantage of weakened imperial 
powers66 and, seeking to challenge the status quo, all borrowed elements from Mao’s 
doctrine — at the time, the most effective insurgent doctrine. Thus, insurgency was framed 
as a protracted, internal struggle with a gradual transition—at a time and place of the 
insurgent’s choosing—to war.67 Kitson stated that insurgents must have a cause,68 
sometimes expressed as an ideology, that exploits disenfranchisement or discontent in the 
population and drives the conflict. Galula emphasised the role of propaganda, calling it a 
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‘one sided weapon’ as insurgents could be freer with the truth than the government.69 
According to Thompson, an insurgency is a ‘war for the people’.70 
 
The principles of insurgencies had not altered with the passage of time. Insurgents were 
unlikely to succeed without a wilderness or safe haven out of reach of the 
counterinsurgent.71 They avoided the enemy’s strength, and instead looked to overwhelm 
isolated outposts. As far as possible they relied on superior intelligence for surprise and 
deception.72 Attempts were made to try and provoke the counterinsurgents into an 
overreaction, thus pushing the population closer to the insurgents.73 In line with Mao, the 
insurgents would remain unconventional in form, right until the very end.74 Finally, Kitson 
described the inherent asymmetry between the insurgent and counterinsurgent, in 
organisation, in funding, and in tactics.75 
 
This classical understanding of insurgency forms the basis of current thinking. But as the 
world has changed since the mid-20th century, so too has insurgency: globalisation has led 
to global insurgents with global objectives. Improvements in transport and communications 
coupled with (perceived) cultural homogenisation and changes in the international economic 
system have driven adaptations to the Maoist model.76 Yet following the precepts of classical 
insurgency, the centre of gravity for the insurgent is still the population and the insurgent 
campaign. Except now, the population and the cause are now transnational.77  
 
Mao’s precepts have been updated for the modern world, to the extent that global insurgents 
are referred to by Mackinlay as post-Maoist insurgents.78 The innovation of worldwide, 24hr 
media has allowed the insurgent to appeal directly to his (global) audience, particularly 
through terrorism of the deed.79 A safe haven is still vital, but now it may be virtual.80 The 
internet is used to link up the same cellular structure advocated by Mao, except that the cells 
are in different countries around the world. It is interesting that global insurgents have taken 
the central tenet of Guevara’s failed theory—that of creating the conditions for revolution 
through direct action—and applied it in the modern world using mass media (the obvious 
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example of this is the al-Qaeda attack of 11 September 2001). Like Maoist insurgencies, 
they are seeking to challenge the status quo, but on a global scale. According to Kilcullen 
and Mackinlay, so-called revisionist counterinsurgents,81 global insurgency exists alongside 
lots of smaller, national, popular insurgencies, which it feeds and finances. 82 This makes it 
an order of magnitude more difficult to counter: the degree of cooperation required to defeat 
traditional national Maoist insurgencies is not currently possible across several countries at 
once.83  
 
Further complicating the issue is a development articulated by David Kilcullen in his highly 
insightful book, The Accidental Guerrilla. Whereas Maoist and post-Maoist insurgents all 
seek to challenge the status quo, accidental guerrillas seek to maintain it—in old parlance 
they are resistance movements. The difference is that here, foreign occupation84 of a country 
to counter a globalised insurgent threat (for example, the 2001 US intervention in 
Afghanistan) causes the local population to react negatively and form an insurgency.85 This 
can lead to a curious role reversal where the insurgent is no longer able to initiate the start of 
hostilities to a time and place of his choosing—that honour is given to the counterinsurgent 
who provokes the insurgent into fighting by invading.86  
 
Insurgency theory is still evolving. In his 2009 book of the same name, Mackinlay describes 
the rise of the ‘insurgent archipelago’. To the categories of global insurgent (al-Qaeda) and 
popular insurgent (Mao’s Red Army) he adds feral militias (many of the extant groups 
operating in Somalia). These are largely the product of state collapse,87 and can be seen as 
the reassertion of de facto local control, often against the backdrop of state predation on the 
population. In the absence of the state, and contrary to popular and global insurgencies, 
feral militias could control territory permanently. They can be organised along tribal, ethnic, 
sectarian or political lines (that is, they are linked to a political party) and differ, critically, from 
the other two types of insurgency in that they can be apolitical.88  
 
At this stage insurgency theory broadens to such an extent that it includes phenomena that 
are not traditionally considered insurgencies. There are two key distinctions. Firstly, with 
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feral militias, included are groups that attempt to prevent political control rather than to effect 
it, for example in the face of government corruption or oppression, or to re-establish de facto 
local control in the face of government weakness. They may not be seeking to overthrow the 
government (effect political control) or follow the Maoist revolutionary ideal (cf. insurgent 
definition: ‘person who rises in active revolt against authority; a rebel, a revolutionary 
[author’s italics]’). Secondly, feral militias, even when fighting each other and when neither 
side is fighting the government, are still categorised as an insurgency. All—popular and 
global insurgencies, and feral militias—are described in terms of their effect on, and 
relationship with, the state. And worryingly for the scholar, all three types of insurgency can 
coexist temporally and spatially.89 
 
Insurgency scholarship, pursued either from the point of view of the insurgent or 
counterinsurgent, has focused on the modes of insurgency, although as discussed above, 
the modern debate is conceptually confused. By contrast, key civil war scholarship has 
tended to focus on the causes of civil war from a third-party, academic point of view, often to 
inform third-party policy makers considering intervention. Arguably civil war theory offers 
more explanatory power than the insurgency literature when seeking to understand the 
Helmandi conflict. 
 
1.1d - Civil war theory 
Civil wars—intrastate wars—have been written about for as long as there have been states. 
During the 20th century, numerous viewpoints have proliferated on the causes of civil war, 
mostly based on juxtaposed dichotomies: the literature pertaining to civil wars is much more 
contested than that dealing strictly with insurgency. For clarity, civil war is defined as ‘combat 
within the boundaries of a recognised sovereign entity between parties subject to common 
authority at the start of the conflict, entailing a de facto territorial division’.90 Others have 
specified the number of deaths that must be involved, and that both sides must suffer 
casualties. These strict criteria have been applied in order to structure quantitative 
analysis.91 This thesis is qualitative, thus Kalyvas’ definition is adequate—it is intrastate 
warfare. 
 
First among the explanations for civil wars, and perhaps the most intuitive, is that conflicts 
are driven by primordial desires; that is, groups of humans are linked psychologically to 
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certain features of their environment, chiefly territory.92 This idea finds its basis in hunter–
gatherers defending territory from raiding parties.93 Much later, with the rise of the concepts 
of ethnicities and cultures, theorists talk of ancient hatreds of other groups of humans, 
guided by perceived histories.94 Both espouse something understood by all: we are ‘Us’ and 
they are ‘Them’.95 The intuitive nature of these explanations is what makes them so popular, 
particularly in the West, where narratives about more primitive, less civilised (other) people 
are still prevalent.96 And whilst history is an excellent guide to the present, particularly when 
analysing group dynamics, human groups, including ethnic ones, are not fixed, but highly 
flexible.97 Moreover, links to territory can be redefined.98  
 
These psychological, sociological and anthropological analyses have been rightly challenged 
by a substantial body of economic analysis. 
 
Of these, the most influential were a controversial series of papers written by two 
economists, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, who attempted to model quantitatively the 
causes of civil war.99 They argued that a ‘useful conceptual distinction in understanding the 
motivation of civil war is that between greed and grievance’,100 and used statistical proxies 
such as GDP/capita derived from primary exports or ethnic and linguistic factionalism, to 
model for greed or grievance (respectively). Greed, in their original analysis, referred to 
economic factors that might motivate non-state actors such as control of natural resources 
and opportunity to loot. Grievance represented those factors similar to, and developed from, 
the ancient hatreds explanation, such as ethnic or religious divisions in society and political 
repression or inequality.101 Their findings were clear: greed statistically outperformed 
grievance as a cause of civil war.102  
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According to Mats Berdal, this body of work had a profound impact on international policy 
making, largely because it simplified what had previously been intractable ‘ethnic’ issues into 
manageable policy challenges.103 Collier and Hoeffler’s work sparked a vast debate in the 
literature that argued, among other things, that the proxies for greed and grievance were 
inadequately chosen and could be conceptually mistaken for each other, including confusing 
correlation and causation.104 More broadly, and as any statistician will tell you, a model is 
only as good as the data that is used, and in the third world economic data is often absent, 
incomplete or biased.105 Critically though, they were trying to model that most human event, 
war, with statistical methods based on Gaussian (normal) probability distribution, yet human 
events do not respond well to this treatment due to having extreme (that is, dominated by 
outliers), rather than normal, distributions.106  
 
The ahistorical quantitative approach has considerable limitations when it comes to 
explaining the causes of civil war. Some of the expressed criticisms were recognised by 
Collier and Hoeffler and the theory was later modified with greed becoming the (economic) 
feasibility of rebellion. Where economically feasible, for example leaders could afford to pay 
rebel fighters, rebellion would occur.107 This has been expanded upon by some authors108 
and rejected by others,109 but even previously critical authors have pointed to the clarifying 
effect Collier et al’s work has had on the field of civil war research.110 Scholars, rather than 
advocating ‘greed’ or ‘ancient hatreds’ presaging conflict, now advocate ‘rationality’ or 
‘identity’ based arguments. And although the genesis of these arguments predate the 
quantitative analysis of the late 1990s and early 2000s, that same analysis helped reinforce 
scholars’ acceptance of rationality and identity as the two dichotomous viewpoints through 
which different theories of civil wars are now articulated. 
 
Rationality–based theorists of war argue that even extreme events such as genocide can be 
explained rationally. Their arguments are based on economic rational choice theory where 
individual actors are all free to make rational choices based on the evidence presented to 
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them.111 Rationalist explanations for civil war abound in the literature,112 and seek to explain 
a central dilemma: in rational terms, why would anyone go to war, when war entails 
destruction and an almost certain loss of utility (wealth), even for the victor? Two possible 
reasons will be discussed here, in addition to the obvious solution, that embarking on a 
particular war will give the instigator a clear and obvious advantage in terms of spoils. One 
explanation is inter-group and the other intra-group: that of the security dilemma and that of 
the predatory elite.  
 
The security dilemma theory states that groups will start conflicts with other groups because 
of fears about the future.113 These fears can stem from several sources, but usually include 
incomplete information about the other group’s strength or intentions114 and problems of 
‘credible commitment’ where a negotiated settlement has been reached that at least one 
side does not have the perceived ability to enforce.115 Predatory elite (also called elite 
manipulation) theorists argue that civil wars are caused by leaders who incite violence for 
their own (domestic) ends. In this scenario, identity, or ethnic/religious factors, are used by 
leaders as motivators or exacerbators in the achievement of rational goals.116 
 
The identity-driven approach to civil war finds its roots in the ancient hatreds argument. That 
is, groups go to war because of their identity, often defined in terms of relationships with, and 
fear of, other groups. Thus, even in the absence of contemporaneous evidence to the 
contrary, group fear narratives of previous persecution at the hands of another group may be 
enough to start a conflict.117 This concept was brilliantly developed by Stuart Kaufman in his 
2001 book Modern Hatreds. In it, he argues that ‘people make political choices based on 
emotion and in response to symbols’.118 Kaufman’s work is refreshing in that he cites a 
number of interdependent causes for civil war. His previous work had focused on the 
interplay between ancient hatreds, security dilemmas and elite manipulation (that is, one 
identity– and two rationality–based drivers for civil war).119 In Modern Hatreds, he focuses on 
the relationship between the symbols and myths that define ethnicity and the ways in which 
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those myths are evoked to mobilise groups. He then identifies foundational factors for civil 
war drawn from across the literature: the presence of myths justifying hostility, fear of group 
extermination and the opportunity to mobilise.  
 
To Kaufman, ethnic groups are flexible entities, and myths and symbols are factors that help 
keep them coherent, especially so if they define a group in contrast to another group. Myths 
(and symbols) are particularly potent when they justify hostility to another group, and when 
imbued with ethnic chauvinism (that is, my group is better than yours). They can be recast 
by leaders, however this takes time and is unlikely to immediately precede violence.120 An 
ethnic group’s fear of extermination, or of serious threat, is what justifies their extreme 
demands for self-defensive measures—including going to war. These security dilemma-like 
fears are often founded on demographic threats (e.g. Israel), mixed settlement patterns (e.g. 
Northern Ireland) or previous persecution or domination by another group (e.g. Iraq). Thus, 
we can see that there is a key inter-reliance between myths (which may define the fear) and 
fear of extermination (which rely on the group coherency and shared history defined by the 
myths).121 Myths and fear of extermination, and the relationship between them, are key 
mechanisms of ethnic mobilisation leading to war, but if that mobilisation is to be realised, 
then groups require opportunity.  
 
Whilst not explicitly acknowledged in Modern Hatreds, the opportunity argument appears 
similar in form to Collier’s feasibility argument—that of having enough money for weapons or 
salaries. But it is also further developed by the addition of factors like the removal of political 
repression or a monopoly of violence, thus allowing violent mobilisation. Thus, these factors 
can combine to become a mass-led mobilisation, or, in a scenario where particular leaders 
arise that are able or willing to manipulate the situation, an elite-led scenario.122 Analyses, 
such as Kaufman’s, that bring together identity and rationality, are important as both schools 
have their conceptual weaknesses. Solely rationality–based approaches are insufficient as 
they often rely on group cohesion and group norms that are defined by identity,123 and solely 
identity–based approaches largely fail to account for situations where ethnic polarisation 
exists in peaceful communities.124 Concepts such as fear are appropriated by both sides, 
either as an ethnic fear (identity),125 or as a security dilemma (rational).126  
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In comparing these approaches, one is reminded of the ‘Nature versus Nurture’ debate 
coined in Victorian times: the question of whether a trait in a human (e.g. height) owes more 
to innate qualities (genes) or to upbringing (environment). In modern times, this debate has 
been resolved through the basic idea that a trait is caused by genetic variation plus 
environmental variation plus (genetic times environmental variation), or, Trait = G + E + (G x 
E).127 Because of the interdependence, biologists still struggle to quantify the causes of most 
traits; it seems intuitive that the causes of civil war, identity and rationality, or greed and 
grievance, will similarly interact to produce violence. Understanding that it might be an 
interaction between factors that was important is a key conceptual leap that echoed my 
previous experiences in Helmand as an Army officer. I return to the issue of interactions 
between factors below. 
 
However, it is perhaps for these conceptual difficulties that scholars have begun to look at 
different approaches to understanding civil war. The new millennium signalled a change in 
scholarship from macro-level scale studies of violence—as described above with respect to 
insurgencies and civil wars—to an ever-decreasing scale. A key mechanism has been to 
study the application of violence in itself, and not just as an obvious consequence of civil 
wars.128 Jeremy Weinstein, for example, has found that differing levels of violence can be 
attributed to the initial conditions that confront ‘rebel’ leaders.129 Thus, for example, those 
groups with external funding will use more violence against civilians in their area of control, 
as the funding weakens the link between combatants and populace.130 Or, groups that rely 
on the same geographical pool of resources as rival groups (including the state) will tend to 
use greater violence against civilians: contested areas experience more violence.131 
Developing these ideas, and combining them with a micro-approach to data collection, has 
brought fascinating insights, not least that by Stathis Kalyvas in The Logic of Violence in Civil 
War. 
 
In the preceding analysis, civil war has largely been discussed in terms of its grand, macro, 
public narratives, however the literature is replete with case studies of the private, intra-
societal cleavages that characterise any dispute.132 This thesis, with detailed local oral data 
collection, will also provide information on private cleavages, or local politics, in Helmand, 
yet the war in Afghanistan is characterised by many in the West (and seemingly their Afghan 
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clients) through the rival ideologies of westernised and modern values Islamic and traditional 
values.133 In his book, Kalyvas argues that identifying clear political groups and their 
ideologies ‘fails to match the vast complexity, fluidity and ambiguity that one encounters on 
the ground’.134 He goes further to argue that studying violence allows us to analyse the 
interaction between public (strategic/ideological) and private (micro/local) causes of civil 
war.135 It is a confluence of economics, politics and sociology at the public level, with 
anthropology and micro-history at the private level. This idea of an interaction between 
public, ideological factors and private, personal narratives matched closely my observations 
of the conflict from serving in Helmand. For example, the Afghan government militia leader 
who abuses his position and annexes a neighbour’s land is utilising ‘public’ resources, for his 
own ‘private’ gain. 
 
Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence argues that there is a privatisation of the politics of war, 
through the role of denunciations and collaborations that are driven by interpersonal 
cleavages.136 Thus, individuals will exploit armed groups and their ideologies to settle their 
personal scores and gain resources, and armed groups will exploit local individuals and their 
grievances in order to mobilise fighters and gather information.137 This leads to the key 
question—where does the locus of agency lie? Or, as Kalyvas quotes Lenin, ‘Who [is using] 
whom?’138 This realisation throws into sharp relief previous discussions about identity versus 
rationality: they may be counterproductive and unsolvable, because both approaches may 
be true at the same time at different levels. Thus, grand labels, whether ideological or ethnic, 
do not fit at all at the micro level, and local grievances are irrelevant at the strategic level.139 
Kalyvas concludes that the focus of study should be the interaction, or ‘alliance’, between 
the levels.140 This alliance, driven by mutual interest, shapes the violence. Furthermore, the 
phenomenon of fluid or shifting allegiances is caused by overlapping labels, from different 
levels of the conflict, being applied at the local level.141 Civil wars, he concludes, are a 
mosaic of discrete mini-wars.142 Kalyvas’ arguments will be discussed further below and 
used to develop my own theoretical framework around which the oral history data is 
organised in this thesis. 
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So far, insurgency and civil war have been treated separately. From the broad definitions, 
‘an organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to 
established authority’ (insurgency) and ‘combat within the boundaries of a recognised 
sovereign entity between parties subject to common authority at the start of the conflict, 
entailing a de facto territorial division’ (civil war), there is little to differentiate them. Yet, the 
authorship is different, the etymology and common understandings are different, and the 
theoretical understandings are different—this will be explored in the next section. 
 
1.1e - Insurgency versus civil war 
Insurgency and civil war are the two major strands of intrastate conflict scholarship. Careful 
study of the literature reveals that there is common acceptance of the slight theoretical 
difference between the two, but this difference does not align with the semantic perception 
that they are different types of war. Theoretically they belong to the same type of warfare. 
The semantic perception discussed above (see figure 1) potentially stems from the separate 
authorship of the two strands in the literature: Mao was an insurgent,143 Yugoslavia faced a 
civil war in the 1990s;144 Kilcullen writes about insurgencies, Kalyvas about civil wars. Even 
when both schools of work misappropriate each other’s terminology, this is still the case.145  
 
Insurgency is a military tactic or stage of civil (intrastate) warfare caused by an inherent 
asymmetry of power and means, and the causal factors of both are the same. Politics and 
ideology can be used as methods to overcome that asymmetry, or not. As Mao described it, 
guerrilla bands would come together to form an ‘orthodox establishment capable of engaging 
the enemy in conventional battle’ (his third stage).146 Galula states that ‘an insurgency is a 
civil war’ with the difference being the ‘form’ which the war takes.147 Guevara talks of 
practicing civil war in a similar way to Mao, with a progression from ‘guerrilla’ to ‘regular’.148 
Mackinlay, a modern insurgency scholar, talks of a ‘rash of civil wars…using quite different 
insurgent strategies’.149  
 
This is echoed in the civil war literature: James Fearon, a renowned rationality theorist, 
states clearly ‘insurgency is a technology of military conflict characterised by small, lightly 
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armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas’.150 Kalyvas states that ‘the 
insurgents are the first movers…imposing the tactics to be used’.151 Thus, insurgency is 
merely that stage of war where ‘insurgent’ tactics are used as a product of military 
asymmetry and is not its own type of war, and while politics can be used as a tool to 
overcome opposed military might in an insurgency, they do not alter that fact that it is still a 
civil war. What has obscured the issue is the Maoist addition of politics into the insurgency 
literature, thus leading scholars to classify it as another type of war, but politics and ideology 
do not need to be present or adhered to for there to be insurgency.  
 
The domination of insurgency theory by the Maoist ideal (vide definition of insurgency ‘… 
political control [author’s italics]’) is further conflated with the inclusion of new types of 
insurgency—such as feral militias, phenomena that appear at first glance to belong to the 
civil war literature rather than the insurgency literature—leading to confusion. They often 
hold ground, and two feral militias can be opposed without one of them being the 
government. The expansion of the definition of insurgency led by Mackinlay has clouded its 
distinction with civil war and confuses the conceptual space: the inclusion of feral militias 
(and clan rivalries in some doctrines)152 conflates those groups that wish to effect political 
control with those that seek to prevent it. This is dangerous as any given counter would not 
be suitable for both: that is, is protecting the population the best approach when the 
population want to be left alone? Only when one considers (political or non-political) 
insurgency as a tactic of civil war (that is, a subset), and consider Mackinlay’s additions as 
aberrations more relevant to civil wars than insurgency, does clarity prevail. 
 
However, if civil war and insurgency are differing manifestations or stages of the same 
phenomenon, and share the same causes, then it is worth asking in the context of this thesis 
whether it matters if a conflict is classified as an insurgency or a civil war. Surely the strategy 
for countering such violence and neutralising the causes would be the same? Theoretically 
yes, but semantically there are two crucial differences. Firstly, the equality of legitimacy 
between the two sides is different in the two constructs (see figure 1). Secondly, insurgency 
suggests an ideologically driven armed opposition to a government, as opposed to micro-
conflicts and intergroup dynamics that are nothing to do with the government, driving the 
violence. These etymological subtleties mask a nuance that does not yet exist in theory and 
argue for more developed countering strategies. 
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The difference is important: policy makers do not have the time or inclination to analyse 
theoretical differences, but, arguably, do use different thresholds for intervention in a civil 
war vice intervening in an insurgency, all other things being equal.153 Even if a truly 
Machiavellian viewpoint is taken and it is argued that governments drive foreign 
interventions for their own geo-strategic reasons, a post-facto description (civil war or 
insurgency) is still used to shape domestic and international support for said intervention. 
This is the same as the freedom fighter versus insurgent argument outlined at the beginning 
of the chapter, and centres on the concept of legitimacy: an intervening state may want to be 
seen to be taking action against an insurgency, but not taking sides in a civil war. 
 
If a war is prosecuted according to its mischaracterised or incorrect post-facto label (that is, it 
were treated as if it were an insurgency, when it is in fact a multi-focal civil war), then this 
creates the potential for the non-achievement of the intervention’s aims. This could be 
because the intervening forces misattribute the violence that they observe to an (Maoist) 
insurgency rather than to a civil war between many groups, and any countering strategies 
employed will be misconstrued. This theme will be returned to in the conclusions. 
 
1.1f – Theory versus intuition 
So what of the Helmandi conflict? My experiences there did not fit the paradigm of 
insurgency at all, particularly the central importance of politics or ideology in insurgencies. 
Whilst the Taliban are an overtly political and ideological movement, the ‘Taliban’ fighting on 
the ground fought for personal reasons—often to keep the police from stealing their opium. 
The police, on the other hand, were not overly imbued with democratic fervour—many of 
them openly laughed when we had to organise special procedures so that women could vote 
in the 2009 elections in Nad-e Ali—but were fighting too for personal reasons: they had been 
pushed out of their villages, for example. These examples will be discussed in chapters 4-6. 
 
The civil war literature, with its narrative of group-on-group conflict, is a much better fit. 
Whether motivated by greed (Helmand is a major opium producer), grievance (Helmand is a 
hyper-factionalised society) or ancient hatreds (the inter-tribal dispute between the Alizai and 
the Barakzai has been going on for at least two hundred years), the idea of equally 
legitimate groups fighting each other was much more commensurate with my experiences. 
But, it is the combination of elements of the two offered by Kalyvas that is especially 
appealing in terms of explanatory power: the Taliban and the Afghan government do offer 
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ideologies and resources to individuals and groups, yet the violence appeared to me to be 
driven at a low level. It is this interaction of the two, as theorised by Kalyvas, that forms the 
basis of the framework outlined below (see section 1.5). 
 
Whereas section 1.1 has considered the theoretical literature in detail, sections 1.2 and 1.3 
will consider elements of the anthropological and historical literatures necessary for the 
conceptual and factual ‘ground-clearing’ that is appropriate for a study of this type. These 
literatures will increase the explanatory power of my analysis by helping in the categorisation 
of events according to the theoretical framework described below. Firstly, I will look concisely 
at the cyclical nature of Pushtun society at war. This will be followed by a brief précis of pre-
1978 Helmandi history. Readers who wish for a more detailed discussion of Helmand’s 
history from 661-1978 are advised to read my A brief history of Helmand154 published in 
2011, or the excellent paper by Rob Johnson, Managing Helmand Province: From Bost to 
Bastion, published in 2012.155  
 
1.2 - Pushtun society at war 
Pushtun society can be succinctly described through a trinity of lenses—those of tribal 
power, state power and religious power (hereafter ‘tribe’, ‘state’ and ‘mosque’).156 These 
power centres are represented at all levels of society. For example, within a village three of 
the most influential people will be the tribal leader (patriarch of a genealogy), the mullah and 
the malik (government representative). Similarly, the tribesman will ideally have access to 
three different types of dispute resolution: that of the tribal jirga governed under 
pushtunwali,157 that of Islamic sharia, or for serious crimes, the secular, institutional justice 
offered by the state. The three power centres, or lenses, exist in equilibrium and exert 
different, and often competing, pulls on the individual tribesman.158 
 
This equilibrium is an ideal. Scholars consistently emphasise that Afghanistan is 
experiencing great change, and the balance between the three power centres is in upset. 
This was commented on in 1970 by Leon Poullada,159 as in the most recent era by Thomas 
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Barfield,160 but actually the idea of flux is repeatedly mentioned in the literature: vide the 
British sources discussing the tribal rebellion of the Alizai in Helmand in 1923161 or the much 
better documented overthrow of Amanullah in 1929.162 This appears to be a paradox: great 
change, yet a tripartite ideal dividing power that has had remarkable steadfastness over the 
years. The reality is one of constant flux: when scholars look at any particular era in detail 
they often observe and comment upon the struggle between tribe, state and mosque, yet at 
a less detailed chronological scale, one can see the movements in Pashtun society, either 
towards or away from, but always around, this ideal. 
 
Louis Dupree, when talking about the balance between tribe and state, described a process 
of fusion and fission as tribes (or small genealogical units) broke up or aggregated 
depending upon each one’s particular military context.163 This context could be internal to 
Pushtun society, perhaps driven by competition between lineages, or even cousins. Cousin 
warfare is exceptionally common among the Pushtun, so much so that the word for enmity is 
‘cousiness’ (turborwali). This is mainly caused by a lack of primogeniture in Pushtun society 
such that patriarchal first cousins violently contest their grandfather’s land inheritance.164 
Thus, the importance of land in Pushtun society cannot be overstated. Alternatively, the 
military context driving this fusion and fission could be external, caused by perhaps the 
invasion of a foreign enemy. At this, authors have commented, the ‘tribes’ are said to unite in 
the face of the outsider.165 But there is a subtler process going on as well, not often 
described: that is, those internal fissures in Pashtun society are exacerbated by the 
presence of outsiders because the internal factions jockey for support from the outsiders in 
order to help them prosecute their local conflict, say, a land dispute with another clan.166 
 
These are the processes of fusion and fission: external intervention exacerbates both of 
them. That is, tribes will unite, often under religious leadership, to fight wars and battles 
against an external enemy, but at the same time, some Pashtun factions will be nearer to the 
outsider than others, causing further disunity. These centrifugal and centripetal processes 
are often depicted in the same source,167 making it difficult for the scholar to define trends: 
the key difficulty is identifying whether a Pashtun leader (and the group that he currently 
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leads) will react to an external intervener by aggregating with other Pashtun leaders (their 
differences temporarily buried) or by aggregating with the outsiders (to bring pressure to 
bear on his enemies within Pashtun society). The balance between the two forces rests on 
the individual leader’s micro-personal history and his relationship with the wider societal 
context in which he lives, from village to nation state. And of course, that wider societal 
context changes as other Pashtun leaders make their own calculations and choices. These 
processes, and the difficulties of outsiders determining their true course, are writ large in this 
thesis. 
 
The question arises of whether these power centres and processes can amalgamate in a 
long-term process of state building (here I am using the term state to mean nation state, 
rather than meaning government as I have used it in the previous paragraphs). This has 
occurred in other countries, through various means. England, for example, although 
detribalised a millennium ago, united church and state during the time of Henry VIII. The 
English monarch is still the Defender of the Faith. In Afghanistan, there have been periods 
where the a similar fusion has occurred, for instance during Zahir Shah’s reign in the 
twentieth century, when the Mujaddidi family of religious leaders married into the Royal 
lineage, enhancing stability (I accept that the two examples are not strictly comparable due 
to the non-unitary nature of Afghanistan’s religious sphere, compared to the Church of 
England).168  
 
Afghanistan is currently enduring processes of fusion and fission: tribal, religious and 
state.169 This has been occurring since 1978, the starting point for this thesis, and has been 
caused by the multiple foreign interventions over the period, and the resulting conflict(s). The 
violence is both an outcome of the dynamics, and a cause: it, itself, has a communicative 
property within the society. To counter this, there have been formal attempts over the last 
thirty-four years of conflict at ‘rebalancing’ Afghan and Pushtun society, some more sincere 
than others. Take, for example, the process of the national Loya Jirgas (big councils) 
enacted in Kabul every so often. Frequently used by Afghan rulers to legitimise their 
imposed decisions, the Loya Jirgas of 2002 appeared, at the time, to be the beginning of a 
period of equilibrium.170 On a smaller scale, the three periods of Helmandi tribal 
rapprochement documented for the first time in this thesis point to a similar process: the 
most recent of these was in 2012 (and is still continuing), the outcome yet undetermined.  
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Lastly, it is appropriate to discuss the concept of, and processes surrounding, warlordism. 
Antonio Giustozzi sees this as part of the process of state building. His definition focusses 
on those military leaders who have risen to warlord status by exerting political power in the 
areas that they control by dint of being the most powerful military leader.171 This is a very apt 
definition when one considers some of the leaders in Helmand (particularly in chapter 4). 
These mini-states fulfil the role of the traditional state in the tripartite equilibrium mentioned 
above, yet the leader may originally have been a religious leader, or a tribal leader—thus 
two of the power centres may overlap. Authors sometimes treat the rise of warlordism in 
Afghanistan as a new phenomenon,172 when actually it is an age-old process and merely 
represents the modern description of the rise of new leaders—often using religious or tribal 
networks—into positions of political, quasi-state power. 
 
Take, for example, the Alizai, the major tribe in northern Helmand. There, Akhtur Khan (a 
religious leader), and Abu Bakr Khan (a tribal leader), who led the Alizai against the British in 
the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars respectively, rose to prominence and led the Alizai, 
usurping the ‘traditional’ tribal leadership.173 Neither however, was subsumed into, or co-
opted by, the state, although arguably, as per the above definition, they were warlords. And 
in the modern era Nasim Akhundzada rose from clerical status to become the primus inter 
pares in the Alizai leadership in the 1980s.174 His brothers, who inherited the dynasty, 
became the provincial governors of Helmand. It is clear from our definition that Nasim was a 
warlord, as were his brothers, even though they had very different relationships with the 
state. More confusing is his nephew, Sher Mohammad, who, as shown in this thesis, is both 
part of the Afghan state as a Senator, whilst simultaneously working against them with the 
Taliban (chapters 5 and 6). Yet, arguably, in northern Helmand he is still a warlord, as a 
politico-military leader. These examples will be explored further throughout the thesis. 
 
In conclusion, this brief discussion of Pushtun society has outlined the tribe, state and 
mosque tripartite equilibrium and the inherent processes of fusion and fission, much 
exacerbated by external interventions. The central importance of land was emphasised and 
warlordism was discussed in the context of state building. All of these elements show us that 
Pushtun society (particularly rural society, such as Helmand’s) is remarkably resilient when 
viewed over the long term. I now go onto discuss the pre-1978 history of Helmand, where 
these structures and processes are clearly evident. 
                                                          
171
 Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Dynamics of Warlordism in Afghanistan, 1980-2007 (London, 2009): 2, 5-
6. 
172
 Ana Pejcinova, "Post-Modernizing Afghanistan" CEU Political Science Journal, no. 05 (2006): 38-40; Seth 
Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad" International Security 32, no. 4 (2008). 
173
 Mike Martin, A brief history of Helmand (Warminster, 2011): 16 & 18. 
174
 See chapter 2. 
 
47 
© Mike Martin 2013 
1.3 - Pre-1978 Helmandi history 
In 1731 a Persian King, Nadir Shah, defeated the Durrani (the Pushtun tribal confederation 
indigenous to Helmand) in Herat. He then incorporated them into his army, and in 1737 
captured Kandahar from the Ghilzai, another Pushtun tribal confederation.175  For their 
service, Nadir Shah granted the Durrani the lands they occupy in modern Helmand and 
Kandahar. The land grants were allocated according to the size of the kinship groups and 
given on condition of providing men for military service—‘a horseman for every plough’. 
Thus, for example, the Alikozai had to give eight hundred and fifty horsemen annually and 
the Barakzai nine hundred and seven.176  
 
Otherwise, they were not taxed: in fact, they received plunder from foreign expeditions 
commensurate with the number of men provided to the king (that is, how much they could 
carry back). The land grants enshrined and strengthened the hierarchical—rutbavi—social 
structures that the Durranis enjoy. Everything that has happened since to land ownership in 
Helmand is seen as an aberration from the status quo established at that time. 
 
Ahmad Shah (Popalzai), Nadir’s successor, established hereditary government positions as 
a way of reflecting tribes’ power relative to their size—a de jure recognition of their de facto 
power—and massively expanded the new ‘Afghan’ state. In this way the Barakzai, as the 
most powerful Durrani tribe, secured the understanding that they would always be ministers 
to the Popalzai crown, and possess the best land in central Helmand on the alluvial plains of 
four rivers.177 As loyal and important servants to the crown, it is not a coincidence that 
Gereshk, a strategic crossing point on the major fluvial barrier between Herat and Kandahar, 
is held by the Barakzai.  
 
Unfortunately, Ahmad Shah’s death in 1772 led to weaker rulers and successional struggles, 
and eventually allowed a Barakzai dynasty, led by Dost Mohammad, to usurp the Popalzai 
throne in 1826.178 This was key for Helmand: there are very few Popalzai in Helmand, and 
so the monarchy had treated the Helmandi tribes in an equal manner. Following the 
Barakzai takeover, the monarchy was drawn from one of the biggest tribal groups in 
Helmand leading to the Alizai-Barakzai rivalry that still dominates Helmandi politics today. 
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Dost Mohammad instituted harsh tax collection on the Alizai, the northern Helmandi tribe, 
using Barakzai tax collectors.179 This regime was brought to a close by the British 
intervention of 1839, which was an attempt to limit Russian influence by re-installing the 
previous Popalzai dynasty under Shah Shuja. At that time, both Kandahar and Gereshk 
were governed by brothers of Dost Mohammad. Once Kandahar fell to the British in April, 
the governors fled to the family home in Gereshk and a British brigade was dispatched in an 
abortive attempt to capture them, before leaving some months later.180  
 
Shah Shuja, however, kept the previous Barakzai tax collectors on, and one of them was 
killed by Alizai tribesmen in May 1840. Failing to understand that they were embroiled in a 
local fight, the British supported the Barakzai, beginning the Alizai-British conflict. 
Subsequently, there was outright Alizai rebellion led by Akhtur Khan, who eventually 
captured Gereshk with six thousand men.181 Akhtur Khan is remembered to this day as a 
hero by the Alizai. He was then driven off by British forces who then launched punitive 
expeditions into Alizai areas. Eventually, the British intervention collapsed and Dost 
Mohammad was reinstated to the throne, with a later British subsidy starting in 1857. This 
reinforced the Barakzai position in Helmand.  
 
Again, in November 1878, British forces invaded Afghanistan over fears of Russian 
influence. Kandahar was occupied, as was Gereshk, albeit briefly, but not briefly enough. 
The Alizai mobilised fifteen hundred men and attacked the British as they were withdrawing 
from Gereshk in February 1879—the Alizai memories of the 1840s were still fresh. Shortly 
after, the British were forced to reoccupy Gereshk to defend Kandahar from Ayub, a 
pretender to the Afghan throne, based in Herat.182  
 
This led to the Battle of Maiwand in July 1880 and a crushing defeat for the British. This was 
administered at the hand of Ayub, ably supported by Abu Bakr Khan, another Alizai leader, 
who mobilised three thousand Helmandi men.183 The Battle of Maiwand is a key story in 
Helmand, and Helmandis will tell you proudly that their ‘grandfather’ fought against the 
British. Abu Bakr Khan, as well, is seen as a hero by the Alizai, and to a lesser degree by the 
Noorzai and Barakzai.184 The British left Afghanistan again leaving the Barakzai Abdur 
Rahman on the throne with another subsidy.  
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Abdur Rahman campaigned in Helmand and Abu Bakr was beaten and exiled, and the Alizai 
began paying tax.185 Elements of the Ishaqzai and the Noorzai were banished to Turkestan, 
in the north-west. Stability reigned until the death of Abdur Rahman’s son, Habibullah, in 
1919, which saw full independence from the British who had previously controlled Afghan 
foreign policy. The end of the British stipend meant that Amanullah, the new king, had to rely 
on conscription to maintain his army.186  
 
Amanullah also sought great reform of Helmandi society—banning the sale of women to 
settle debts, for example—and the Alizai rose in rebellion in 1923.187 Further rebellions, 
related to the scale of state intrusion into the polity (in this case compulsory education), 
broke out under Nadir and Zahir Shah, the subsequent monarchs, before they began to 
implement reforms at a slower pace and with appropriate care taken over the centre-
periphery balance. Helmand then entered a forty-year golden era of peace. 
 
The government, at first on their own, and later with increasing levels of American support, 
began to build canals in Helmand starting with the Nahr-e Bughra from Gereshk down to 
Marjeh. This canal allowed the reclaiming and settling of Nad-e Ali and Marjeh with non-
Helmandi tribal and ethnic groups in 1954 and 1957 respectively.188 The Americans saw the 
canal projects as a way of competing with the Soviets in Afghanistan, but for the Afghan 
government, it was a way of breaking up the power of large tribal groupings and settling 
nomads. The discord in aims resulted in acrimony and poorly designed and sited canals. 
Eventually, with massive amounts of US aid, the problems were overcome and over ten 
thousand families were settled across central Helmand. There were plans to develop a canal 
system in northern Helmand, but this never came to fruition.189  
 
In 1960, Helmand was made a province, with Gereshk as its capital. In 1964, the capital 
moved to Lashkar Gah and the number of districts was increased to something akin to 
today.190 Each district was ranked according to the resources and services that it would 
receive from the central government. The central Barakzai-majority districts did much better 
than the northern Alizai districts: the Barakzai were being compensated for the loss of the 
provincial capital in the district carve-up. As the canal projects progressed, central Helmand 
became more developed with schools and hospitals, leaving northern Helmand further 
                                                          
185
 Adamec, Gazetteer vol. 2: 237. 
186
 General Staff India, Military Report - Afghanistan: History, Topography, Ethnography, Resources, Armed 
Forces, Forts and Fortified Posts, Administration and Communications  (Dehli, 1925): 381. 
187
 Ibid., 143. 
188
 Dupree, Afghanistan: 502. 
189
 Nick Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State" The Journal of American History 89, 
no. 2 (2002): 527. 
190
 Adamec, Gazetteer vol. 2: 1. 
 
50 
© Mike Martin 2013 
behind. Nad-e Ali, by now the largest district, and with thirty-seven different tribal and ethnic 
groups, was awarded a very small scale of resources compared to its size.191 The projects 
were extended south to Nawa and Garmsir. 
 
The Kajaki dam, designed to regulate water flow and provide hydroelectricity to southern 
Afghanistan, had been built in 1953. This was of concern to Iran, as the water flow affected 
the ecology of its Sistani region. A treaty had been signed in 1939 between Afghanistan and 
Iran, but never ratified and Zahir Shah, in one of his last acts as king, signed another treaty 
on the water division of the Helmand. This was not ratified either and the water from the 
Helmand remains a major issue.192  
 
One of the reasons that the treaty was never implemented was the overthrow of Zahir Shah 
by his cousin, Daud, in 1973. He further increased the scale of immigration under the canal 
projects and mixed indigenous Helmandis with settlers, leading to land disputes that are still 
unresolved today. All of these events laid the backdrop to the April 1978 Communist Party’s 
coup in Kabul, which is where the story begins in chapter two.  
 
The previous sections have focused on the theoretical, anthropological and historical 
literatures to set the context for what follows. I now present my antithesis—the ‘public’ nature 
of the literature from 1978-2012—before I present my thesis—the importance of the 
interaction between the public and private spheres and the primacy of the private sphere—
and definitions. 
 
1.4 - Post-1978 Helmandi history: the public sphere  
My antithesis is a critical review of the post-1978 historical/political studies/conflict studies 
scholarships on the Afghan (and Helmandi where available) conflict, demonstrating the 
degree to which the literature often focuses on the public sphere of the conflict rather than 
the private sphere which I will expose in this thesis. It can be seen throughout, however, that 
the conflict since 1978 has obeyed the anthropological context as set out in section 1.2. 
 
There have been separate public spheres for each of the three recent periods. The first, 
during the communist period in Afghanistan (1978–92), was that of the cold war. The war, of 
which the Helmandi conflict was a subset, was understood in terms of an ‘East-West 
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confrontation’.193 This was the age of the glorious mujahidin, fighting their Soviet oppressors 
in a jihad. As the foreword to Sandy Gall’s memoirs, written by Margaret Thatcher, begins, 
‘…one of the most heroic resistance struggles known to history has been taking place…in 
the mountains and plains of Afghanistan’.194 This is not atypical of western journalistic 
accounts of the era. Arthur Bonner, one of the very few journalists to travel to out-of-the-way 
Helmand, discussed the war in terms of the holy mujahidin fighting the atheist communists, 
even when investigating the incongruity of opium-growing among the Alizai religious figures 
of northern Helmand.195 The public sphere of the religious nature of the anti-Soviet 
resistance was repeatedly emphasised by western journalists with, for example, Jon 
Anderson speaking of a ‘peculiar fatalism of men for whom belief in God and paradise has 
replaced the fear of death’.196 The Soviet side had a different vocabulary, but the public 
sphere still applied. The ‘limited contingent’ was doing its ‘international duty’ in supporting 
world-wide socialism.197 The Afghans fighting them were labelled as ‘counterrevolutionaries’, 
or ‘imperialist and Zionist agents’.198 In soldier-slang, they were ‘dukhi’ (ghosts).199  
 
Writing later, scholars have the benefit over journalists or practitioners of intellectual 
distance, and this can enable them to analyse with greater clarity. Oliver Roy, one of the 
great scholars of the Soviet period, shows well the heterogenic nature of the mujahidin and 
explores the interactions between tribe, (mujahidin) party funding and charismatic leadership 
(he also published in 1985 when the conflict was in full swing).200 Antonio Giustozzi charted 
the government side of the conflict, and Barnett Rubin attempted a dualistic approach.201 All 
produced impressive works, shedding much light on the degree of contemporaneous 
fragmentation extant in the Afghan communist government and mujahidin. However, their 
base assumption was that the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan was a unitary 
institution, albeit one suffering from factionalisation, rather than merely a public label that 
was adopted by private groups and leaders in an ad hoc manner. Gilles Dorronsoro too 
wrote in the same vein and he further explored public lenses through which to understand 
fragmentation, be they ethnic, religious, or ideological.202 I am greatly indebted to these four 
authors even though they did not write in detail about Helmand. Their overall analysis, 
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however, of ‘public’ organisations (i.e. the mujahidin or the communist government) that 
suffer from exquisite fragmentation and overlapping recruitment bases was an excellent 
motivator to understand further the private nature of conflict in Helmand. Apart from Roy, 
their strength lies in the retrospective nature of their writing.  
 
The Soviet Army left Afghanistan in 1989, and the Soviet-backed Najibullah government 
collapsed with the cessation of outside funding in 1992, leading to civil war. The cold war 
had ended and thus it became harder to frame the conflict in ideological, geopolitical terms. 
So began a period of Pakistani domination of Afghanistan and an alternative public 
sphere.203 The civil war, approximately running from 1992–6 in most of the country, was 
often depicted in Hobbesian, ethnic terms: ‘it only remained to deplore the propensity of the 
Afghans to internecine struggle’.204 In retrospect, it seems that the civil war was a missed 
opportunity in terms of scholarship, in that it was a chance, freer of external, public 
dynamics, to understand the continuing conflict in its private form. And although scholars 
began to dissolve the ‘falsely unifying rubrics [that] invent collective identities’,205 they 
replaced them with a very Orientalist view of Afghan on Afghan violence, often focussing on 
ethnicity.206 
 
The rise of the Taliban movement in Kandahar in 1994 resulted in yet another public sphere 
describing Afghanistan.207 William Maley captured the viewpoint of the new era when he 
reported that ‘religious fundamentalism of a particularly virulent kind seemed to be on the 
march’.208 Writings about the Taliban often focused on their religious nature, extolling for 
example, the strength of their ‘religious dogma’.209 Journalists were even more direct in their 
prose focussing on ‘the weird society…television sets hung up like hanged men’.210 The 
post-2001 public sphere—described above as the ‘insurgency narrative’—is exceptionally 
pervasive, and accentuated by a lack of detailed, on-the-ground, scholarship. 
 
Although there are other side-issues to this public sphere: corruption, the lack of legitimacy 
suffered by the Afghan government, Taliban softening of attitudes with regards to education, 
and so on. But they all use the unstated assumption that the Taliban are a movement, no 
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matter how fractured, so too the government, no matter how corrupt or rapacious.211 
Moreover, serious scholars take as their starting point these assumptions. Antonio Giustozzi, 
still producing first-rate analysis on Afghanistan, writes for example, ‘[in the early 2000s] the 
Neo-Taliban maintained a strong cohesiveness’212 and of the ‘penetration of the Taliban’ into 
the population.213 Ahmed Rashid, the respected Pakistani writer, discusses the military 
clashes between the ‘Taliban’ and American troops in 2003 as if they had equal levels of 
organisational cohesion.214 Even scholars who have conducted extensive on-the-ground 
research, such as Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, who lived in Kandahar whilst 
researching, argue so strongly in their otherwise brilliant work An Enemy We Created that 
the Taliban is a separate organisation to Al Qaeda, that it gives the Taliban cohesion and 
agency that some centralised western governments lack.215  
 
This public sphere and the assumptions of coherence given to actors are (perhaps by 
definition) echoed in the policy arena. Tony Blair’s memoir paints a binary view of 
Afghanistan, pitting ‘fanaticism’ against ‘modernisation’.216 Some of this can be dismissed as 
rhetoric or conscious simplification, but it appears that western militaries, above all the US 
military, believe(d) in a simplistic good-versus-evil narrative.217 General Jones, President 
Obama’s National Security Advisor, described the conflict as, ‘a clash of civilisations…a 
clash of religions…a clash of concepts of how to live’.218 President Obama himself received 
intelligence briefings that stated that ‘the whole Taliban insurgency is designed to outlast the 
coalition of US and international troops [my italics]’ implying elements of cohesion, planning, 
purpose and agency.219 The US commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan in 2009 wrote in 
his Initial Assessment to President Obama that the leadership of the Taliban ‘conducts a 
formal campaign review each year’ after which ‘Mullah Omar announces his guidance and 
intent for the year’.220 Even Major-General Flynn, the erstwhile commander of NATO 
intelligence in Afghanistan, whilst lamenting the US intelligence focus on the Taliban at the 
expense of the wider country, still wrote of ‘subvert[ing] the Taliban power structure’ and of 
the ‘distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of the Afghan population’.221 The generals 
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describe the Taliban as a cohesive, unitary whole. In summary, there is an exceptionally well 
defined public sphere describing the current conflict in Afghanistan. 
 
1.5a - The thesis: the logic of violence in civil war  
In the civil war literature, one theorist in particular stood out as having particular relevance to 
my experiences in the Helmandi context: Stathis Kalyvas, and especially his major study, 
The Logic of Violence in Civil War. In his book, Kalyvas argues that the interaction between 
public and private is what explains the violence in civil wars. The fusion of the two, he puts it 
rather elegantly, is the ‘essence rather than the noise’.222 And his key observation, and basis 
for my thesis: private narratives are central rather than peripheral in explaining civil wars.223 
Civil wars, Kalyvas concludes, are a mosaic of discrete mini-wars.224 
 
Conflicts and violence ‘on the ground’ are more related to private cleavages rather than the 
public cleavages, even though private issues are often presented within the framework of the 
public sphere.225 Kalyvas concludes that the role of lower-level actors in shaping violence is 
often missing in the literature—they are treated as objects rather than subjects—and so he 
focusses on them in his data collection.226 The absence of lower level actors is very evident 
in the literature on the Afghan conflict (see section 1.4). Therefore, I make a similar move in 
this thesis. This turns the traditional view of war on its head.227 I propose that agency228 lies 
with these low-level leaders: it is they who negotiate between private groups and public 
actors, for example. This is reflected in my research design: these district- and provincial-
level notables comprise the vast majority of my interviewees, and so give me the ability to 
explore that interaction both looking up (to the public sphere) and down (to the private 
sphere). 
 
For Kalyvas, the key mechanisms shaping violence are denunciations and collaborations. 
These are driven by interpersonal cleavages: outsiders are mere tools for settling 
disputes.229 Put simply, a civil war generates lots of opportunities to kill personal enemies 
with indirect violence (perpetrated by a public actor). This cuts both ways though: private 
individuals will exploit public actors and their ideologies to settle their personal scores and 
gain resources, and at the same time public actors will exploit private individuals and their 
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grievances in order to mobilise fighters and gather information.230 There is a critical point 
here: denunciations will only work if the outside, public actor is blinded to the private sphere 
by its opacity. Going beyond Kalyvas, this is the ‘but’ that I discussed earlier. The 
‘policeman’ is not simply corrupt: he has chosen the appropriate public group to enable him 
to best protect his business interests. This manipulation of the ‘public sphere’ through 
denunciations, very important in understanding Helmand’s conflict, is one mechanism of the 
interaction between public and private spheres (defined below). In addition to the role of 
denunciation and collaboration, identified by Kalyvas, the Helmand case suggests that 
further mechanisms are also at play in shaping violence, including militia creation, 
channelling of development funding, and the impact of elections on the distribution of power 
within formal government structures. Having outlined the importance and aptness of the 
public-private dichotomy, and critically, the interaction between the two, I now define the 
public and the private spheres and outline my theoretical framework around which my oral 
history data will be analysed. 
 
1.5b - Definitions231 
The public sphere of conflict232 is that which describes violence in terms of macro-dynamics 
as reflected in official, institutional narratives, political ideologies, grand, national-level ethnic 
politics and bureaucratic ideals. This sphere is often reflected in strategic studies and the 
dominant theoretical approach to international relations (i.e. realist theory).233 These 
academic literatures share one key aspect: they tend to assume unitary actors and elites 
and groups are fused and amalgamated. Elites control of units (states and organisations 
within them) tends to be unproblematised. Examples include the different mujahidin parties 
(organisations), the democracy offered by the current Afghan government (public narrative) 
and the Soviet-mujahidin clash (public cleavage). Strictly defined for this thesis, public 
organisations espouse and propagate an ideology or public narrative at a macro or non-local 
scale—this includes ethnicities fighting ethnic politics at a national level. Membership of 
public organisations is—apart from national-level ethnicities—derived from political context, 
supposedly voluntary and often transitory. Public cleavages stem from the clash of public 
narratives. 
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Examples of public organisations include countries (Argentina),234 insurgent/rebel groups 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC),235 political parties (Sinn Féin)236 
and (often government) security organisations (the Wehrmacht).237 Examples of public 
narratives range from political ideologies (communism)238 to reactions to events (a drive for 
freedom from an occupation).239 Examples of public cleavages in conflict include those 
between alliances (the Axis and the Allies),240 between countries (Pakistan and India),241 
between non-state organisations (Al Qaeda and the Anbar Awakening)242 or a mixture of all 
three (France and Islamist rebels in Mali243 or the African Union and Al Shabaab in 
Somalia).244 These macro, public entities and labels are habitually how scholars have 
understood civil wars—private, or micro entities and labels are often overlooked.245  
 
The private sphere of conflict is that which describes violence in terms of the micro-dynamics 
of personal relationships between leaders, between leaders and groups, or within groups. 
This sphere is often described in anthropology and micro-historical literature, novels, poems 
and journalism. These approaches also share one key aspect: they all privilege personal and 
intracommunity dynamics. Examples include a village head (actor), a clan (group), local 
police brutality (private narrative) and a blood feud (private cleavage). Strictly defined for this 
thesis, private groups have involuntary memberships of private actors, a degree of 
rootedness in community and exist at the micro scale e.g. people are born into tribes or 
clans (although note the caveats on page 9). This can also include minority ethnicities at a 
local scale. Private narratives stem from specific events (whether real or perceived) between 
or about private actors and groups—these can lead to private cleavages.  
 
Examples of the elements existing in the private, micro sphere of conflict are also common in 
the literature (although different types of literature—see above), yet they are often anecdotal 
and un-explained, rather than explanatory and central, as the public, macro elements are 
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often considered.246 (Named) actors are most often mentioned, particularly in journalism, and 
include examples of types as wide as humanity is long (militia leader, drug dealer, 
terrorist).247 Private groups, particularly genealogical ones such as tribes or clans, are less-
often mentioned, but are covered well in anthropological literature (tribes in Kenya).248 Inter-
group or inter-actor narratives or cleavages are much more difficult to find in the literature, 
although authors may often describe tribal warfare’ or ‘blood feuds’.249 Whilst these micro-
elements in the private sphere of conflict helped me understand the battles that I witnessed 
in Helmand, these clashes could almost always be interpreted in two ways. That is as 
conflict between the Taliban and the government (macro, public) and, at the same time, 
conflict between village A and village B. This underlines the importance of the interaction 
between the two levels, micro and macro, public and private: it is the key to unlocking the 
conflict and the violence. 
 
Thus, following Kalyvas, I will examine the interactions between the two spheres. Take the 
example of two neighbouring village heads (private actors) that are having a land dispute 
(private cleavage). The first affiliates (interacts) with the Taliban jihad (public 
narrative/organisation) in order to receive Taliban funding and weaponry to support his 
position in the local dispute. The second affiliates (interacts) with the government (public 
narrative/organisation) to obtain funding for a village militia to protect the village from the 
‘Taliban’ of his neighbour. Moreover, in the interaction outlined above, the private group and 
the public organisation overlay each other making research and analysis challenging. Types 
of interaction include manipulation, co-option and subscription to public actors and 
patronage, among others. War on its Head will explore the public and private spheres of 
conflict and the interactions between them. 
 
Theoretically, an important distinction is that between ethnicities and tribes. It can be seen 
from the above definitions of public and private that ethnicities could fit into either. An 
ethnicity, ideally, is a group born of common descent that speaks the same language: 
different ethnicities speak different languages (e.g. Pushtun, Hazara, Uzbek). However, 
tribes are the smaller building blocks of common descent: many tribes make up an ethnicity, 
and so many tribes will speak the same language (e.g. Alizai, Barakzai, Noorzai). This 
distinction, between tribes and ethnicities, one private, one public, is slightly arbitrary and is 
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defined by scale and ideology—tribes do not fight national-level politics, yet ethnicities do. 
Practically-speaking however, for the scale of this study, this distinction is irrelevant. There 
are separate ethnicities in Helmand, mostly settlers from the canal projects (see later), yet 
they define themselves on a tribal level. For example, were I ask two people in Helmand (a 
Hazara and a Pushtun) what quam (tribe) they were, they would respond Hazara and Alizai 
(or Barakzai etc). That is, the Hazara are such a minority in Helmand as to be treated as just 
another tribe, and critically, Pashtun tribes will work with the Hazara, against other Pashtun 
tribes over a water dispute (this example explored in chapter 5)—at this level, it is a private 
cleavage rather than a public one. Further, on a local level, inter-ethnic dialogues are not 
about the ideologies that separate them (e.g. the Hazara in Helmand do not argue that there 
should be more Shia-oriented religious teaching in Helmandi schools), but about private 
issues like land and water. I include this fine distinction here to aid in the conclusions, where 
I will extrapolate my Helmandi-level analysis up to the national level where, of course, there 
are public, battling ethnicities. 
 
 Public Sphere Private Sphere 
Themes Official, institutional narratives, 
political ideologies, grand, national-
level ethnic politics (i.e. inter-
community) and bureaucratic 
ideals. 
Personal relationships between 
leaders, between leaders and 




Organisations espouse and 
propagate an ideology or public 
narrative at macro or non-local 
scale (includes national ethnicities); 
membership is derived from political 
context, voluntary and often 
transitory. 
Groups have involuntary 
memberships of individuals 
(private actors); groups have a 
degree of rootedness within the 
community and exist at a micro or 





Strategic studies and international 
relations literature. 
Anthropology and micro-historical 




















Sher Mohammad  
Alizai / Helmandi 
Hazara 
Police theft of opium 
Feud over land 
Figure 2: Table setting out the differences between the public and private spheres 
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Finally, I wish to define my usage of punctuation. Kalyvas identified a strong epistemic bias, 
especially in the sociological and histological traditions, in ‘favour of the assumption that all 
(or most) participants in conflict are motivated by ideological concerns’.250 In the terms of this 
thesis, the bias privileges the public over the private: in the public sphere there is the 
assumption that private actors are motivated by ideology or the institution that they 
represent. (Thus, in the private sphere there is the assumption that, despite claims to the 
contrary, individuals will act only in their, or their own private group’s, benefit). This bias is at 
the centre of my conceptual space. Therefore, on many occasions in this paper the reader 
will notice that a public organisation, narrative or cleavage occurs in inverted commas thus: 
‘government’ or ‘Taliban’. This is to indicate that, in my analysis, this aspect of the public 
sphere is being used by a private actor for private reasons. For example, the above 
description of the village headman who applies to the government for permission to raise a 
militia. He is in the ‘government’: not in any meaningful sense and only so that he can 
defend his village from the ‘Taliban’. 
 
1.5c - Thesis: interaction between the public and private spheres and the primacy of 
the private sphere 
Both public and private spheres can used to describe conflict in Helmand. The public sphere 
is that which describes the conflict in terms of macro-dynamics; the private, micro-dynamics. 
Habitually, the public sphere is dominant in explaining conflict dynamics, and the private 
sphere is treated as subsidiary. My thesis is that it is the interaction between the public and 
private spheres that shapes the conflict dynamics in Helmand. Furthermore, I posit that 
where the private sphere is opaque to outside, public organisations, it will have primacy in 
the interaction between public and private in shaping conflict dynamics.251  
 
1.5d - Testing the thesis 
This is an oral history of the Helmandi conflict. Using the methods outlined in the next 
section, a historical narrative describing the conflict of the last thirty-four years in Helmand 
will be constructed. The thirty-four year period will be separated into eras defined by the 
dominant external influence. Within each era, events will be considered. Each event will be 
comprised of a series of elements (groups, actors, organisations etc.) which will be tested 
separately against the definitions of the public and private spheres set out in section 1.5b 
and figure 2. For example, when considering a particular battle, the ways in which the 
different sides portray themselves and how others portray them will be considered. This will 
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allow categorisation of the composite elements involved in each event, in terms of private, 
personal elements or public, ideological elements.  
 
At this stage, any possible interactions between the two spheres in creating and sustaining 
the conflict(s) will be identified. Critically, it will be necessary to assess whether the public 
organisations involved in those interactions were/are cognisant of the complexity inherent in 
the private sphere. The final stage in the analysis is to ascertain whether that information 
asymmetry has contributed to enabling elements of the private sphere to shape conflict 
dynamics. Throughout, the anthropological and historical literature, outlined above in 
sections 1.2 and 1.3, will be used contextually and as an aid to categorisation and analysis 
of the elements in my data, be they public, private, or both. 
 
1.6a - Methods 
This thesis is primarily based on interviews with Helmandi district- and provincial-level 
leaders conducted in Helmand, Kabul and London in Pushtu.252 Using oral history 
techniques, I aim to tell the Helmandi stories of the last thirty-four years, thus testing the 
primacy of the private sphere in driving conflict dynamics. More broadly, the thesis is based 
upon nineteen months’ of participant-observation in Helmand, both serving as a British Army 
officer and as a researcher. These primary source materials have been blended with 
historically restructured secondary sources, that is, the secondary sources have been 
reappraised through the lens of the primary source material.  
 
Helmand was chosen as the basis for this study for several reasons. Through my previous 
military service in Helmand, I was able to conduct a pilot study showing the feasibility and 
benefits of conducting research in central Helmand. My extant contacts with local Helmandi 
notables, alongside deep knowledge from my previous work, and contacts within the British 
Army (to facilitate transport, for example: the logistics of conducting research in a warzone 
should not be underestimated) are what made this study possible. I recognise that these 
factors also present limitations to my work: these were mitigated as far as possible by 
conducting interviews among Helmandi diasporas in London and Kabul.  
 
Central Helmand is a heterogeneous area which offers much richness to the researcher. It is 
deep within the Pushtun ‘belt’, and more than many ethnicities, outsiders project 
assumptions onto, and fail to understand, the Pushtun.253 Through Gereshk, Helmand 
occupies a strategic location on the route between the sub-continent and Persia: this 
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generates resources that actors and groups wish to dominate. Central Helmand was also the 
site of Afghanistan’s most major development project ever in the 1950s–70s, which created 
unprecedented social heterogeneity. This too shapes the conflict dynamics. 
 
Lastly, Helmand has been the major focus of NATO military activity in recent years, with up 
to thirty thousand American and British troops deployed there during 2010–12. This has 
meant that I have been able to study closely the interaction between the public and private 
spheres. Whilst this is a study of the entire province, logistics dictated that central Helmand 
remained the detailed focus, and that the remaining districts of Helmand were not covered 
with as much specificity. However, my familiarity with central Helmand meant that I was able 
to get a good ‘density’ of data, thus facilitating detailed analysis. 
 
1.6b - Oral history in an illiterate society 
Helmand is a largely illiterate society.254 Even though the Pushtu language was first written 
down in the 15th century, exceptionally low literacy rates have meant that oral history has 
predominated for the Pushtun as a mechanism of data capture and storage.255 This too has 
sufficed for foreigners wishing to study them: oral studies of the Pushtun abound256 and oral 
histories, in particular, have many advantages over written ones. Written history, until 
recently, has tended to be a documentation of the struggle for power involving important 
men and events, reflecting the public sphere. The perspectives of the ordinary man and 
woman have remained unrecorded; this is particularly important for this thesis as ‘internal’ 
conflicts are fought within and amongst communities. Additionally, for much of the period 
under study, there has not been a government in Helmand; when there has been, it has 
often been replaced by its enemies, which does not aid continuity of record keeping. In brief, 
oral history fills in gaps, for which the Taliban and mujahidin periods in Helmand certainly 
qualify.257 That is not to say that there are not disadvantages to oral history as a concept: 
there are and they are largely related to the method of data collection, interviewing. 
 
Interviews, conducted properly, allow interviewees to ‘reflect and reason on a variety of 
subjects’ allowing the researcher to gain ‘a deeper insight into how they think and reflect’.258 
They are, however, a subjective process and the responses will invariably be shaped by the 
social exchange between the interviewer and interviewee: an interview is literally an inter 
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view, a constructive process between two people. This will colour the oral history.259 It is not 
just what the respondents say that is important, the context within which they make their 
statements is essential too.260 Therefore, this unavoidable bias was used as the prism 
through which my interviews were conducted: that is, it was accepted that many of the 
interviewees attempted to manipulate me for their own, or their interest groups’, betterment.  
 
It is worth asking why the interviewees wished to speak with me and give me information, 
when it might put them in danger. For many, it was that I had known them for three years, 
and in some cases dealt with them extensively. They knew me, and, for many of them it was 
an interesting request to contribute to research about their home region. They were being 
requested to tell me, an outsider, the story of what has happened. Furthermore, interviews 
were interesting. I often spoke as much about the British, ISAF and myself as they did about 
themselves: it was a trade.  
 
However, there was a darker trade as well. Interviewees were often attempting to use me, 
either to help gain lucrative ISAF contracts, or perhaps to spread disinformation into the 
‘western system’. This linked into my former identity where I worked as an advisor for the 
British commander in Helmand; my interviewees may have felt that I still had residual 
influence. In a Kalyvasian world, what better way to denounce your neighbor than to an 
unsuspecting academic? 
 
To balance this unavoidable, yet not insubstantial, risk to my data validity several steps were 
taken. For each interviewee, a detailed biography was recorded (from them and from others) 
in order to ascertain their predicted viewpoints on particular issues, as they might describe 
them to a former British Army officer and taking into account what they might want from the 
interaction. I also recognise that there may have been a self-selection element within my 
interviewees, that is, they wanted to be interviewed by me to fulfil other goals other than 
helping my research. Wherever possible events were verified by a minimum of two 
independent oral sources, preferably three (hence providing triangulation),261 except where 
indicated in the text. An iterative design allowed verification of facts and viewpoints in a 
continuous fashion. 
 
This thesis uses a mixture of inductive and deductive research methods. Both have inherent 
weaknesses. For example, it is accepted that it is almost impossible for research of this type 
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to be truly inductive,262 that is, that the investigator has no idea what he or she might find 
when they begin the research. Yet a deductive approach of gathering data to ‘prove’ a theory 
in such a complex and little understood environment threatens to canalise thinking and 
restrict opportunities for understanding. Arguably, this is the root of any misunderstandings 
surrounding the Helmandi conflict. Therefore, a phenomenological approach was used that 
attempted to understand the dynamics on their own merits, drawing out natural units of 
meaning, stating them as simply as possible and trying to gain a sense of the whole as seen 
by the interviewee.263 Thus, 
 
The phenomenological reduction is a conscious, effortful, opening of ourselves to the 
phenomenon as a phenomenon...we want not to see this event as an example of this 
or that theory that we have, we want to see it as a phenomenon in its own right, with 




The phenomenological analysis process is about getting inside the interviewees/protagonists 
worldview; it is about understanding why they are saying what they are saying, and why they 
might be presenting it in that particular fashion. Phenomenology is not objective: it is about 
accepting all of the implicit biases in research collection and trying to use them to 
understand the interviewees’ or protagonists’ narratives.265 In-keeping with the marriage of 
inductive and deductive methodologies and phenomenology, I used an iterative, semi-
structured/semi-standardised interview process.266 This allowed a predetermined chronology 
to be used as a handrail, but allowed the interviewees maximum scope to expand on what 
they felt as important within that chronology.267 
 
There is an implicit balance in research of this sort that prompting interviewees with 
questions may have guided them as to the answers that they thought I wanted to hear, 
whereas insufficient questions would have reduced their focus on relevant topics. Therefore, 
there was no predetermined question set beyond asking what happened, who was involved, 
why it happened and attempting to identify the perceptions and misperceptions surrounding 
an event, and how those may have fed the event itself. As an iterative process, the 
chronology and question set expanded and improved such that some interviewees were re-
interviewed as understanding developed: it is very hard to separate collection and analysis 
when interviewing.268 Distinctions were made in my analysis between first-hand and second-
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hand knowledge as reported by the interviewees, as were reflections made by them about 
their own group, as compared to competing groups.  
 
1.6c - Interviewee selection 
The sample size was eighty-five anonymous interviews, of which seventy-one were 
conducted in Helmand, seven were conducted among the Helmandi diaspora in London and 
seven were conducted among Helmandis living in Kabul. A further eleven interviews were 
conducted with NATO officials to frame a small number of events.  
 
For ethical reasons,269 namely that I am interviewing active participants in a civil war, the 
interviewees’ identities are withheld and are represented by a three-digit code within the 
thesis. In a very few cases I even had to redact the interview code, because linking the 
interviewee description with the comment would make the interviewee’s identity clear. 
Appendix 1 lists the anonymous interviewee descriptions. Assigning interviewee descriptions 
was slightly arbitrary, and should be seen as a guide rather than absolute categorisation. 
Everyone has multiple, overlapping identities, and in Helmand they are often strongly 
juxtaposed. I discussed with each interviewee the descriptions that they would use as their 
primary identity within this history: they are included here as an aid to reader understanding.  
 
Interviewees were selected from my network of Helmandi contacts and from other notables 
that they were willing to introduce me to. This ‘snowball sampling’ was an especially useful 
technique when trying to study such a hidden or difficult-to-access population.270 They were 
chosen on the basis of having agency over their environment: they are those who negotiate 
between the public and private spheres. The majority were tribal leaders, jihadi 
commanders, religious leaders, landowners, government and security officials or 
businessmen. During my pilot study I identified that it was not feasible to interview people 
who were lower down the social hierarchy: more often than not they had no concept of the 
world outside their villages. 
 
Interviewees were selected to give broad representation across tribal groups, jihadi parties, 
and positions with respect to the government (although government is a fluid concept in 
Helmand).271 The iterative snowball sampling allowed adjustment for this. The minimum age 
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was eighteen, and as the period from 1978 was focussed on, many of the interviewees were 
aged approximately fifty or over. Some worked exceptionally closely with the individuals 
attacking British and Afghan government forces including, in one case, a gentleman who 
facilitated the supply of bomb components and coordinated attacks on British patrols. These 
identity markers are withheld from the interview descriptions in Appendix 1.  
 
Almost all of the interviewees were men, by nature of Helmandi society, and where women 
were interviewed their sex is not disclosed for anonymity. Interviewees were recognised as 
coming from a vulnerable population, that is, potentially put at risk from being interviewed by 
me. However, these notables often communicate with coalition forces and international 
civilians. There was no element of coercion or payment whatsoever (beyond refreshments). 
The approach used was based on the principle of not putting anyone in danger. No 
interviews were discarded, although some were more useful than others. 
 
The interviews were carried out over two trips to Helmand; at the end of 2011 and the spring 
of 2012, as well as a trip to Kabul in the summer of 2012. The diasporic interviews were 
carried out in London around these visits. This deliberate peripatetic interview scheduling 
was to facilitate periods of reflection and refocusing between interviewing. Interviews in 
Helmand were conducted in secure ISAF or government locations, to enter which 
interviewees often had to pass some sort of security procedure. For that reason, the Kabul 
and London interview sets were added as control groups: these were carried out in the 
interviewees’ homes. 
 
Interviews conducted in London had a further distinguishing analytical perspective: in many 
cases these interviewees had split loyalties—both to Helmand and to Britain—leading to 
touching confusion over the words us and we. These aided me very much in separating 
perspectives. So too, the Kabul interviews: living freely in Kabul and being able to interview 
people on their own terms greatly helped my holistic understanding. These two different 
additional interview contexts, yet with the same target set of Helmandi notables, were 
deliberately chosen to provide contrasts to the Helmand-conducted interviews. For 
anonymity I do not identify to which context the interviewee belonged. The interviews were 
all conducted in Pushtu, during which notes were taken; these notes were written up 
immediately after the interview. Interviews lasted between half-an-hour and five hours. 
 
Often interviewees (those that did not know me from before), would begin describing the 
conflict in very general public terms and at times the social conventions governing 
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conversations among the Pushtun make it difficult to ascertain ‘hard facts’.272 I sometimes 
found it necessary to inject some private, localised and neutral knowledge—say, for 
example, identifying someone’s brother in their story—in order to guide them to a greater 
level of detail. This, combined with a level of directness and honesty that they did not often 
experience from foreigners (a Pushtu-speaking foreigner is rare enough as it is), and a level 
of frankness usually ensued. I cannot overstate how important my previous in-depth 
knowledge was: one has to ask the right questions to get the right answers.  
 
Other issues endemic to oral history with ill-educated populations were rife: not knowing their 
own ages, having idiosyncratic estimates of relative versus actual time, and distinguishing 
between different types of ‘foreigner’, for example. All required slight alterations to interview 
technique. Some interviewees were excellent for chronological structure, some for 
eyewitness detail, some for reflective perspectives, and others yet for corroboration. This 
explains why some interviewees crop up more than others in the footnotes. There was also a 
natural disinclination to talk about the Taliban. I was a foreigner, and the foreigners were 
fighting the Taliban. Readers will notice the Taliban-era as slimmer on primary research than 
other periods. This was the reason why the interviews of Taliban commanders, discussed 
below, were so important.  
 
By kind permission of Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi I was given access to an interview 
set of fifty interviews conducted with Taliban commanders in Helmand and fifteen further 
interviews of Helmandi notables. I had some reservations over the use of these interviews as 
I had had no control over their commissioning or conduct. However, on balance, the 
interviews agree in style, tone and substance with my own interviews which, when combined 
with the rarity of interviews of active Taliban commanders, suggested that I utilise the data. 
Additionally, they offered a further ‘control’ group in that they were conducted by different 
interviewers.  
 
Finally, I conducted a small number of on-the-record interviews with key Helmandi and 
western personalities, in order to understand their thoughts and actions at the time of 
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1.6d - Analytical methodology  
This thesis is about the private sphere of conflict. Therefore, my interviews and personal 
experience form its primary basis. Secondary sources, often representing the public sphere 
of the conflict, are used to explain, corroborate, chronologise and otherwise compare with 
that primary basis. However, in order to reframe secondary sources from the public 
viewpoint to the private one I rely heavily on the work of Robert Johnson, who used a 
process of ‘historical reconstruction’.273  
 
I combine Johnson’s work with that of Kalyvas: the historical reconstruction that I use is to 
take those events described in the literature as peripheral and make them central. This 
brings the private sphere to the forefront of the analysis. This process allows me to utilise my 
oral testimony, generated from interviews, as the basis of my analysis, whilst using 
secondary sources as far as possible to reinforce that analysis. Unfortunately, some areas of 
my discourse rely entirely on secondary sources. This is avoided whenever possible. 
 
Finally, I recognise that those events described by my interviewees that are further in the 
past are more likely to be described using the public sphere rather than the private: people 
tend to rationalise and romanticise their involvement in past conflicts. 
 
1.7 - Caveats and limitations 
This thesis might well be considered a further pilot study for future work. I seek to use the 
Helmandi ‘ecosystem’ as an example to challenge the narratives surrounding the entire 
Afghan conflict. This thesis can only be the first step in such a gargantuan task. 
Furthermore, the limitations of researching in an illiterate society at war stretch academic 
credibility to the limit. However, at present, there are no other approaches that generate this 
quantity and quality of data.  
 
What has made this research fascinating and frustrating in equal measure is the fact that at 
times it has felt like being nothing more than catching snippets of rumours, passing on the 
winds of Helmandi gossip. However, in Afghan society rumours are an established currency 
of political debate, and scholars now deliberately factor them into their analyses.274 
Information is still mainly spread by word of mouth in illiterate societies. This has only 
hastened with the introduction of mobile phones, beginning in 2003.275 Wherever possible, I 
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have tried to explore these rumours and have attempted to corroborate them either with 
other interviewees or with secondary sources.  
 
Ultimately, while I have strived to assuage any possible charges of Orientalism it is 
impossible, whilst engaged in the human sciences, to ‘ignore or disclaim [my] involvement’ in 
Helmand.276 I first went there in 2008 as a British Army officer, which is as far as can be from 
neutral in the conflict. Furthermore, for many of the events in the 2008–12 section of the 
analysis I have relied upon my own direct participant-observation, albeit where I have later 
tracked the same events in interviews. In areas where it appears that the British or the 
Americans have misstepped I, too, must accept my share of the blame: in some instances I 
was involved in formulating or implementing some of those policies. I was not above the fray, 
although I have done my utmost to detach myself and remain objective in this analysis. The 
benefit of my previous position, however, is that I understand well the public sphere 
surrounding the conflict. 
 
This is not a complete history. It could never be. This is a selection of stories and events that 
I have been exposed to, and that I argue illuminate the overall dynamics in Helmand. For 
some events there exists such a juxtaposition of explanations and stories that I have painted 
the major views of an event, and my assessment of how those perceptions have shaped 
events. Furthermore, with examples that I describe to be one way or the other, there will 
always be a counter-example. Thus, if I write, for example, that clan ‘x’ supported the 
‘Taliban’, there will be, almost certainly, a sub-clan ‘y’ that did not support the ‘Taliban’ due 
to, for example a sub-clan feud that was unknown to me. The analysis that I offer here, 
whilst the most nuanced to date, is still simplified by Helmandi standards. One of my closest 
Helmandi confidants teased me for knowing ‘just one per cent’ of what went on in Helmand, 
despite knowing ‘a lot’.  
 
This simplification also creates other imperfections in this work: there are certain positions 
that I have taken throughout the thesis on a balance of evidence. Firstly, the overwhelming 
Helmandi feeling towards the British, or the Angrez, is antipathetic.277 Secondly, I argue it 
inconceivable that Pakistan is not currently supporting the Taliban, as part of achieving 
‘strategic depth’ vis-à-vis India.278 Further, I conclude that there is comprehensive evidence 
that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI: Pakistan’s main intelligence agency) is supplying arms, 
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money and advice via the Taliban Quetta Shura.279 The US has been aware of this since at 
least February 2005.280 This is also the overwhelming Helmandi perception, including among 
Taliban commanders.281  
 
1.8 - Thesis outline  
This chapter has presented the introduction, theoretical, historical and anthropological 
literature reviews, thesis and definitions, methodologies and caveats. Chapters two to six 
offer an analysis of the public and private spheres of consecutive eras of the Helmandi 
conflict. The public sphere is simple and straightforward. Indeed this is a major source of its 
appeal for western politicians, policymakers and publics. In contrast, the private sphere is 
immensely complex, as it explores the various characters, social relationships, local power-
plays, shifting allegiances, and employment of violence for personal and community gain. In 
order to ensure the reader does not get lost as we explore the private sphere of the 
Helmandi conflict, I regularly provide summaries and signposts throughout each chapter. 
 
Chapter two offers the story of the conflict during the period of maximum Soviet influence in 
Helmand, that is, 1978 to 1989, and traces the narrative through several angles. The thesis 
of public-private interaction is well supported; too there is evidence that when public 
organisations understand the private, inter-personal Helmandi world, they are better able to 
shape the conflict dynamics. 
 
Chapter three covers the period of rising and dominant Pakistani influence, that is, 1989 to 
2001. For the first half of the period, freer of public, external influences, a Helmandi civil war 
rages. The story here presented matches the public Afghan-wide narratives in terms of style, 
but the detail is completely different: the public-private interactions in Helmand were 
markedly different from those elsewhere in the country. The Taliban-era represents an 
anomaly in the story: it appears that they had exceptional local, private knowledge that 
allowed them to dominate the public-private interactions and shape the Helmandi conflict (or 
maintain the absence thereof). 
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Chapters four, five and six cover the era of dominant western influence: chapter four the 
period before the British deployment to Helmand in 2006, chapter five the era of British 
dominance in the province, that is, until mid-2009. Chapter 6 is thematic and discusses 
aspects of the counterinsurgency practiced by British and American forces in Helmand from 
2009 to present. It is in these three chapters that I present the clearest evidence for the 
primacy of the private sphere in driving the conflict’s dynamics when its dynamics are 
opaque to public organisations. 
 
The final chapter—chapter seven—offers conclusions. There, I seek to discuss five issues. 
Firstly: I summarise the historical narrative presented in chapters two to seven. I then go on 
to discuss the implications of this research for both policymakers and scholars, including an 
assessment of whether the findings can be extrapolated up to the national and international 
levels. Finally, I offer what I think will happen in Helmand in the coming years. 
 
Thereafter, in the Appendices, a glossary of terms, people, tribal diagrams, family trees and 
lists of Helmandi officials are appended, as well as an analysis of those Helmandis who have 
spent time in Guantanamo Bay prison camp, Cuba. Readers are advised to keep this to 
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Everyone had a [Khad] file… [there was] so much 
trickery between different mujahidin [groups and 
leaders] 
 
Hafizullah Khan  




The overarching public narrative of the communist coup and subsequent Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan is very strong. The coup ushered in an ideological government that was 
authoritarian in its approach to implementing reform: specifically land redistribution and 
improving literacy.283 The Soviet intervention was planned for six months and was 
considered enough time to stabilise the country and its armed forces and then leave.284 As 
viewed through the western prism of the cold war, the Soviets were atheist communists, who 
sought to subjugate Afghanistan as a client state. This ‘intervention’ caused (particularly) the 
United States to begin funding resistance to an ‘occupation’. This injection of resources 
caused a reinforcement of the public sphere surrounding the war. In this, the Afghan 
resistance—the mujahidin—were holy fighters, striving to liberate their homeland from the 
oppressive Soviets.285 
 
In addition to this public cleavage, there are a series of public organisations on either side. 
The Afghan communists were divided into two factions, the Khalqis and the Parchamis. 
Afghan communism was based on Marxism-Leninism, with the Khalqis being the more 
fervent of the two.286 The Afghan government’s most efficient organ was the state security 
police, Khedmat Amniat Dulati (Khad). This was essentially an extension of the KGB, and 
acted across all departments of the state in a ‘counter-revolutionary’ role. Their main aim 
was to hold the state together. Most of the time, it was the main instrument of government 
policy.287  
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Ranged on the other side of the conflict were the ‘freedom-loving’ mujahidin, backed (mainly) 
by Pakistan, the US and Saudi Arabia. The mujahidin were organised into seven parties, 
with differing ideologies. I will here discuss four of them: Jamiat-e Islami (Jamiat), Hizb-e 
Islami (Hizb), Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami (Harakat) and Mahaz-e Milli (Mahaz) because they 
feature most prominently in Helmand’s story. Hizb and Jamiat are closest in ideology, and 
there is disagreement between the two parties as to who came first. Both parties are Islamist 
in outlook and their ideologies could be described as similar to the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Rabbani, Jamiat’s leader, was the first to translate Sayed Qutb’s work into Dari). They 
wanted a modern state (without a monarchy), based on Islamic principles.288 Harakat and 
Mahaz were the so-called traditionalist parties. Harakat wanted a return to Islamic law 
(sharia), yet did not see any incompatibility between the monarchy and Islam. They were 
mainly comprised of clerics. Mahaz were known as the Royalist party. They sought a return 
to the monarchy and were comprised of people connected to the old order.289 
 
Over time, the perception grew that Hizb were more reactionary and Jamiat more moderate, 
in an analogy to the Khalq and Parcham factions in the government. Both these dichotomies 
tended towards national ethnic polarisation as the war went on: Khalq and Hizb towards the 
Pushtun, and Parcham and Jamiat towards the Tajiks.290 The Pakistani ISI should be 
considered a separate public organisation to the mujahidin parties.291 It supported the parties 
to different degrees as suited its national policies towards Afghanistan. The ISI was able to 
do this as the US allowed them to distribute its aid: the US paid while the Pakistanis played. 
 
2.1 - Revolution! 
President Daud Khan was killed during a People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 
coup in April 1978—a communist takeover. This was known as the Saur revolution. Because 
they dominated the army, the more ideologically extreme left-wing Khalq faction managed to 
seize power in 1978 and Noor Mohammad Taraki was proclaimed president. The twenty-one 
months of Khalqi rule were to drastically affect Helmandi society. Later, with the Soviet 
intervention at the end of 1979, the Parcham faction was to gain power.292 
 
It is hard to say whether Khalqis deliberately planned to destabilise society by removing the 
power of the previous elite,293 but reading contemporaneous government newspapers gives 
                                                          
288
 Edwards, Before Taliban: 237-8. 
289
 Roy, Islam: 114. 
290
 Edwards, Before Taliban: 243. 
291
 Rubin, Fragmentation: 205 & 243-4. 
292
 Ibid., 107. 
293
 Roy, Islam: 90. 
 
73 
© Mike Martin 2013 
the impression of an almost fervent desire to reform society as fast as possible.294 They were 
also cognisant that they might face resistance, and so, they moved as quickly as they 
could.295 Following the communist public narrative, the Khalqis wanted to increase the power 
of the proletariat (the farmers) versus that of the capital class (the landowners). This also 
had the added benefit of disempowering the previous government’s power base, the Durrani 
landowners, or khans. But the public narrative of ‘class struggle’ made no sense to illiterate 
farmers.296 
 
There were three important decrees: No. 6 referred to the regulation of rural mortgages and 
debt, and removed a key basis of the khans’ power—by controlling credit khans were able to 
keep their tenant farmers in debt cycles. No. 7 imposed limitations on marriageable age and 
bride price, which changed marriage from a social institution to a transaction between two 
individuals. This criminalised a key Pushtun conflict resolution and power regulation 
mechanism: that of kinship groups swapping women to settle disputes. No. 8, probably the 
most damaging as it was easiest to enforce, decreed land redistribution whereby estates 
over thirty jereebs would be redistributed to peasants.297 
 
2.2 - Land reform 
Decree No. 8 was announced at the end of November 1978.298 It outlined the redistribution 
of land holdings over thirty jereebs299 to be given out in packages of six jereebs. This was 
not enough to support a family of ten.300 The land was to be distributed to the farmers who 
were previous sharecroppers, thus inverting the rural hierarchy.301 Thereafter, it was to be 
given to landless people in the village, the district, the region and finally nationally. The 
arbitrary redistribution cut-off was to have critical resonance in Helmand: thirty jereebs had 
been the amount given to the 1950s settlers, hence they were unaffected by decree No. 8.302 
It is not clear that the Khalqi government was aware of the impact that this was to have in 
Helmand. 
 
For example, it meant that the communists found support in the canal-zones, generating the 
fifth largest Provincial Communist Party in the country by 1980 (see map 4). Helmand was 
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the only major area of recruitment in southern Afghanistan,303 probably because the 
landholders from the canal-zone escaped redistribution unless they had since accrued more 
land than they had been given originally.304 Conversely, those groups who had received land 
under Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah (see section 1.3) were major targets due to the size of 
their landholdings—some of the largest estates in the country were found in the Helmand 
Valley.305 Often, land had been in families for two hundred and fifty years306 and thousands 
of families and acres were affected.307 
 
The land reforms were poorly thought out and the public narrative made no sense to the 
Helmandis.308 As a Barakzai militia leader said to me, ‘the mother of the problems that we 
have now is the land redistributions under Taraki’.309 The reforms were based on an 
ideological model of a nuclear family that did not exist in Helmand, where extended families 
shared undivided inherited land. The reforms were also predicated on land area, but in 
Helmand land area was not the most important factor in determining harvest: access to 
irrigation water was. Thus, if land was subdivided in a way that meant that water had to be 
obtained from a neighbour then it could become valueless, and could even cause conflict 
(cousins often owned contiguous land inherited from a common grandfather). Communal 
land, a vital part of the community, was not recognised. It seems clear from this evidence 
that the ideologically-driven government did not understand, or ignored, the private sphere of 
land ownership in Helmand, allowing some to take advantage. 
 
Thus, the redistributions were carried out in different ways. In Malgir, force was not always 
needed as there was the perception of government strength carried over from the pre-
revolutionary period.310 In other areas, the police were used, in others yet, the depaye militia 
were used. These were a legacy from the Zahir Shah-era:311 militias of varying size (about 
one hundred men in Nawa312 and three hundred men in Musa Qala)313 that were under the 
control of the District Head Teacher, but working to the District Chief of Police and 
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composed mainly of students. Quickly purging the militias, the Khalqi government used them 
extensively to achieve its revolutionary aims.314  
 
However, private actors often manipulated the public sphere of land redistribution. The 
process was under the control of the Revolutionary Defence Committee in Lashkar Gah, with 
requisite sub-committees in each district to which people could appeal.315 However, the 
committee was always loaded at the expense of certain local groups over others: Khalqis 
and their families always did well out of the land distributions.316 For example, in Nad-e Ali, 
the leader of the land committee was Abdul Hakim (Kakar, from Chah-e Mirza) and the 
secretary was Amanullah Khan (Laghmani, from Loy Bagh). They ensured that they 
distributed the land to their and their kin’s advantage.317 In other areas, groups of Khalqis 
spontaneously banded together and stole their neighbours’ land, waiting for the theft to be 
ratified later by the Revolutionary Defence Committee.318 
 
2.3 - Anti-Islamic abuse 
This was accompanied by a background of rapacious arrests by the government of anyone it 
deemed an opponent.319 The government, viewing events through the prism of the earlier 
communist-Islamist violence in educational establishments, believed that anyone who 
resisted the government must be ikhwan (a member of, or associated with, the Muslim 
Brotherhood).320 This was a similar approach to that taken by the US in the immediate post-
2001 era, in terms of arresting people to a public, ideological (‘Taliban’) blueprint.321 This 
pushed people to become what they had been accused of. Not just those who opposed the 
government, but those who had the potential for opposition, were rounded up and sent to 
Lashkar Gah or Kandahar prison. This resulted in the arrest of tribal leaders, mullahs, 
sayeds, members of the old order and Parchamis: in short, anyone with influence. In one 
incident, one hundred Helmandi political prisoners were thrown out of a plane into the 
Arghandab reservoir.322 
 
But there was a paradox. Even though the very poorest in Helmandi stood to gain from the 
land redistribution, they formed the manpower for the uprising. This was because the 
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government’s public narratives were misrepresented by the rural mullahs and khans. The 
public literacy programme, for example, was considered a key part of the reforms.323 But the 
only people in the village who could read were the khan and the mullah and they considered 
it an assault on their means of power. They saw their interests eroded, and traditional 
Helmandi narratives of government interference were easily exploitable to generate popular 
mobilisation. Helmandis began to respond to what they saw as a godless, imposing and 
cruel government.324 As many were persuaded to see it by their land-owning leaders, land 
redistribution was state theft and it was their Islamic duty to oppose it.325 The public narrative 
of the anti-Islamic flavour of the government is the same complaint as that levelled by jihadi 
publications associated with the post-2001 Taliban organisation.326 For them, it is the same 
long struggle.  
 
2.4 - Government collapse: local reassertion 
The response to the Soviet intervention in 1979 was one of local resistance, driven by 
private factors.327 Originally, resistance groups rose up without the help of the mujahidin 
parties along community or tribal lines.328 The mechanism was that a private actor—a 
military entrepreneur329—would leverage the perception of a power vacuum created by 
weakened or non-existent government in a district to improve his own position. For this he 
needed two things: men to fight and weapons/supplies to equip them with. And later, with the 
rise of the mujahidin parties, the leader would personify the interaction between the two 
spheres, the public and the private, as supplies were more likely to be given out to 
successful commanders with many men, and men would be likely to follow a commander 
who was well-stocked with munitions. This interaction channels the private elements of men 
and local information from the group, on the one hand, with the public elements of funding 
and legitimacy bestowed by an organisation—a mujahidin party—on the other. But at first, it 
was a local, private usurpation of government power. 
 
Within two months of the revolution, government officials were being assassinated in 
Lashkar Gah.330 In October 1978, the Baghran District Governor, Ekhlas (Barakzai, Khalqi, 
from Malgir) was killed by Rais Baghrani (Alizai/Khalozai) the Baghran government 
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agricultural cooperative leader331—and a fellow ‘Khalqi’. That is, this was a naked grab for 
power, rather than an ideological uprising. The government, not sure of the situation, sent a 
replacement, Jan Gul (Barakzai, Khalqi, from Malgir) who was killed shortly after. Baghran 
has been under Baghrani’s control since.332 In other northern districts, the government 
retreated into its administrative enclaves and bands of criminals began to take advantage of 
the vacuum. Local notables began to police their own communities. In Kajaki, Mahmad Khan 
(Taraki), a landowner, collected men to ‘defend the population’; Nasim Akhundzada 
(Alizai/Hassanzai) the son of a locally-famous cleric, did the same in Musa Qala.333 Shortly 
after, at the end of November 1978, land redistribution was announced. 
 
In January 1979, Musa Qala fell. One night at 3am, the District Governor Zabit Aulleah 
(Noorzai, Khalqi, from Garmsir), went on patrol with three hundred depaye, presumably to 
supervise land redistributions the following day (land redistribution had begun that month). 
He was ambushed by Nasim. The depaye’s leader (also the District Head Teacher), Ghulam 
Dastgar Mahali, and one hundred of his men were killed. The remainder fled back to the 
District Centre, or ‘hukomat’.334  The next day, Nasim cut a deal with the Chief of Police, 
allowing him to escape. Nasim then attacked the hukomat and, killing one hundred and sixty 
people associated with the government, proclaimed himself District Governor.  
 
Three days after that, the army was sent in from outside Helmand and retook the hukomat, 
installing an administrator from Nangahar, Sher Gul, as the Governor. After a month, the 
army was redeployed elsewhere, leaving behind police and the depaye. Within two months, 
Nasim had reoccupied the hukomat, executing thirty Hassanzai elders (that is, from his clan 
and the people who posed a challenge to his power) who had been working with the 
government. He buried them in the village square, over which he had a dining area set up for 
entertaining guests.335 His private quest for power interacted with the public narrative of 
resistance to communism. 
 
By June, Now Zad, Washir and Sangin were under attack. Now Zad and Washir fell to 
coalitions of local commanders. Similarly, Sangin fell to Abdul Khaleq 
(Ishaqzai/Mistereekhel, from Qala-e Gaz), Atta Mohammad (Ishaqzai/Chowkazai, from 
Myanrodai)336 and Dad Mohammad (Alikozai, from Sarwan Qala). By mid-1979, the non-
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canal zone areas had fallen from government control.  Garmsir, Nad-e Ali and Nawa were to 
remain under government control until after the Soviet intervention at the end of the year.337 
Lashkar Gah remained a ‘bastion of the regime’.338 The higher education levels and lack of 
large-scale land redistribution in the canal-zone made them less susceptible to rebellion. 
 
2.5 - Mujahidin patronage 
The ‘organised’ resistance of the mujahidin parties only came later, once the Soviets had 
invaded. At the time that most of the northern districts were falling from government control, 
the mujahidin parties in Peshawar were still forming and reforming, fighting for influence and 
trying to attract funding.339 Local commanders reached out to Peshawar for membership, 
recognition and funding using different communication networks. The public narrative of 
Hizb-e Islami, hereafter referred to as Hizb, was as a party well known for recruiting among 
teachers and among young educated people.340 Their members often sought links through 
school or university colleagues to Hekmatyar and the supplies coming from Peshawar.  
 
Harakat was almost exclusively a clerical party341 and those that reached out to it often did 
so through previous religious teachers or through other mullahs that they had met at 
madrassas. Mahaz, led by Pir Gailani and widely seen as the Royalist party,342 organised 
itself along connections either generated around the Royal government or through teacher-
pupil relationships in Gailani’s Sufi order. But originally the resistance was private and local; 
the adoption of public narratives through interacting with the mujahidin parties came later 
and was based on personal connections to the Peshawar parties.  
 
These public-private interactions were related to refugee dynamics. Helmandi families, 
forced to move by the war and declining outputs of the canal and karez systems,343 adopted 
what is known as a split-migration strategy.344 This involved moving the bulk of the family to 
a refugee camp (usually Girdi Jangal in Pakistani Baluchistan), whilst maintaining workers 
(usually older men) to tend the land and keep it productive. The young men would, of 
course, be fighting: thus the family was able to maintain its obligations to the jihad. This 
meant the family tended to their assets, at the same time as keeping safe and reducing 
costs because they were being fed through refugee hand-outs. All of the mujahidin parties 
maintained offices in Girdi Jangal and people who had fled to the camps were quickly 
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recruited, armed and sent back.345 This interaction was later repeated with the post-2001 
Taliban.  
 
I will now give examples of the mobilisation of three key people. They are self-descriptions 
(or descriptions by close family members) and mostly echo the public narratives of the era. 
Self-descriptions, however, are often self-justifying. There is almost certainly some ex post 
facto justification occurring here. When we consider these personal stories alongside the 
government collapse discussed above, it is clear that there was an interaction between 
private actors and public organisations (the mujahidin parties) mediated by personal 
relationships.  
 
Hafizullah Khan, from Bolan (see map 5), immediately left for Peshawar upon Taraki’s 
acquisition of power. There, he met with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hizb, and 
started his training in Attock, in the Pakistani Punjab. As he put it, ‘[then] there was only 
Jamiat and Hizb to choose from’. He remembered the Islamic movement before this split had 
occurred from his days at the Lashkar Gah Lycee. In 1969, when he was sixteen, Ghulam 
Mahmad Niazee, a leader of the nascent Islamic movement in Afghanistan, had come to 
speak at the school and the ‘non-Muslims’ (i.e. communists) had tried to stop them speaking. 
The Islamists then fought the communists and were allowed to speak. Upon leaving school, 
Hafizullah studied Engineering at Kabul University shortly after Hekmatyar had been 
expelled and imprisoned for murder. There was still a residual ‘Hekmatyar network’, ensuring 
that when he went to Peshawar he was only looking for one man. Once he had been 
appointed Hizb Amir346 for Helmand by Hekmatyar in 1978, his job was to, as he put it, 
‘organise the war’. As mujahidin organisation developed this meant facilitating the interaction 
between private fighting groups and public organisation-supplied funding and weapons. He 
began to organise depots in Girdi Jangal and Baram Cha on the border between Helmand 
and Pakistan.347  
 
Malem Mir Wali was two years younger than Hafizullah and shared very similar experiences. 
He also blamed many of the disturbances at the Lycee on the communists and described the 
atmosphere as very factionalised: ‘the communists did not pray and had no respect for the 
teachers’, he said. What was happening at the Lycee in Lashkar Gah during the 1970s was 
a microcosm of what was happening on a much larger scale at the universities in Kabul: ‘you 
knew who the communists were and who the Muslims were’. After graduating from the 
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Lycee in 1975, Mir Wali went to teacher training college in Kandahar, completing his studies 
eight months after the Taraki coup. Many of his classmates in Kandahar had links to Hizb 
and the training college was a hotbed of political activism. He spent 1979 completing his 
national service. Just before the Soviets invaded he returned home to Spin Masjid, to teach 
in the primary school. After six months of teaching, and once the Soviets began to 
permanently base themselves in Helmand, he began fighting with Hizb as Shaed Mansour’s 
(Barakzai) deputy. When Mansour was eventually killed by the Soviets in 1984, Mir Wali took 
over.348  
 
Nasim Akhundzada, mentioned above, affiliated with Harakat. He had known Nabi 
Mohammedi, the leader of Harakat, since well before the war when Nabi had owned land 
and taught in Helmand.349 As Sher Mohammad, Nasim’s nephew said, ‘once [Nabi] had 
started Harakat [in September 1978] it was obvious who Nasim would go with, all the 
mullahs were with Nabi’: a very clear articulation of the public narrative. Once Nasim had 
begun to ‘protect the population’ he reached out to Nabi in Peshawar. When the weapons 
began to flow is not known, but what is clear is that, much like the Hizb mobilisation 
described above, there was an interaction between what was occurring in Musa Qala and 
the presence of a public organisation that was willing to provide legitimacy and funding. 
 
These three stories of mobilisation tell us several things. Firstly, that people will often 
describe formative events in their lives prima facia through an ideological prism. However, 
when we pick apart their stories we can see a very clear public-interaction between the 
individual commanders and the mujahidin organisations. Moreover, it was the commanders 
who reached out to the mujahidin parties and not vice versa, which gives credence to the 
second part of my thesis: that the private sphere has primacy in driving conflict dynamics. 
 
2.6 - Amin and the Soviet intervention 
Hafizullah Amin (Kharoti) seized power in Kabul in September 1979. The takeover was an 
echo of the Taraki coup and there was little change to government policy seen in 
Helmand.350 As an ex-Khalqi said to me, ‘Amin just altered the patronage network’.351 Those 
who had been jailed under Taraki were released, and previous Taraki supporters were jailed 
or fled.352 Land, the key mechanism of patronage in Helmand, was redistributed again. 
‘Trib[al] [membership] was very important’ said a senior Kharoti tribal figure: they got their 
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confiscated land back by order of (the Kharoti) Amin.353 Others began to take their land 
back. In most cases the new owners of their land were their previous tenants; only those 
who had done something wrong (for example, they were among the Khalqis who had stolen 
it) were removed and killed, the remainder were allowed to stay, readopting tenant status. In 
one case described to me, the local Hizb commander cut a deal with the tribal leadership—
the mujahidin would get their land back for them, but they had to pay. ‘Jihad was not free’.354 
This is far from the public narrative of the glorious mujahidin. 
 
Concurrently, (private) groups of resistance fighters began to seek interactions with public 
organisations and their narratives—the mujahidin parties. As a result, the population became 
able to indicate which party a commander was affiliated with,355 even though most 
commanders ‘wouldn’t have been able to say who Hekmatyar, Zahir Shah or the Muslim 
brotherhood were or what they stood for’.356 This cut both ways: ‘the [parties] who gave 
[them] weapons had no idea how they were being used’.357 This is a clear example of private 
actors exploiting the opacity of the private sphere to public organisations. Soon, the Soviet 
intervention would massively increase the amount of funding that mujahidin parties received: 
before the intervention they were ‘more or less dormant’ due to lack of funding.358 This 
increased the opportunities for exploitation. An interaction between the public and private 
spheres fed the violence in Helmand.  
 
In December, with the situation spiralling, the Soviets intervened and enthroned the 
Parcham faction under Babrak Karmal. They planned for a temporary deployment to 
stabilise the situation, thus allowing them to leave.359 From the Soviet perspective, troops 
were not necessary in Helmand as ‘the government was really strong [there]’.360 They also 
considered Helmand (and particularly northern Helmand) a strategic backwater.361 As one 
senior ex-communist police officer commented ‘before [he] came to Helmand, [he] thought it 
was just Gereshk’.362 The key Soviet aim, and the only one that was prosecuted until the 
end, was to keep the route from Herat to Kandahar open.363 However, the installation of 
Karmal by the Soviets made him an instant puppet in the eyes of the Helmandis (even more 
so than Taraki and Amin had been considered, although there was no change in policy 
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between any of the three leaders, as discerned from Helmand).364 Thus, the population 
evicted the government from the remainder of the countryside including Nad-e Ali, even 
getting to the point where they were able to fire upon Safean, a southern part of the urban 
area of Lashkar Gah.365  
 
The situation became critical. In mid-1980, the Soviets deployed up to five hundred troops to 
Lashkar Gah. Bost airfield, hereafter referred to as the ‘maidan’, was developed as the 
Soviet headquarters in Helmand.366 Up to that point, only the pre-intervention mentoring 
structure of two advisors per police or army kandak (battalion) was in place.367 The 
immediate Soviet concern was to establish a defensive perimeter (a ‘cumberband’: see map 
5) around Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and the connecting road through Chah-e Anjir. Secondary 
to that was the re-establishment of some of the hukomats from which the government had 
been evicted.368 This took until late 1983, and was some of the toughest fighting of the 
Soviet’s Helmand deployment; for example, the Nad-e Ali hukomat was established and 
overrun several times.369  
 
Eventually the mujahidin, as they had become labelled by that point, were pushed back and 
a series of posts were established through Nawa, Aynak, Bolan, Loy Bagh, Chah-e Anjir, 
Basharan and in the desert to the east of Lashkar Gah.370 A similar series of posts was 
established around Gereshk, running along the Abhashak Wadi, and through Abhazan and 
Deh Adam Khan (see map 5).371 The Soviets then established a second headquarters with 
an artillery detachment on a small hill just to the south of Gereshk—the Helmandis now call 
the hill ‘taapuh’.372 Soviet troop numbers based in Helmand eventually rose to about one 
thousand373 or fifteen hundred374 by 1987.  
 
So far, we have discussed the post-communist revolution actions of the government and the 
responses of the population. Whilst, by definition, the government’s actions were driven by 
the public sphere, the population’s response was shaped and driven by an interaction 
between the public and the private spheres. The ensuing conflict caused the Soviets to 
deploy troops to central Helmand. We will now explore what was happening in areas of 
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Helmand where Soviet troops did not base themselves, before looking at central Helmand, 
where there was a more extensive Soviet presence. 
 
2.7 - Inter-‘mujahidin’ group conflict 
Northern Helmand began to fight itself. Where coalitions of local groups had ejected the 
government in 1978 and 1979, they began to fall out during 1981. This was not helped by 
the fact that commanders who were geographically proximate often subscribed to different 
mujahidin parties because they were trying to gain leverage their in private cleavages: the 
interaction between the two spheres worsened any conflicts.375 Northern Helmand’s mini civil 
war is one of the dynamics from this era that completely divorces from the public cleavage of 
the mujahidin resisting the Soviets. They used Soviet and mujahidin party money to fight 
each other. Private cleavages drove the conflict in northern Helmand whilst public 
organisations supplied it.376 
 
This dynamic was partly understood by Khad, the government security service, and 
exploited ruthlessly in Helmand as per its official, national policy.377 As Jabbar Qahraman, 
one of my on-the record interviewees (see Appendix 1), said to me, ‘the mujahidin in 
Helmand didn’t fight the government at all; they fought each other’. ‘Khad had links with all of 
[the mujahidin groups], we just sat back and watched them attack each other’ he said with a 
laugh. Not as much ISI-supplied mujahidin party money made it to Helmand as to other 
areas. They too considered it a backwater populated with the ‘Royal’ Durrani tribes that they 
were trying to disempower.378  
 
Now Zad offers a key example of private cleavages between mujahidin groups. By mid-1980 
Khad began to explore what was happening in Now Zad. The situation was complicated—
there were three main tribal groupings and a host of smaller communities, each of which had 
multiple commanders. The Ishaqzai, probably the largest community, were led by Mullah 
Abdul Ahad and were affiliated with Harakat. Ahad soon subjugated himself to Nasim from 
Musa Qala, in order to guarantee supplies.379  
 
The Noorzai were clustered around the two leaders of Haji Abdullah Jan and Israel Khan, 
both of whom had sought supplies from Hizb. Israel Khan was in a stronger position though: 
Mahmad Ashem, his patriarch, lived in Lashkar Gah, and was deliberately supportive of the 
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‘government’. Tor Jan, his nephew, was also a tribal liaison officer in Khad. Israel was the 
family member in the ‘mujahidin’. This affiliation with both government and mujahidin public 
organisations was later to prove useful when the mujahidin took over Lashkar Gah and Israel 
was a member of the attacking force—those ‘communist’ members of his family were 
saved.380 The deliberate splitting of (private) lineages across public organisations is a key 
piece of evidence in support of my thesis. It continues to the present day. See Appendix 4 
for Mahmad Ashem’s family tree. 
 
The third largest community, the Barakzai, were led by Malem Yusof and Zabit Jalil, an ex-
teacher and army officer respectively. They were both supplied by Hizb.381 ‘Hizb’ and 
‘Harakat’ in Now Zad soon began to fight, although now, the reason why is obscure. Some 
eyewitnesses say it was about ‘money and drugs’.382 Yet others, point to the killing of a 
‘Harakat’ commander by ‘Hizb’, sparking revenge.383 Mir Wali believes they began to fight 
because of a failed internal ‘Harakat’ arrest that caused two ‘Harakat’ men to seek asylum 
with a ‘Hizb’ commander. The ‘Hizb’ commander then refused to give them up to ‘Harakat’ 
because of the importance of offering asylum to the Pushtun. Whatever the precise spark, 
‘Harakat’ attacked ‘Hizb’,384 yet it appears from the evidence above that private cleavages 
instigated the conflict. Khad also had a key role, if not in instigating the conflict, then in 
massively supporting the ‘Harakat’ factions through Nasim Akhundzada.385 Khad’s dealings 
with Nasim deviate so much from Harakat’s and the mujahidin’s public narratives that they 
are worth exploring in some detail. 
 
Nasim, his brothers and nephew were later to dominate Helmand, continuing to the present 
day. A large part of their narrative is that they fought the Soviets forcing them to leave and 
that they then evicted the remnants of the communist government from Lashkar Gah.386 It 
echoes the glorious mujahidin narrative and is often presented thus in the literature.387 When 
I interviewed Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, Nasim’s nephew, and asked him about the 
public-private interaction—whether his uncle had, as many others had, accepted supplies 
from Khad—he started laughing and stumbling over his words, asking me, ‘Which Khad?’ As 
we both knew, there was only one Khad.  
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He looked me straight in the eye, and, without a trace of irony, said ‘We [were] the cleanest 
mujahidin in the country; it was pure jihad’. Whatever Sher Mohammad might protest, that 
Nasim Akhundzada accepted money and supplies from Khad to attack other mujahidin 
groups (particularly Hizb ones) is well known in Helmand. He was not the only commander 
to have done so by any means, but, he was the primary recipient of their aid.388 There is a 
clear interaction between public and private spheres here. Rasoul, Nasim’s brother, even 
later preached in northern Helmand’s mosques against Hizb: ‘Parcham and Khalq have 
become Muslims, but not Hizb’, he said.389  
 
So why did the government support Nasim so much? In central Helmand, the main 
mujahidin party represented was ‘Hizb’, particularly in Nad-e Ali and around Gereshk, thus 
they represented the biggest threat to the government in Helmand. On a public, ideological 
and a national level, the government knew Hizb the best from pre-Saur revolution clashes in 
the universities. They were also scared of them as they were the most organised, literate 
and best funded element of the resistance.390 One knowledgeable and well-connected 
interviewee thinks that the Khad interest in Now Zad was piqued by the growth of ‘Hizb’ 
there in early 1980.391  
 
However, a policy of putting Hizb under pressure in northern Helmand, in order to provide 
relief for the government in central Helmand, betrays a misunderstanding by Khad of the 
degree of acephaly present in the mujahidin in Helmand. Khad were blinded by the opacity 
of northern Helmand. It shows that they were following the public narratives surrounding the 
mujahidin—particularly their ideological and unitary nature—rather than understanding that 
their formation, organisation and ideological affiliation was driven to a much greater extent 
by the private sphere. This was confirmed by a professional police officer who stated that ‘it 
was only during Najib’s time [1986 onwards] that Khad started to understand the differences 
in-between the different mujahidin groups [i.e. understand the private sphere]’.392 Because 
Khad did not understand the private sphere surrounding different ‘mujahidin’ groups they 
were manipulated by actors like Nasim: the private sphere drove events. 
 
This inter-commander war became wider and demonstrates well the interaction between the 
public and private spheres that drive conflict, as well as the primacy of the private sphere. 
For example, Abdul Rahman Khan (Alizai/Khalozai) was a major commander from Kajaki. 
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He had had ‘problems’ with Nasim since before the Saur revolution, but he was also 
responsible for ‘Hizb’ in the north of Helmand and in charge of those ‘Hizb’ sub-commanders 
who were fighting Nasim’s Harakat-supplied commanders in Now Zad.393 As a khan he was 
much more likely to follow Mahaz’s public narrative, as opposed to Hizb’s, whose main 
constituency was teachers, engineers and other educated professionals,394 yet he switched 
from Mahaz to Hizb when Mahaz could not supply him adequately.395 When asked about the 
reasons for the Abdul Rahman Khan-Nasim discord, responses vary from money,396 
accusations about one or the other of them being supported by Khad397 or giving information 
to Khad,398 territory,399 pre-Taraki issues400 or that Abdul Rahman Khan got dragged in to the 
fighting because his sub-commanders were fighting for their lives in Now Zad.401 These 
reasons are all public-private interactions, mostly driven by private cleavages. 
 
Rais Baghrani was the third big commander in northern Helmand, and came from the 
Khalozai, the same sub-tribe as Abdul Rahman Khan. Originally a Khalqi, he affiliated 
himself to Harakat.402 Then, to escape Nasim’s growing dominance, he affiliated himself with 
Abdul Rahman Khan under Hizb patronage.403 Baghrani was later to ‘join’ Jamiat, the 
Taliban and finally the Karzai government.404 Each change in membership of public 
organisation was due to evolutions in the private sphere, particularly cleavages, which he 
needed to either exploit or not be destroyed by: the public sphere was/is irrelevant to him. 
Soon, Baghrani and Nasim also began to fight, potentially in response to the Nasim-Abdul 
Rahman Khan fighting. Khad were ever-present on the side-lines.405 These dynamics have 
implications reaching to the present day and are a key piece of evidence supporting my 
thesis. Different public spheres have come and gone, but Baghrani’s and Nasim’s families 
are still fighting, all the while interacting with whichever public organisation will help them in 
that private cleavage (as we shall see in sections 3.11, 4.2, 4.8 and 5.2). 
 
Sangin followed a similar pattern.406 It had fallen to a private alliance of Abdul Khaleq, Dad 
Mohammad and Atta Mohammad in mid-1979 (all from the areas surrounding Sangin’s 
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hukomat), who ejected the Governor, Engineer Qasim (Achakzai, Hyderabad, Khalqi).407 
Rauf Khan (Ishaqzai/Mistereekhel)408 was a fourth commander from the north of Qala-e 
Gaz,409 and appears not to have been involved in the original overthrow in Sangin, yet rose 
to become the Mahaz Amir for Helmand due to his standing as the second most important 
leader in the Helmandi Ishaqzai.410 Dad Mohammad affiliated himself to Mahaz despite 
being Alikozai. He was driven by a private cleavage with Atta Mohammad (Ishaqzai) over 
Sangin’s bazaar.411  
 
Thus, Dad Mohammad was soon to ‘join’ Jamiat for the remainder of the jihad, as Mahaz 
could not supply him properly.412 Atta Mohammad was ‘with’ Jamiat, although he had briefly 
‘been’ Harakat at the very beginning, and was soon to re-affiliate himself with Harakat.413 
Abdul Khaleq, from the southern part of Qala-e Gaz, opted for Hizb,414 probably because he 
was in competition with all of them and was the furthest removed from Sangin. His southern 
flank also abutted central Helmand, which was a Hizb stronghold. The plethora of side-
switching and deal making in Sangin supports the idea that private cleavages were the 
primary driver in public organisation (~mujahidin party) selection (see map 6). 
 
2.8 - Papaver Somniferum415 
Opium poppy is a traditional crop in Northern Helmand. During the course of the 1980s its 
cultivation spread province-wide.416 It was vital: the drugs trade ensured survival due to the 
revenues it could generate thus buying a military edge in local disputes. Drugs money 
increased one’s power and allowed greater territorial control, which in turn meant more 
control of the narcotics business. Although Nasim controlled the traditional opium growing 
areas, other mujahidin groups soon adopted the same strategy.417 Some scholars418 have 
argued that Nasim coerced individual farmers into poppy production. This seems unlikely 
given the attraction of poppy growing for farmers, in terms of increased and more stable 
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revenue. He did, however, support opium production by offering credit to growers and 
facilitating trade.419 
 
A key factor in leading me to make this analysis is the sheer number of Helmandi famers 
who claimed to me when I was a British officer that the Taliban forced them to grow poppy, 
even among communities where I knew the ‘Taliban’ to be nothing more than their own 
village defence forces or tribal militias. I came to the conclusion that they were merely 
appealing to what they thought my public narrative was, that is, ‘Drugs are bad, Taliban are 
bad, they must be linked’. Of course, the implicit assumptions in my argument are that the 
Taliban and the mujahidin are similar, if not conceptually identical,420 and that the farmer is a 
rational economic actor. 
 
What is clear though is that production was taxed by Nasim at ten per cent, and 
transportation was further taxed.421 Rasoul, Nasim’s older brother and a cleric, offered 
Islamic justification for the growing of opium. He manipulated public narratives for his own 
private gain: ‘we must grow and sell opium to fight our holy war against the Soviet 
nonbelievers’ and 'Islamic law bans the taking of opium, but there is no prohibition against 
growing it’, said he.422 Moreover, Nasim offered credit to farmers under the traditional423 
salaam system, whereby he bought the crop at the time of sowing.424 The opium moved out 
along the same route that weapons came in, to the Girdi Jangal camp in Baluchistan, thence 
to nearby refineries owned by Hizb in Koh-e sultan.425 Nasim even had an office in Zahidan, 
Iran to handle onward movement.426  
 
The poppy funding gave Nasim another edge in his struggles with rival mujahidin groups and 
soon the clashes became not only financed by drug profits, but about drug profits; control of 
agricultural land, transport routes and bridges became essential. The farmers grew the crop 
for economic reasons,427 but the commanders had to control the territory to tax them. 
(Nasim’s fighters demanded in-kind payments of bread from farmers for ‘protection’ and so 
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farmers needed even more to maximise the revenue from their land).428 This dynamic 
continues today, where often poppy funds are not so much used to pay for anti-government 
fighting, but anti-government fighting is used to defend or gain elements of the narcotics 
business. By 1989 when the Soviets left, the ‘mujahidin’ in Helmand were considered largely 
self-financing.429 
 
Nasim claimed to have set up hospitals and clinics in the areas that he controlled.430 
Similarly, Nasim and other clerical leaders, such as Baghrani, expanded their madrasa 
networks to train military recruits for their mujahidin forces (Nasim’s were known as the 
‘Sacrificers’)431 and a clerical-run civil bureaucracy.432 I interpret this as part of a quest for 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population that many Helmandi leaders exhibit once they get to 
a certain stature. No matter how they have accumulated their money or power, most leaders 
in Helmand begin to act like tribal leaders and distribute patronage to establish the 
beginnings of patron-client relationships. This provision of ‘political’ services to the 
population marks the transition to warlordism. Incidentally, Sher Mohammad, Nasim’s 
nephew, went to one of these madrasas in Zamindawar with Abdul Qayoum Zakir, a future 
leader in the Taliban movement and head of the Taliban Military Commission in 2012.433  
 
2.9 - Nahr-e Saraj 
Central Helmand was more stable in terms of large-scale inter-commander warfare, due to 
the presence of an enemy—the government and the Soviets. However, particularly in the 
canal-zones, there were numerous, smaller groups due to the social heterogeneity. Gereshk 
itself was held by the government, and a defensive line was established by the hydroelectric 
dam to the east (the band-e barq) guarded by one of the few remaining depaye militias.434 
The area around the dam was/is socially heterogeneous with a Barakzai majority. This had 
been a key part of the previous monarchy’s power base in Helmand and there are many 
Mohammadzai villages. There are a smattering of Kakar villages, some Ishaqzai on the 
eastern fringes and seventy-five (mainly Ghilzai) families from the canal projects.435 This 
multiplicity of private interests was enough to diversify the public-private interactions of party 
membership, village by village.436 Hizb, Harakat, Mahaz, Etihad and Nejad were all 
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mentioned as having villages in the area who sought supplies from them.437 There was small 
scale skirmishing throughout the jihad, but the presence of the government kept them 
focused.438 It matches very well the public sphere of the era. See map 7. 
 
In Malgir, to the west of Gereshk, a slightly different situation prevailed. Malgir and the areas 
around Paind Kalay were overwhelmingly Barakzai. Those that were not were implants from 
the Taraki land redistributions, but these were often ejected once the government lost 
control.439 The Barakzai in that area have traditionally allied themselves into two power 
blocks of different clans. Led by Haji Khalifa Shirin Khan were the more powerful clans, the 
Akhundzadakhel, the Utmanzai, the Bayezai and the Sardarzai. These generally affiliated 
with Hizb. The second, weaker power block was led by Haji Abdul Agha and consisted of the 
Shamezai, Nekazai, Yedarzai and Masezai. These generally affiliated with Harakat.440 Both 
of the power block leaders were major landowners: Khalifa Shirin Khan owned one thousand 
six hundred jereebs.441 Such large historical landowners were not ‘normal’ Hizb commanders 
(according to Hizb’s public narrative). Thus, in Malgir, the pre-Taraki division was reflected in 
the choice of mujahidin party selection. The private cleavage drove the public-private 
interaction, in this case between two mujahidin organisations with different ideologies. 
 
According to Mir Wali, who was later to dominate the area as the major Hizb commander, 
‘Harakat’ groups began to form in Malgir in 1980 under Mahmad Wali. The ‘Hizb’ groups 
formed in 1981 under Shaed Mansor (Barakzai) and eventually became more powerful. 
There were also a smattering of Mahaz and Etihad groups, but these soon allied themselves 
with one of the two dominant factions.442 There were no major clashes between the different 
groups reported to me, at least during the first few years of the communist government. This 
was similar to Babaji, further to the west and positioned on the border between Lashkar Gah, 
Nad-e Ali and Nahr-e Saraj districts, where the villages (all Barakzai) tended to get on, 
despite differing party membership—it was mostly Hizb affiliated, with some Etihad, Jamiat 
and Mahaz villages.443 In Babaji, the types of commanders fitted the public sphere better. 
For example, the Mahaz leader was Khwashdel Khan, a tribal leader.444 The Harakat 
groupings were under Mullah Hafizullah.445 It was probably proximity to the government 
strong-hold of Chah-e Anjir that kept the different groups allied. 
                                                          
437








 800 acres. 
442









© Mike Martin 2013 
2.10 - Nad-e Ali: a plethora of groups 
Nad-e Ali was different yet again. The canal settlements had created a unique social 
laydown with different villages populated by different tribal and ethnic groups. In addition, 
there were also completely socially mixed villages. The most developed government 
infrastructure of any rural area in Helmand generated interaction between the government 
and the population, that is, between public and private. This led to a degree of Khad 
penetration, although it appears to have been on a much smaller scale than in northern 
Helmand. Yet overall, Nad-e Ali did not suffer from the major infighting that was present 
elsewhere, for several reasons. The presence of the government focussed effort and, most 
of the different groups in Nad-e Ali shared common cause due to arriving at the same time, 
whereas elsewhere in Helmand the settlers were mixed in with the indigenous Helmandis. 
Secondly, in Nad-e Ali—as per the Royal Government’s aims446—the social power blocks 
were relatively small, and so infighting could be quickly contained. The ‘Hizb’-‘Harakat’ 
fighting was not to reach Nad-e Ali for some years and by-and-large it remained peaceful 
until then. See map 8. 
 
At the time of the Soviet intervention, the Kharoti were the largest community in Nad-e Ali.447 
Like many communities, or lineages, they used a strategy of bridging the public mujahidin-
government cleavage by deliberately placing people in key positions on both sides.448 In 
their thinking, the unit of currency that must survive was the community group. Thus, the 
Kharoti leader, Wakil Safar, became a Senator appointed by Karmal.449 Yet the village that 
he was from, Shin Kalay, and another closely related Kharoti village, Naqilabad, were utterly 
dominated by ‘Hizb’ groupings (Hekmatyar, the leader of Hizb, was also Kharoti).450 
Ironically, it was the arrest of the respected Wakil Safar during the Taraki-era that had 
pushed the village to reach out to Hizb for supplies.451 Shin Kalay provided multiple fighting 
groups led by commanders such as Dr Jailani and Baryalai, with each commander leading 
men from their lineages.452 See Appendix 4 for Kharoti tribal diagram. Naqilabad was 
dominated by Pir Mohammad Sadat who was widely respected as an exceptionally brave 
commander and revered for fighting hand-to-hand against Soviet soldiers in irrigation 
ditches.453  
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The third major grouping of Kharoti in Nad-e Ali were those who had been settled by Noor 
Mohammad Khan (also a parliamentarian)454 around Khwashal Kalay and Noor Mohammad 
Khan Kalay. Previously kuchis (nomads), they were slightly looked down on by the other 
Kharoti, who had already been landowners before they came to Nad-e Ali.455 The Kharoti in 
Shin Kalay and Noor Mohammad Khan Kalay had been feuding at a low-level for years.456  
Although Noor Mohammad’s son Haji Jalalzai originally joined Hizb ‘for lack of other 
parties’,457 the villages soon broke with the rest of the Kharoti and affiliated with Harakat458 
under Mullah Baz Mohammad (Taraki) from Marjeh.459 The switch in mujahidin party 
affiliation was driven by the low-level feud with Shin Kalay. This cleavage was to prove 
surprisingly stable during the jihad, however, with only minor skirmishing between the 
groups, usually over who could get supplies from different sections of the population.460 
 
This stability was mainly due to the presence of a Kharoti shura across the two mujahidin 
parties represented within the Kharoti and covering those members of the tribe in the 
government, including Wakil Safar—i.e. Kharoti private interests were allied across the 
memberships of several different public organisations.461 Disputes between different Kharoti 
mujahidin groupings would quickly be resolved before they escalated and the tribe was able 
to maintain a foot in all camps whilst sharing information between themselves.462 When I 
questioned senior Kharoti leaders in early 2009 (as a serving British Army officer, in uniform) 
about those members of their tribe in the ‘Taliban’ that we knew to be fighting us, they would 
shrug and explain that they had lost control of the younger, more wayward members of the 
tribe. Their explanation was that the ‘Kharoti’ supported the government, but the tribe was 
fragmented because of the war. They argued that the differing public narratives (e.g. 
Taliban, government) were driving their private cleavages.  
 
I further explored this issue with the same elders in 2011-12 (as a researcher). I suggested 
that (the private alliance of) a pan-tribal shura straddling government and non-government 
lines and sharing information was still in existence during the contemporary Taliban-
government conflict. They laughed, looked sheepish, and agreed.463 It was fascinating to 
compare their open acknowledgement, even glee, at the deliberate splitting of families 
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during the jihad, juxtaposed with their denials of a similar contemporary dynamic. The same 
private dynamic, but I, the questioner, was from different public sphere. This is a further 
important piece of evidence for my thesis that the private sphere has primacy in driving 
public-private interactions, when the outside actor does not fully understand the private 
sphere. 
 
The second most populous community at that time was probably the Noorzai centred on Loy 
Bagh under the leadership of Shah Nazar Helmandwal. He was also asked by Karmal to be 
a parliamentarian despite his ‘membership’ of Mahaz.464 Within Shah Nazar’s sub-tribe, the 
Gurg, his brother Haji Pida Mohammad was a ‘clean skin’ (i.e. affiliated to no-one), and his 
nephew, Abdul Ahad, was an ‘Etihad’ commander, although this was a deliberate decision 
for family safety, as opposed to the unplanned ‘Hizb’-‘Harakat’ split in the Kharoti.465 Another 
sub-tribe of the Noorzai in Loy Bagh, the Aghezai, were also deliberately split: they were 
mostly in the ‘government’, indeed one of them, Khano, later grew to become the most 
influential militia leader in Helmand. Yet, Mullahs Habibullah and Karim, two influential 
members of the sub-tribe and Khano’s relatives, were the ‘Hizb’ commanders for the area.466 
See map 9.  
 
The high degree of private cleavages in Loy Bagh, interacting with strong Hizb and 
government public penetration meant that Loy Bagh was frequently a battleground (more 
interactions meant more conflict).467 It was destroyed twice during government offensives 
and even doubled up as the hukomat when the real one was overrun.468 The deliberately 
split kinship groups were a gift for Khad. It enabled them to manipulate the private 
cleavages: sub-tribe against sub-tribe and cousin against cousin.469 As Khad were Parchami 
dominated, Hizb and Khalq were both competitors to them, albeit on different sides of the 
public ‘government’-‘mujahidin’ divide.470 Of course, as shown by Kalyvas’ denunciation 
theory, it worked both ways—it was not just Khad exploiting private cleavages, but members 
of the population attempting to manipulate Khad against their own private enemies.471 This 
meant that Loy Bagh became an impossible place in which to live, and several people left 
Loy Bagh and went to Chah-e Mirza in order to prosecute their jihad there.472 This, in turn, 
led to their neighbours trying to steal their land—something else that Khad spotted and took 
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advantage of.473 As one senior Noorzai tribal leader described it, ‘it was a civil war between 
families’.474 Loy Bagh was a ‘front line’ and whose territory you lived in dictated your public 
ideological leanings.475 Interestingly, in Loy Bagh, the public organisation of Khad 
understood well the private sphere in Loy Bagh,476 and this meant that neither sphere was 
able to determine to conflict dynamics: neither the ‘government’ nor the ‘mujahidin’ wanted to 
destroy Loy Bagh, yet that was what happened. 
 
The last major group of Noorzai in Nad-e Ali were not settlers from the canal projects. Haji 
Lal Jan (Noorzai/Darzai, Harakat) led a group of Noorzai tribesmen from the village of 
Gundacha in Washir to Noorzo Kalay (so named after them), north of the Nahr-e Bughra just 
as government control began to slip in central Helmand. Water stress had forced them out of 
Washir.477 The area was known to him because his brother, Qabir Khan, had been fighting 
with Harakat in Nad-e Ali.478 They were cousins of Abdul Rahman Jan (Noorzai/Darzai), who 
was later to become much more prominent as the Helmand Chief of Police under President 
Karzai.479  Another group that came at that time was an Ishaqzai community led by 
Rahmattiar who settled to the south of Khwashal Kalay in Jangal. As a Hizb commander, 
Rahmattiar had cut a deal whereby the Hizb Amir Hafizullah would bless what was 
effectively land theft.480 Rahmattiar was to grow into the most powerful Hizb commander in 
the south of Nad-e Ali.481 
 
Despite the difference in background and provenance between Rahmattiar (Hizb, Ishaqzai, 
land thief) and Jamalzai (Harakat, Kharoti, settler) there was no infighting reported between 
the groups in the early stages of the jihad. Khwashal Kalay was shared on an amicable basis 
between Harakat and Hizb. Haji Mullah Paslow, leading the Popalzai community around 
Khwashal Kalay, was the third big commander in the area. Both Harakat commanders, 
Jamalzai and Paslow, got their supplies from Baz Mohammad in Marjeh.482 The Hazaras, 
right on the southern tip of Nad-e Ali, were unified and fought with Wahdat (a Shia, Iranian-
sponsored party) under Assadullah Karimi, the village teacher.483 Marjeh was similarly 
fractured with Hizb commanders including Obaedi (Daftani) and Muslimyar (Achakzai), 
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Mahaz commanders including Tor Jan (Alikozai), Etihad commanders including Matouf Khan 
and Yahya (Noorzai) and Jamiat commanders including Hakim Khan (Daftani), as well as 
the aforementioned Baz Mohammad who organised Harakat supplies in the area.484 The 
social heterogeneity created by the canal projects had bred a plethora of mujahidin groups. 
 
2.11 - Nawa and Garmsir 
Moving further south, Nawa enjoyed a unique situation which meant that fighting was kept at 
a low-level during the jihad. Apart from settler families, Nawa is dominated by the Popalzai 
and Barakzai tribes, both of whom enjoy good relations with each other in Helmand. At first, 
many groups tried to affiliate themselves with Mahaz, a natural party for these two ‘Royal’ 
tribes, however an absence of supplies meant that they both aligned with Jamiat.485 Jamiat 
in Nawa was led by Akhwaendi (Barakzai/Akhundzai), the party Amir for the province.486 But 
the most important part of Nawa’s stability was the fact that Allah Noor 
(Barakzai/Nooradinzai/Gurgezai), a relative-by-marriage of Akhwaendi (Akhwaendi’s sister 
married Allah Noor’s brother), was the Khalqi militia leader in charge of the southern part of 
the cumberband that stretched through Nawa protecting the District Centre and Lashkar 
Gah.487  
 
Allah Noor’s brothers were in Jamiat, and, Akhwaendi’s brothers were in the militia: ‘a lot of 
women had been swapped between [their] two clans [over the years]’.488 Thus, there was no 
public cleavage between the ‘government’ and ‘Jamiat’ in Nawa, largely because they were 
composed of allied private groups! This also allowed both the government and the mujahidin 
to claim that they ‘controlled’ Nawa, but in reality it was controlled by allied private actors. 
This vignette is a useful piece of evidence in support of my thesis. Any fighting that occurred 
in the area was between Hafizullah Khan’s ‘Hizb’ commanders and Akhwaendi’s ‘Jamiat’ 
commanders, who were backed up by Allah Noor—the ‘government’. This was mainly over 
who could control and tax the people in that part of the Barakzai belt489 and bears no 
resemblance to the public sphere of the conflict.  
 
Finally, we turn to Garmsir. As the gateway with Pakistan, Garmsir occupies a strategic 
position as a major mujahidin supply route for weapons travelling into, and drugs travelling 
out of, Helmand. However, as elsewhere, the resistance in Garmsir started independently of 
political parties. Haji Aurang Khan (Noorzai) had been Garmsir’s first political prisoner, and 
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after twelve months in jail, was released and began to fight the government. In 1980, he 
‘joined’ Harakat, using the village mullah’s links to a Harakat mawlana named Zakiri (Hotak, 
from Kandahar) in the party’s Quetta office. Aurang cooperated with mujahidin from other 
parties including Hazandar and Neamatullah Khan (both Alizai, Hizb)490 and Alam Gul 
(Kharoti, Nejad).491  
 
Even so, they were not able to push the government out of the hukomat. In mid-1980 
Mudomer Khan (Noorzai), a Harakat commander, enlisted the support of Nasim Akhundzada 
from Musa Qala to come down and evict the government.492 Nasim left behind in place a 
‘Harakat’ administration, but soon there were problems. Aurang still allowed ‘Hizb’ to operate 
in the district and pass supplies as they had done before—after all, they were all mujahidin 
fighting the infidel communists—however Zakiri in the Harakat office complained. Aurang 
promptly left Harakat and became independent again. Sometime later (probably 1982), once 
the Soviets had re-established the District Centre, Aurang and his men re-joined the jihad 
with the Khales faction of Hizb.493 
 
I have here summarised what was occurring in the different districts in Helmand in response 
to the Soviet intervention. This general discussion of the different districts reveals an 
intensely complicated private sphere of actors, groups, narratives and cleavages. Each of 
the areas had a slightly different mix of local factors—the presence of government in their 
area, the degree and type of social fragmentation based on tribal structures, length of time 
settled in the area, migration patterns, land ownership and so on—which resulted in a 
multiplicity of different public-private interactions.  
 
In most areas, however, the private cleavages and actors were paramount, due to 
government ignorance of the complexity of the private sphere. The coping strategy 
employed by Helmandis over the last thirty-four years—membership of different public 
organisations by the same private lineage—demonstrates clearly how in these 
circumstances the private sphere is important in comparison to the public one. For every 
example, though, there is a counter-example. Some families did genuinely split along 
ideological lines at the beginning of the jihad, only to reconcile later, but these were very 
few.494 I will now discuss how the government attempted to control the situation.  
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2.12 - Government infighting 
Whilst the early rebel bands were seeking supplies from their respective mujahidin parties, 
the government and their Soviet backers were fighting to secure central Helmand. The 
cumberband came under the responsibility of the police,495 although the southern sections 
were held by Khalqi militias.496 Outside of the police cumberband the Afghan Army was 
deployed. Their brigade headquarters was based in Bolan497 with kandaks in Khan Eshin, 
Khwash Kawa, Garmsir and the desert to the south of the Arghandab River. Their main role 
was interdiction of mujahidin supply routes. Artillery was kept in Bolan, the maidan and to the 
south of Gereshk, and was regularly used to shell villages as punishment for harbouring 
‘mujahidin’.498 Aside from their advisors in the police, Soviet troops worked with the Afghan 
Army, although the numbers of Soviet troops were much smaller and would rise and fall 
dependent on what was happening across the south and west of Afghanistan.499 At most, 
the Soviets had a kandak in Lashkar Gah and a kandak of spetznaz (special forces) working 
across the province with the Afghan Army. Any major operations were usually conducted by 
extra troops brought in from either Kandahar or Herat.500 
 
In a reflection of the intra-‘mujahidin’ cleavages, there were major problems between the 
Khalqi and Parchami factions within the government.501 Helmand was a major area for 
Khalqi recruitment, yet the national government was dominated by Parchamis. Kabul had to 
tread a careful line politically in Helmand, and chose to appoint Khalqis there, as a reflection 
of the local political landscape. For example, Zeyarmal, a Parchami Barakzai from 
Kandahar, was appointed Provincial Governor in 1984, but was swiftly removed when it 
came to be understood that only Khalqis could work in that position.502 The police, who were 
drawn from the villages of central Helmand, tended to be Khalqi dominated. Khad was 
mostly Parchami, but did not trust the Helmandi Khalqis, leading to problems with 
information sharing and cooperation.503  Often their Soviet mentors took on the views of their 
mentees causing factionalism within the Soviet establishment as well.504 Of course, within 
these distinctions we have to take account of the degree to which people actually subscribed 
to the public narratives, as party membership was often a necessary part of career 
advancement.505  
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The Khalqi-Parchami relationship should be considered a complicating factor for the overall 
Soviet-Afghan government relationship within Helmand. Generally speaking the latter 
relationship was good, particularly between the Soviets and the Parchamis. Soviets were 
posted to Helmand for two years, and so were able to gain some familiarity with Helmand’s 
private sphere. In addition, the Soviet intervention had been prefaced by a decades-long 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, meaning that many of the Helmandi 
communists had studied in the Soviet Union and spoke Russian. As such there was a 
degree of familiarity with each other’s culture and they would often socialise together in 
Lashkar Gah. The Soviets also had a number of Pushtu-trained linguists, as well as native 
Tajiks (Farsi, Dari and Tajik are all derivations of the same language that allow mutual 
comprehension). Finally, many of the Afghan communists were already members of the 
PDPA before the Soviets intervened and so a person’s ideology was better known—this 
increased general trust between the two camps.506 That said, many Khalqis were willing to 
accept the technical and material help that the Soviets gave them, but, as Habibullah, an ex-
Khalqi District Governor in the Karzai-era said, ‘it was ok to cooperate on military stuff, but 
the politics were all wrong between the groups’. 
 
Finally, there was a mosaic of different militia groups. Allah Noor, from Nawa, was in the 
Grow Mudafen: the Revolutionary Defence Group.507 These militias had fairly low salaries 
and were not very strict on their recruitment ideologically-speaking.508 Comprised mainly of 
students in Helmand there were even ex-mujahidin present in their ranks. The main thing 
holding them together was their salaries.509 The band-e barq was held by another type of 
militia, a derivation of the Zahir Shah-era militias, the Depaye Khudai, which were essentially 
village defence forces510 and were ‘mainly mujahidin anyway’.511 There were other types of 
militia, including the more ideologically focussed, with PDPA membership a prerequisite to 
admission, such as the Depayan-e Enqelab.512 At their peak, there were probably around 
four-and-a-half thousand police and associated militias in Helmand.513 
 
2.13 - Heavy fighting and a massacre 
Central Helmand was the focus of many government and Soviet operations to ‘clear’ the 
mujahidin and establish security posts and District Centres. Universally, my ex-mujahidin 
interviewees would focus on the cruelty of the Soviet and Afghan troops, and particularly on 
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the ubiquitous use of airpower and artillery.514 This was usually used in response to 
‘mujahidin’ attacks, and included the use of anti-personnel bomblets and mines in villages.515 
In one instance, the village of Zhargoun Kalay in Nad-e Ali was completely destroyed from 
the air.516 Events such as theft and rape were also reported as commonplace.517 Worst of all, 
massacres of the civilian population occurred, the largest of which I document below.  
 
Without access to Soviet sources, picking apart different government and Soviet operations 
is difficult from this chronological distance. Certainly, from the perspective of the population, 
they had a short-term military focus, with the aim being to kill as many mujahidin as possible 
and not to hold territory.518 The reestablishment of the hukomats in central and southern 
Helmand required longer-term operations, but not longer than two or three months.519 The 
Afghan Army and Soviet troops would then withdraw to their bases leaving the police to hold 
the hukomats, often resulting in a 50m by 50m defensive perimeter.520  
 
In general, operations in central and southern Helmand would occur approximately once 
every month and would be of a small scale.521 In comparison, the less-often operations in 
northern Helmand had no intention of establishing security posts.522 These operations were 
conducted by units from Kandahar and Herat and sometimes involved thousands of 
troops.523 Ex-communist interviewees repeatedly emphasised the fact that in all these 
operations serious attempts were made by the Soviets to help the population with medical, 
agricultural and other support,524 in-line with their public narrative of international duty. 
However, these attempts were not understood or appreciated by the population against the 
backdrop of indiscriminate violence.525 It was these operations above all else, and the 
resultant damage to the irrigation systems, that drove people to move their families to 
Pakistan as refuges. Whether that damage was deliberate or non-deliberate is a question of 
perspective.526  
 
By far the worst event perpetrated by government and Soviet troops in central Helmand is 
the massacre in Khwashal Kalay, Nad-e Ali, probably occurring on the second day of Eid al-
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Adha (10 October 1981).527 The reasons for the massacre vary—some say it was revenge 
for a Soviet colonel who was killed near Shin Kalay the day before,528 others, that the village 
of Khwashal Kalay had not provided its conscription quota,529 or merely that the village was 
a centre of resistance and needed to be punished.530  
 
Government and Soviet troops went through Khwashal Kalay, searching for people, and 
lined up two hundred villagers.531 The troops then proceeded to move along the line shooting 
each person in turn, with women being taken away for rape elsewhere in the village.532 The 
troops then moved through the villages killing those who had escaped or avoided the line-up 
and even turned their weapons on the village’s dogs, camels and donkeys. Eyewitnesses 
describe the smell as their most vivid remembrance: bodies were still being found two weeks 
later. That evening, people from the surrounding countryside crept into the village to bury the 
dead in the village’s graveyard on the desert escarpment to the west. The villagers were 
buried four to a grave.533 
 
The fact that a deliberate massacre of around two hundred people occurred was 
acknowledged by many interviewees, including a government one.534 The one eyewitness to 
the aftermath that I interviewed said that the massacre was committed by a Soviet unit called 
‘seyara sarakuwa’ (my transcription from their enunciation), however I have been unable to 
translate the phrase, or find any more information regarding the unit. According to the same 
interviewee, the unit was involved in operations in Chah-e Mirza shortly afterwards and Amir 
Jalat Khan (Kakar), a Jamiat commander, was killed with eighty-five of his men. That was 
the end of Jamiat in Chah-e Mirza for the remainder of the jihad.535  
 
Many of my interviewees were hard men, who had done and seen terrible things, yet they 
became misty eyed and faltering when discussing the Khwashal Kalay Eid massacre. This 
level of emotion was not displayed when discussing any other events during my interviewing. 
For that reason it was very hard to pick apart the public and private spheres with regard to 
the event. For example, I do not know the number or identity of any Helmandis involved in 
perpetrating the massacre. It appears, from the evidence, that this was an event best 
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explained by the public sphere surrounding the war, particularly as it is hard to distinguish a 
motive for the event. 
 
2.14 - Najibullah: a new policy 
Karmal was not able to manage the situation nationally and was removed by the Soviets. In 
his place came Dr Najibullah (hereafter known as Najib), the previous head of Khad.536 The 
lack of progress, or momentum, nationally was reflected in Helmand. Although the 
cumberband was complete, there was a limit on what military operations could achieve, in 
terms of getting the central Helmandi population to support what they considered an 
occupation government: the government was perceived by the rural population as being 
‘godless’ and a ‘puppet government’.537 In return, many PDPA officials were utterly disdainful 
of ‘tribalism’ which they considered ‘feudal and backwards’.538 These were issues that were 
unlikely to go away whilst Karmal was in power or the country was occupied by Soviet 
troops. The civil war still raged in northern Helmand.  
 
This aside, normal life went on. Those government employees and businessmen that were 
not ideologically committed to communism, or responsible for cruelty or atrocities, and 
offered a service needed in the rural areas—e.g. doctors or engineers—were allowed to 
travel with a party of elders to where they could, for example, offer medical support or 
service the canal networks.539 Schooling and health services continued in the centres of 
Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and occasionally the southern and central District Centres, but these 
were precarious and sometimes evicted by mujahidin.540  
 
Najib became General Secretary of the PDPA in May 1986. Shortly afterwards, he launched 
his policy of National Reconciliation. The population were fairly cynical to new 
pronouncements and with the change in rhetoric, people were not sure if it ‘was just noise or 
whether it was an actual change…certainly in the beginning there was a lot of talk and not 
much action’.541 However, as his rule developed many, even some mujahidin commanders, 
began to consider him a good leader, and much more conciliatory in approach after the 
ideologically-set views of the Karmal administration.542 The National Reconciliation 
Programme was designed to bridge the public cleavages between the irreconcilable 
mujahidin and government viewpoints by softening hard-line government positions. Aspects 
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included power-sharing with non-PDPA parties or individuals, amnesty for political prisoners, 
a new constitution modelled on that of 1964 and, later on, removing Marxism and replacing it 
with Islam and a market economy as guiding principles of the government and nation.543 
This overarching public, ideological framework was designed to encapsulate a much more 
pragmatic policy on the ground in Helmand. 
 
Policy in Helmand consisted of a three-prong strategy heavily dominated by Khad. Firstly, it 
evaluated its policy of support for mujahidin groups and decided privately to focus on 
supporting Nasim in his war to wipe out all the other mujahidin groups, particularly ‘Hizb’ 
groups. This was the hammer. Secondly, the anvil; Khad began to offer amnesty and arms 
to whole mujahidin bands, and the communities they were drawn from, if they were to come 
over to the government and form militias. These twin policies formed the main base of the 
government’s strategy to reduce government-mujahidin violence in the province and were 
complimented by the third prong: that of inviting mujahidin figures to take their place in the 
government.544  
 
These policies were used as a way to break the stalemate of the Karmal years, and as a 
way of ensuring the government’s survival once the Soviets left.545 However, they should be 
seen as a rebalancing of power from the centre to the periphery (i.e. from state to tribe). In a 
patronage system such as exists in Helmand’s society the public, ideological manoeuvring 
had little effect without the threat of force or the benefits of cash and supplies. Thus, the 
provincial council, once reformed, was still seen as a fig leaf.546 However, according to 
government figures, Najib’s policies could be considered a success—between 1985 and 
1987 the percentage of Helmand under ‘government control’ rose from 13.1% to 24%.547 
 
Shah Nazar Khan, the leader of the Nad-e Ali Noorzai, from Loy Bagh and a Mahaz 
‘member’, was appointed Provincial Governor in 1987.548 The negotiations leading to his 
appointment were carried about by Khad. But whilst Shah Nazar was a significant tribal 
leader, he was not a very important ‘mujahidin’ commander. Despite being the Provincial 
Governor, he was not necessarily in the ‘government’—he merely adopted the public 
government label to support his own private interests. The remainder of his family stayed 
affiliated with the same ‘mujahidin’ franchises detailed previously and his non-affiliated 
brother acted as a go-between.  
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Thus in 1989, during mujahidin infighting in Nad-e Ali the ‘Etihad’ part of the family came 
under pressure from Rahmattiar’s ‘Hizb’ groups. Shah Nazar used his relatives in Khad to 
contact the ‘Etihad’ part of the family and offer weapons. This was still the case when it 
became clear that the weapons were being used to attack Habibullah (Noorzai, Garmsir) the 
Khalqi Chief of Police in Nad-e Ali who was under a constant state of siege from the 
mujahidin. At that point, Habibullah and his men were the only things that were enabling the 
‘government’ to remain in Nad-e Ali.549 The family’s private interests were much more 
important than Shah Nazar’s affiliation with the government and it was at this point that 
public organisations began to break up in Helmand. 
 
In summary, so far, we have discussed the revolution of 1978, the population’s response to 
it, the Soviet intervention, and how that generated fierce resistance and private infighting in 
Helmand. Finally we have broadly discussed the changes that Najibullah brought in an 
attempt to calm the conflict. We now explore the result of those policies in detail and discuss 
the final stages of the Soviet presence in Helmand. 
 
2.15 - Khad and Nasim 
Khad began by inflaming the Nasim–Abdul Rahman Khan tensions in northern Helmand by 
increasing its support to Nasim at the expense of other commanders: that is, the public-
private interactions shifted.550 Even though Nasim ‘did one thing for Khad and ten for himself’ 
(i.e. Nasim manipulated Khad),551 the supplies had the desired effect, and by 1987 Abdul 
Rahman Khan had been forced out of Kajaki, to Malgir, where he based himself with Mir 
Wali.552 At around the same time, Baidullah (Alizai/Khalozai), originally a ‘Khalqi’ District 
Governor of Kajaki but now a sub-commander of Abdul Rahman, defected back to the 
‘government’ with his men and formed a militia in Gereshk. The fact that he was the first, 
not-insignificant commander to do so means that he is still remembered today. Later on he 
was to defect back to ‘Hizb’ in Nad-e Ali and was eventually killed by Nasim.553  
 
At the same time, Rais Baghrani joined Jamiat because Nasim was successfully blocking 
Hizb supplies reaching him from Pakistan. Hundreds of people died in clashes between the 
two of them in the summer of 1988. His defection was a boon to Jamiat as it was another 
way of guaranteeing supplies to Ismail Khan in Herat, at the end of a very long supply 
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route.554 Slightly later, Rauf Khan (Ishaqzai, Mahaz) also defected to the government and 
formed a militia in Gereshk from his mujahidin band.555 These glorious ‘mujahidin’ groups, 
fighting for their liberty and for Islam, were simply bought off with government cash. 
  
Nasim began to expand and attack other ‘mujahidin’ groups all over the province. Privately, 
Mir Wali was a particular target for harbouring Abdul Rahman Khan, and so the local 
Harakat groups in Malgir were reinforced by Nasim. This was the first time that the ‘Hizb’-
‘Harakat’ war had come to Malgir and was exactly what the government wanted to happen 
(although Mir Wali had fought Nasim before in Now Zad as part of the previous ‘Hizb’-
‘Harakat’ fighting).556 Those mujahidin groups not affiliated with Hizb or Harakat quickly 
chose.557 Nasim then persuaded Dad Mohammad in Sangin to ally with him: he did not leave 
Jamiat, but merely formed an alliance with Nasim.558 Little persuasion was needed if the 
extra supplies would help him fight Atta Mohammad, his closest rival.  
 
The Dad Mohammad-Atta Mohammad private cleavage dictated the story of Sangin. 
However, the combination of two leaders with similar names, and switching affiliations to the 
same two parties, or splinters thereof, means that I am not at all clear on the dynamics in 
Sangin during the jihad, and the following should be treated with a degree of caution. 
Interviews, secondary sources and discussions with Sangin experts fail to yield clarity and I 
assume that this complexity in the private sphere contributes to the levels of public violence 
there in the modern era (see map 6). 
 
Atta had previously betrayed Nasim leaving ‘Harakat’ to join ‘Jamiat’. Rasoul, Nasim’s 
brother, had then reportedly said ‘I don’t want to kill anyone except Atta; he is a devil’.559 
Thus, the later Dad Mohammad-Nasim alliance benefited them both (as Atta and Dad were 
rivals). Atta Mohammad then later ‘joined’ what the locals called kuchnai (little) Harakat 
(whereas Nasim was in loy (big) Harakat), probably one of the splinter factions of Harakat 
led by Mansur or Malawi Moazen,560 presumably because he was able to secure better 
supplies to fight Dad Mohammad.561 At that time, Dad Mohammad and Atta Mohammad 
each repeatedly took control of the bazaar and lost it again. During the course of this, Atta 
Mohammad affiliated with the public organisations of Harakat, Jamiat and then kuchnai 
Harakat. This whilst Dad Mohammad went Mahaz, Jamiat, and then formed an affiliation 
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with Harakat. Privately, they continued to fight each other for much of the time.562 The 
complexity of shifting public-private interactions was epic, and reinforces well my thesis: the 
actors and groups in Sangin were willing to subscribe to any ideology in order to obtain 
weapons to help them in the private feuds. 
 
Hafizullah Khan, the Hizb Amir for Helmand, later claimed to me that Atta affiliated himself 
with Hizb as well. This is unlikely as Atta Mohammad, as well as fighting Dad Mohammad to 
his north, was also fighting Abdul Khaleq (also Ishaqzai, Mistereekhel) to his south, who was 
with Hizb.563 Abdul Khaleq was eventually to die during this period in Qala-e Gaz, although 
whether due to government or intra-mujahidin action is not known.564 As this was occurring, 
the other half of the Mistereekhel under Rauf Khan were persuaded to join the government 
(he was under heavy pressure from Atta Mohammad at the time).565 Rauf then became the 
leader of one of the first tribal kandaks in Gereshk.566 This war over Sangin, and its profitable 
drugs bazaar, still has not been concluded at time of writing in 2012: the conflict is still being 
driven by the private sphere, although the public spheres have changed several times. 
 
Outside of Sangin, the Khad-funded ‘Hizb’-‘Harakat’ war continued apace and Nasim began 
to dominate northern Helmand. Baghrani was contained in Baghran; Now Zad and Washir 
came under Nasim’s purview.567 Although there were attempts at mediation by Israel Khan 
(Noorzai, Etihad, from Now Zad) throughout the decade568 this was all-out war funded by 
Khad. Privately, Israel’s family was split across ‘Khad’, ‘Etihad’ and ‘Hizb’ at the time, but it is 
not known what effect this had on negotiations, if any. Apparently, the Soviets (and one 
assumes Khad) only realised just before they left that Israel’s family was so split—this 
according to my interviewee, a member of the clan, and a member of ‘Khad’!569 The war was 
increasingly becoming about big commanders (‘komandan’ as the Helmandis borrowed the 
Soviet word) and where they could accrue resources in an utterly tangled web of public-
private interactions.  
 
It is worth at this point considering what this territorial control gave Nasim. He was certainly 
not the governor of northern Helmand, in the sense that a western observer would 
understand—he did not have direct control over all of the territory that he ‘owned’, for 
example. That territory also contained the networks of his vanquished foes, who had had to 
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accept Nasim’s rule. The nature of tribal or militia warfare is that Nasim would have 
established himself as the dominant security actor in that space—the primus inter pares—
and this would have given him some ability to levy ‘Islamic’ taxes on agricultural production, 
particularly the ever-expanding poppy fields. Some areas, like Baghran, he was never able 
to influence at all, and others, he could only influence by proxy.  
 
Nasim developed his rule though a series of private alliances: inter-clan marriages. In this, 
he was seeking to be able to rely more on those commanders who controlled his sub-areas. 
The nature of patronage-based tribal militias is that there will be a shifting system of 
allegiances (public-private interactions), dependent upon what each individual commander 
thinks that he can gain by loyalty to his public patron. That Khad injected a lot of patronage 
into this system through Nasim allowed him to ‘buy’ more commanders, and ‘acquire’ more 
territory, which in turn allowed him to make more money from the poppy crop in a virtuous 
circle, however the nature of these interactions make them inherently unstable, as they are 
based on private relationships.570  
 
2.16 - The militia programme 
There was concern that the government would not be able to survive the Soviet 
drawdown.571 And so the second part of the public strategy, starting in 1987,572 concerned 
the increased formation of militias, which diminished the resistance’s recruitment pool and 
increased government forces. The militias were employed to defend major population 
centres and government sites in Lashkar Gah and Gereshk, which were all that the post-
Soviet government could realistically expect to hold. The Parchami-dominated Khad grew its 
‘mujahidin’ kandaks, some of whom ended up in the army chain of command. The police 
grew their own ‘Khalqi’ militia kandaks.573 For the tribal leaders, having members of the tribe 
in different parts of the ‘government’ and the ‘mujahidin’ was a perfect enhancement of their 
position. It allowed them, as private actors, to interact with opposed public organisations. 
With a militia, they now had their own ‘force’, that they could move individual fighters into 
and out of, whilst maintaining government legitimacy, and access to healthcare (critical for 
wounded mujahidin). Conversely, Jabbar Qahraman, the largest militia leader in the South, 
used to offer the same services to wounded mujahidin in Kandahar.574 
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Thus, recruitment by different ‘government’ organisations led to a patchwork of private 
militias under different chains of command that progressively emasculated the professional 
armed forces in Helmand.575 To start with, the militias were under professional control. Later, 
once Soviet forces had left, a shift occurred where militias began to outnumber and control 
the ‘professionals’. Eventually, the division in Gereshk was to come under Allah Noor’s 
(militia) control.576 At the time of the Soviet exit, February 1989, the militia situation was 
increasingly confused, with groups changing their chains of command, or ignoring it and 
doing as they wished.577 As a former professional army officer said disgustedly ‘the Najib 
militias were just private armies’.578  
 
The ‘Khalqi’ police militias tended to be based around Lashkar Gah to reinforce the 
cumberband. Allah Noor, in Nawa and later Bolan, was the largest of these at that time, but 
other examples include Khano (from the Noorzai/Aghezai sub-tribe from Loy Bagh), Khudai 
Noor (Noorzai, from Garmsir) and Usem Khan (Barakzai) who guarded his hometown’s part 
of the cumberband in Basharan.579 Khano had taken advantage of the fact that his brother 
was closely linked to a senior Khalqi by launching a militia.580 He originally started with a 
kandak-sized militia and ended up becoming a major-general militia commander by the early 
1990s. He later spawned an impressive Helmandi dynasty, including a son who studied as a 
‘refugee’ in Ireland and was an Afghan MP in the 2005 session.581 
 
Militias under Khad’s control guarded what the central government considered critical 
strategic points. Thus, there was a Baluch militia under Mir Aza (who was actually Pakistani 
Baluch) to help guard the frontier with Pakistan582 and there were militias in Deh Adam Khan 
to defend the band-e barq (hydroelectric dam).583 Engineer Matin (Noorzai) was given the 
most important job of all: defending the Khad headquarters and supply depots in Lashkar 
Gah and at the maidan.584  
 
The militias that fell under Afghan Army commander clustered around Gereshk under the 
remit of the 93rd division. This was because the government, like countless before it, 
recognised the strategic importance of Gereshk. The division began with an establishment of 
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two thousand, but as the ‘jihadi’ kandaks grew this was expanded to seven thousand, 
dwarfing the professional forces in the province.585 But the government policy was working 
(for them): ‘Mahaz’, for instance, had lost Shah Nazar Helmandwal, Dad Mohammad and 
Rauf Khan, their Amir, and by 1987 they were finished in the province. The private groups 
and actors that had comprised ‘Mahaz’ were still in existence, but now interacting with new 
public organisations. As the Soviets left, the division was under the command of General 
Baba Tapa, a professional officer.586  
 
Finally, sitting outside of all of those structures was the brigade of militias under the 
command of Jabbar, but answering directly to Najib, based in Maiwand and supposedly 
responsible for security across much of the south once the Soviets left.587 These conflicting 
chains of command were to lay the basis for much friction later and allowed the private 
sphere to dictate events. 
 
2.17 - The Soviet swansong 
Whilst the inter-‘mujahidin’ war was continuing, and Khad was gradually militiaising the 
province, conventional operations still continued. There was, for example, an extensive 
operation in Sangin launched by Soviet troops, Afghan troops and militias during March to 
May 1988. Large government operations were among the only times that the mujahidin 
worked together to a common goal and the Soviets were forced to reinforce themselves from 
Shindand airbase in Herat province.588 The operation spread from Sangin to Qala-e Gaz in 
April and then Sarwan Qala in May. On the first of June, the Soviets pulled out.589 From this 
chronological distance, it is hard to say what the long-term effects of operations like these 
were.  
 
For example, in this case, some argue that the operation was to set up power lines590 (which 
the ‘mujahidin’ took down once the ‘government’ troops had gone). Others argue that it was 
designed to provide a distraction for withdrawal later that year, and to allow the new militias 
breathing space.591 Whatever the reason, starting in February, six thousand regular troops 
and militias fought towards Kajaki; effectively, the central Helmandis were paid to fight the 
northern Helmandis, reinforcing the old north-south cleavage.592  
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The conventional military operations, simply, did not change facts on the ground. When a 
mujahed was killed, his relatives would feel honour-bound to replace him with another male 
member of the family593 and so massive military sweeps were pointless. What broke the 
Karmal-era stalemate was the programme led by Khad that supported Nasim to force other 
mujahidin groups to join the government. An important example of this is the defection of Mir 
Wali to the government in 1989, squeezed in Malgir between ‘Harakat’ (Nasim) and Khad. 
He became a kandak commander, with responsibility for the Abhashak Wadi part of the 
cumberband.594  
 
The 1988 withdrawal of Soviet and regular Afghan government forces from Helmand was in 
the first phase of the Soviet withdrawal plan,595 and was preceded by a retrenchment of 
Helmandi district-level government. First, in June 1988 the government withdrew from Khan 
Eshin.596 Garmsir was then abandoned in August.597 The central districts of Nad-e Ali and 
Nawa were part of the cumberband for Lashkar Gah and so were held. The last regular 
government force to leave Helmand was a Soviet spetznaz battalion who withdrew from 
Kajaki at the end of October 1988.598 The dam was immediately occupied by Nasim’s 
men.599 By the end of October 1988, the government was only present within its central 
defensive line.600 
 
2.18 - Conclusions 
The Soviet-era has generally been perceived as dominated by the public sphere: that is, 
viewed through the prism of the cold war. Indeed, there are events that appear to be close to 
that overarching narrative—the Saur revolution and the descriptions of fighting between the 
mujahidin and the Soviets, including the Khwashal Kalay Eid massacre. However, this 
chapter has also revealed the importance of the interaction between the public and private 
spheres in shaping conflict. Moreover, this chapter shows that in the face of a public 
organisation’s ignorance of the private sphere, the private sphere is more likely to shape the 
conflict dynamics. Firstly, Khad support for rival ‘mujahidin’ groups and those groups’ 
manipulation of Khad resources to aid them in their local disputes. This was certainly true at 
the beginning of the decade in northern Helmand. In areas where the government had good 
knowledge of the private sphere, for example Loy Bagh, neither sphere was able to drive the 
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interaction that shaped the conflict dynamics: Loy Bagh was destroyed. The machinations of 
Khad demonstrate that there were frequent public-private interactions, and it appears that 
individuals like Nasim managed to manipulate government policy for their own ends, 
although, as government knowledge improved, they were able to put pressure on Hizb in 
central Helmand thus easing the pressure. 
 
Secondly, the common tendency for private actors to flip backwards and forwards between 
different parties and between the ‘mujahidin’ and the ‘government’. Membership did not 
follow these public organisations’ narratives at all: ideology was an unusual reason for party 
selection. Choice of mujahidin party was often driven by private, pre-revolutionary cleavages 
and commanders regularly switched parties based on on-going feuds. Finally, the deliberate 
practice of splitting communities (private groups) across different public organisations, in 
order to ensure lineage survival, shows that the private group was much more important 
than what, to them, were ideological abstractions in the public sphere. These dynamics were 
facilitated by a lack of knowledge by both the government and the mujahidin parties—the 
main public organisations—of the private sphere. In conclusion, the Soviet-era was 
portrayed as an East-West clash, but was in fact a conflict driven by public-private 
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I was told it was all about Islam; I can see now 






Talib: We want you to go [forward] under the 
Qur’an; we want the Qur’an to be raised up high. 
Khalifa Shirin Khan: We have [fought] the 
Soviets for fifteen years; we have been doing 
jihad; we are not kaffirs. 
 
The Taliban’s second meeting 




The Soviet withdrawal weakened international attention on Afghanistan. This resulted in a 
less polarised public cleavage than the Soviet-mujahidin clash. However, the collapse of the 
Afghan government led to civil war in Afghanistan which is usually explored through a focus 
on the internecine struggle for the capital. This battle for Kabul contains an eye-watering 
confusion of different (often ethnic) sides, deals, intrigues and betrayals.602 Appalling 
depredations were exacted on the civilian population. Data describing the conflict dynamics 
occurring outside of Kabul, however, are almost entirely absent.603 
 
The rise of the Taliban movement—a movement of religious clerics who promised to restore 
order—was seen by scholars as a direct reaction to the chaos of the civil war, even though it 
was acknowledged that they were a movement heavily supported by Pakistan. (Pakistan had 
switched its favourite client status from Hekmatyar and Hizb to Mullah Omar and the 
Taliban).604 The Taliban had a very strong public narrative that focussed on social order. 
Their ideology was closest to Harakat’s—that is, they were traditionalist and focussed on 
their interpretation of Islam as being the source of all laws. The West were opposed to, and 
particularly irked about, the movement’s treatment of women.605 Most famously, the Taliban 
formed an alliance with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in their war against Ahmad Shah 
Masoud and the Northern Alliance. This was to be their downfall. After bin Laden attacked 
the US on the 11 September 2001, the US drove the Taliban from government. 
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3.1 - Finance 
The Soviets left a vast amount of weaponry in the hands of the militias in Helmand. This 
included tanks and artillery and was to affect the balance of power in the province drastically, 
giving more power to the central Helmandi groups who controlled the weaponry.606 There, 
‘government’ patronage was a key part of the economy. In a parallel development, the taxing 
of the growth, sale and transportation of opium had become the bedrock of the northern 
Helmandi economy: one source states that opium was taxed at approximately 5% and the 
average yield per jereeb was 16kg. The same source calculates that this netted, just from 
Musa Qala, over thirteen metric tonnes in opium taxes from the 1990 harvest (it was taken in 
kind; total amount was two hundred and sixty tonnes). This was mostly spent on the main 
expense for the various mujahidin administrations: supporting fighters.607 The post-Soviet 
era represents the almost complete breakdown of the public sphere. 
 
Nasim, for example, was the biggest commander in the province. In recognition, he was 
appointed Deputy Defence Minister in the Afghan Interim Government based in Peshawar in 
February 1989.608 This public position, and the legitimacy it conferred, did not alter his 
behaviour and he still followed the twin aims of supporting the production of opium and 
attempting to destroy any opposing mujahidin groups. He was later to have his ministerial 
funding removed at US insistence because of his role in the drugs trade. That winter 
however, 1989/90, Nasim presented himself unannounced at the US embassy in Islamabad 
and tried to negotiate with the Ambassador by linking reductions in poppy growth with 
development aid. Although agreed (for $2m), it was later cancelled as the US felt it could not 
be seen to be engaging ‘drug dealers’.609 
 
The drugs war continued and in September Yahya (Noorzai), a Hizb commander from 
Marjeh, tried to hold the bridge over the Helmand in Garmsir,610 in order to tax the passing 
trade.611 Nasim attacked and wiped him out causing Yahya to flee to Pakistan having 
reportedly suffered four hundred casualties.612 It was later rumoured that he reinvented 
himself as a government militia commander in Lashkar Gah, but I have been unable to 
confirm this.613 The public sphere here describes a ‘Hizb’-‘Harakat’ war, but it was in truth a 
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private war between Nasim and anyone who opposed him. Commanders affiliated 
themselves with either the ‘Hizb’ or ‘Harakat’ alliances depending on which interaction would 
best preserve their individual political control (and hence profit) in a particular area. This is 
best shown by the fact that Nasim used to sell his drugs to Hekmatyar’s ‘Hizb’ labs, which 
were stationed in Iran for protection.614  
 
Similarly, drugs funding did not immediately replace Khad funding or mujahidin party funding 
when the Soviets left. Khad still paid Nasim money, for example. Slowly, however, over the 
course of three years, drugs funding became relatively more important and the latter two 
sources of funding became relatively less, until 1992, when they disappeared altogether. 
The public sphere’s organisations were progressively collapsing. 
 
Gradually, the territory planted with poppy grew in size. For example, poppy was harvested 
on a large scale for the first time in 1991 in parts of ‘lower Helmand’.615 However, taking into 
account the loose, patronage-based methods of political control employed by Nasim (and all 
commanders) and the benefits that poppy cultivation would bring to the individual farmer,616 I 
argue that this was not forced on farmers (see section 2.8). As an ex-Hizb commander told 
me with a grin, ‘Rasoul [Nasim’s brother] was never really able to force people to grow 
poppy [around Lashkar Gah]—he didn’t really have that much control’.617 Another 
interviewee in Gereshk, and less biased than a Hizb commander would have been when 
talking about Rasoul, pointed to the fact that farmers grew poppy to try and strengthen their 
economic situation, not because Rasoul ordered them to.618 
 
3.2 - Government weakness 
The ailing government had completely retreated to the defensive cumberband that had been 
established in and around the central districts (see map 5). The situation was desperate. For 
example, twenty days after the Soviets left, a thirty-eight year old police captain from 
Garmsir, Habibullah (Noorzai, Khalqi), was sent to Nad-e Ali as the District Chief of Police. 
He described it as the most awful period in his life and visibly shuddered. He expanded, 
saying that he lost men ‘every day, sometimes two, sometimes five, sometime more’. He 
controlled a 300m by 300m area of the hukomat, he said showing me, as I interviewed him, 
the very area he had lost so much blood defending. Habibullah said he was daily under 
siege by mujahidin commanders such as Dr Jailani (Kharoti, Hizb), Haji Barakzai (Kharoti, 
                                                          
614
 Joel Hafvenstein, Opium Season (Guilford, 2007): 130; Afghan Embassy, News bulletin: 3. 
615
 Afghan Information Centre, Monthly Bulletin No 123-4  (Peshawar, June-July 1991). 
616







© Mike Martin 2013 
Harakat; Haji Jamalzai’s nephew), Rahmattiar (Ishaqzai, Hizb) and Abdul Ahad (Noorzai, 
Etihad).  
 
Habibullah was forced to abandon the District Centre about a year after being posted there. 
He and the then District Governor Mahmad Razer (from Chah-e Anjir, Barakzai) had to leave 
in the middle of the night as they had run out of ammunition and food (supply convoys 
normally came across the desert from Lashkar Gah, but had been unable to get through). He 
was jailed for deserting his post, but in a move typical of the survivors in Helmand (of which 
Habibullah is a prime example) he was released a week later and made the company 
commander of the tolay (company) guarding the prison!  
 
Publicly, this appeared a mujahidin-government fight. But a deeper private irony is that these 
characters, or their representatives, were later to become important elders sitting on the 
District Community Council (designed to provide a checking and advisory role on the District 
Governor) established in 2009, when Habibullah had returned to Nad-e Ali as District 
Governor. This somewhat hampered politics in the district. Apart from the Taliban-era, there 
were no centrally appointed, non-indigenous, non-‘mujahidin’ officials in Nad-e Ali between 
Habibullah leaving in 1990 as Chief of Police and returning in 2008 with the support of the 
British as District Governor.  
 
However, one event was to drastically change security provision in Helmand, indeed in 
Afghanistan as a whole: General Tanai, a Khalqi, attempted to launch a coup with the help of 
Hizb in Kabul against President Najibullah (a Parchami) on 6 March 1990 (hereafter ‘Najib’). 
As a result, Najib could no longer trust the Khalqis as partners in government, but was 
unable to completely alienate them. Thus, he began to change the balance of power 
between the militias and the professional security forces by reducing the amount of 
patronage the Khalqi Ministry of Interior had available to distribute. However, in Helmand, 
the security forces were historically Khalqi-orientated.619 Two (Khalqi) interviewees identify 
this as the point at which stability in Helmand in Helmand changed irrevocably for the 
worse.620 Many ‘Khalqi’ police commanders simply reinvented themselves as militia 
commanders.621 Indeed, Habibullah, a well-known ideological Khalqi,622 simply switched 
patronage networks by leaving the police and forming his own militia—the 904th kandak—
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which guarded the Bughra in-between Babaji and Gereshk.623 One ex-army officer described 
the army and police as being ‘on paper’ at the time.624  
 
Militia commanders—individuals such as Khano, Allah Noor and Jabbar—became more 
powerful (see section 2.16). This was at the expense of professional policemen who were 
paid by the Khalqi dominated Ministry of Interior.625 Thus far this matches the public 
narratives of militiaisation. But what of Khano? His brother was a senior Khalqi and he was a 
‘Khalqi’ militia commander. Yet Khano himself probably gained more than anyone out of the 
militiaisation in Helmand, which was designed to offset Khalqi domination of the security 
forces. Private actors manipulated the public narrative of militiaisation, due to the 
government ignorance of the identities of the private actors. When we also consider 
Habibullah’s example, we must accept that the public narrative of the increasing militiaisation 
of the security forces had little meaning when, privately, police commanders were just 
becoming militia commanders. The security infrastructure was changing form, accelerating 
government collapse. And although they were not yet Chief of Police and the 93rd Division’s 
Commander, Khano and Allah Noor, respectively, became the de facto decision makers in 
the security infrastructure after the coup.626  
 
General Tanai was forced to flee to Pakistan after his failed coup d’état. Shortly afterwards, 
he came to Lashkar Gah, probably then the most concentrated powerbase of the Khalqis in 
the country,627 and led secret negotiations between Khano and Hafizullah Khan, the 
figureheads of the two central Helmandi power blocks.628 As Hafizullah put it to me, ‘Tanai 
surrendered to Hizb…Khano gave us money and weapons’. The ex-Khalqis that I spoke to 
described it as a rapprochement.629  
 
The outcome of the negotiations was that ‘Hizb’ commanders and the remnants of the 
‘Khalqi’ Helmandi government would work together against the ‘Parchami’, Khad-backed 
‘Harakat’ alliance that was threatening them.630 This was while the rest of the (national) 
government was being purged of Khalqis and fighting Hizb.631 One assumes that either the 
central government was not aware of this accommodation, or was forced to accept it. A very 
strange situation was developing where the two halves of the ‘government’ were openly 
                                                          
623




 043, 044. 
626
 008, 033, 049. 
627
 Dorronsoro, Dernier. 
628




 007, 044. 
631
 Dorronsoro, Revolution: 205. 
 
116 
© Mike Martin 2013 
working with opposed ‘mujahidin’ groups: a new set of public and private interactions. Malem 
Mir Wali even tried to claim to me that he joined the government at this point, probably to 
increase the legitimacy of his move, but Hafizullah (and other interviewees632) dispute this 
saying, ‘I [Hafizullah] hated him for his [earlier] defection’ (see section 2.17). 
 
So far, I have discussed the different funding bases of the various ‘mujahidin’ polities and 
looked at the changes occurring on the ‘government’ side. Now, I discuss the continuing 
Helmandi civil war, which by now had expanded from just northern Helmand to encompass 
the entire province. 
 
3.3 - The death of Nasim  
The impact of Tanai’s failed coup on conflict dynamics in Helmand was overshadowed by an 
event of even greater consequence. Nasim was assassinated near Peshawar on the 25 
March 1990.633 Many scholars634 attribute his murder to Hizb who killed him due to the 
reductions in poppy production that he had ordered after his deal with the US embassy in 
Islamabad (his poppy went to Hizb refineries). This is the public sphere: drugs and mujahidin 
parties. The private sphere is much more confused. 
 
Firstly, there is conflicting evidence as to whether Nasim ever reduced poppy growth in the 
areas that he controlled.635 Additionally, the US never kept its side of the bargain, and by the 
time that Nasim visited the embassy, poppy had already been planted for the 1989/90 
season, and had not yet been harvested at the time he was killed (although the effectiveness 
of his ‘ban’ would have only just become verifiable as the plants reached harvesting stage). 
Finally, Nasim, inevitably and as was the custom, would have built up stocks of opium as a 
form of capital savings. More likely is honour: just before his death, he accused Hekmatyar, 
the leader of Hizb, of ‘betraying the jihad’ by affiliating himself with Tanai.636 The 
assassination was eventually traced by Harakat to a nephew of Abdul Rahman Khan, 
Nasim’s old Alizai enemy, who then confessed that Hekmatyar had planned the killing.637 
Private cleavages probably explain the event better. 
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The mujahidin press was effusive in its eulogies of Nasim. They fully described the public 
sphere of Nasim’s life. The Afghan Information Centre’s (AIC) Monthly Bulletin, set up by the 
highly esteemed Professor Majrooh638 in Peshawar, said that he controlled eighteen 
thousand men in the south-west of Afghanistan and was the only commander in the area not 
to have had his base captured by the Soviets. It was, according to the AIC, the biggest 
funeral ever for a commander. People ‘all over the South’ were sad to see him go.639 Even 
the Jamiat-sponsored Afghan News claimed that he had ten thousand men and was keen to 
stamp out poppy cultivation.640 Nobody mentioned his collusion with Khad or the murder of 
groups of elders. Nasim was immediately replaced by Rasoul, his older brother, at the head 
of their ‘Harakat’ patronage organisation.  
 
Rasoul publicly launched a ‘general war’ against ‘Hizb’ in Helmand, but privately this was a 
series of attacks on people that Rasoul had previously fought and feuded with, or those who 
refused to submit to him.641 First and foremost, Rasoul attacked the man he believed was 
responsible for this brother’s murder: Abdul Rahman Khan, still in Malgir.642 After that, 
Rasoul attacked anyone who was not allied with him, galvanising his sub-commanders to do 
the same, and the conflict was to continue until Rasoul established himself as the Provincial 
Governor in 1993.  
 
But the ‘government’ and the ‘mujahidin’ were becoming less defined by the day. A massive 
battle in Deh Adam Khan then ensued between Allah Noor, Mir Wali and Rauf Khan (on the 
‘government’ side), with Rasoul and Khan Mohammad (Barakzai, from Deh Adam Khan) on 
the ‘Harakat’/’non-government’ side in August 1990.643 The Nejad groups in Deh Adam Khan 
also joined Rasoul’s alliance.644 During this battle, an eyewitness stated that Najib personally 
intervened and sent a message through Khad in Gereshk that Rasoul should be supported 
against the ‘Hizb’/‘Khalq’ remnants. Rasoul refused the offer of help. The ‘Parchami’ Khad 
were trying to bring down their own ‘government’ because they hated the ‘Khalqis’ so much. 
The unity of government was ceasing to exist. 645 
 
Fighting raged all over the province. Attacks were launched by Rasoul on Atta Mohammad in 
Sangin. Sher Mohammad (Ishaqzai, Harakat) from Shurakay, who was also the brother-in-
law of the Khan Mohammad involved in the attack on Gereshk, attacked Abdul Khaleq 
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(Ishaqzai, Hizb) in Qala-e Gaz. Malem Yusof was attacked in Now Zad.646 Abdul Rahman 
Jan (Noorzai, Jamiat, Marjeh) described a defensive alliance against Rasoul. This comprised 
himself, Mir Wali, Atta Mohammad, Mato Khan (another Etihad commander in Marjeh, 
related to Haji Lal Jan from Nad-e Ali)) and Malem Yusof—they would all support each other 
when Rasoul came to their area. 
 
Rasoul’s attacks spread to Nad-e Ali. There, ‘Etihad’ groupings and the remnants of ‘Mahaz’ 
joined the alliance with Rasoul against the ‘Hizb’/‘Khalq’ forces.647 This was driven by a feud 
between Rahmattiar (Hizb) and Abdul Ahad (Etihad).648 Generally in Nad-e Ali, however, 
fighting was kept at a low-level. As Harakat asserted its dominance over Nad-e Ali, the 
Kharoti ‘Hizb’ fighters fled to Pakistan and the Kharoti ‘Harakat’ fighters were unavailable for 
duty until they had left.649 The Kharoti pan-tribal shura across the public cleavages was still 
working.  
 
However, other members of Hizb were not so lucky: Rahmattiar (Ishaqzai), from Jangal in 
the south of the district, was kidnapped by Rasoul and taken to Musa Qala where he was 
imprisoned for two years. Their front collapsed when Rasoul confiscated all of their 
weapons.650 Small groups stuck between the two opposing forces did not fare well; for 
example, Nejad split between the two opposing sides with some joining the ‘Hizb’/‘Khalq’ 
patronage networks, some joining the ‘Harakat’ network and some going home. ‘[Nejad’s] 
jihad was over’.651 Over the whole of the province, the public factionalisation appeared to 
subside, as groups either opted for the ‘Hizb’/‘Khalq’- or the ‘Harakat’/‘Parcham’-led 
groupings. The complexity of side switching, however, as people either opted for or against 
Rasoul, rested on the private sphere as people sought to secure alliances that would protect 
themselves, the business interests and their villages. The public sphere’s organisations had 
ceased to exist as unitary wholes: the government for instance, was split into and working 
with different sections of the population. In addition, to the weakness of public organisations, 
the increase in drug’s funding meant that the elements in the private sphere did not need 
government of mujahidin party patronage to continue their private wars. The national 
government did continue to fund different parts of the provincial government, but it is not 
known how much information they had of Helmand’s private sphere at this point. 
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3.4 - The population’s response 
These shifting public-private interactions were interpreted uneasily by the people of 
Helmand. Different bits of the ‘government’ were supplying different bits of the ‘mujahidin’, 
although it is not clear how much knowledge each side had of the other at that time. Later 
on, when Khad were forced to flee the province, Hafizullah went to the Khad headquarters in 
Lashkar Gah and reviewed the documents. What he saw shocked him: ‘the mujahidin were 
completely penetrated by Khad’ he said, and ‘almost everyone had a file’ detailing ‘so much 
trickery between different mujahidin [groups and leaders]’.  
 
The fluidity with which two bitter public enemies, Hizb and Khalq, could align with each other 
left many to conclude that the spirit of the jihad had been hopelessly corrupted. As one 
former commander who was twenty-three at the Saur revolution told me bitterly, ‘I was told it 
was about Islam; I can see now that they were lying; it was about power’.652 
 
It was during this period that the Helmandi population sensed that the external, public 
resources—those from Najib’s government and from the parties in Peshawar—were ending. 
These were being replaced with more organic, private sources of money, that is, drug-
derived funding, or predation on the population. The external funding had forced, or at least 
appeared to force (vide the deliberate splitting of private groups across public cleavages), 
some ideological, public separation within private groups (i.e. tribes). However, once this 
funding was no longer available, or perceived to be not forever available, the groups and 
their leaders did not need to demonstrate allegiance to any particular public organisation or 
narrative and sought stability through other networks. The old public-private interactions 
dissolved. Private actors turned to tribal networks, much damaged since 1978, but still extant 
(of course some, like the Nad-e Ali Kharoti, had maintained this strength throughout the 
jihad). Tribal shuras were held, pledging ‘unity after war’, and ‘cooperation and 
consolidation’.653  
 
Thus, the different tribes asserted their leadership, for example, the Popalzai in the South 
formed a tribal council in Quetta in January 1991 with judicial and financial commissions. No 
matter the background, ‘any tribesman can join’.654 Specifically in Helmand, and in addition 
to the Kharoti, the Noorzai in central Helmand began to broaden channels between 
members who had been on ‘opposing’ sides during the jihad.655 So too, the Barakzai,656 the 
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Noorzai and, in Garmsir, the Alizai.657 This represents the reassertion of Helmandi private 
groups and alliances in the face of dwindling outside, public interest and patronage. The 
dynamic was to repeat itself in Helmand at two other similar junctures, firstly, when the 
Taliban were forced out in 2002658 and, secondly, as ISAF were leaving Helmand in 2012.659 
This episodic series of tribal shuras is one of the most important dynamics in this study, 
because it shows the reforming of private groups once public organisations dissolve. 
 
3.5 - No more cash 
Funding from Russia to Najib’s government was cut off in August 1991, after the coup 
attempt in Moscow. The government could only support itself by printing money. The air 
force was grounded in January 1992 for lack of fuel. American funding to the mujahidin was 
similarly curtailed.660 Elsewhere in the country, the territory controlled by the government 
shrank and mass desertions ensued.661 The ‘Khalq’/‘Hizb’ grouping in Helmand meant that 
the government could hold onto its traditional area of influence—Gereshk, Lashkar Gah, 
Chah-e Anjir and the routes in-between—whilst the ‘Harakat’ grouping controlled the rest of 
the province. As Rasoul slowly expanded his area, many petty commanders began to switch 
to him, safe in the knowledge that once they did, they would still be able collect their own 
taxes and live in relative autonomy. Those commanders that were vanquished did not have 
this privilege extended to them.662 Concerns of survival dictated their alliances with other 
private actors. 
 
This lack of funding forced individual commanders to look for other sources of funding, in 
addition to opium funding. The most obvious source was looting from the population, 
perpetrated by all the ‘government’ commanders including Khano,663 Mir Wali,664 
Hafizullah665 and Abdul Rahman Jan.666 Chaos ruled: one had to cross fifty or sixty ‘posts’ to 
get to Kandahar from Helmand, each controlled by a different commander, and each one 
charging the equivalent of half a day-labourer’s wage for passage.667 It was ‘impossible to 
move’ for the combination of banditry and larger-scale battles between the commanders, for 
example when Dad Mohammad attacked Hafizullah in April 1991668 and Rasoul attacked 
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Atta Mohammad in Now Zad (where neither of them were based) in July of the same year.669 
The commanders were ranging across the province fighting other commanders where they 
found them and hundreds were killed and wounded in the fighting.670  
 
I have no evidence that Rasoul’s commanders were systematically looting at this time (as 
the ‘government’ commanders were). However, they only controlled the rural areas so there 
was less to loot. Certainly, travellers to northern Helmand in 1991 emphasise the fact that 
there was ‘no robbing or stealing’ and ‘people were free to come and go’.671 Rais Baghrani, 
the preeminent ‘mujahed’ in Baghran, for example, established anti-bandit checkpoints along 
roads.672 The dichotomy between those commanders who were in the ‘government’ and 
those who were outside the ‘government’ has certainly affected how the population in 
Helmand feel about the concept of government—something that has worsened over time, 
particularly during the Karzai-era.  
 
The period between the collapse of Najib’s government until the coming of the Taliban was 
known as the ‘mujahidin nights’ or the ‘topakiyan [gun men]-era’ in the South. One 
gentleman, who had already fled from Now Zad to escape the fighting and settled in Deh 
Adam Khan, described how farmers would go to work in their fields with a Kalashnikov lain 
by their side, due to the unpredictability of the environment. ‘One house would be one way 
[supporting one faction], and the next would be the other’, he said.673 The public sphere and 
its organisations had completely collapsed. 
 
In summary, I have described the slow death of the ‘government’ in Helmand, alongside the 
rapidly forming and reforming alliances among the different Helmandi private actors. I now 
move onto the various public-private interactions (with the new government) and private-
private alliances that the ‘communist’ militia commanders made in an attempt to stay in 
power. 
 
3.6 - Deal-making 
When, in April 1992, Najib’s government finally handed over to a ‘mujahidin’ coalition in 
Kabul most of the few remaining Helmandi police and army officers simply took their 
uniforms off and went home.674 Civil officials like Abdul Sangar, the District Governor of 
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Nahr-e Saraj, did the same.675 In Helmand, the Hafizullah-Khano secret agreement laid the 
foundations for the political formulations that were to follow. A meeting was called in Lashkar 
Gah by Gul Mahmad Khwashal (Noorzai, from Farah), who had been appointed Provincial 
Governor by Najib, replacing Shah Nazar Khan from Loy Bagh. Present were all the major 
powerbrokers in the Rasoul-opposed alliance: Khwashal, Mir Wali, Hafizullah Khan, Atta 
Mohammad, Sarwar Khan (Abdul Rahman Khan’s nephew), Khano, Allah Noor, Rauf Khan, 
Jenat Gul (the professional army commander of the 93rd division) and Akhwaendi. Everyone 
promised to work together and fight Rasoul, Mir Wali said in his interview with me. However, 
according to Mir Wali, another plan was already in motion. 
 
Khwashal began to drag his heels in the meeting saying that it would be impossible to defeat 
Rasoul. This was a delaying tactic because Khad had already made a deal with Rasoul that 
he would enter Lashkar Gah through one of their posts on the cumberband (Khwashal was 
publicly labelled a ‘Khalqi’, and Khad were ‘Parchami’ but it was irrelevant). Once Rasoul 
entered Lashkar Gah, things did not go as smoothly to plan and there was house-to-house 
fighting between ‘Khad’ and Rasoul’s troops on the one hand and the 
‘Hizb’/‘Khalq’/‘Jamiat’/‘Mahaz’ commanders above-mentioned on the other. The fighting 
lasted all through the next day and the ‘Khad’/Rasoul grouping were pushed back to the 
maidan, where the ‘Khad’ brigade was based.  
 
With ‘Khad’ and Rasoul contained, Mir Wali describes having to rush back the following day 
to Gereshk which was under attack, before finally returning to Lashkar Gah and teaming up 
with Khano and Hafizullah Khan in Muhktar. The next day (the 4th after the meeting), this 
Khano/Hafizullah grouping took the hospital and the old Khad headquarters before attacking 
the maidan. Matin, the ‘Khad’ brigade commander, escaped to Musa Qala with Rasoul’s 
help.676 Lashkar Gah secured, Mir Wali again had to head to Gereshk (suitably refitted with 
Khad weaponry and ammunition) which was under attack by one of Rasoul’s commanders, 
Engineer Ghani. They surrendered, and whilst Ghani was jailed, the Barakzai troops 
underneath him immediately switched sides and pledged allegiance to Mir Wali—possibly an 
outcome of the tribal rapprochement process outlined above.677  
 
The ending of Khad patronage for Rasoul presented a problem and put him under pressure 
all over the province.678 Khano and Hafizullah led an operation, supported by Sar Katib 
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(Hizb) from Kandahar, to clear the province of ‘Harakat’ forces. Starting in Gereshk, they 
moved through Malgir, Babaji, Nad-e Ali, Nawa, Marjeh and finally Garmsir installing District 
Governors as they went.679 Nahr-e Saraj went to Khalifa Shirin Khan (Barakzai, Hizb), the 
Malgir land owner,680 Nad-e Ali to Khalifa Khwashkea (Noorzai, Jamiat, from Loy Bagh),681 
Nawa went to Mahmad Wali (Popalzai, Jamiat, Nawa)682 and Garmsir to Abdullah Jan (Hizb, 
Barakzai).683 This took three days, and many of the ‘Harakat’ commanders fled to Pakistan. 
They then raided and looted Now Zad and Musa Qala, where they stayed for three days of 
pillaging. There was no intention of holding northern Helmand: it was a raid. Upon returning 
to Lashkar Gah, they announced the remaining ‘government’ posts.684 
 
Hafizullah Khan was made ‘Provincial Governor’.685 Khano was finally given the position of 
‘Chief of Police’, to reflect the de facto position that he had held for the last two years.686 
Allah Noor was promoted and made the ‘commander of the 93rd Division’687 and Rauf Khan 
an independent ‘brigade commander’.688 Akhwaendi was also part of the alliance.689 Due to 
the vast stocks of weaponry that they were able to arm themselves with from government 
armouries, this grouping proved stable enough stop Rasoul taking Lashkar Gah and 
Gereshk. Both Abdul Rahman and Mir Wali speak of being armed by the ex-government 
weapons, and one interviewee claimed that Mir Wali had inherited eleven hundred weapons 
from the government, cached them, and still has possession of them in 2012.690  
 
Astonishingly Helmand, the location of so much fighting, and despite minimal government 
and Soviet interest, was to become the last hold-out of the communist ‘government’, 
personified by people like Khano and Allah Noor.691 However, as the ‘government’ mainly 
comprised both ‘Khalqi’ and ‘Hizb’ commanders it was completely cut off from the 
government, which was at that time led by President Mujaddidi (leader of the Nejad party) 
and dominated by Parchamis and Jamiatis. The government in Kabul was far too worried 
about dealing with the local threat from Hizb even to think about Helmand, which existed in 
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limbo from the national public sphere.692 Helmand was effectively independent (the national, 
public sphere had no links to it) and the story was completely driven by the private sphere. 
 
3.7 - ‘Hizb’/‘communist’ cooperation 
Many, of course, tried to take advantage of this complete lack of government in Helmand 
and moved to occupy better land than they were already on. Several Noorzai commanders 
from Now Zad and Washir followed Haji Lal Jan in escaping water stress in Northern 
Helmand. Lal Jan had originally come to Nad-e Ali in the chaos surrounding the Taraki 
revolution. His brother, Haji Qabir Khan, settled on land around the Bolan junction alongside 
Mato Khan, another relative.693 Malem Sher Agha also settled nearby, in Zaburabad, 
stealing government (non-owned) land.694 Abdul Raziq (Noorzai, from Washir, a cousin of 
Qabir Khan) also came and took ‘a hundred households’’ worth of land in what was 
previously the Bolan ‘desert’.695  
 
 
Figure 3: Rabbani-era land document. 
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Other commanders were given land in recognition of loyal service during the jihad.696 All of 
these land gains were recognised a few months later by the Rabbani government, and 
crucially, are seen as completely legitimate today by the land-owners, but not by their longer-
settled neighbours. In addition, the previous jihad-era land thefts were also officialised, for 
example Haji Lal Jan’s697 and Rahmattiar’s (see section 2.10).698 Official land documents 
were issued (itself a type of public-private interaction), meaning that these land thefts are still 
creating division and conflict today. See figure 3. 
 
The more progressive elements of Lashkar Gah society began to rue the day that Hafizullah 
took over. He began by looting the bank and stealing the street lights for scrap.699 Despite 
initially promising cooperation with the teachers, the girls’ school was closed, not to reopen 
until the Karzai government a decade later. There was some—secret—home schooling, 
however most of the (ex-) communists, hence the educated professional people, either fled 
or started making plans to leave.700 Shah Nazar Khan, the Noorzai ex-Provincial Governor, 
was assassinated in his home by persons unknown.701  
 
The killing bore all the hallmarks of a political assassination like that favoured by Hizb 
commanders, but when I questioned Hafizullah about it, he looked at the floor saying that he 
knew nothing about it, and mumbled something about it being a ‘tribal thing’. I later spoke to 
a close relative of Shah Nazar’s who I knew well,702 who told me that the actual killer had 
already been (revenge) killed, but there were two other people involved who ‘still need to be 
killed’ and so he would not be able to talk to me about it until that work was done. He did, 
however, confirm that they were members of Hizb, but it was the actual individuals who were 
important, not the public narratives they subscribed to. The fact that I had that conversation 
twenty years after the event gives an indication of the innumerable intertwined and 
everlasting feuds that percolate through Helmandi society and demonstrates the strength of 
private cleavages there. 
 
The government collapse also spawned a new interest in Helmand from the Iranian 
intelligence services. Shortly after the Najib government fell, a Sardar Baghwani reportedly 
held meetings with Allah Noor and Khano in Lashkar Gah.703 This was the first report of 
Iran’s interest in Helmand since the negotiations over the Helmand water supply in 1973. A 
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decade later, Baghwani was reportedly in Helmand distributing arms,704 and again in 2006, 
he supposedly came to meet with ‘Taliban’ in Marjeh and Now Zad.705 Iran has major 
strategic interests in Helmand, particularly the water that flows through the Kajaki dam.706 
 
The fighting between Rasoul and the Lashkar Gah ‘government’ continued. In October, there 
were violent clashes between Hafizullah’s men and Rasoul’s, when Rasoul attempted to 
take the maidan.707 But even the threat of an external enemy failed to hold the government 
together in the long-term. Some say that the argument began over dividing the spoils,708 
others, that it started when Gulbuddin, Assadullah Sherzad’s (a cousin of Khano and later to 
become Helmand’s Chief of Police during the Karzai-era) nephew, launched a rocket 
propelled grenade at Sar Katib, the Hizb commander from Kandahar who was reinforcing 
Hafizullah. This was in revenge for an earlier killing when ‘Hizb’ and ‘Khalq’ were enemies. 
This is a good example of private cleavages remaining extant over two separate consecutive 
public spheres.  
 
Gulbuddin was killed and Assadullah Sherzad wounded in the ensuring mêlée.709 The battle 
lasted for eight hours in the centre of Lashkar Gah and ‘lots of Sar Katib’s men were 
killed…one roundabout had ten of their bodies on it’.710 Contemporaneous secondary 
sources711 state that a difference in public narratives relating to girls’ schooling caused the 
‘Hizb’/‘Khalq’ grouping to fracture, however this was not confirmed in my interviews and 
deemed unlikely by a neutral witness who was in Lashkar Gah at the time.712 The private 
cleavage above is more likely as a reason. Hafizullah had only been Provincial Governor for 
six months when he was ejected from Lashkar Gah. The ‘Hizb’ commanders then set up a 
base in Khwashk-e Nakud with their men:713 the site of the battle of Maiwand against British-
Indian forces one hundred and twelve years before.  
 
3.8 - ‘Jamiat’/‘communist’ cooperation 
By this time Rabbani, the leader of Jamiat, had been appointed President in Kabul and it 
seemed prescient to have a ‘Jamiat’ face to the Helmandi ‘government’: they needed an 
interaction with a public organisation that could support them. Thus, the Helmandi 
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‘government’ morphed and Akhwaendi (Barakzai, Jamiat) was appointed Provincial 
Governor. The real power, however, was still held by Khano.714 Akhwaendi was reportedly a 
very parochial, (metaphorically) small man who was only interested in supporting his 
community in Nawa rather than acting like a Provincial Governor.715 Another interviewee 
described him as ‘a dangerous man [who] always had a group of eighteen-year-old [kids] 
with him’.716 Shortly after the switch in provincial governor, Khano attacked ‘Hizb’ posts in 
Babaji, Nad-e Ali and Marjeh and funding began to flow. This was both from Kabul, 
encouraged by personal interactions between Akhwaendi and Rabbani, and from Mazar-e 
Sharif, by interactions between Khano and Dostum.717 These should not be classified as 
public-private interactions, because although there was a government in place in Kabul, it 
was far from institutional. It is very hard during this period to classify elements as purely 
public, because although they were national-level and macro, they acted in a very inter-
personal, private way. This theme will be discussed further in this chapter’s conclusions. 
 
Akhwaendi’s period in power appeared to represent a brief respite in the continual military 
action. This may have been because it was over the winter, and therefore not during the 
traditional fighting season. At the same time, it appears that Rasoul spent that winter building 
a broader alliance consisting of most of his former enemies from the previous decade: Atta 
Mohammad, Dad Mohammad, Mir Wali, Hafizullah Khan, Rais Baghrani, Obaedi and, 
crucially, Ismail Khan, known as the Amir of Herat.718 The addition of Ismail Khan was a 
masterstroke as the presence of a heavyweight player held the alliance together. It is worth 
noting, however, that Ismail Khan was also part of the national ‘government’ led by Rabbani. 
One assumes that the national government was not aware that different parts of itself in the 
periphery were attacking each other, thus allowing the private cleavage—that between 
Rasoul and the central Helmandi commanders—to drive the conflict. 
 
After the poppy harvest in 1993, the Ismail-led alliance staged in Delaram. Khano received 
word and immediately launched a pre-emptive attack on them inflicting some damage.719 
Whether this was the original plan, or whether the pre-emptive attack had changed their 
plan, Ismail’s alliance then attacked Gereshk approaching from the east. Allah Noor 
conducted the defence of the cumberband in Deh Adam Khan in June. The battle lasted 
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twenty-two days and resulted in the fall of Gereshk to Ismail.720 Both sides had tanks and 
other heavy weapons that had been left by the Soviets.721 And different private actors had 
their own public-private interactions: as one of the militia commanders said, ‘Iran was 
helping Ismail and Pakistan was helping Rasoul…what chance did [the militias] have?’ He 
neglected to mention that the militias and Ismail were being supported by the Rabbani 
government. Allah Noor et al fled to Lashkar Gah to try and work out what to do.722 
 
3.9 - The flight of the ‘communists’ 
During the week after the Deh Adam Khan battle, Rasoul went through Malgir, Babaji, 
Marjeh and Nad-e Ali, clearing them of the remnants of the ‘government’, leaving just 
Lashkar Gah and Chah-e Anjir in their hands.723 The story then becomes more confused. At 
some point during that week Abdul Rahman Jan switched sides with his men, allying himself 
with Rasoul (he had previously been with the ‘government’).724 He himself attributes this to 
his Jamiat links to Ismail Khan. The next decisive battle took place in Chah-e Anjir where 
Khano and Allah Noor were cornered, with Abdul Rahman on Rasoul’s side.  
 
Khano and Allah Noor both fled in the middle of the night, escaping to Mazar-e Sharif on a 
plane that Dostum supplied,725 and one interviewee commented that ‘Rasoul had tried many 
times to take Lashkar Gah, but was only successful when Abdul Rahman joined him’.726 As 
Khano left, he turned over his heavy weapons to Abdul Rahman,727 an act that many 
attribute as decisive in Abdul Rahman’s rise to power.728 A senior Noorzai tribal leader 
interpreted this as a ‘tribal act’,729 as he would, however there is perhaps another option 
identified by another interlocutor: that is, the role of an Iranian intelligence in brokering a deal 
between Khano, Ismail Khan and Abdul Rahman.730  
 
The ground work laid by the previous tribal shuras paid dividends. As Rasoul entered 
Lashkar Gah, the members of the former administration were absorbed by their tribal kin. 
For example, Israel Khan, the ‘Etihad’ commander from Now Zad, entered Lashkar Gah with 
Rasoul and was able to guarantee the safety of those members of the clan who had worked 
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with the government.731 The previously-held interactions with public organisations were 
ignored in the face of membership of private groups. In this, they were working with the grain 
of Helmandi society. No-one wanted to kill someone if they had a powerful family behind 
them: the obligations for revenge would be too strong. The public labels that people had 
adopted were not enough of a reason to kill them. 
 
Abdul Rahman was appointed ‘Deputy Provincial Chief of Police’ under Rasoul who became 
‘Provincial Governor’.732 The other jobs were divvied up at a meeting attended by Mir Wali in 
Lashkar Gah. As Mir Wali recounted, when Rasoul turned up to the meeting he pretended 
not to know who Mir Wali was, a deliberate and serious slight attempting to put the ex-‘Hizb’ 
commander at a disadvantage. Firstly, Baghrani was made ‘commander of the 93rd Division’ 
and Abdul Ahad, the Ishaqzai Harakat commander from Now Zad, was made the ‘Chief of 
Police’. Atta Mohammad was made the ‘District Governor’ of Sangin.733 ‘Hizb’ got the scraps. 
Khalifa Shirin Khan and Abdullah Jan remained in Gereshk and Garmsir respectively, and 
Malem Yusof was either appointed or remained in Now Zad. Mir Wali was made the 
‘Provincial Head of Culture and Information’, and Hafizullah was not given a post. ‘Khad’ 
went to Dad Mohammad from Sangin, in recognition of his long-term alliance with Rasoul.734  
 
What is particularly interesting about this series of events are the public narratives offered 
afterwards by the Rabbani (Jamiat) government in Kabul. These contrast with the private 
sphere where Ismail Khan, a ‘Jamiat’ commander affiliated to the government, had deposed 
another ‘Jamiat’ commander, Akhwaendi, also recognised by, and affiliated to, the Rabbani 
government. This gave Rasoul (a ‘Harakat’ commander) the Provincial Governorship.  
 
Afghan News, the Jamiat mouthpiece, proclaimed that the ‘Herat to Kandahar road had been 
opened for use after government forces had smashed several groups of armed bandits 
along the road’. It went on to say that ‘government administration had also been reactivated 
in Farah and Helmand’. ‘All [of Ismail’s alliance] decided to join together and liberate the 
province from the militia forces of the former regime’ and listed the change in administration 
in Lashkar Gah as a ‘defeat for [Hizb] as [they were] close to the militias’.735  
 
The private sphere is very different: that the ‘Hizb’ forces in the area had actually been 
fighting on Rasoul’s side; that the only defeat they suffered was in the division of post-battle 
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spoils; that it had been a ‘Jamiat’ on ‘Jamiat’ fight. This shows the reality. The public sphere 
had no hope of influencing events in Helmand that it could not understand, and could merely 
follow them, accepting and recognising the private sphere’s ‘facts on the ground’ as they 
occurred. This disparity between the public and private spheres and the primacy of the 
private sphere in describing the Ismail Khan-led takeover of Lashkar Gah is an important 
piece of evidence for this thesis. 
 
Thus far, I have outlined the continuing civil war in Helmand and its spread to central 
Helmand as the ‘government’ slowly collapsed. Once the public sphere had completely 
collapsed, the two broad ‘government’ and ‘non-government’ groupings fluctuated 
backwards and forwards wildly, based on rapidly shifting private alliances driven by private 
cleavages. The story finished with attempts by the ‘communist’ militia leaders to remain in 
power. The Helmandi private sphere of cleavages, alliances and narratives did not at all 
match the national public sphere, as exemplified by what was happening in Kabul, although 
it is hard to classify the government as a purely public organisation during this era, because 
although it was national, it was not institutional. Now, we discuss Rasoul’s governorship and 
the rise of the Taliban. 
 
3.10 - Rasoul’s calm 
Rasoul’s tenure was another period of greater stability for Helmand, mainly due to the lack of 
large-scale, military maneuverers across the province. This stability allowed families to 
return and by 1994, fifty per cent of refugees had returned.736 Rasoul was confident enough 
to offer to send military support to the Rabbani government in its war against Hizb for control 
of Kabul.737 Some of the District Governors were changed to reflect the new order so, for 
example, Mullah Said Gul (Alizai/Khalozai), a Baghrani sub-commander was appointed to 
Nad-e Ali.738  
 
With the exceptional weakness of the public sphere, these positions had ceased to have 
meaning, and several people commented on the fact that ‘officials’ stopped having defined 
positions and that the only qualification for a ‘government’ position was a militia. This was 
the period of andiwali government (andiwal means friend in Dari): where nothing got done 
and friends of the appointee filled all of the ‘posts’ (that is, it was ‘private’ government).739 In 
essence, this was a fully patronage-based organisation and the culmination of the process 
originally set in motion by Najib’s National Reconciliation (and militia) policy.  
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This was publicly an administration of mujahidin unity including ‘Hizb’, and those areas that 
were ‘conquered’ by Rasoul, for example Babaji, joined the ‘government’.740 However, 
privately Rasoul coveted all the power for himself and a round of looting occurred with 
former ‘Hizb’ areas the targets. Thus, the street lights in Shin Kalay were stripped and taken 
to Musa Qala. Apparently, Haji Jamalzai, the Kharoti Harakat commander, allowed this to 
happen despite having influence with Rasoul. As far as he was concerned, ‘[my village] does 
not have streetlights, so why should Shin Kalay?’741 Even more bizarrely, in the private 
sphere there were ‘Hizb’ figures in the ‘government’ (e.g. Mir Wali), which was funded by the 
central government, at the same time that the government was under grave threat from Hizb 
in the environs of Kabul. Helmand was utterly disconnected from the (weak) national public 
organisations. 
 
Rasoul’s tenure was short. He died of natural causes in Lashkar Gah on 6 September 1994 
at the age of sixty and was immediately replaced by Ghaffour, his younger brother.742 He 
was not as dictatorial or hard line as Rasoul, who had lost a lot of the support that Nasim 
had built up during the jihad.743 As ever, control was exerted by proxy and Ghaffour, like 
Rasoul, never had direct control over Gereshk (where Khalifa Shirin Khan was still District 
Governor and Baghrani Commander of the ‘93rd Division’). He did not have that much control 
in Nad-e Ali either.744 Even so, Ghaffour, like Rasoul before him, condoned the settlement of 
a large number of Alizai tribesmen on government land in the southern Bolan desert.745 Life 
went on much as before. 
 
3.11 - The students 
As Ghaffour was settling into his new job, a new movement of religious students was arising 
in Kandahar: the Taliban. The story—or myth—of their rise in Kandahar has been covered 
elsewhere and so will not be here,746 but their takeover of Helmand is worth recounting in 
some detail, as it demonstrates how they were to take over so much of Afghanistan in the 
coming months. It also gives credence to the theory that in the initial stages of their growth 
as a movement the main motivating factor for the Taliban was securing the trade route to 
Central Asia, through Gereshk, for Pakistani trucking mafias:747 most of their military activity 
focussed on clearing the route between Kandahar and Herat.748   
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As the Taliban seized power in Kandahar, Ghaffour mediated between them and the soon-
to-be ejected commanders who had been in charge there.749 There was however, no loyalty 
to Ghaffour and they approached Rais Baghrani, the commander of the ‘93rd Division’ in 
Gereshk, and reached an agreement that he would affiliate himself with the Taliban, 
breaking his private alliance with Ghaffour. Six Talibs then organised an ‘official’ meeting 
with Khalifa Shirin Khan (the District Governor), Khan Mohammad (an ex-Harakat 
commander) and Baghrani (the ‘93rd’ divisional commander). As described by an 
eyewitness, they used the public narratives of the Taliban, imploring them to work with the 
new movement and be good Muslims saying, ‘we want you to go [forward] under the Qur’an; 
we want the Qur’an to be raised up high’. Khalifa Shirin Khan was slightly incredulous: ‘we 
have been fighting against the Soviets for fifteen years; we have been doing jihad; we are 
not kaffirs’, he retorted. The meeting broke up.750 
 
Nine days later, two cars came from Kandahar with ten Talibs. They proceeded to 
Baghrani’s headquarters for lunch. Post-prandially, Baghrani and the Taliban set about 
removing the checkpoints on the main road between Gereshk and Kandahar that were 
manned by Mir Wali and other ‘Hizb’ commanders. This took two days and on the third day 
they launched an attack on Mir Wali’s positions in Deh Mazang and Abhashak. The fighting 
lasted for eighteen hours, and finished at 8am the next day when Mir Wali escaped 
westwards to Nimruz.751 Whilst this was occurring, Ghaffour was approached in Lashkar Gah 
by Taliban representatives.  
 
The Talibs had been sent to negotiate the fall of Helmand and told Ghaffour that they wanted 
to cut a deal: the Taliban would remove Mir Wali and Atta Mohammad from Helmand and 
Ghaffour would be left to control the Alizai territory in the north of the province. They used 
private interests rather than public narratives to appeal to him. In return, he had to give up 
Lashkar Gah.752 Ghaffour considered what had happened in Gereshk and realised that he 
had no choice—with Baghrani on their side, the Taliban would be undefeatable, even though 
they had not yet sent any serious forces to Helmand.753 Many interpreted this as a deal 
between Ghaffour and the Taliban,754 and Abdul Rahman probably summed up the best how 
most people felt about it, ‘Ghaffour and [Baghrani] went over to the Taliban; they did it 
because they were all mullahs’. Actually, Baghrani had formed an interaction with the 
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Taliban, a new public organisation supported by Pakistan, because he saw it as a way to 
dominate his private enemy: Ghaffour. Ghaffour fled to Musa Qala and Taliban forces 
occupied Lashkar Gah peacefully.755 The Taliban were clearly a new public organisation with 
a strong ideology, yet they also had very good knowledge of the private sphere—vide the 
secret negotiations with Baghrani and then the approach that they made to Ghaffour—which 
enabled them to shape the events in their favour. This is a new dynamic, and I treat it as key 
support for my thesis. 
 
By this time the Taliban had moved forces in from outside Helmand and, with Baghrani, 
attacked Atta Mohammad and Dad Mohammad in Sangin who had, amazingly after the bitter 
fighting of the last fifteen years, allied in the face of the Taliban threat. Both were defeated 
and fled west, Dad Mohammad with five hundred of his fighters and Atta Mohammad alone: 
his fighters immediately went over to the Taliban.756 These forces then pressed on to Musa 
Qala and evicted Ghaffour from there and Kajaki in mid-January.757 It was here, that one of 
Ghaffour’s nephews, Sher Mohammad, fought his first battles as the commander of a few 
men. Upon Ghaffour’s death, he was to rise and take control of the dynasty, eventually 
becoming Provincial Governor during the Karzai-era.758  
 
Ghaffour and his family were forced to flee through Baghran, where Baghrani made sure that 
they were attacked and plundered for their weapons, money, opium and women. This 
particular act and the dishonour associated with it still shape events today.759 At 
approximately the same time, the Taliban pushed to Marjeh, where Abdul Rahman had 
retreated from Lashkar Gah when Ghaffour left. They attempted to disarm him, provoking a 
furious response.760 Abdul Rahman was pushed out to Washir, where he linked up with 
Malem Yusof in Now Zad. Both were soon defeated by the Taliban.761 In the months of 
December 1994 and January 1995, Helmand had fallen to the Taliban, who then proceeded 
to disarm as many of the jihadi commanders as they could.762 This was, in large part, 
facilitated by their knowledge of the private sphere, which enabled them to form interactions 
with the correct private actors. 
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Ghaffour fled to Herat via Ghor, where he allied with Ismail Khan.763 Abdul Rahman and Mir 
Wali met them there.764 They all wanted to retake Helmand in order to regain their interests 
in the drugs trade, upon which their power was based. Thus, Ismail Khan and the Helmandis 
(and some Kandahari commanders) tried to reconquer Helmand in March and succeeded in 
occupying Gereshk, but were quickly beaten back by the Taliban, losing over two thousand 
men captured.765 Despite serious trust issues between the Herat-based commanders,766 a 
second assault was carried out in August and by the twenty-sixth of that month, Gereshk 
and Musa Qala were under their control.767  
 
At this point, the ISI intervened in the Taliban’s favour, rushing men and materiel to them, 
including one thousand five hundred new Toyota Hiluxes. The Pakistani army even gave 
artillery and helicopter support, probably for the first time.768 Within a month, the Taliban had 
recaptured Gereshk and Ismail Khan’s force disintegrated. Ghaffour, Mir Wali and Abdul 
Rahman all fled to Iran.769 Ghaffour soon ended up in Quetta where he was eventually 
assassinated by the Taliban.770 Abdul Rahman fought briefly with the Northern Alliance 
against the Taliban, before ending up in Iran. Mir Wali spent much of the next six years 
fighting with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the north of the country. Neither 
Abdul Rahman nor Mir Wali were welcome in Pakistan as they had fought the Taliban: when 
they visited they were forced to leave by the ISI.771 
 
So far, I have presented the collapse of the ‘government’ and the chaotic changes of power 
once the public sphere had collapsed and before the Taliban took control of Helmand. 
During this takeover, I highlighted the importance of the knowledge of the private sphere that 
the Taliban—a public organisation—had of the private sphere. Using this they were able to 
convince Baghrani to switch sides in order to gain power over Ghaffour. Now I discuss in 
detail Taliban methods of rule. 
 
3.12 - Taliban provincial-level control 
The Taliban brought an entire set of political appointees with them, mainly from Uruzgan.772 
Their first Provincial Governor was Mullah Mahmad Karim (Noorzai, from Kandahar). Shortly 
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afterwards he was replaced by Abdul Bari (Alikozai, from Deh Rawoud) who remained 
governor for the remainder of Taliban rule.773 Generally Abdul Bari was seen as a fair 
governor, if disorganised and slightly corrupt.774 In many respects the critical position was 
the Governor for Gereshk, who also had responsibility for Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qala: 
Mullah Mir Hamza (Noorzai, Deh Rawoud). Mir Hamza was highly respected by Mullah 
Omar and was referred to by him as ‘Haji Khan’.775 Echoing history, such an important 
position—Gereshk was the back door to Kandahar—had to go to someone trustworthy. He 
was also respected by the local people as being serious and fair: he reflected the public 
Taliban narrative.776 Mir Hamza’s deputy was Haji Mahmad Azem777 and the Mayor was 
Abdul Haq (both Noorzai, Uruzgan). Abdul Haq’s job reportedly centred on collecting the 
road tolls778 upon which much of the Taliban treasury in Helmand rested.779 The District 
Governor was the commander of Taliban forces in the area.780 
 
Beyond those key posts government administration appeared to be an afterthought. This is 
probably best summarised by an ex-Mahaz commander, who said, ‘the Taliban came into 
Helmand stating that they didn’t want to do government, and they didn’t’.781 When the 
Taliban commanded by Mullah Ibrahim (Laghmani, from Garmsir) had reached Nad-e Ali 
and finished fighting with Abdul Rahman, Ibrahim simply became District Governor. 
Characterized as intelligent and respected by the people, he was unfortunately replaced by 
Mullah Abdul Rahman (Noorzai, from Now Zad)782 after about a year. Shortly after, he was in 
turn replaced by Mawlana Sahib (from Uruzgan). Mawlana Sahib remained the longest, but 
was characterized by one of the senior tribal leaders in the district as desperately corrupt 
when dealing with land issues and cruel, resorting to shooting people to maintain order.783 
 
There followed four other District Governors, bringing the total to seven in seven years: 
Mullah Abdul Rahim (Ishaqzai, from Uruzgan), Mullah Sharwali (Daftani, from Nahr-e Saraj), 
Mullah Abdul Haq (Daftani, from Waziristan, Pakistan) and Mullah Saifullah (Alizai, from 
Uruzgan).784 This represented an astonishing personnel turnover. Apparently, Nad-e Ali was 
considered a ‘rest and recuperation’ posting for Taliban commanders from the fighting in the 
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north of the country. The district was also seen as a position in which they could make 
money due to the fact that there were, by now, interminable land disputes in Nad-e Ali and 
the social heterogeneity meant that the need for an ‘impartial’ figure was greater than in 
areas where there was a unified tribal leadership. As one man who was fairly close to the 
Taliban administration told me, ‘people had no choice but to allow the Taliban to solve 
[disputes] as they allowed no fighting…when they solved them they made money out of it!’785  
 
The last central district of Nawa began the Taliban-era with an unknown District Governor, 
who was soon replaced by the Mullah Ibrahim from Nad-e Ali. He was again highly 
respected by the population. He seems to personify what we understand to be the public 
narrative surrounding the Taliban. One interviewee recalled that when Ibrahim’s own brother 
killed someone, he made sure that justice was served and that the victim’s family got the 
appropriate blood money. He did not abuse his power, and made sure that disputes over 
land and women were solved without the payment of bribes.786 Yet beyond the central 
districts, the Taliban instituted a form of indirect rule, by employing a District Governor from a 
supportive, sometimes minority, community in the district, although they were also selected 
for religious achievement. Thus in Garmsir, Mullah Naim was appointed from the Alizai, a 
minority community.787 In Now Zad, the Taliban District Governor was Dost Mohammad 
Akhund (Ishaqzai, Harakat) who was the brother-in-law of Abdul Ahad,788 the main Harakat 
commander for Now Zad during the jihad. 
 
Every district had a shura (council), whose composition varied depending on the micro-
political situation. The significance of the appointees is interesting and every district had a 
slightly different method of Taliban control. Over much of the province Harakat networks 
quickly became Talibanised.789 This conforms to the public narratives of the two movements. 
Harakat and Taliban structures were both clerical, and Mullah Omar had been a member of 
Harakat. Broadly speaking, both parties had the same type of people: mullahs and those 
who wanted a return to traditional village life. Yet whilst many of the Hizb or Jamiat networks 
were ignored or suppressed,790 in other areas commanders of those parties would rise in the 
Taliban movement. This depended on the local political balance: in some cases the 
suppression was due to the fact that their previous private enemies were now affiliated with 
the Taliban government.791 This shows that the Taliban used detailed local political 
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knowledge of the private sphere in order to dominate the interaction between public and 
private spheres. 
 
3.13 - Taliban district-level control in central Helmand 
The provincial-level figures and Mullah Mir Hamza were people who were close to Mullah 
Omar and could be trusted. In Gereshk, Mir Hamza reactivated Harakat networks to govern, 
thus relying on a minority of Barakzai from the smaller tribal coalition (see section 2.9) and 
other tribes.792 Ex-Harakat commanders like Mullah Atta Mohammad (Barakzai, from Malgir) 
and Saddiq (Ishaqzai) became Taliban petty officials.793 Hizb affiliated commanders were 
excluded, thus Khalifa Shirin Khan, the mujahidin District Governor, stayed at home.794 The 
district shura consisted of ‘influential’ mullahs and elders from the district, but reflected the 
private ‘Harakat’ bias expressed above795 and had very little power anyway.796  
 
Baghrani remained as commander of the division, before moving to Herat to fight Ismail 
Khan and then Kabul to fight the Northern Alliance,797 eventually becoming a ‘Chief 
Mullah’.798 Many of his sub-commanders went on to become Taliban sub-commanders, 
taking the prenominal mullah, thus, Mullah Janan (Alizai/Khalozai/Arabzai), Mullah Rauf 
(Alizai/Khalozai/Mirazai), Mullah Zakir (Alizai/Khalozai/Arabzai)799 and Mullah Ahmad Shah 
(Alizai/Khalozai/Yahyazai) among others.800 All were to feature prominently in the next fifteen 
years of the Helmandi story.  
 
Finally, young men came of age during the Taliban-era and joined the movement. One such 
man was Lal Mohammad from Torghai, south of Malgir, who joined at a young age. He was 
much later to become a militia commander for ISAF and the Karzai government and then 
change sides back to the ‘Taliban’ in 2012.801 Much of this side-switching was driven by 
private cleavages with his neighbours. Ezmarai, the son of the head of intelligence for the 
Khalqi police, also became a petty commander in the vice and virtue organisation in 
Gereshk.802 He was later to become the Chief of Police of Nahr-e Saraj in 2010 and was 
rumoured to run a brothel with the female prisoners. Mir Wali described Ezmarai as a 
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‘money dog’ and pointed out that he would go with whoever was in power: it appears it was 
no different with the Taliban. 
 
The approach in Nad-e Ali was similar—empowering former Harakat commanders and 
working with minorities.803 Thus, Haji Mullah Paslow, the Popalzai Harakat commander, was 
an official in the government and his nephew, Akhtur Mohammad, was a judge.804 From the 
Noorzai clan in Loy Bagh that had split so successfully during the jihad, the Aghezai, Mullah 
Karim (who was actually Khano’s nephew, and had been with Hizb, although whether the 
Taliban knew this or not is unknown) acted as a mullah for the movement. Another ex-
Harakat commander, Zakiri (Noorzai), acted as a petty commander.805 Mullah Karim aside, 
the Hizb figures in the district were not represented in the Taliban administration. Some were 
persecuted: Rahmattiar (Ishaqzai, from Jangal) was repeatedly arrested and tortured. In one 
incident in January 2001, he was blamed for a disturbance that was actually created by 
Abdul Rahman (who had been running a low-level insurgency against Taliban rule in Marjeh) 
and thrown in prison in Kandahar. He was eventually freed by the Karzais at the end of the 
year (see section 4.1).806 
 
In Nad-e Ali too, as in Nahr-e Saraj, young men came of age during the Taliban-era and 
joined the movement. One particular young man, Murtaza, was a young Kharoti tribesman 
from Shin Kalay.807 Shin Kalay was not well represented in the Taliban administration, mainly 
because they had been so closely aligned with the communists or Hizb, and the Taliban had 
lots of ex-Harakat people. Taliban knowledge of the private sphere dictated their 
interactions. Murtaza, however, came from the smallest of six Kharoti clans in Shin Kalay, 
the Shabakhel (see Kharoti tribal diagram in Appendix 4). This was either a reflection of the 
Taliban policy of empowering minorities, or, Murtaza saw it as a way of breaking out of his 
pre-proscribed role in life in one of the less powerful clans in the village.808 Before long, 
Murtaza was in command of a group fighting in the north of the country and was eventually 
arrested by the US and sent to Guantanamo.809  
 
3.14 - Taliban district-level control outside central Helmand 
The central districts were split politically between ex-Hizb and ex-Harakat patronage 
networks and the Taliban managed them by mostly supporting Harakat over Hizb networks. 
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They understood the private sphere well. Most other districts in Helmand were similarly 
divided, but the Taliban managed them in different ways. In Sangin, Atta Mohammad’s men 
had switched sides to the Taliban and so they formed the immediate political constituency. 
Later famous, Akhtur Mohammad Osmani came from this Ishaqzai Chowkazai clan.810 He 
eventually rose to become a treasurer to the Taliban and a close confidant of Mullah Omar 
(he was finally killed by ISAF in 2006).811 Mullah Abdul Ghaffour, also from a minority tribe in 
Sangin, the Popalzai, rose to become the Head of Communications at the Taliban Ministry of 
Defence.812 The same minority strategy was used in Garmsir, where Mullah Naim from the 
Alizai (approximately ten per cent of the district’s population were Alizai) was chosen, 
despite the fact that the Garmsir Alizai largely sided with Hizb during the jihad.813 This clearly 
shows that the Taliban understood and took into took into account the private sphere when 
controlling the population, and did not rely on their public, ‘religious’ narrative. 
 
Now Zad, however, offers a striking example where almost the entire district was supportive 
of the Taliban administration and the district supplied some of the biggest commanders 
nationwide to fight for the Taliban. The public narratives of the conflict match that which was 
described to me as occurring in Now Zad. There, the Taliban engineered an interaction 
whereby Mullah Dost Mohammad Akhund (Harakat) was the District Governor representing 
the faction of the Ishaqzai that had fought under Abdul Ahad (Dost was Abdul’s brother).814 
Mahmoud Yunous (Ishaqzai) was from the same community and rose to become the 
commander of Kandahar Airfield and Hafiz Yunous (Ishaqzai) became the Taliban Minister 
for Mines.815  
 
But, the other communities in Now Zad also had power. One of the largest Taliban field 
commanders in the country came from the Noorzai community who had sided with Hizb: 
Mullah Salam from Tizne village. He eventually rose to become the Herat military 
commander,816 despite being despised by the residents of Herat and being seen as 
operating independently of control by the Taliban government in Kandahar.817 The district 
had a lack of friction during the Taliban-era due to the alliance between the Ishaqzai and 
Noorzai communities. I asked a former Taliban Ishaqzai mullah how it came about (that is, 
how was it that what I understood to have happened in Now Zad matched the public 
narratives of the conflict). He attributed it to the large number of madrasas and religious 
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students in Now Zad, although perhaps he is amplifying his own experience, and applying 
ideological narratives to his own actions: ‘when the Taliban came, all the students joined 
immediately’.818  
 
Thus, the Taliban had a variety of strategies for governing Helmand, each dependent on the 
social make-up of the area they were trying to administer. In many areas they chose to 
empower ex-Harakat networks. Those commanders who chose to affiliate themselves with 
Harakat during the jihad were more likely to find their views commensurate with the Taliban. 
But, ideological selection of public organisations in Helmandi politics was minimal, in that it 
was mainly a patronage game—vide those Hizb and Jamiat commanders that they 
empowered. The private sphere was important in driving their public-private interactions with 
private actors. Most interviewees agreed that the Taliban government was very similar to 
Rasoul or Ghaffour’s style and ideology of governing: strict, Islamic and andiwali.819 
Interestingly, unlike other periods covered in this thesis, they described it in terms of Taliban 
co-option of the population, rather than population manipulation of the Taliban:820 this was 
down to their local knowledge. 
 
Those who had not joined the Taliban from an established jihadi power block did so for a 
variety of reasons, which created another layer in many communities’ politics. Some, like 
Murtaza (Kharoti), joined for private interests, because it was a way of increasing their 
standing in the community. Others, because they wanted to take advantage of Taliban 
patronage in paying for fighters where there was little other employment: Atta Mohammad’s 
men in Sangin, for example. Some speak of ideological public narratives as reasons for 
joining. The Taliban mullah from Now Zad discussed above makes a good example, 
although he may have been self-justifying. He recounted to me that the Taliban had visited 
his madrassa and described the situation in Gereshk and Kandahar. ‘Women are uncovered’ 
they said, ‘they are all warlords and not true jihadists [in Gereshk]’. But Kandahar was 
worse: the Taliban had gone to arrest a commander one evening and when they went into 
his room they found ‘his chaiboy masturbating him’. As the then soon-to-be Taliban mullah 
said to me, ‘the Taliban showed me how people were not living properly’. He joined 
immediately and saw extensive service leading Taliban troops in prayer on the front line.821 
 
Having discussed the Taliban methods of control, it can be seen that they took into account 
the private (political) sphere. These public-private interactions were discussed in terms of 
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Taliban (public) co-option rather than population (private) manipulation. And although the 
Taliban did motivate some people through their public narratives, for many it was just the 
same as any other regime: how they treated you depended on who you were in Helmandi 
society. We conclude this chapter by considering what that control meant to Helmandis: the 
benefits, the drawbacks and the weaknesses of Taliban rule. 
 
3.15 - Stability 
Helmand was stable under the Taliban. And this was almost certainly due to the 
disarmament of militias and the bespoke political control generated by interactions with 
different private actors. These two factors were more important for stability than the public 
narrative of fairness that the Taliban administration exhibited towards its Helmandi citizens. 
My interviews show this to be patchy at best, with some administrators being the epitome of 
fairness,822 others as corrupt as those who came before or afterwards823—it all depends 
upon the official spoken about and my interlocutor. But stability seemed to be the same 
across the districts. The main thing that many Helmandis recounted was keeping a low 
profile, which meant that the Taliban left you alone.824 ‘Like before, it was done in the name 
of religion, but it was all about power’, said one man who was a petty Talib.825 Even the very 
few communists who did not flee were safe, as long as they kept a low profile.826 The 
emphasis was on stability, probably because for the entire time that the Taliban controlled 
Helmand they were fighting bitter wars elsewhere in the country, first against Hekmatyar 
then later against Masoud and Dostum. 
 
There was, however, one aspect of Taliban rule that did not pass unnoticed by the 
population: the domination by Pakistani intelligence of the upper levels of the decision 
making processes of the organisation. The ISI was the source of much of the funding for the 
Taliban, alongside road tolls and drugs.827 One shopkeeper, who kept a shop in Lashkar 
Gah during the Taliban-era, claimed he saw regular visits from the ISI. Allegedly, Hamid Gul, 
the former Director of ISI and at that point ‘retired’, was given a tour of Helmand by the 
Taliban.828 Generally speaking however, the numbers of full-time Talibs in Helmand was low, 
because manpower was needed elsewhere in the country.829 This led to the greatest 
weakness of the Taliban method of government—conscription. 
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Conscription was how the Taliban maintained and delivered manpower in a flexible way. The 
draft was a common experience for Helmandis. Everyone knew someone who had been 
conscripted and many of my interviewees had been conscripted themselves.830 The system 
of conscription was organised through the miraws (community water allocators) who were 
asked to draw up a list of males of the appropriate age. They were the natural choice as they 
knew everyone in the community. This was then passed to the local shura to issue the 
orders conscripting people. Individuals were ordered to report to Lashkar Gah, then they 
were taken by bus to Kandahar and then onwards to wherever they fought: mostly Kunduz, 
or Mazar-e Sharif, allowing us to date their conscription from 1997 onwards.831  
 
Many fled rather than face conscription and there were even ‘uprisings’ in 1998.832 As 
conscription lasted for three months, most extended families had to give at least one person. 
In Shin Kalay around thirty-five were sent: one family sent two men, and although both 
returned, one had only three limbs.833 From the small village of Kakaran in the north of Nad-e 
Ali, ten men were conscripted. Naqilabad, a previous Hizb stronghold, suffered particularly 
badly having thirty men conscripted, of which only fifteen returned alive.834 Conscripts were 
not paid for their service—only clothing, food and ammunition were given—however, they 
were allowed to steal from the population in the areas where they fought in order to gather a 
salary.835 The only way out was to pay: around fifteen hundred dollars was the going rate for 
not doing your ‘Islamic duty’.836 
 
The Taliban really became infamous for their social policies, which seem extreme to 
outsiders, but in the context of seventeen previous years of war in Helmand, were welcome. 
This was another aspect of Taliban rule that all my interviewees commented on, probably 
because they thought that it chimed with what they thought was my understanding of the 
public narratives surrounding the Taliban movement. My interviewees also erred on the side 
of negative perceptions about the Taliban because at the time of interviewing the West was 
fighting a ‘Taliban’ insurgency in Helmand: clearly, they wanted me to know where they 
stood with respect to the Taliban. However, even though there was a divergence of opinion 
about whether the Taliban were too harsh in their implementations everyone, without fail, 
welcomed the absence of crime and the increase in stability.  
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But there was not a huge difference between the public Taliban narratives and the private 
Helmandi traditions. The Taliban were recruited from madrassas and refugee camps in 
Baluchistan, north-west Pakistan. These camps were mainly populated by people from the 
south of Afghanistan anyway.837 The province’s government had also been run previously on 
a clerical system under the Akhundzadas, exactly that which the Taliban wished to ‘impose’. 
The conservative values of the Taliban were similar to the conservative values of rural 
Helmand.838 This is an important point as it runs counter to the prevailing overarching public 
narratives about the Taliban: that they forced their rules on an unwilling population. 
 
Upon getting to Gereshk, and before they had even begun to take over the rest of the 
province, the Taliban closed the barbers in the bazaar (to prevent people from cutting their 
hair thus allowing it to grow long and, according to them, more Islamic). They also 
immediately issued a dictate banning reshwat, or the soliciting of bribes. They also 
understood the Helmandi mentality and took over the few remaining brick built or concrete 
buildings: then, and now, a building not made of mud indicated the hukomat.839 As per the 
internationally-known public caricature, many commented on the fact that they used to check 
people’s beard lengths with their fists840 and would not allow music.841 But there was a 
private under-society: as a Karzai-era District Governor of Gereshk, who was rather fond of 
his viskey (which is what Helmandis call most alcohol) pointed out to me, Gereshk was then 
as it is now: ‘you could still drink and get women, it was just hidden’.842  
 
The rural areas were left to their own devices: in Babaji, people only saw the Taliban once a 
month when two Talibs would circulate on a motorbike to ‘check that no-one had any 
televisions’.843 Even in somewhere like Shin Kalay in Nad-e Ali, which is close to the 
hukomat, the elders would often go a month without seeing a Talib: rural government was a 
very, very ‘loose-touch’844 and based on spies—usually mullahs—and fear.845 This was ably 
helped by the copious amounts of distrust present in Helmandi society created by the 
corrupted jihad.846 In areas like Gereshk, the strictures were relaxed more, but this probably 
reflected the indigenous males’ attitudes rather than those of the Taliban.847 
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Where the Taliban were most appreciated was their stance on law and order. My data match 
the well-known public narratives of the Taliban-era. Hands were cut off for theft848 and 
beatings issued for minor infringements such as not praying.849 As a result, there was very 
little crime.850 This was only slightly stricter however than the rule of Rasoul or Ghaffour, 
where cigarette smoking was allegedly punished with torture.851 Many spoke very favourably 
of it—or rather the lawful effects on society of it—especially in comparison to the Karzai-era 
that was to come.852 As one of my closest contacts said to me, ‘people were scared, but at 
least their home was not a war-zone’;853 another commented on the fact that ‘you could go 
anywhere, it was safe’.854 The Taliban increased the stability that had been established by 
Rasoul. People accepted that life was more peaceful under the Taliban,855 and returned. 
Only thirteen per cent of refugees were still away by 1999.856 These descriptions very clearly 
match the well-known public narratives surrounding the Taliban government.  
 
3.16 - Taliban weaknesses 
Where the Taliban really failed was to provide anything like enough services. Zakat (Islamic 
tax) was collected, but was not spent on the poor as it was supposed to be. It was used to 
help the Taliban with their wars in the north.857 There were no schools or clinics built 
whatsoever,858 but up to five hundred madrasas were established province-wide teaching 
over one hundred thousand students.859 The residents of Nad-e Ali, however, used their 
connections to Mutmain (from Nad-e Ali), the Taliban Minister of Culture and Education in 
Kandahar, to argue for the inclusion of secular subjects, to which he agreed.860 Those 
services that did exist were provided by NGOs: for example the hospital in Lashkar Gah,861 
the first major repairs to the canal project since the 1970s, a gravelled Route 601 from 
Lashkar Gah862 and several clinics province-wide.863 There was no building, however, in 
areas that had supported Ghaffour’s rule like Musa Qala.864  
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Perhaps the public narrative that separated the Taliban from the population the most was 
that of poppy. When they took over in Helmand, the Taliban declared poppy growth illegal for 
the briefest of periods, before recognising the revenue implications and re-implementing the 
ten per cent Islamic tithe.865 Soon, Taliban commanders themselves were involved in the 
trade.866 Many became rich from the crop: one rumour circulating in 1999, told of nine 
thousand Helmandis who had gone to Mecca for Haj that year alone.867 This continued until 
the Taliban opium ban in 2000.868 Scholars disagree as to whether this was a ban to 
appease the United States and the International Community who were increasingly isolating 
the Taliban government869 or whether it was merely a Taliban ploy to increase the price of 
opium so that they could make a windfall profit on their stocks.870 The ban was completely 
effective though: the Taliban ‘just beat people until they complied’.871 Opinion was equally 
divided in my interviews872 and I conclude that both were true.  
 
For example, one elder recalls travelling to the West and being asked by Talibs as he left the 
country to make sure that people abroad saw his photos of the opium ban,873 yet others 
recall that before the ban the Taliban went around to every household collecting two mahn 
(approximately 9kg) of opium paste, as they did every year (worth approximately $252 
before the ban and $4500, or even $6300, after the ban).874 What made it clear to Helmandis 
that the Taliban were taking advantage of the ban was that once a major drought set in in 
Helmand during the year 2000,875 the Taliban did not seem to suffer at all and were still able 
to ‘buy nice cars’.876 This came at a time when a quarter of Helmandi livestock was dying 
from lack of water.877  
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, people were starting to feel less positively about the Taliban 
government. The war in the north of the country between the Taliban and the Northern 
Alliance was interminable. In response to the drought of 2000, the Taliban reduced the flow 
through the Kajaki dam in an attempt to help, but this caused tensions with the Iranians.878 
The combined effects of the opium ban, the drought and conscription, created the 
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impression that the Taliban government was about to crumble. Against this backdrop the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 occurred in the United States. 
 
3.17 - Conclusions 
This period has two different dynamics to those that come before or after. During the ‘civil 
war’, there were no strong outside powers acting upon Helmand. Effectively, the public 
sphere weakened to the point of irrelevance and then completely disappeared during 
Hafizullah Khan’s tenure as ‘Provincial Governor’. Once the Rabbani government 
established itself, there were attempts at the government re-establishing itself—namely the 
Rasoul/Ismail Khan assault on Lashkar Gah. This however, appears to have been marred by 
a poor level of knowledge by the public organisation, leading to different bits of the 
government fighting each other. For much of this period, however, Helmand existed in its 
own, private bubble, with no true public sphere to speak of (even though the government 
was national, it was not ideological or institutional, for instance). 
 
The Taliban period is conceptually the resumption of strong public, external control over 
Helmand. There is a clear public-private interaction. But this interaction is one of a public 
Taliban power co-opting private Helmandi actors, driven by excellent Taliban knowledge of 
the private sphere. This began before the Taliban even moved into Helmand with the secret 
negotiations with Baghrani and then Ghaffour. This knowledge enabled them to dominate 
the interaction between the public and private spheres and continued when the Taliban were 
setting up their political control of Helmand. Each area was considered separately and a 
decision was made whether to effect minority control, or to rely on a particular ex-mujahidin 
network. This knowledge extended to a fine level of detail, enabling them to choose the 
correct individuals from within communities—vide the selection of Murtaza from one of the 
smallest clans in Shin Kalay to be a Taliban commander. These conclusions will be 
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Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. 
 
George W Bush 
20 September 2001 
 
With one bullet [Sher Mohammad] did many hunts. 
 





The events of 11 September 2001 prompted the US to attack Afghanistan and drive the 
Taliban from power. The Taliban were then replaced by the internationally-backed Interim 
Government of Hamid Karzai. The overarching public narratives of these years focus on the 
happiness of the Afghan population to be free of Taliban oppression. This general optimism 
was tempered with some emerging concerns that the US was relying on warlords too 
heavily, partly because its attention was diverted by the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and that 
these warlords were preying on the population. The end of this period is usually defined by a 
re-emergent Taliban movement that is seen by scholars as a reaction to the warlords’ 
predation. They are discussed in the public sphere as a unitary actor that came across the 
border from Pakistan, to fight democracy and western influence in the name of Islam.879 
 
4.1 - Taliban exit 
During October 2001, the US began intermittently to bomb Helmand. Their primary target 
was the Daud-era military camp in Bolan, still used by Taliban military forces.880 Beyond this, 
there was some bombardment of the outpost on artillery hill near Gereshk, where the 
Taliban kept some vehicles, and of their headquarters in Gereshk.881 The cotton gin (factory) 
was also bombed as it was one of the few buildings standing.882 In response, the Taliban 
began to conscript men onto trucks in order to take them to Kandahar and the north, to 
defend against an expected assault on Taliban front lines.883 The population began to move 
away from the bombardment sites.884 
 
Concurrently, Hamid Karzai, the head of the Popalzai tribe in Kandahar, held meetings with 
ex-mujahidin commanders in Quetta in order to build a coalition. Where support was pledged 
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it was conditional on the US backing Karzai: foreign money was the ‘kingmaker’.885 There 
was then a hiatus in Helmand until mid-November, when Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kabul and 
Jalalabad fell in days to former mujahidin commanders that had been in control before the 
rise of the Taliban. They were backed by US special forces. Then, Karzai moved into 
Afghanistan with a band of followers, including Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, the son of 
Rasoul, the erstwhile Provincial Governor of Helmand. According to legend they crossed the 
border on a motorbike together and headed for Uruzgan province.886 Sher Mohammad and a 
small group then continued onto Kajaki and Musa Qala, where he began to organise 
fighters.887  
 
Other Helmandi mujahidin commanders began to return independently. Hafizullah Khan left 
Pakistan and headed to Bolan.888 Abdul Rahman Jan mobilised in Iran (one assumes with 
Iranian support) and crossed Nimruz to capture Marjeh. As he recounts, Marjeh was taken 
from twenty Taliban fighters, one of whom was an Arab, and then lost to a Taliban 
counterattack from Lashkar Gah. Marjeh was captured and recaptured twice more, with a 
loss of eighty casualties on Abdul Rahman’s side. If true, this story represents the only 
reported on-the-ground fighting with the Taliban in Helmand. The general view is reflected 
thus: ‘the US pointed a finger and the Taliban government fell’.889 There was not any 
coalition special forces activity in Helmand at this early stage, unlike elsewhere in the 
country.890 
 
By the end of November, it was becoming clear that the Taliban position in the south of 
Afghanistan was untenable. The non-Helmandi Taliban evacuated Lashkar Gah and 
Gereshk on 28 November 2001.891 The Helmandi ‘Taliban’ went home, and some went to 
Girdi Jangal refugee camp in Pakistan.892 As they left, they handed control of Lashkar Gah 
to Israel Khan, from Ashem Jan’s influential Now Zadi Noorzai family. He was immediately 
challenged by Hafizullah Khan from Bolan and there was a standoff over the Bolan Bridge. A 
shura of elders decided that Israel should temporarily remain ‘Provincial Governor’ and 
Hafizullah should become his ‘Chief of Police’.893 Negotiations for the control of Helmand 
then began between Israel Khan, Hafizullah, Abdul Rahman and Sher Mohammad.894 By 
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mid-December the new order was defined: Sher Mohammad, who had Karzai’s 
endorsement (and hence the US’), was announced Provincial Governor. He entered Lashkar 
Gah with a militia comprised mainly of ex-Taliban fighters (he had mobilised old Alizai 
Harakat networks, which were mainly Taliban-aligned).895 Sher Mohammad, in his version of 
the story, claims that he personally pushed the Taliban out of Lashkar Gah, as does Abdul 
Rahman. 
 
Kandahar fell on 7 December 2001,896 with the Taliban surrender negotiated by Rais 
Baghrani.897 He had been fighting as a senior commander in Kabul and was asked by Mullah 
Omar, the Taliban leader, to negotiate with Karzai who was in the mountains surrounding 
Kandahar. Once negotiations were complete, Baghrani claims that Omar left Kandahar and 
that several days later, on the day that Kandahar fell, he went home to Baghran. Two of his 
commanders—Qayoum Zakir and Rauf Khadim—were not so lucky and were given over to 
the Americans in the North by Dostum and spent the next five years in Guantanamo Prison 
Camp in Cuba.898 Murtaza, the Kharoti commander from Shin Kalay, was also caught in the 
North and sent to Guantanamo to be released in March 2003.899 However, Gul Agha Shirzai 
and the US special forces suspected that Omar had escaped with, and was being protected 
by, Baghrani. Shirzai threatened to send four thousand men to Baghran to capture Omar, 
but Sher Mohammad offered to negotiate Omar’s handover and the disarmament and public 
reconciliation of Baghrani. Baghrani has always maintained that Omar would never seek 
shelter with him as they were from different tribes, Alizai and Hotak, and the chance of 
betrayal would be too great. 
 
4.2 - American arrival 
On the 31 December 2001, US (and possibly British) special forces arrived in Lashkar Gah. 
They then moved to Baghran with Sher Mohammad to meet Baghrani and to attempt to 
search for Mullah Omar. Baghrani, confronted with his family enemy backed by the Coalition, 
and with little choice but to comply, handed over ‘seventy to eighty heavy weapons, including 
artillery, and eight to ten anti-aircraft guns; more than one hundred light weapons, including 
AK-47 rifles and rocket-propelled grenades; and two hundred tons of ammunition’ as a token 
of public reconciliation. An advisor to Shirzai joked that the weapons offered were paltry and 
collection of all the weapons Baghrani owned would take weeks.  
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By January 5th, reconciliation in both the public and private spheres had occurred: Baghrani, 
‘the Talib’, had publicly reconciled with the ‘government’, and, privately Sher Mohammad 
reconciled with, and allowed, him to remain as a tribal leader in Baghran (the two families 
had been feuding for decades). These reconciliations were considered false by the US, who 
spent the next three years trying to capture or kill Baghrani. What drove the US is not clear. 
That is, whether they pursued Baghrani because he was ‘Taliban’, or whether Baghrani 
maintained links to the ‘Taliban’ as a way of hedging against US and Sher Mohammad’s 
aggression.900  
 
As a result of Karzai backing Sher Mohammad with American funds and legitimacy, 
Hafizullah was removed as Chief of Police and Abdul Rahman was appointed in his place.901 
Abdul Rahman attributes this to the presence of the ex-Jamiat Panjshiris controlling the 
Ministry of Interior. Dad Mohammad (Alikozai), from Sangin, was appointed head of 
Helmand’s National Directorate of Security (the new Khad)902—a reflection of his client 
status to the Alikozai leader in Kandahar, Mullah Naqib, who was also part of the Karzai 
tribal coalition.903  
 
Gereshk, for once, was not the primary focus of activity. An ex-Harakat commander from 
Deh Adam Khan, Khan Mohammad (see section 3.3), immediately seized control there, 
having slipped over the border from Pakistan in the dying days of the Taliban government.904 
Malem Mir Wali arrived approximately two weeks later having, he claims, taken part in the 
Northern Alliance capture of Kabul. He had come via Peshawar, Quetta and Kandahar, and 
through the hands of Gul Agha Shirzai, the Kandahari Barakzai strongman who had the 
support of US special forces. At this point, the US armed Mir Wali and he established his 
patronage links to the fledgling US-backed Afghan government (although through a different 
route to Sher Mohammad).  An important public-private interaction was born. Mir Wali was 
appointed commander of the re-established 93rd Division.905 
 
Once Mir Wali arrived in Gereshk he called a meeting amongst (mainly) ex-Hizb 
commanders: Khalifa Shirin Khan, Abdul Raziq, Mirza Khan, Haji Kadus and Khan 
Mohammad were among those who attended.906 This is the first time that Haji Kadus enters 
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the story and there is some confusion surrounding his origins. Many907 argue that he was a 
small time Hizb commander citing his closeness to Mir Wali. However, Kadus 
(Barakzai/Shamezai) actually came from the other ‘Harakat’ side of the tribal split in Malgir—
that led by Haji Abdul Agha (Barakzai/Shamezai). See section 2.9. His father was a medium-
level Khan and his family were ‘all Harakat’.908 Mir Wali may have appointed him as his 
deputy in order to create a stable coalition: between the two of them they were to have a 
massive effect on Gereshk over the coming decade. It certainly had the desired effect of 
balancing Khan Mohammad’s power—during the negotiations there was some posturing, 
and one of Khan Mohammad’s commanders was shot in the leg, but Mir Wali was far more 
powerful and prevailed. Khan Mohammad was made Chief of (a much smaller) Police, as 
compared to Mir Wali’s divisional command.909 This reflected the power balance between the 
ex-Harakat and ex-Hizb networks in Nahr-e Saraj: the public sphere reflected the private. 
 
So far, we have discussed the collapse of the Taliban and the initial set up of the ex-
mujahidin administration. Now, we turn to the population’s response, how political control 
was re-established and the role of the US special forces. 
 
4.3 - The population takes stock 
The events of 2001 had taken everyone by surprise in Helmand. This is one reason why the 
old commanders, who had wrought so much destruction during their previous tenures, 
managed to regain control. They retained their old networks in place from the jihad and 
gained access to the tidal wave of US patronage (money and weapons) distributed by the 
CIA and special forces teams in the South: combining the two reactivated the networks, 
demonstrating the importance of the public-private interactions with the US. The fact that the 
resurgent commanders had been removed by the Taliban in 1994 actually lent them some 
credibility with the US, but all relied on ex-‘Taliban’ for their support—it was impossible not to 
in a society such as Helmand’s that had been so thoroughly co-opted by Taliban networks.  
 
As elsewhere in the country, the fall of the Taliban was greeted with a sense of relief and of 
opportunity. Now the international community was going to finally help rebuild 
Afghanistan.910 As such, tribal leaders began to reassert themselves and reintegrate former 
‘Taliban’ forces. This was the second in a series of tribal rapprochements that has occurred 
during the conflict—the previous one being in 1991/2. The most recent is occurring in 2012 
as ISAF pull out of Helmand. These rapprochements should be seen as the strength of 
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public organisations (and associated funding) diminishing and their morphing into private 
Helmandi tribal groups. In some cases this was an automatic function of the acquisition of 
power: vide Sher Mohammad arriving in Lashkar Gah with recently ex-‘Taliban’ fighters 
supporting him. In others it was a deliberate policy of convening shuras to work through the 
issues involved. Thus, Barakzai commanders and tribal elders convened under Khalifa 
Shirin Khan and Haji Mudir Agha (from Nawa) in early 2002 and agreed to move forward and 
work together.911 
 
In some cases these shuras were not able to broach the differences. In Now Zad, for 
example, the Ishaqzai shura (there were also other tribes’ shuras in Now Zad) was unable to 
reintegrate those Ishaqzai tribesmen who had fought under Kakar commanders, due to an 
unresolvable feud. Those members of the tribe were expelled from Now Zad and forced to 
seek government employ for protection. An important Ishaqzai Taliban commander, Rahim, 
gave his weapons back to the tribe. He was later to re-join the Taliban becoming their 
Provincial Governor.912 In other areas with different social constructions, different 
communities worked together through inter-tribal shuras. In Nad-e Ali, immediately upon the 
Taliban’s leaving, a multi-tribal militia was formed under the shura to ensure security under 
Haji Jamalzai, the old Kharoti Harakat commander. Many of the men had connections to the 
previous administration, but in the atmosphere of 2002, anything was possible.913 In a sense, 
when Helmandis talk of the broken expectations of the Karzai-era,914 they are talking as 
much about the broken expectations of those early tribal shuras, and the spirit of cooperation 
that ensued, as they are the broken promises of the international community.915 
 
That said, like the previous mujahidin governments, those with positions of power (and 
access to patronage) needed to reward those who supported them. Thus, district-level 
positions reflected the areas of influence of the top-level powerbrokers appointed by 
President Karzai: Sher Mohammad, Mir Wali, Abdul Rahman and Dad Mohammad. This was 
to protect their powerbases. The commanders used patronage to mobilise men, upon which 
their ability to maintain power rested. It was an interaction between money and men, public 
and private. This was very similar conceptually to how mujahidin commanders sought and 
maintained power during the jihad and the way in which the mujahidin administrations were 
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conducted between 1989 and 1994. Many Helmandis called it the second mujahidin unity 
government.916  
 
Khalifa Shirin Khan, close to Mir Wali, was appointed to Gereshk as District Governor and 
Meera Jan, an Abdul Rahman commander, to Nad-e Ali.917 Gul Mohammad, Dad 
Mohammad’s brother, was appointed District Governor of Sangin.918 Likewise, northern 
Helmand was considered important to the powerbase of Sher Mohammad: his brother, Amir 
Mohammad Akhundzada was appointed Governor of Musa Qala.919 But with cousins-in-law 
in place in Kajaki (Haji Sherafuddin) and Baghran (Abdul Raziq),920 Amir Mohammad 
effectively became the Governor of the old pre-1964 district of Zamindawar (this is what the 
Alizai still call northern Helmand).  
 
In those areas out of the control of the ‘big four’ other, less connected people were 
appointed: Haji Abdullah Jan (Barakzai, Hizb) managed to regain his position in Garmsir921 
and Mohammad Nabi Khan, a Jamiat commander from Nawa, was appointed there.922 
Hafizullah, detested by Sher Mohammad,923 and surpassed in importance by Mir Wali,924 
was not given any official positions.  
 
4.4 - Mir Wali’s militias 
Mir Wali attained the luckiest position: as divisional commander he had a large number of 
patronage positions to offer, and, the 93rd Division largely became a ‘Hizb’ construct. For 
example, he appointed Rahmatullah and Pir Mohammad Sadat from Nad-e Ali as his sub-
commanders.925 He also appointed Mir Ahmad and Mirza Khan from Malgir and Gereshk, 
respectively.926 Sarwar Khan (Alizai), Abdul Rahman Khan’s nephew, was a regiment 
commander responsible for the ring road from Delaram to Gereshk—a major money making 
opportunity.927 Each commander inflated the number of men ‘under command’, and so would 
receive, for example, fifty salaries for thirty men.928 Further south in Babaji, Haji Gul Ehktiar 
and Sur Gul, his nephew, raised men and became sub-commanders, and then themselves 
had further sub-commanders, like Sayed Amir (Tsuryani) and Lal Mohammad (Barakzai), 
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both from Torghai. Marriages were arranged to solidify links between different clans and 
different groups of armed men. Thus, Kuchnai Agha (Sayed, from Saidabad), a 93rd 
commander, married his brother to one of Mir Wali’s daughters. Unfortunately, the 
relationship came to an end when Hekmat, Mir Wali’s son, killed Kuchnai Agha in a dispute 
over a chaiboy.929  
 
Travelling up the valley, Abdul Khaleq’s930 sons, Qari Hazrat and Lala Jan, became the main 
Ishaqzai commanders.931 These two men provide a good example of the link between 
security and drug production. Mamouk, another of Abdul Khaleq’s sons and Haji Aka (in the 
same clan) are both large-scale smugglers.932 Similar to the role played by Mir Wali, but at a 
lower level, Qari Hazrat and Lala Jan personified the public-private interaction through which 
armed power, government legitimacy, mobilised men and drug profits could be fused. In this, 
Mir Wali’s links to Gul Agha Shirzai were to prove very useful: when the US wanted to 
establish themselves in Helmand, Mir Wali was the natural choice.933  
 
This played into a wider dynamic, however. The Barakzai were the main competitors to 
President Karzai’s Popalzai in Kandahar. By supporting Mir Wali, a fellow Barakzai, Shirzai 
was creating a counterbalance to Karzai’s main ally in Helmand, Sher Mohammad.934 
According to Sarah Chayes, the US was not aware of these power dynamics in the south, so 
intent were they on hunting down Al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants. They did not realise that 
in supporting Shirzai and Mir Wali, they were creating problems for Karzai’s tribal balancing-
act. This was because they saw Afghanistan according to the public sphere: in Taliban/non-
Taliban terms.935 Thus, the first US special forces teams to reside in Helmand arrived in the 
summer of 2002 and began to set up what later became known as Camp Price. Critically for 
this thesis, the obscurity of the private sphere to the US special forces meant that the private 
actors (the warlords) were able to dominate the interaction between public and private and 
determine the course of the low-level conflict in Helmand. 
 
According to Mir Wali, he tried to direct them to the old army encampment on Artillery Hill, 
but the Americans wanted a base near the city. Mir Wali detached a compliment of sixty men 
under Idris, Haji Kadus’ brother, to guard the base for them, of course, in return for a fee.936 
But much more important than the money was the impression to the rest of the population 
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that he, Mir Wali, was working with the foreigners and that he, alone, controlled access to 
their base. This mistake was made all over the country and gave the impression that the 
various warlords affiliated with the US enjoyed impunity—which was often true. Initially the 
Americans operated on their own, but then lost two soldiers in Sangin during a reconnoitre in 
March 2003.937 Mir Wali offered a solution: ‘anywhere you go, take my men with you; they 
are familiar with the people, with the terrain; anyone you need will go with you’.938 The US 
began to operate with militias of Helmandis. 
 
4.5 - Sher Mohammad and the ‘Taliban’ 
Sher Mohammad did not receive the same patronage opportunities that Mir Wali did. He did, 
however, control a large part of northern Helmand, without serious competition. This, in a 
traditional growing area, allowed him to dominate the opium trade and its profits. Mir Wali 
gained income from road tolls, US special forces, the Ministry of Defence and also drug 
growing areas under his control. Sher Mohammad gained from his position as Provincial 
Governor which allowed him later to extract money from development projects. Mainly, 
however, he gained his income from growing and taxing opium in areas that he controlled: 
he maintained a series of drug militias, run by ex-‘Harakat’ commanders—many of whom 
had also been ‘Taliban’ commanders.939  
 
Commanders such as Mullah Manan (Alizai/Hassanzai) were vital to his operation in Musa 
Qala.940 Rahmatullah (Alizai/Hassanzai) was responsible for moving the drugs to Baram Cha 
on the Pakistani border941 and Pir Mohammad (Alizai/Hassanzai) was his bodyguard 
commander.942 Other commanders included Mahmad Akhundzada (Alizai) and Abdul Bari 
(Alizai/Hassanzai).943 Furthermore, Sher Mohammad maintained very close links with a 
major international drug smuggler, Haji Azizullah Alizai, later to be identified as a ‘Significant 
Foreign Narcotics Trafficker’ by the US President in June 2007944. They are allegedly 
cousins.945 In a further twist to the tale, it was later rumoured that the President Karzai’s 
brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was living in Haji Azizullah’s house in Kandahar.946  
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Initially, Mir Wali and Sher Mohammad were the two major players in the province, with 
Abdul Rahman and Dad Mohammad occupying the second tier of power. Abdul Rahman 
was dealt a more difficult hand. His ‘police department’ was effectively a series of random 
local militias (e.g. the Haji Jamalzai militia in Nad-e Ali). The area that he controlled, mostly 
Nad-e Ali, Marjeh, Washir and Now Zad, was also significantly fractured, both tribally and by 
jihadi party affiliation. Abdul Rahman was very much a junior partner to Sher Mohammad. 
Whereas Mir Wali was out in Gereshk, Sher Mohammad was in Lashkar Gah, as was Abdul 
Rahman, and both men kept some of their militias there. This created some tension initially 
between Abdul Rahman and Sher Mohammad.947 Habibullah feels that this private cleavage 
was exacerbated by interactions with the public sphere: Sher Mohammad looked to Pakistan 
and Abdul Rahman to Iran for support. 
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4.6 - The ‘police’ thieves 
The ‘police’ was mostly built through family networks. See Appendix 4 for Noorzai tribal 
diagrams and family trees. Abdul Rahman’s deputy was Ayub Khan, who was Israel Khan’s 
brother.948 Israel, in turn, is related to Arif Noorzai.949 Arif Noorzai is one of the most powerful 
figures in the South—one of his sisters is married to Ahmad Wali Karzai (Hamid’s brother) 
and another to Sher Mohammad. Thus, Ayub’s appointment was purely as a result of his 
tribal standing: it conferred a degree of tribal legitimacy and strength on Abdul Rahman’s 
organisation. The public organisation of the ‘police’ meant nothing if it was not backed up by 
a strong private actor.950  
 
Like other big commanders Abdul Rahman (Noorzai/Darzai/Parozai) placed loyalists in key 
positions. He appointed Sarwar Jan (Noorzai/Darzai/Parozai), for example, Chief of Police in 
Now Zad, which was Abdul Rahman’s tribal centre of gravity despite his (stolen) land being 
in Marjeh.951 Hakim Khan (Daftani), an ex-Jamiat commander and a neighbour of Abdul 
Rahman, became the commander in Marjeh and then later in Nad-e Ali: it was an andiwali 
(friends) ‘government’. 
 
As soon as the ‘police’ reformed, the ex-communists who had fled began to return. In the 
case of the Noorzai ex-communists, this had been part of Israel’s original negotiations in 
Lashkar Gah: the Noorzai should become fully reintegrated into the new government.952 A 
number of ex-policemen returned such as Gulie Khan (Baluch), Ismail Khan (Hotak) and 
Habibullah (Noorzai).953 Whilst a positive step for the future development of the police (they 
were all well-trained, professional policemen), there were initially some private frictions 
between the jihadis and the communists.954  
 
Gradually, Abdul Rahman started to shift his centre of gravity down to Nad-e Ali from Now 
Zad, by allowing members of his clan to settle on stolen government land. He eventually 
became responsible for the theft of twenty thousand jereebs955 of land, much of which would 
have been redistributed to others as part of patron-client relationships.956 This allowed him to 
increase his control: he became top of a larger patronage organisation, that controlled more 
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land and drugs and that could mobilise more men than before. For the ‘police’ especially, 
this dynamic enabled them to control more routes in Helmand allowing them to dominate 
opium transport. The Helmandi ‘police’ came to be completely controlled by Abdul Rahman’s 
network and it was in this way that commanders who later became well-known were 
recruited, such as Haji Baran, Dil Jan, Mirdel and Mahboob Khan—all Noorzai, all cousins, 
and mostly from the same clan: the Parozai.957  
 
As well as massively increasing his own landholdings in Marjeh (to be farmed by families 
from Now Zad), Abdul Rahman allowed relatives to divide up the area around the Bolan 
junction:958 north of the Lashkar Gah road was given to Mato Khan (who was related to Lal 
Jan by marriage), a Noorzai commander who had fought in Jamiat with Abdul Rahman. His 
nephew, Abdul Raziq, was given the south side of the road—he came with one hundred 
households.959 Qabir Khan, already mentioned as Haji Lal Jan’s brother, occupied the land a 
little further to the south, around Zaburabad.960 Lal Jan himself, a cousin of Abdul Rahman, 
resumed control of northern Nad-e Ali, selling land in the desert.961 See Appendix 4. 
 
Even so, the ‘police’ was not a cohesive organisation. A UN report at the end of 2002 
identified five separate ‘police’ factions that did not answer to the District Chief in Nad-e Ali, 
Hakim Khan.962 This was also one the first observations that Habibullah made to me when I 
met him for the first time in December 2008. The incoherence of the ‘police’ was due to the 
nature of their funding, which was fragmented, bottom-up and from many individual actors in 
the drugs trade. There were even reports of individual ‘police’ commanders running their 
own heroin processing labs in Chah-e Mirza, Nad-e Ali.963 This compared to Sher 
Mohammad, who ran a much older, more established network, where much of the 
competition had been eliminated by his forefathers. Or to Mir Wali, who again ran a mainly 
Barakzai-, Hizb-dominated ‘organisation’ that was supported well by the government (unlike 
the ‘police’, the 93rd Division appeared to get paid regularly) and the special forces.964  
 
However, every commander who had the power (~US patronage) stole land. Militia 
commanders divided up the area to the north of the Bughra canal. Thus, for example, Haji 
Kadus parcelled up the land to the west of the Abhashak wadi. Much of this land went to 
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refugees from water stress (lack of irrigation water) from northern Helmand.965 Sher 
Mohammad also allowed (mainly) Alizai families to settle in the Bolan desert from northern 
Helmand,966 as well as stealing land in Musa Qala.967 All the settlements created tension 
with the existing landowners though: the Bolan settlers with the Barakzai near the river, 
those north of the Bughra with the canal-zone settlers and those in Musa Qala with the 
Pirzai.  
 
Finally, Dad Mohammad, the provincial head of the NDS, ran the smallest of the networks in 
the province. One brother was the District Governor of Sangin.968 Another, Daud, became 
the Chief of Police in Sangin. All ran private militias that guarded the family power base.969 In 
the case of Dad Mohammad’s militias, some were sponsored and armed by US special 
forces from mid-2003 onwards, as was the case of Karim Khan, one of his sub-
commanders.970 This was to prove beneficial to Dad Mohammad later on, when the special 
forces repeatedly intervened in his favour to help him retain his position as the provincial 
NDS head, even though the UN advised that he be removed for his abuses.971 Astonishingly, 
and perhaps indicative of the lack of communication between different branches of the US 
effort and different rotations of officials in the country, the US continued to support Dad 
Mohammad even though they believed he was implicated in the deaths of US special forces 
soldiers in Sangin in March 2003.972 These issues will be explored in more detail later on. 
 
In summary, I have described the power networks of the big four commanders and the 
arrival of the US special forces in the province. Their positioning was entirely dictated by the 
private sphere: none of them behaved like a government, which is how the US treated them. 
I now cover in detail the manipulation of the US forces by Helmandi power brokers, in an 
astonishing triumph of the private sphere over a public organisation. This was caused by US 
ignorance of the private sphere. 
 
4.7 - Mujahidin unity and the loya jirgas 
The public titles and positions that were bestowed upon the old mujaheds did not mean 
anything in a western sense. Rather they were a mechanism of reflecting de facto power that 
facilitated access to government funding and legitimacy. From the perspective of Kabul, it 
was better to have the commanders inside the tent than out, but it was more than an 
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organisational carve-up of Helmand. It represented a geographic one as well, with the client 
militias of the main players continuing to act out their private alliances and cleavages. This 
carve-up, and the resulting inter-commander competition it enshrined, reflected the profit 
from the opium trade. In a study of money movements in 2005, Edwina Thompson found 
that the centres of (drug) finance in Helmand were Sangin (Dad Mohammad), Lashkar Gah 
(Abdul Rahman), Gereshk (Mir Wali), Musa Qala (Sher Mohammad) and Baram Cha (on the 
border with Pakistan and contested).973  
 
This was the provincial backdrop for the emergency Loya Jirga (grand council) held in June 
2002 in Kabul and the constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003. There was some 
confusion surrounding the emergency Loya Jirga, with no candidates’ list drawn up.974 
Further, the list for the constitutional Loya Jirga was reportedly manipulated by Sher 
Mohammad to make sure that it contained very few Barakzai, and as many Alizai as 
possible.975 Hamid Karzai was elected President of the Interim Administration once Zahir 
Shah had anointed him at the emergency Jirga. He was popular, but it was felt that he could 
have done more to limit the role of the topak salaran (warlords). Whilst this comment was 
directed at Northern Alliance figures like General Fahim, it should be taken in the context of 
a province where four warlords were in charge. The Helmandis also felt that they were 
underrepresented in terms of delegates-per-district compared to areas in the north of the 
country, particularly Panjshir. The identification of Panjshir—later synonymous with the 
central government—as a source of contention and unfairness by Helmandis repeatedly 
surfaced in my interviews.976  
 
At the start of the jirgas the Helmandi delegates felt free to talk, but as the process continued 
they felt less able to talk openly, particularly about national politics, in the presence of the 
northerners. At one point they stopped Wakil Safar, the Nad-e Ali Kharoti leader, from 
speaking as they feared for his safety. This underscored the climate of fear that pervades 
Afghan, and particularly Helmandi, society: the last twenty-three years of fighting, side-
switching, betrayal and discordance between the public and private spheres had eroded 
trust. However, overall, the process was seen as an important first step: the delegates felt 
important and proud of their democratic role.  
 
                                                          
973
 Edwina Thompson, Trust is the Coin of the Realm (Karachi, 2011): 230. 
974
 ‘Loya Jirga sees wheeling-dealing and pressure from US’, e-ariana (14 June 2002). 
975
 047, 083. 
976
 e.g. 068, 082. 
 
161 
© Mike Martin 2013 
One delegate’s comment, however, demonstrated a true understanding of how things were 
to develop over the next five years: ‘the foreigners must like the topak salaran’.977 Helmandi 
fears about the role of the US were exacerbated as the US special forces detachment 
established itself near Gereshk. Helmandi lexicon underscores the importance of this and 
different eras have given the Pushtu dialect additions, for example, ‘raaket’ and ‘komandan’ 
were Soviet-era additions. One of the key additions in the 2000s has been ‘specialporce’, 
showing their ubiquity. Their public mission was to search for Al Qaeda and Taliban 
remnants—privately in Helmand, this meant a focus on Baghrani, even though publicly he 
had reconciled.978 
 
4.8 - The specialporce & Guantanamo  
The specialporce lost no time. They offered bribes to anyone who was able to bring in former 
members of the Taliban, or particularly, Al Qaeda. The US troops did not understand how 
fractured the society was in which they were operating: the cleavages and alliances of the 
private sphere. They also failed to understand how offering bribes would cause people to 
denounce anyone they were having a feud with, or even random innocent people, in order to 
collect the bribe.979 That is, that the multiple private cleavages in the society were much 
more important than the Taliban-government public cleavage. Once arrested, a prisoner 
would often end up in Guantanamo Bay Prison. For example, very early on in January 2003, 
Abdul Kadus, a seventeen-year-old orphan from Nad-e Ali, was arrested by Mir Wali’s forces 
in what appears, from the Guantanamo documents, to be a ‘sting’ in order to gain the bounty 
offered. In an almost exact copy of the modus operandi, Mohammad Ismail, a sixteen-year-
old, was arrested, also in Gereshk.980 They share consecutive Guantanamo inmate 
numbers, although the records are confused about their exact date of arrest.  
 
At the end of January, Abdul Raziq was arrested in Lashkar Gah by the ‘3rd Commando, 
Afghan Military Forces’. The evidence for his initial arrest is unknown, but in Guantanamo he 
was accused of being a member of a forty-man terrorist ‘unit’ run by Baghrani (largely based 
on evidence from another detainee—Mohammad Hashim—that was probably extracted 
under torture).981 Raziq was to die in Guantanamo nearly five years later of cancer.982 This 
forty-man terrorist ‘unit’ became a spectre for the specialporce. Allegedly, it had helped 
Osama Bin Laden escape from Afghanistan and had assassinated the Afghan Vice 
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President, Abdul Qader, in July 2002. Its funding came from Al Qaeda.983 Many of the 
Helmandi detainees were accused of membership of this ‘unit’ yet, as far as I can tell, its 
origin lies in the Guantanamo interrogations of the Kandahari Mohammad Hashim.984 The 
only time I have seen mention of this ‘unit’ is in the Guantanamo files, where it is mentioned 
repeatedly and it appears to have been driving specialporce operations in early 2003. My 
interviewees never mentioned it (although I did not ask about it).  
 
The arrests continued. In early February 2003, a Mohammad Nasim was arrested because 
he had a ‘similar name’ to Mullah Nasim, a Talib who had fled the North during the ousting of 
the Taliban.985 Soon after, on the 10 February 2003, the specialporce launched a major 
operation to Lajay village in Baghran in an attempt to arrest Baghrani. They were heavily 
ambushed. In response, the soldiers rounded up ten locals, some of whom were most likely 
involved in some way in the incident, but along with several who were not. Most were 
released during 2005–7.986 They failed to catch Baghrani, but this incident was the beginning 
of a series of attempts until 2005 by US special forces to capture him.987 
 
The inter-commander war began to be reflected in the Guantanamo arrests. For example, 
Haji Bismillah was Sher Mohammad’s Head of Transportation in Gereshk. He was 
responsible for collecting tolls and issuing permits: their families had intermarried and 
Bismillah’s brother, Mohammad Wali, was Sher Mohammad’s driver (he is currently one of 
the MPs for Helmand). It appears that he was arrested on a tip from Haji Kadus in Gereshk, 
who coveted the revenue-making position for himself. Bismillah was accused of being a 
member of ‘Fedayeen Islam’ (this is another ‘group’ that, used in this context, I have never 
heard of outside of the Guantanamo files) and working with Sher Mohammad and Baghrani 
against the United States, as well as being a member of the forty-man ‘unit’. Eventually he 
was released in 2009 after taking Donald Rumsfeld, then US Secretary of Defense, to 
court.988 Mir Wali and Haji Kadus were brilliantly playing the US off against their rivals: the 
private was driving the public-private interaction. 
 
The commanders had realised that the US forces did not understand Helmandi private 
sphere at all. They all took advantage by offering false reports to the US forces:989 a fatal 
interaction of US ignorance and Helmandi greed. Then, in March 2003, two US soldiers in 
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Helmand were killed in Sangin.990 The specialporce was convinced that Sher Mohammad 
was responsible and asked permission from their senior command in Kabul to ‘take him out’, 
but this permission was denied. Their request had probably been the result of ‘information’ 
from Shirzai and Mir Wali, who were their main sources of intelligence.991 Sher Mohammad’s 
ally Dad Mohammad gave the specialporce a Haji Jalil instead.992  
 
Soon after the US forces realised that they were being played again and began to suspect 
that Dad Mohammad himself may have had something to do with the attack that led to the 
loss of their soldiers. Haji Jalil, for his part, always insisted in US interrogation that he was a 
victim of a feud. Mir Wali further exploited the situation when he offered more men to the US 
forces.993 This period demonstrates clearly a public-private interaction between a public 
organisation requiring intelligence and manpower, and private actors manipulating those 
public organisations to denounce private rivals. I treat the Guantanamo arrests and the 
manipulation of US special forces as key evidence for my thesis that the private sphere 
drives the conflict dynamics in Helmand in the presence of a public organisation ignorant of 
the private sphere. See Appendix 6 for selected Helmandi Guantanamo cases in context. 
 
The US stopped sending people to Guantanamo from Helmand, but it had been a 
reputational disaster. In the worst case of abuse, an Abdul Wahid had been beaten to death 
in Camp Price (probably) by the Helmandi militias working with them.994  It directly countered 
the US public narrative of rebuilding Afghanistan. The hunting of people by the US special 
forces in some ways resembled the reign of terror instigated by the Khalqis in 1978, albeit 
smaller in scale.995 They compounded their earlier mistake by accepting Mir Wali’s offer of 
‘loaned’ men, even though they were no longer abducting people for Guantanamo.  
 
The militias were led (mainly) by commanders chosen by Mir Wali from the 93rd Division,996 
although Dad Mohammad also supplied some commanders (which is astonishing when you 
consider the US realisations surrounding Haji Jalil, and demonstrates the incoherence 
surrounding the US deployment and mission). Commanders affiliated with the specialporce 
included Jan Mohammad (Barakzai), Daud (Kadus’ and Idris’ brother), Ghulam Rasoul (a 
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brother of MMW), Abdul Sattar and Raziq, two ex-Hizb commanders, and Karim Khan, one 
of Dad Mohammad’s cousins.997  
 
The specialporce’s first step was to set up a firebase in Sangin, in the compound of a Haji 
Fatah Mohammad, a Chowkazai Ishaqzai smuggler, and permanently install militia there.998 
Later, they took over responsibility for security in Gereshk—this led to the death of Idris at 
the hands of (the Chief of Police) Badr’s men in a gun fight. Idris’ death occurred as he tried 
to take control of Gereshk’s bazaar: in effect, a US-backed militia attacking the police.999 
Badr, linked to Ahmad Wali Karzai, was making so much money from smuggling drugs at 
that point that, no doubt, he was concerned about the effect on his transport network and 
had fought to keep Idris out of the bazaar.1000 Mullah Daud, Idris’ brother, took over as the 
US’s ‘man’.1001  
 
4.9 - The Ishaqzai 
The commandeering of Haji Fatah Mohammad’s (Ishaqzai/Chowkazai) compound in Sangin 
marked a watershed in relations with the Ishaqzai, and patterns from the jihad-era began to 
re-emerge. Although the Ishaqzai Mistereekhel clan (Abdul Khaleq’s old clan) were firmly 
within Mir Wali’s patronage network, the more northerly clan, the Chowkazai (Atta 
Mohammad’s clan) were not. Both clans were significantly involved in drugs: the 
Mistereekhel through Mamouk (a son of Abdul Khaleq)1002 and Haji Aka,1003 and the 
Chowkazai through Fatah Mohammad.1004 The fact that the Chowkazai did not have 
protection through any of the main four patronage networks, combined with their drugs 
wealth, made them an obvious choice for predation. The obvious excuse was the public 
narrative: that the clan harboured members of the Taliban government (which is true: 
Osmani, from Jushalay, and previously the head of the Kandahar Corps during the Taliban 
government,1005 came from the Chowkazai).   
 
It appears that the US forces unknowingly went along with this as they were being 
manipulated by Dad Mohammad’s greed. Of course, when the Chowkazai clan rekindled 
their links to the regrowing Taliban movement in 2005, it would become pertinent to ask 
whether the aggressive stance of the specialporce and their Helmandi allies had pushed 
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them to seek protection from the Taliban, or whether they had been ‘Taliban’ all along and 
the US had been correct in pursuing them. That is, did the private sphere or the public 
sphere drive the conflict? I think the fact that they were trying to protect their drugs wealth 
indicates the former. After all, many former ‘Taliban’ were working also with the 
‘government’, and particularly with Sher Mohammad.1006  
 
Fatah Mohammad, the Sanginite drug dealer, retreated to Quetta once evicted from his 
compound and began to divert his not inconsiderable resources into the scattered Taliban 
movement. He was eventually to sponsor, and pay for the running costs of, the Gailani 
Hospital in Quetta, which is well known for treating ‘Taliban’ fighters injured in Helmand. This 
dynamic demonstrates the complicated nature of the relationship between drugs, the 
‘Taliban’, the Taliban and the ISI. ISI officers regularly come backwards and forwards to the 
hospital, making sure it is ‘protected’, as well as paying a fee for each patient that is treated.  
 
It also allows Fatah Mohammad, a drug smuggler, to play a ‘community’ role, thus helping 
his image with the populace, even though he is doing it to interact with the Taliban and 
support the ‘Taliban’ (who are his clan and aid his opium business) over the Afghan 
government/‘government’ and the West (who would predate on him).1007 Of course, the 
private Alikozai-Ishaqzai group cleavage had its recent roots in the twenty-year cleavage 
over Sangin bazaar between the private actors Dad Mohammad and Atta Mohammad. The 
government-Taliban dynamic was merely a fresh public cleavage overlaying an old private 
dispute. 
 
For most of 2003 the specialporce’s focus (in addition to Baghran) was Sangin, and they 
were based there for six months.1008 Their enemies were almost all Ishaqzai—they spent 
months trying to capture Haji Naser and Haji Bashar (reportedly two Ishaqzai ‘Taliban’ 
commanders). They also spent time in Qala-e Gaz and Shurakay (both Ishaqzai areas), 
Mirmandaw (mixed Barakzai and Khugyani) and Hyderabad (Achakzai).1009  
 
Eventually, they began to work in Musa Qala, with Sher Mohammad’s people, and to his 
intelligence.1010 This cooperation was driven by US money—but the situation was confused. 
Haji Bismillah1011 was still in Guantanamo being accused of working with Sher Mohammad 
against the US, yet the US specialporce that had arrested him (or probably the next 
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roulement) was working with Sher Mohammad.  It appears that there was just as little 
communication between US roulements as there was between troops on-the-ground and the 
Guantanamo interrogators. Sher Mohammad, of course, would have been aware of this, but 
manipulated the specialporce’s ignorance to gain bounty money and pursue his own private 
enemies in Musa Qala. This behaviour was to be a significant driver of recruitment to the 
shattered Taliban movement.1012 Tor Jan (Alizai/Pirzai), for example, a tailor, was beaten up 
by Sher Mohammad’s men pushing him to seek support from the Taliban.1013 
 
4.10 - Bounties & manipulation 
Whilst these specialporce deployments continued, the members of the 93rd Division 
continued to collect bounties: up to $2000 per ex-Taliban commander captured.1014 In Malgir, 
this led to arrests of people such as Khudaidad (Noorzai), Atta Mohammad (Barakzai), 
Shahzada (Baluch) and Mullah Janan (Barakzai)—all ex-Taliban commanders who had 
returned home after 2001 and were living under President Karzai’s 2003 amnesty for Taliban 
foot soldiers.1015 It even caused competition between different elements of the ‘security 
forces’. In one instance, Mir Wali’s men were trying to apprehend a Mullah Saddiq (Ishaqzai, 
from Marjeh). A car chase ensued across Nad-e Ali, considered Abdul Rahman’s territory. 
Unfortunately, Mir Wali’s men crashed their car into a canal near Zaburabad. Abdul 
Rahman’s ‘police’ arrived and arrested Mir Wali’s men. This was a major problem: arresting 
Talibs was ‘police business’, they said. Mir Wali had to apologise to Abdul Rahman to get his 
men back.1016  
 
The US-led militias acted almost entirely on intelligence that was generated from the people 
they worked with: Mir Wali and Dad Mohammad.1017 I explored the issue of faulty intelligence 
driven by feuds and vendettas repeatedly in 2011/2. The attitude of those involved is 
perhaps best summed up by one of the more prominent militia commanders, still working 
with the US special forces in 2012, when I asked him if there were still any feuds left over by 
the false targeting of the early days. ‘All those sorts of problems are solved now’, he said, 
laughing, ‘they [the people we targeted] are all dead’. He then thought about this for a bit 
and clarified: ‘maybe about ten per cent of those problems remain’ he shrugged.1018 In 
general, my interviews with these Helmandi militia commanders (some had been working 
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with the US for ten years by the time I interviewed them)1019 showed arrogant young Afghans 
who knew that they had US support in their activities’. Even Mir Wali, the arch denouncer, 
said he could not work out why the US was ‘so stupid’. 
 
It is not fair to say that all the work of the specialporce was bad, and it appears that the 
specialporce made efforts at traditional ‘hearts and minds’ activities which were 
commensurate with their public narrative. They set up regular temporary clinics and schools 
for locals.1020 But these were still fraught with issues of cross-cultural communication, and 
often, ‘the locals stole the money, the clinic wasn’t built…they didn’t want it anyway’.1021 The 
specialporce also made an effort to compensate the relatives of those that they had 
accidentally killed during military operations.1022 But the key issues remained: bounties, false 
intelligence, militias and denunciations. This combined fatally with US ignorance. As my 
oldest interviewee stated, ‘people like money…money for information…doesn’t work in 
Afghanistan. Afghans are happy to sell their own country. Everyone thinks: what can I get 
out of this? These are the foundations of the last thirty years’.1023 Exploring this, I had a long 
conversation with a Helmandi militia commander1024 where we discussed the US-led militias 
and whether they might have made the situation worse in Nahr-e Saraj. 
 
‘The Taliban are the enemy’, he stated, ‘but they are local people, it is house on house 
fighting; the source of this war is the thirty years of fighting that has created badai on badai 
[revenge on revenge]’. He had described the fighting as utterly local, yet we had previously 
discussed the Taliban as being a Pakistani construct, so I asked him to explain whether his 
enemy were locals or Pakistani-led Taliban, or both at the same time. That is, did they act 
according to the public sphere or the private sphere? Although illiterate, his answer 
described a public-private interaction perfectly. ‘Both’ he said, describing a view where they 
were completely synonymous, but worse, if they were his enemies and he worked for the 
government, then they are Taliban, and, at the same time, if they were Taliban, they are his 
enemies. This was a perfect logic circle: by his definition they were the same thing.  
 
I then broadened the discussion to include the role of the US, that is, a public organisation 
on the other ‘side’ of the conflict. He did not accept that they (the Helmandi commanders of 
the militias) were using the US, except to defend their houses from the ‘Taliban’, which he 
saw as perfectly legitimate. He said that the US had helped them during the jihad and it was 
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helping them again, conflating his private war with the public war. I then discussed a specific 
case and asked about Khudaidad, a Noorzai commander who had been arrested and put in 
Bagram prison by the US-backed militias in 2004/5. He was from a village called Noorzo 
Kalay just to the south-west of Gereshk. After spending around three or four years in 
Bagram he was released and returned to his community.1025 Moving forward to the present 
day, and the 2012 specialporce deployment to the area, most of the problems with the 
‘Taliban insurgency’ seemed to stem from or pass through that village.1026 Once I mentioned 
Khudaidad’s name to the commander, he looked at the floor and tried to change the subject.  
 
He understood that I was asserting that they had manipulated the US because of a private 
feud.  It is only because of detailed knowledge, that outside players do not normally have, 
that I was able to challenge him on it. Later, when I discussed Khudaidad and Noorzo Kalay 
with the US detachment in 2012, they were not aware of the issue. Speaking with elements 
of both the public and private spheres in this dispute showed clearly to me the manipulation 
of a public organisation by the private sphere, caused by the ignorance of the public 
organisation. I treat this case as an important example that offers strong support for my 
thesis. 
 
Thus far, I have presented a detailed account of how Helmandi power brokers manipulated 
US special forces. I will now discuss the story of how the big four commanders, all part of the 
‘government’, used their positions to fight each other for resources, as well as predating on 
the population. The private sphere dictated events; the public sphere was used to excuse 
them. 
 
4.11 - Inter-commander conflict 
It is not always thus. I think in the same way that the interventions of the British in the 1800s 
united the disparate tribes in Helmand, so too the post-2006 ISAF interventions have 
similarly pushed Abdul Rahman and Sher Mohammad together. But as we can see below, 
they were certainly not working together in the early 2000s. A Noorzai man I interviewed 
pointed out that once the British had arrived, Sher Mohammad began to use Abdul Rahman 
as a proxy to undermine the British and the Provincial Governors they supported.1027 By the 
time that I interviewed them both in 2012, both made a big effort to impress upon me the 
strength of their alliance. 
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I treat this partly as a tribal issue: Sher Mohammad and Mir Wali are the most prominent 
figures in the two largest tribes in Helmand, the Alizai and the Barakzai (which is the largest 
depends upon who you ask), and they use tribal networks for recruitment and legitimacy 
(they also act like tribal leaders by, for example, solving disputes).1028 Abdul Rahman is the 
most prominent individual in the third largest tribe, the Noorzai. Thus, he holds the balance 
of power, and his allegiance dictates the overall power dynamics. Links to Karzai are key: 
Hafizullah Khan, the old Hizb amir, described Sher Mohammad as President Karzai’s 
boypriend (he even used the English word, giggling as he said it), suggesting that he knew 
someone who had seen Sher Mohammad ‘in’ Karzai’s room when they were living in Quetta 
in the late 1990s. 
 
The tension between the commanders began well before 2001 and revisited itself upon 
Helmand immediately that they returned. Abdul Rahman was slightly incredulous when he 
described Sher Mohammad turning up in Lashkar Gah in December 2001 with a number of 
(ex-) ‘Taliban’ in tow. During 2002, this developed into a full-blown power struggle for control 
of Lashkar Gah, Nad-e Ali and drug routes. Nad-e Ali was eventually ceded to Abdul 
Rahman’s control,1029 but not before their competition almost developed into outright war. In 
October 2005, Rahmatullah, one of Sher Mohammad’s militia commanders, was transporting 
a convoy of drugs across the desert to Baram Cha on the Pakistani border. Amanullah 
(Noorzai), one of Abdul Rahman’s commanders and the ‘policeman’ in charge of the security 
of Lashkar Gah, intercepted the convoy and a gun battle ensued, during which he was killed.  
 
When news of this event reached Lashkar Gah the militias of Sher Mohammad and Abdul 
Rahman began to clash and there were sporadic outbreaks of gunfire in the city. This 
caused the deaths of twenty-two of Abdul Rahman’s men and an unknown number of Sher 
Mohammad’s. Noorzai elders went to Sher Mohammad and complained that his commander 
had murdered Amanullah, and the incident began to take on wider implications. Abdul 
Rahman’s tribal elder, Abdullah Jan, had led the Now Zadi Noorzai under the Hizb banner 
during the jihad (see section 2.7) and the shadow of the thirteen year ‘Hizb’-‘Harakat’ 
confrontation (1980–93) began to loom. 
 
President Karzai, worried, summoned Sher Mohammad and Abdul Rahman to Kabul and 
warned them that the posturing had to cease. From then on, relations between the two of 
them began to improve. Karzai may have brokered an alliance between them to the 
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exclusion of Mir Wali, who has been shut out of Presidential-level politics since.1030 Most 
pertinent to this thesis are the public, media-issued narratives surrounding the original 
interception. In these, the ‘police convoy’ was ambushed by ‘suspected Taliban’, rather than 
the private narratives of the Governor’s drug convoy being intercepted by the ‘police’, which 
was what actually drove the clash.1031 
 
Mir Wali and Sher Mohammad had problems from the start, reflecting age old antipathies 
between the Barakzai and the Alizai and between ‘Hizb’ and ‘Harakat’.1032 In addition to the 
manipulation of the US special forces, both Mir Wali and Sher Mohammad raided each 
other’s client militias and opium stocks,1033 whilst making sure to paint their actions within the 
public sphere provided by the international community, thus, attacks and violence would be 
perpetrated against the ‘Taliban’,1034 whereas stealing each other’s opium stocks would be 
phrased as ‘drugs raids against smugglers’.1035 When, finally, in June 2005, Sher 
Mohammad’s office was raided by US-backed independent narcotics officers from the 
central government, nine tonnes of opium were found.1036 Amusingly, this had been 
previously stolen from Mir Wali.1037  
 
Outright warfare, à la 1990s, was not possible due to the presence of the US, and so a 
pseudo-war ensued, that took advantage of the complex nature of the private sphere to 
mask the true meaning of events from (particularly international) public organisations. For 
example, there was competition between Abdul Rahman and Mir Wali for who provided 
lucrative ‘security’ on the national ring road. The original agreement was that Abdul 
Rahman’s men would control the road from Gereshk going west and Mir Wali’s would control 
from Gereshk going east. This fluctuated, with groups of ‘Taliban’ attacking the other 
person’s checkpoints.1038 In this proxy war, Khan Mohammad, the Chief of Police in Gereshk 
(2002/3) and an ex-Harakat commander, often acted for Sher Mohammad in Gereshk. This 
caused almost continual problems including open gun battles in the bazaar. Khan 
Mohammad was kept in his position by his patron, Sher Mohammad.1039  
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The war between the commanders was largely about drugs. Uncertain of the future, people 
had immediately planted in the interim between the Taliban and the Karzai government. As a 
result, in 2002 Nad-e Ali alone produced eight percent of the country’s opium.1040 As the lead 
nation for counter-narcotics, the British sent a team in the spring of 2002 to coordinate and 
finance an eradication effort. At Sher Mohammad’s request, they did not leave the Bost 
Hotel (thus exacerbating their ignorance), and without verification, the process was horribly 
manipulated. Compensation was available, but directed to Sher Mohammad’s allies. Other 
farmers, upon hearing of the compensation, assumed they were going to have their crops 
eradicated and stopped irrigating their fields, intending to rely on the compensation money. It 
never came and their crops died, leaving them destitute. In April, there were massive 
demonstrations in Lashkar Gah1041 as Sher Mohammad had used eradication to target his 
rivals’ fields and compensate his friends.1042  
 
In a sense, the Karzai national government, and thus the international community, had little 
choice but to support the warlord polity: they were the de facto power holders. However, the 
interaction of unscrupulous Helmandi warlords and ignorant international support was very 
damaging to the concept of ‘government’ in Helmand. From the point of view of many of the 
disenfranchised in Helmand, it also reinforced a historical narrative that the Kabul 
government was distant, didn’t understand them, and was not to be trusted. 
 
4.12 - The Kharoti in Nad-e Ali 
The commanders did not just attack each other; they also attacked many communities and 
people who were not within the patronage networks of the big four. This was in addition to 
the bounty-hunting dynamic set up by the specialporce: the ‘government’ became predatory 
and manipulated the government-Taliban public cleavage as an excuse. The commanders 
targeted individuals who were deemed to be easy prey and as the four commanders’ militias 
grew in confidence entire communities began to be terrorised: this was most pertinent in 
Nad-e Ali, Sangin and Musa Qala. In Nad-e Ali, these dynamics started with a private 
cleavage between Kharoti ex-‘Talib’ Murtaza and Noorzai ‘policeman’ Haji Manan. This 
resulted in rupture between the Noorzai and Kharoti communities (or parts thereof) in Nad-e 
Ali. Publicly, this looked like the government-Taliban cleavage, however a personal feud 
interacted with external, public support for the protagonists. 
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 Murtaza was a government-era Talib who had been arrested in Kunduz during the 
overthrow of the Taliban government and had spent some time in Guantanamo, before being 
transferred to Afghan authority in March 2003.1043 He was released shortly afterwards and 
returned home. Haji Manan was the nephew of Haji Lal Jan who had settled in Noorzo Kalay 
(see map 8) during the jihad and was acting as a commander in the nascent police in Nad-e 
Ali (in reality a non-uniform wearing militia). Studying the public and private spheres 
surrounding the relationship between Manan and Murtaza helps us to explore multiple 
public-private interactions.  
 
The Kharoti narrative is strong. ‘Every Kharoti who is a Talib is a Talib because of police 
brutality’.1044 In my experience, this view is held throughout the community. Once Murtaza 
had been released from Guantanamo and returned to Shin Kalay, he began to be harassed 
by Haji Manan and his men. The fact that he had been in Guantanamo was used as 
justification for their harassment, although because he was a releasee he was apparently not 
subject to a bounty. This harassment became serious during Haji Twoyeb’s (Noorzai) tenure 
as Nad-e Ali Chief of Police (mid-2004 to end of 2005) where the police became 
progressively Noorzai-dominated.1045 Haji Manan used to raid Murtaza’s opium stocks and 
bully his family, claiming all the while that he was a ‘Talib’ and against the ‘police’: this, at the 
time that Haji Manan ran a heroin factory in Zorabad.1046 Manan finally arrested Murtaza, 
stole all of his opium, and he spent a year in Pul-e Charki prison in Kabul. He was released 
at some point in early 2006 and went home. Shortly after, Manan raided his house and in the 
ensuing fight killed two of Murtaza’s brothers, Abdullah and Nek Mohammad.1047 His 
nephew, Shaedzada, was arrested, but released after five months.1048  
 
Murtaza disappeared to Washir and began working to get other Kharoti to resist the 
government.1049 As an Afghan politician said to me, ‘Murtaza was a good guy; he was forced 
to join the Taliban’.1050 One of those that Murtaza managed to recruit was Ibrahim, known by 
the nom de guerre Shakir. Shakir was twenty-two, then. He was known in his village for 
being a rabab player (a type of guitar).1051 Afghan intelligence painted him as a minor thief, 
who used to steal copper electrical wires.1052 In 2005 or so, Manan raided his family home 
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and stole their stocks of opium. Previously, Shakir had been arrested and beaten, before 
being locked in a tandoor [bread oven] for three days—all for being a ‘Talib’. This time, he 
arrested his older brother, Ismail, who was twenty-seven, and accused him of stealing. 
Ismail is still in jail in 2012.1053 Once Ismail was arrested, Ibrahim had no choice: he was 
‘majboor’, or forced, to fight the government as he had been dishonoured. He contacted 
Murtaza.1054 Ibrahim’s father, Spin, despaired with the situation and moved the remainder of 
the family to Quetta for safety.1055 
 
The Noorzai perspective is very different. In my frequent interactions with Haji Manan in 
2008/9, he described Shakir and Murtaza as Talibs (of course, as a British officer, I was also 
eliciting that public narrative from him). Upon reflection, his insistences were similar to the 
narrative of the Helmandi militia commander discussed above. Abdul Rahman, the Provincial 
Chief of Police at the time, and Manan’s boss and relative-by-marriage, explained it to me 
thus: ‘their differences were about the fact that [Murtaza] was a friend of the Taliban and 
Manan was a friend of the government’. This is, of course, completely true, but rather paints 
the issue inside-out. According to Abdul Rahman, Murtaza had said to Manan, ‘you have 
brought foreigners, kaffirs; we are obliged to do jihad’. This was a perfect echo of the Taliban 
public narrative. Murtaza, he said, had tried to kill Manan, and even managed to kill one of 
his brothers with a road-side bomb.  
 
When I first met District Governor Habibullah (Noorzai) in Nad-e Ali in 2008, he pointed at 
Shin Kalay and said they ‘are all Taliban’. Even though Habibullah was using the same 
public narrative as Manan, he was thinking of a quite different private cleavage: that of 
defending the hukomat from Shin Kalay-based mujahidin in 1991 (see section 3.2). In a 
further twist, Manan had been in a separate mujahidin group in 1990/1 (when Habibullah 
was in the government), yet in 2008 was allied with Habibullah ‘against’ Shin Kalay. I 
demurred, questioning the Governor, ‘[Shin Kalay are] all Taliban?’ ‘All of them’ he repeated.  
 
Trying to understand the dynamics later, I came to understand that this series of events had 
almost become buried, particularly for the Kharoti leadership. A Senior Kharoti leader told 
me that the ‘Noorzai’-‘Kharoti’ problems (as he defined them, at that point Nad-e Ali was a 
‘Taliban’-‘government’ battleground) had started because of Abdul Rahman and Tor Jan, his 
District Chief of Police in 2007/8 (also a relative-by-marriage).1056 Another Kharoti leader 
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pointed out that it was during Tor Jan’s time that the police picked up their reputation for 
brutality and it was this that drove the rejection of the government.1057  
 
Over the years, I came to know several Kharoti leaders well. In particular one, with whom I 
had dealt extensively in 2009, I knew well enough to have a frank conversation. We sat 
discussing Shakir over chai and dried Kandahari mulberries. By this point, Shakir had been 
killed by British forces, and he was a bit of an icon to the Kharoti community in Shin Kalay. 
The car in which he had died had been dragged to the desert outside Shin Kalay and had 
become a shrine. Before he died, he had operated against the British and Afghan 
government forces, at the same time as the Kharoti leadership was talking with British 
forces, claiming that he was a wayward child that they could not control. But he was very 
much supported by the tribal leadership in Shin Kalay: in one incident the British fed this 
Kharoti leader information in a way in which it could be judged whether it reached Shakir. It 
took about ninety seconds. The Kharoti leadership was playing the same game that it had 
played during the jihad: interacting with opposed public organisations for the safety and 
security of their private group.  
 
Looking back with the elder to the time when the Kharoti and the Noorzai community 
narratives had begun to diverge, I described to him the efforts the British had made to try 
and kill or capture Shakir, and vice versa. He, by that point, had realised that the British 
knew that he had been closely communicating with Shakir and he grimaced, wondering 
whether I was blaming him for any harm that might have been visited upon British troops. I 
was not; I said I was trying to understand why Shakir was fighting. Without mentioning 
Shakir’s suffering at the hands of Manan, he began to discuss the district-level power 
balance: the Noorzai controlled the police; they used to be much less populous in the district, 
and now, after their illegal immigration and land theft, they claimed to be the largest 
community, and so forth. For him, it was a community-level war, but then, he was a tribal 
leader.1058  
 
What is yet more interesting is that more neutral individuals agree that it was not a 
community war as such, but that there was just polarisation between the communities. A 
non-Kharoti Hizb commander, who had worked with the Kharoti during the jihad, said that 
Haji Manan ‘would sell his brother for a lak [100,000 Afghanis; approximately US$2000 in 
2012]’. He didn’t know who had killed Murtaza’s brothers, but it wasn’t Manan. ‘They just 
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blame it on [Manan and Tor Jan]; that is their story’, he said.1059 A former Talib was even 
more dismissive: ‘that was just a feud. Look. If I shoot you, then you have to shoot me, 
right?’ Who shot first, I asked. ‘I dunno’ came the reply.1060  
 
Exploring this issue in detail shows that there are multiple elements that exist at different 
levels in different spheres. These include individual actors (Shakir, Manan, Habibullah, the 
tribal leader, a British officer), communities (Noorzai, Kharoti), ideological organisations 
(government, Taliban, ISAF, mujahidin) and so on. There also exist multiple interactions 
between these elements using different public narratives to their own private advantage. 
This complexity is why public organisations often revert to simplistic public cleavages to 
explain the stochastic private sphere. It is hard, in this example, to identify any public 
organisations’ ignorance of the private sphere, until the British arrived, who saw this conflict 
in government-Taliban terms. That moment, and the increase in conflict that it heralded, is 
described in the next chapter. 
 
Unfortunately, this was only one example among a plethora where government officials—
charwakian—abused their public positions in the government, pushing the population away. 
The classic case of this in Helmand is that of the Ishaqzai in Sangin, although the Kakars in 
Garmsir also provide a powerful example.1061 Sher Mohammad, moreover, is accused of 
massive land thefts in Musa Qala1062 just as Abdul Rahman was in Marjeh.1063 Attempts by 
tribal jirgas to mediate between the commanders and the population would often end in an 
agreement for compensation to be paid by, for example, Sher Mohammad. The judgement 
would then be ignored.1064  
 
So far, I have covered the fall of the Taliban government, the re-emergence of the ex-
mujahidin commanders, the role and manipulation of the US special forces and the inter-
commander war that continued in the early 2000s. The complexity of public-private 
interactions in Helmand was explored using specialporce militias and the Kharoti as models. 
I now turn to how development funding was hijacked and look at a detailed example of the 
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4.13 - Hijacked development 
In addition to completely manipulating the specialporce to target their enemies, and 
manipulating eradication for the same reason, the Helmandi commanders also entirely 
hijacked development funding.1065 The common thread was lack of on-the-ground 
understanding by public organisations. Apart from admirable efforts by the UNDP and Japan 
to sink wells and build schools irrespective of communities’ political orientation,1066 aid would 
generally be diverted to allied communities and withheld from non-allied (or ‘Taliban’) 
communities.1067 The US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)1068 was physically protected 
by Abdul Rahman’s men, so it became impossible for non-allied communities to access the 
US decision makers or resources.1069 More generally, the fact that the internationals worked 
through the provincial authorities, in the public sphere, meant that they were blinded to the 
private sphere. 
 
The foreigners initiating development projects completely underestimated the level of 
complexity inherent in Helmandi society and that disparities in wealth, or the misapplication 
of development projects to favour one group over another, would create massive 
jealousy.1070 As one gentleman said to me, ‘jealousy is the biggest enemy of all [in 
Helmand]’.1071 From the point of view of the average Helmandi, they could not even conceive 
that the US was unable to understand the private political dynamics so obviously 
fundamental to Helmandi society: ‘the foreigners must have an ulterior motive for being 
here’.1072  
 
In one of the worst cases of this, a small USAID-sponsored contractor team began to offer 
province-wide cash for works in 2004–5 to provide a financial buffer for upcoming opium 
eradication. The metric of success was how many man-labour days they could pay through 
the scheme, which they ran through the provincial governorship. This resulted in, for 
example, Alikozai militias protecting (Alikozai) farmers in Sangin, whilst Ishaqzai 
communities had their crops eradicated. There was no accounting for the private sphere or 
attempts to balance across private cleavages. Examples of this scheme’s naivety abound 
and include: paying money for ditch clearance schemes that they could not observe or verify, 
stumbling into the old Barakzai-Alizai dispute and a massive over-focus on Nad-e Ali and 
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Marjeh, because they received much of their local advice from an old USAID engineer from 
the 1970s who clearly loved those areas of central Helmand.1073  
 
4.14 - The Gereshk merry-go-round 
Studying the politics of Gereshk during 2002–5 offers a perfect microcosm of the provincial-
level dynamics of the same period. In Gereshk, the most important position is that of the 
Chief of Police. As it has been for hundreds of years, he who controls the bridge over the 
River Helmand, controls Gereshk. As a private actor in Gereshk, ‘Police’ membership was 
the most useful interaction with the public sphere possible. A diverse array of lower-level 
commanders all attempted to become Chief of Police in order to facilitate their core business 
interests, which were almost always drugs: it was not that the Chief of Police was a drug 
dealer—it was that a drug dealer had become the Chief of Police.1074  
 
Khan Mohammad was the initial Chief after the US intervention.1075 He was to last in post for 
around two years, until late 2003 when Ahmad Wali Karzai pushed to have Badr Khan 
(Popalzai, Uruzgan), an acolyte, put in position. This followed the historical pattern set by the 
Mohammadzai dynasty: the monarch (or president i.e. Hamid) rules Kabul, a brother rules 
Kandahar (i.e. Ahmad Wali) and a cousin (or acolyte i.e. Badr) is sent to Gereshk. Previously 
the dynamics had been about defending Kandahar from Herat; now the dynamics were 
about ensuring safe passage of drugs west to Iran.  
 
Badr had literally to fight his way into position against Khan Mohammad, the old Chief of 
Police.1076 Badr and Gereshk had a tumultuous year, suffering a mini-insurgency caused by 
Khan Mohammad. It was during that time that Idris was killed by Badr as Idris tried to take 
over control of the Bazaar with the help of US special forces (that is, US special forces and 
Idris’ militia tried to take over security in an area that was controlled by a presidentially 
appointed policeman). It is hard to see this happening if the US special forces understood 
what they were doing. Eventually, the situation became unsustainable and Abdul Rahman 
sent Amanullah, his Lashkar Gah Head of Security, as a stopgap to calm the opposing 
factions in Gereshk. 
 
Amanullah’s role was only temporary and, Haji Kadus, Idris’ brother, was appointed the 
Chief of Police. One assumes that the specialporce, as Haji Kadus’ main patron, was 
involved in the lobbying for the unusual situation where the Deputy of the Army Division and 
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the Chief of Police were the same person, and their paymasters were the US special forces! 
It was a stable arrangement in the sense that Haji Kadus controlled the main sources of 
violence. The arrangement lasted until late 2004, when the 93rd Division was disbanded (see 
section 4.15). At about this time, Haji Kadus was sacked as Police Chief and went back to 
working for the US as a militia commander. He plundered the police armouries as he left.1077 
 
The US, however, retained their influence in the police by using Sergeant Abdul Raziq as a 
commander of their ‘District Response Team’, which was a counterterrorism team, and part 
of the ‘police’. Although only a Sergeant (and an ex-Talib), because he had access to the 
resources of the specialporce, he became the de facto Chief of Police, even though there 
was a figurehead Chief in place. Actions like these made Helmandis wonder what the US 
was up to, because its public rhetoric of state building did not match its private actions. 
  
Later it became clear to the US that Abdul Raziq had been abusing his position in order to 
smuggle vast quantities of opium and he was dropped. However, it was only in 2009 that he 
was put in jail through the internationally-mentored ‘non-corruptible’ narcotics justice 
chain.1078 Khan Mohammad was arrested too a year before Abdul Raziq, but not before they 
had fought repeatedly as rival drugs networks, using the public-private interaction of ‘police’ 
membership as means of protecting their business interests.1079 Even now that they are in 
jail, their networks are extant and controlled by relatives: Abdul Khaleq, Abdul Raziq’s 
brother and Agha Mohammad, Khan Mohammad’s eldest son, both continue the family 
businesses.1080 
 
This fantastical narrative provided the backdrop for a number of other stories, all centred on 
control of (mostly) the drugs trade. The Mayor’s and District Governor’s positions suffered 
similar abuse from individuals or networks trying to exploit them for graft. Additionally, the 
people in those positions had to be careful not to ‘rock the boat’ otherwise they risked 
becoming side-lined or worse. Said Dur Ali (Shia, from Abhazan), for instance, was the long-
running mayor of Gereshk, not linked to any factions, and played a very careful balancing 
act. His son was kidnapped by the ‘Taliban’. Khan Mohammad stepped in and very kindly 
offered to ‘pay’ the ransom for him, thus neutering him.1081 The manipulation of the public 
sphere continued apace. 
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As well as militia commanders affiliating with the ‘government security forces’ there were a 
number of private militias formed by ex-jihadi commanders. Mirza Khan Kakar was one such 
ex-Hizb commander.1082 He had been a sub-commander for Mir Wali during the jihad and, 
with Mir Wali’s blessing, settled his mujahidin group and their families in north-west Gereshk, 
where they appropriated land and established a village, Mirza Khan Kalay. He used to 
regularly clash with Khan Mohammad’s militia. In the early 2000s he had married into Mir 
Wali’s family greatly helping his private feud with Khan Mohammad.1083 He then became the 
NDS case officer for Gereshk which helped even more.1084  He was eventually arrested for 
drugs smuggling in 2011. 
 
The final major dynamic in Gereshk was the role of the Highway Police, under a United 
States Protection and Investigations (USPI: a private security contractor) contract. This 
contract was paid for by USAID to guard the national ring road that had been built during 
2003/4.1085 Prior to September 2004, Mir Wali had been in charge of security on part of the 
road, but the new contract was nation-wide and Mir Wali had no choice but to vacate the 
checkpoints to this new force. A man called Masloom (Barakzai, ex-Khalqi, from Babaji) was 
the first commander, but once the posts were taken over they were immediately attacked by 
‘Taliban’ causing the loss of several highway policemen. Masloom immediately accused 
Hekmatullah, Mir Wali’s son, of being behind the attacks.1086  
 
Others1087 also point to Mir Wali being responsible in this classic manipulation of the public 
narratives surrounding the conflict. This was a demonstration of the Helmandi sentiment 
that, if you are not going to include me in the security answer, I will become part of the 
security problem. Mir Wali berated Sher Mohammad and President Karzai for failing to 
provide security with the USPI contract. When I asked Mir Wali later whose Taliban had 
attacked the checkpoints he, in a sarcastic tone of voice, said ‘My Taliban; who do you 
think?’ At some point a man called Ezmarai, who had been a delgai (platoon) commander 
under the Taliban took over the contract, making him exceptionally rich (even though he had 
to pay Mir Wali a ‘tax’),1088 money that he later used to become Gereshk Chief of Police in 
2010.1089 Utterly unaccountable, the complaints against USPI were legion,1090 including using 
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their control of routes to affect drug smuggling.1091 USPI was eventually closed down in 
September 2007.1092 
 
Thus far, I have discussed the ex-mujahidin polity in detail, and particularly its interactions 
with the US special forces. These are extensive examples of what was happening all over 
Helmand: the public sphere was being exploited by private actors to help them in their 
private cleavages. Here, in the final third of the chapter, I discuss in detail the collapse of the 
‘government’ and the re-emergence of the ‘Taliban’. 
 
4.15 - The collapse 
The combination of the inter-commander violent competition, the skewed counter-narcotics 
operations, the abuse of the population and the aggravating role played by the specialporce 
created a ripe atmosphere. This was exacerbated by the removal the big four commanders 
(and many other petty ones), under the UN administered Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Process (DDR), and by the resurgence of the Taliban movement, starting in 
late 2004. These consecutive processes combined and created a shift in public-private 
interactions. Commanders changed from working under the ‘government’ patronage network 
(channelled through the big four commanders) to working under a ‘Taliban’ patronage 
network.  
 
Sher Mohammad manipulated the public DDR process:1093 Mir Wali and the 93rd Division 
were the first to be disarmed, loosing thirty-five pieces of heavy artillery (amongst other 
heavy weaponry) at the end of 2004.1094 As with elsewhere in the country, however, Mir Wali 
handed in his oldest weapons and cached the rest, where they allegedly still remain.1095 
Similarly, Dad Mohammad only surrendered some machine guns.1096 Khano, by this time a 
shopkeeper, was disarmed personally by Abdul Rahman in Lashkar Gah in April, in a harsh 
repudiation of the relationship that had begun thirteen years earlier when Abdul Rahman 
grew to prominence on the weapons that Khano had given him.1097 This was about power 
and the fact that Khano was an independent ‘commander’ in Lashkar Gah that Abdul 
Rahman could not control.1098 Furthermore, Khano still controlled a faction of the police, his 
relatives, who had managed to use their militia-era linkages to join in the post-2001 era.  
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However, more important than the DDR process was the removal of the powerbrokers from 
their jobs. Mir Wali was removed from his position as he was disarmed—as divisional 
commander the two were, by definition, linked. Sher Mohammad, by contrast, remained in 
post until December 2005, when he was removed at the insistence of the British 
government, who were soon to deploy troops to Helmand as part of the NATO expansion 
into the south of Afghanistan.1099 Karzai then appointed him Senator in Kabul. Abdul 
Rahman remained in post until the 10 June 2006 and, critically, none of his men were 
disarmed as they were part of the police.1100 
 
Thus, the de facto powerbrokers in the province were replaced in their de jure provincial 
positions. The larger commanders entered the parliamentary elections. For example, Dad 
Mohammad and Mir Wali were elected, as was Wali Jan, Abdul Rahman’s son. Baghrani 
ran, but was not elected, and Amir Mohammad Akhundzada, Sher Mohammad’s brother, 
was disqualified because of his ‘links’ to unofficial armed militias. He then polled the greatest 
number of provincial votes through tribal support, leading to protests in Lashkar Gah!1101 
Hafizullah ran and would have become an MP, if not for the rules reserving a certain number 
of seats for women—two female teachers, Nasima Niazee and Naz Parwar, leapfrogged him 
in the voting results. This was fairly ironic as Hafizullah refuses to deal with western women 
at the PRT in Lashkar Gah—only men. The voter turnout was 37%, which was significantly 
lower than the presidential elections the year before.1102  
 
Once the DDR process began, a separate campaign of assassination was launched to 
remove any vestiges of ‘government’ from Helmand. This was universally accepted by my 
interviewees to be directed, if not in many cases actually conducted by, the ISI, Pakistan’s 
intelligence service, however in the media they were discussed as ‘Taliban’ operations 
emanating from across the border.1103 Whereas there had been assassination attempts on 
Sher Mohammad before in 20031104 and 2004,1105 in the second half of 2005 a systematic 
campaign was waged against provincial notables including senior religious figures,1106 
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election candidates1107 and judges;1108 set against the on-going murder of policemen. 
Another attempt was also made on Sher Mohammad’s life.1109  
 
Subsequent to this, the schools in Helmand were targeted resulting in almost all being 
destroyed and the remainder closing down.1110 There were one or two exceptions in Nad-e 
Ali. The issues of school burning, the ‘Taliban’ and Pakistani influence exerted on the 
‘Taliban’ are important ones for the Helmandi population. Helmandis accept that most of the 
‘Taliban’ fighters and commanders are Helmandi, and most would not burn schools in their 
own communities. They point to a more extreme branch within the Taliban that is either 
entirely Punjabi (Helmandis call all Pakistanis Punjabis), or closely mentored by the 
‘Punjabis’ (the ISI).1111 This issue will be explored more closely the next section. Finally, the 
Taliban distributed ‘night letters’ to pressurize those that had not been assassinated. One 
such letter said, ‘Anyone who gets money from the government or the US, whether he is 
clergy, grower, officer etc., the mujahidin of the Islamic state will not spare him and will be 
punished according to the sharia’.1112 
 
By the end of 2005, the province was approaching near anarchy and power began to flow 
back to the localities. Groups assumed responsibility for their own security, much the same 
as they had done when the state collapsed in 1978. This was encouraged by the same 
external influences leading the assassination campaigns, who suggested to groups that had 
lost out under the departing administration that by opposing the government, they could 
regain their rights. Essentially, the Taliban public narrative encapsulated well the multiplicity 
of private reasons that people had to be annoyed with the ‘government’. The ensuing 
provincial power vacuum meant that by the end of 2005 the government in most Helmandi 
districts had dissolved.1113  
 
4.16 - The ‘Taliban’ franchise and the mahaz system 
The Taliban resurgence in 2004/5 was primarily based on the reactivation of old Taliban 
networks from the previously ousted government. This was similar to the resurgence of the 
jihadi commanders in 2001, or even the dynamic of the ‘civil war’ period from 1989–94. That 
too was driven by the activation and reactivation of different commanders’ networks based 
upon new or different patronage flows resulting from public-private interactions. 2004/5’s 
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mobilisation also shared similarities with that of 1978 in that there were private cleavages 
(then created by the Khalqi predations, later driven by the warlords’ predations) that formed 
interactions with public organisation (i.e. the mujahidin parties or the Taliban) that were able 
to restate these private cleavages in a public, ideological framework. 
 
This public-private interaction was pursued along many levels. As well as providing a forum 
for training and organisation in Pakistan the exiled Taliban leadership sent emissaries 
forward to preach in mosques in Helmand.1114 Often they would cite the predations of the big 
four by name.1115 Once it became clear that Britain would be deploying troops as part of the 
extended ISAF mission, the Taliban activities reached fever pitch, and even Iran used its old 
links to invigorate resistance against the British: Sardar Baghwani was seen again in 
northern Helmand exhorting young men to rise up.1116  
 
Initially, the dispossessed ex-government Taliban formed links through their own personal 
networks to funding streams in Pakistan controlled by mahaz commanders (see below).1117 
This was very much like how the rebels in 1978/9 used personal links to contact the 
mujahidin parties.1118 The main difference was that publicly the Taliban was a single 
organisation, although with a degree of acephaly. Taking the evidence here into account, it 
could be mistaken for several different jihadi parties held together in a loose alliance: exactly 
what the jihad was. Only later did the Taliban attempt to reassert control and encourage 
cohesiveness. 
 
The main difference, discussed below, between the 1978 government collapse and the 2005 
government collapse is that many of the 2005 pre-collapse ‘government’ players changed 
their public-private interactions (or switched sides), such that the post-collapse ‘Taliban’ 
contained people who had previously been antagonistic and even fighting each other. This 
did not occur in 1978. The 2004/5 divested ‘government’ commanders had taken the position 
that if they were not included in the security solution they would be part of the security 
problem. Security was a zero-sum game and commanders could not opt out of a position in 
the new patronage landscape. They had to have at least one interaction with a strong public 
organisation: they could not survive as a lone private actor. Either they were being 
patronised, and hence protected, or they were not, and they would be fair game for those 
with resources and protection. Confusingly for the British when they arrived in 2006, Mir Wali 
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and Sher Mohammad, the two greatest side-switchers to the ‘Taliban’, retained positions in 
the government as an MP and a Senator respectively. This meant each had two juxtaposed 
public-private interactions. 
 
Individual commanders reformed affiliations through personal networks with mahaz 
commanders, which should be seen as analogous to the amirs that each jihadi party had in 
each province to represent them and organise supply.1119 Conceptually, it was the same 
public-private interaction. In 2005, the most important mahaz commander in the south of 
Afghanistan was Mullah Dadullah (Kakar, from Uruzgan),1120 closely followed by Osmani 
(Ishaqzai/Chowkazai),1121 from Sangin. There were others, like Mullah Baradar (Popalzai, 
Uruzgan),1122 Akhtur Mohammad Mansour (Ishaqzai, from Band-e Timor)1123 or Mullah Naim 
(Barich, Garmsir—not to be confused with the Alizai Mullah Naim, also from Garmsir who 
was the Taliban District Governor for Garmsir).1124 All were Taliban government-era officials 
or founding members and had all fled to Pakistan in 2001.1125  
 
Dadullah was an exceptionally charismatic commander, and known as the ‘lame 
Englishman’. This was apparently because he had one leg and was so unbelievably 
devious.1126 Originally fighting in Kandahar, he moved to Helmand and fought under Nasim 
Akhundzada returning after one year, once Nasim was killed in March 1990. During the 
Taliban government, he had risen to command the so-called ‘Helmandi Brigade’—shock 
troops—and had escaped capture in the north of the country in late 2001. By now he was 
the largest Taliban military leader in the south. In 2006, he was able to muster three hundred 
‘Taliban’ to attack Sangin District Centre and the (mainly) US troops that were defending 
it.1127 Dadullah was quoted as saying that his ‘most lovely activity was the jihad and fighting 
the heretics face-to-face’.1128 
 
Enmities jarred the relationships between the four main mahaz commanders: Dadullah and 
Osmani did not get on,1129 and Baradar and Dadullah were also enemies.1130 In 2005 this, 
alongside the nature of Taliban public-private interactions discussed above, led to a much 
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fractured situation. A district might have several ‘Taliban’ groups in it, which had mobilised 
for different reasons, and were working to different mahaz commanders. See figure 5. Many 
of these groups were led by previously antagonistic commanders, who had been on either 
side of the government-nongovernment divide, or were drug smugglers protecting their crop, 
or both. In addition, many families looked at the rapidly changing situation and opted to send 
(at least some of) their sons to the Taliban to protect the family.1131 Before 2006, the 
population were aware of who was fighting, but not which mahaz they belonged to, very 
much like the situation in 1978/9 when the rebel groups had not yet formed their public-
private interactions with the mujahidin political parties.1132 Adherence to the Taliban public 
narrative became easier, however, once the British arrived in mid-2006: the groups were 
more likely to coalesce in the face of the historical enemy.  
 
 
Figure 5: The Taliban mahaz system. Note that no one mahaz commander controls 
all the fighters in any one district. 
 
4.17 - Nad-e Ali 
Nad-e Ali began to see the earliest revivals of the old Taliban networks, but one of the latest 
manifestations of major military activity. This can mostly be explained through the continued 
activities of Abdul Rahman. Despite his commanders being among the worst for predation, 
they were still in government positions and so were able to supress potential ‘Taliban’ 
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military activity. Even when removed in mid-2006, Abdul Rahman had built up such a 
successful network of relatives in the police (for example Tor Jan and Sarwar Jan, the Chiefs 
of Police in Nad-e Ali and Now Zad, respectively)1133 that he was still able to exert massive 
influence. As Abdul Rahman put it, ‘Nad-e Ali was ok because my people were in charge of 
security…they are the only ones who know who the Taliban are’. In a sense, he wasn’t lying; 
he had just omitted to mention the fact that it was his men in the first place who had pushed 
other communities in Nad-e Ali to seek to affiliate with the Taliban. 
  
The main problem in Nad-e Ali was the police preying on people, and this was mainly 
focussed on members of the previous Taliban government.1134 In 2003, these ex-Taliban 
members started organising.1135 The first step in the reactivation of their networks was to 
travel to Quetta and ask for help from the newly reformed Taliban central shura. Once a 
public-private interaction was initiated, a two-way flow would begin with Afghans living in 
Pakistan making the journey to Nad-e Ali and vice versa. Weapons were organised, brought 
over from Girdi Jangal camp, and cached. Very gentle military activities started in mid-2005, 
with some skirmishing attacks on government patrols as they moved around the periphery of 
Nad-e Ali (e.g. Saidabad).1136 The levels of military activity were kept low due to Abdul 
Rahman’s grip on security in the district. Later on, in 2006, ‘Punjabis’ (the ISI) would be seen 
in Nad-e Ali, however the overall organisation was very much in the hands of the local 
‘Taliban’ commanders,1137 and the Punjabis were working as advisors: every mahaz had 
their own set of advisors.1138  
 
The most obvious example of a ‘Taliban’ commander is Murtaza, the Kharoti ‘Guantanamo 
Talib’; however Akhtur Mohammad (Popalzai), a previous Taliban judge, was also among 
those who made the journey to Pakistan.1139 Sardar Mohammad (Ishaqzai, and a relative of 
Rahmattiar) was involved in smuggling, and kept his options open by offering support.1140 
Similarly, the Noorzai Aghezai clan in Loy Bagh (Khano’s clan and known for splitting itself 
across ideological divides during the jihad, see section 2.10), began to reach out using 
Mullah Karim. Later on, Karim’s cousins were to become the Provincial Chief of Police and 
Nad-e Ali District Chief of Police—the faction that lost out when Khano was disarmed in 
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2005 managed to regain power in the police in 2008.1141 The clan was successfully 
interacting with both public organisations again. 
 
Other Noorzai groups suffered from unwanted splits. For example, Haji Lal Jan, a strong ex-
Taliban commander, suffered from a split in his own family, and as a result was forced to 
leave Noorzo Kalay, his village, in 2005. Arab, his nephew by marriage, contested the 
leadership of Noorzo Kalay, despite being only thirty-years-old. But the divide is deeper than 
that. In the original migration from Washir in the early 1980s, Arab’s family had come from 
Nakhooma Kalay, whereas Haji Lal Jan had come from Gundacha Kalay (both are in 
Washir) and the villages competed. Arab’s interaction with the ‘Taliban’ was about sub-
village private cleavages, and nothing to do with public ideology.1142  
 
His uncles, Ghulam Saki and Mullah Habibullah, were both ex-members of the Taliban 
movement, linked to Dadullah’s mahaz, and had arranged for Arab to go to Pakistan for 
training. He returned as ‘commander’ of Maat-e Que (his home area) and his base was in 
Washir under Abdul Salam (Noorzai commander of the Herat Corps during TB government; 
see section 3.14), where he raised a multi-tribal group of fighters. As someone from Noorzo 
Kalay put it to me, ‘Arab was using the Taliban to improve his own position’.1143 I see the 
incidences of Taliban mobilisation discussed here, particularly that of Arab, as key evidence 
in support of my thesis that the public and private spheres interact to shape conflict 
dynamics. 
 
The Taliban public narrative was affiliated to many private actors and narratives. Thus 
towards the end of 2005, in an attempt to corral the movement, the central command in 
Quetta appointed Taliban District Governors—for example, Mullah Mohammad Arif Akhund 
in Nad-e Ali1144—to coordinate civil issues. However, the mahaz commanders continued to 
‘act…like kings’,1145 and it was to be some time before the Taliban managed to coordinate 
the ‘Taliban’ better.1146 
 
4.18 - Nahr-e Saraj 
Nahr-e Saraj suffered ‘Taliban’ instability much earlier than Nad-e Ali. In 2003/4, and 
replicating the pattern elsewhere in the province, the ex-Taliban came under pressure from 
predation by Mir Wali and his bounty-hunting commanders. As elsewhere, many of the 
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commanders left Nahr-e Saraj and went to Pakistan seeking interactions with mahaz 
commanders that could provide them with training and weapons. Then, a two-way flow of 
personal and equipment began to flow from Pakistan. Military activities began in mid- to late-
2005, although at first these were very low-key: two men on a motorbike carrying out an 
assassination, or a roadside bomb. However, in Nahr-e Saraj the new ‘Taliban’ were 
composed both of those who had supported the government previously and those who had 
not1147—i.e. those who had been in the 93rd Division and those who had been persecuted by 
the 93rd Division.  
 
Mir Wali, and the 93rd Division, were DDR’d (another ‘word’ that has entered the Pushtu 
lexicon along with raaket and specialporce) in the autumn of 2004. This required a degree of 
coordination as parts of the Division were being maintained by the specialporce as militias. It 
appears by this point that the US detachment had begun to realise that it had been 
manipulated over various issues including the Guantanamo arrests. This caused the US to 
move from an interaction with one private actor—Mir Wali—to a lesser one: Haji Kadus. This 
meant that they were affiliating themselves with the smaller faction of the tribal split in Malgir. 
The interaction with Haji Kadus was to last for the next eight years, with the specialporce 
calling him ‘The Dous’. The ignorance of the IC in prosecuting the DDR program and of the 
US in switching support to Haji Kadus has shaped the conflict in Nahr-e Saraj to the present 
day (2012).1148 
 
Once the Division’s weapons were handed over, Mir Wali’s house was raided by the 
specialporce, who confiscated his personal weapons. This was organised by Haji Kadus.1149 
At the same time, the US purged its client militias to remove anyone who was loyal to Mir 
Wali or had any previous association with ‘Hizb’.1150 Mir Wali also reported to me that he 
found out at that time that Haji Kadus was planning to kill Hekmat, his eldest son. The US 
did not understand that Haji Kadus was launching a coup against Mir Wali. Kadus 
commanded their militias and his brother Daud guarded Camp Price, thus ensuring that only 
the people that the brothers wanted to meet the Americans got to meet the Americans.1151  
 
Many of those ‘Hizb’ elements, particularly the Ishaqzai, were put under pressure once the 
93rd Division was DDR’d. For example, Qari Hazrat and Lala Jan, his brother, were 93rd 
commanders for the Mistereekhel clan of the Ishaqzai in Qala-e Gaz. Now that they no 
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longer had the protection of the 93rd patronage network, their drugs interests run by 
Mamouk, another brother, came under pressure from Dad Mohammad and his militias—
much like the Ishaqzai Chowkazai clan’s interests had been since 2001.1152 Dad Mohammad 
was later removed from his post six months after Mir Wali and disarmed in June 2005, giving 
up his weapons just one week before the deadline required for participation in the national 
parliamentary elections.1153 His brother, Gul Mohammad, managed to remain in position as 
an official in Sangin until mid-2006 when he was killed.1154  
 
Sher Mohammad was only removed in December 2005. Before he was removed he realised 
that the Mistereekhel drug interests were unprotected because of the DDR of the 93rd 
Division.1155 This uneven disarmament opened up some opportunities for a little extra 
predation and harassment.1156 Thus, whereas the two Ishaqzai clans—the Chowkazai and 
the Mistereekhel—had fought each other during the jihad (see section 2.7), they were now 
pushed onto the same side. Qari Hazrat (Mistereekhel) affiliated himself with the Taliban and 
became a significant commander with both Ishaqzai clans behind him. This exploited a 
leadership position’s interaction between men and patronage, or public and private.1157 It is 
interesting to see how this looked from an Alikozai perspective: ‘the Taliban, the smugglers 
and the Ishaqzai are all the same thing’, a well-connected Alikozai scribe said to me.1158  
 
The disbanding of the 93rd Division had also destroyed the tribal coalition created by Mir 
Wali—that between the two tribal groupings led by Khalifa Shirin Khan (the Akhundzadakhel, 
the Utmanzai, the Bayezai and the Sardarzai: the more powerful grouping previously 
affiliated with Hizb) and by Haji Abdul Agha (Shamezai, Nekazai, Yedarzai and Masezai: the 
less powerful grouping previously affiliated with Harakat). Mir Wali was Bayezai (stronger 
grouping/‘Hizb’) and Haji Kadus was Shamezai (weaker grouping/‘Harakat’).  
 
Now that the 93rd had been disbanded, and as a result of Haji Kadus’ coup against Mir Wali, 
those from the stronger grouping were affiliated with the Taliban: ‘Taliban’ commanders were 
‘Hizb’ people such as Hazrat (Barakzai/Sardarzai) and Zapran (Barakzai/Bayezai).1159 The 
weaker grouping, however, contained the US militia commanders: the militia commanders 
were ‘Harakat’ people such as Jan Mohammad (Barakzai/Shamezai)—in fact Kadus, Daud 
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and Jan Mohammad all came from the same village, Khowganai in Charkandaz.1160 This 
was an age-old private cleavage that took on a government-Taliban label in the public 
sphere. The US ignorance of the implications of its interactions with certain private actors 
(Haji Kadus) meant that private actors and cleavages were able to drive the interaction 
between public and private and shape the conflict. 
 
It is unfortunate for the Americans that they supported such a narrow faction, and pushed 
their enemies from the other part of the tribal coalition into forming an affiliation with the 
Taliban. Did Haji Kadus persecute those from the stronger grouping because they were 
affiliated with the Taliban, or did they affiliate with the Taliban because Haji Kadus was 
persecuting them? Ultimately, it was driven by private cleavages: the intra-Barakzai 
cleavage that was much older than, and nothing to do with, either the Taliban or Haji Kadus’ 
persecution. Nonetheless, the situation accelerated and before long village elders were 
organising their own defence and asking either Haji Kadus, or the ‘Taliban’ for support.1161 
Haji Gul Ehktiar and Sur Gul, his nephew, were such examples of ex-Hizb commanders, 
who joined the 93rd patronage network, and after the disbandment of the division looked to 
ally with the ‘Taliban’ for protection.1162 
 
In short, DDR was a disaster in Nahr-e Saraj and was entirely to the Taliban’s benefit.1163 
The 93rd Division split, with a small Barakzai rump remaining with the US special forces 
(affiliated to the government), but the vast majority of the Barakzai and other tribes’ 
commanders affiliating with the Taliban.1164 These two alliances then continued to fight each 
other for the next few years. The US drove the militias under Haji Kadus to attack Qari 
Hazrat, then a member of the ‘Taliban’, often against Mir Wali’s wishes (he was, by that time, 
the MP for Nahr-e Saraj).1165 Haji Kadus also exploited his family’s Harakat links to open 
negotiations with Sher Mohammad. In case the US dropped him, he would need a powerful 
sponsor to best Mir Wali, who now hated him.1166 The Taliban organisation was a franchise, 
designed to protect other private interests.  
 
Interviewees were agreed, ‘everything that Qari Hazrat did was for Hizb, not Mullah 
Omar’.1167 Qari Hazrat interacted with several public and private groups at the same time: he 
‘had several bosses—Mullah Saddiq [the Taliban District Governor—see below], Mir Wali, 
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his own tribal drug interests and Gulbuddin [the leader of Hizb]; but Mullah Omar [the 
Taliban leader] got blamed for everything that went on in Nahr-e Saraj’.1168 Even members of 
‘Hizb’ agree: ‘most of the [Nahr-e Saraj] Taliban are actually Hizb fighting for themselves, in 
the name of the Taliban’.1169 Jabbar Qahraman, an MP for Helmand, also agrees that ex-93rd 
people joined the ‘Taliban’ in 2005. He was later part of an abortive attempt in 2007 with 
Michael Semple, an EU diplomat at the time, to reintegrate them into the police (see section 
5.7). Mir Wali, however, when questioned about the ‘Taliban’ in Nahr-e Saraj in fact being 
affiliated with ‘Hizb’, proved evasive over the issue. He turned my question back on me and 
spoke about the growth of the Afghan Local Police in 2011/2 (see section 6.10), and said 
that you must have local forces who know who the Taliban are in order to fight them. 
 
It is pertinent to point out that ‘Hizb’ in Nahr-e Saraj, whilst previously a public organisation, 
now represent a solidarity group of ex-mujahidin: they could be considered a private group. 
They no longer, for instance, espouse an ideology, or exhibit institutional organisation; but 
the personal bonds between the fighters remain strong: ergo I define them in the private 
sphere in this instance. What is not clear, however, is whether the Taliban in Quetta were 
aware of this dynamic and were being manipulated, or whether they were aware of it and 
were manipulating it. In the terms of my thesis, there is a clear interaction, however I cannot 
assert with this event whether the ignorance of a public organisation is allowing the private 
sphere to dictate events (although it was the ignorance of the US and the IC that originally 
caused the alliances between the ‘Hizb’ groups and the Taliban).  
 
The Quetta Shura Taliban knew DDR was occurring and took advantage by appointing a 
Taliban District Governor a month later. Initially this was Mullah Saddiq (Ishaqzai, ex-
Harakat), who was described above being chased by Mir Wali’s men, and then Sur Gul 
(Barakzai, ex-Hizb), who had been part of Mir Wali’s 93rd Division. This suggests that at first 
they did not understand the ‘Hizb’-Taliban dynamic outlined above, and when they came to 
understand they appointed Sur Gul to act as the point of interaction between them and the 
private ‘Hizb’ groups. Whether the Taliban understood the private sphere or not, the 
outcome was two previously antagonistic private groups (some 93rd Division actors and their 
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4.19 - Northern Helmand 
Ultimately what happened in Nahr-e Saraj was linked to what was happening in Sangin, 
through the Ishaqzai community who straddle the border between the two districts. The 
Ishaqzai dynamic was such that Qari Hazrat provided the private on-the-ground leadership, 
with Osmani and Akhtur Mohammad Mansour helping provide the interaction with the 
Taliban Quetta Shura. Additional funding was provided by drug smugglers such as Mamouk 
and Fatah Mohammad.1171 The Ishaqzai community was heavily predated upon by Dad 
Mohammad and Sher Mohammad, who were disarmed and removed much later than Mir 
Wali (who was ‘protecting’ them). This private cleavage and the associated interactions 
(Ishaqzai-Taliban; Sher Mohammad/Dad Mohammad-government) drove the conflict. This 
story eventually came to a nadir when thirty-two members of Dad Mohammad’s family were 
ambushed and killed when they went to collect the murdered body of Gul Mohammad, the 
ex-Sangin District Governor in June 2006.1172 The massacre has been described variously 
through the public and private spheres: a drugs hit, a Taliban hit and an Ishaqzai-Alikozai 
dispute. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that it is all three.1173 
 
Musa Qala followed a similar pattern to Nahr-e Saraj, where individual commanders affiliated 
themselves with the Taliban for protection. There were many people who had been 
persecuted by Sher Mohammad and his brother, Amir Mohammad, who was the ‘District’ 
Governor of the Alizai areas in the north of Helmand. Mullah Salam (Alizai/Pirzai), later to 
become famous for switching sides yet again, was an ex-Taliban commander who had been 
the District Governor of Kajaki during the Taliban government. His land was appropriated by 
Amir Mohammad, and Hassanzai (their sub-tribe) tenants were moved onto it. Mullah Matin 
was another Pirzai commander who began working with the Taliban to protect himself.1174 
During 2005, the depredations became so extreme that a group of elders asked the Taliban 
for protection,1175 and there was a groundswell of people joining the ‘Taliban’ under people 
like Mullah Salam to protect themselves from Sher Mohammad’s network.1176 Because Sher 
Mohammad had also affiliated himself with the US, there was the further motivating factor of 
a US firebase a short distance from Musa Qala, from which artillery was occasionally fired at 
the ‘Taliban’.1177  
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4.20 - Sher Mohammad’s game 
Sher Mohammad was removed from the Provincial Governorship in December 2005. This 
was at the insistence of the British.1178 Sher Mohammad then ordered his commanders to 
begin fighting under the Taliban public umbrella. Many had come from the Taliban in the first 
place. This is considered common knowledge in Helmand,1179 and was even confirmed by 
the first UK taskforce commander, Brigadier Ed Butler. When I questioned Sher Mohammad 
about it, and in particular pointed out a Telegraph article1180 that referred to his purported 
admission of this, he categorically denied that he had ordered his men to the Taliban and 
touted his anti-Taliban credentials. I again raised the article in the Telegraph and asked if he 
had met Damien McElroy, the author. He had, but, ‘that journalist lied and twisted it; he was 
Angrez [sic] wasn’t he…I hate that journalist’. Taliban commanders, however, point out that 
by being ‘Taliban’ as well as ‘government’, Sher Mohammad was protecting drug 
interests.1181 As one put it, ‘with one bullet he did many hunts’.1182 
 
Not only did Sher Mohammad order his men to work with the ‘Taliban’, he also provided 
massive financial support to their operations—some Taliban commanders even went as far 
to say that Sher Mohammad became a mahaz commander himself (this while being a 
Senator in Kabul).1183 Sher Mohammad’s commanders who began to work for the ‘Taliban’, 
or under Taliban patronage, include Mullah Manan.1184  Rahmatullah, mentioned above in 
the incident where Abdul Rahman’s commander Amanullah was killed, also moved to Baram 
Cha to work as a ‘Talib-smuggler’.1185 Hafizullah provided me with the names of other 
commanders who entered the ‘Taliban’ franchise from Sher Mohammad’s at that time: Abdul 
Bari (Alizai/Hassanzai) and Mahmad Akhundzada (Alizai), although coming from Hafizullah 
(Hizb), these names should be treated with a degree of caution. Overall though, it is clear 
that Sher Mohammad was interacting with both of the main public organisations in the 
conflict at the same time, much as Nasim his uncle had done during the jihad (see section 
2.7). What is clear though, is that the ignorance of the British in insisting that Sher 
Mohammad was removed, caused him to work more with the public organisation that the 
British were opposed to—the Taliban. That is, the private sphere dictated events in the face 
of the ignorance of a public organisation. 
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The re-emergence of the Taliban in Helmand province is not difficult to explain. Warlord 
predations on ex-Taliban commanders causing them to form affiliations with the public 
organisation of the ISI-sponsored Taliban provided the background dynamics. The power 
vacuum created by the warlords’ removal coupled with a destabilisation campaign 
orchestrated by the ISI played a close supporting role.1186 But the actual shift between the 
two public organisations, from majority government-control to majority Taliban-control, was 
caused by the commanders switching sides, and forming new public-private interactions: Mir 
Wali in 2005, Sher Mohammad at the end of 2005, and Abdul Rahman in 2008 (see section 
5.10). 
 
In the case of Sher Mohammad, this was done deliberately, probably motivated by his hatred 
of the British, both historically and for insisting that he be removed from his job. In the case 
of Mir Wali, his sub-commanders switched sides for their own protection. The evidence 
shows that Mir Wali allowed it to happen and took advantage of it. Interestingly, and as 
during the jihad, the super-local, private sphere was all-important, in the face of public 
ignorance. Later on, for example, in Malgir, US special forces worked with a previously 
‘Harakat’ aligned coalition led by Haji Kadus against mainly ‘Hizb’ groups. But in Musa Qala 
the ‘government’, and the British when they arrived, fought the old ‘Harakat’ networks of 
Sher Mohammad. These private dynamics drove the fighting against the British when they 
arrived. The public narrative of Taliban jihad simply provided an ideological framework and 
funding. 
 
Sher Mohammad was replaced by Mohammad Daud as Provincial Governor, an English-
speaking technocrat from Helmand, but with no tribal base. He was deputised by Sher 
Mohammad’s brother, Amir Mohammad, making it very hard to escape the influence of 
the previous governor.1187 Sher Mohammad absolutely detests the British for his removal and 
called them ‘nah poh’, which translates as ‘stupid, unintelligible, slow-witted, unintelligent, 
uneducated and ill-informed’. ‘They do not understand Helmandi politics at all’, he told 
me, ‘we are both on the same side’. He was not lying; he was just affiliated to several 
public organisations at the same time.  
 
Once appointed, Daud led the 2006 eradication programme supported by the newly-
deployed Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. The crop in 2006 was 
twice that of 2005, and his intent was to eradicate the poppy that was grown on 
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government land, by government officials. That this coincided with the British deployment 
was regrettable timing.1188 The ISI-sponsored Taliban were offering to fund resistance to 
the eradication forces using protection of the poppy crop as a public narrative to gain 
farmers’ support.1189 The eradication, led by Amir Mohammad, began in Dishu and then 
moved into Khan Eshin and Garmsir.1190 It later moved into areas like Sangin, at that 
point in the throes of outright warfare between the ANA and the ‘Taliban’.1191  
 
Overall, less than ten per cent of Helmand’s forty thousand hectares of opium poppy was 
eradicated and the process was horribly corrupted by private interests. Central Helmand, 
the domain of Abdul Rahman, was left untouched, largely because his police were 
providing the protection for the eradication force. The same occurred in Musa Qala, Sher 
Mohammad’s domain. Province-wide, poor farmers were targeted rather than richer 
landlords or those with connections to government and in Sangin, the eradication proved 
incendiary and allowed the ‘Taliban’ to (publicly) protect poor farmers from government 
eradication. Privately, this was in fact Ishaqzai tribesmen facing down an Alikozai-led 
eradication effort.1192 
 
4.21 - Conclusions 
This period offers the clearest, unqualified support for the thesis that conflict in Helmand 
is caused by a public-private interaction, and that the private sphere has primacy in 
shaping conflict dynamics when there is ignorance of the nature of the private sphere by 
public organisations.  
 
This thesis of public-private interaction is reinforced when one considers recruitment to 
the ‘Taliban’: both micro-examples, like that of Haji Lal Jan and Arab, or Murtaza, and 
macro-examples like that of the disarmament of the 93rd Division. The evidence here 
presented about Mir Wali and his dealings with the specialporce, the militias that were 
raised from local men and led by the US, the four warlords’ denunciations of each other 
to the US, and the Guantanamo arrests all point to a public organisation that did not 
understand the private sphere, and failed to control the public-private interaction that 
drives conflict. Particular cases—the study of money movements in Gereshk, the 
descriptions of his own local conflict by the US-led (Helmandi) militia commander and the 
removal of Sher Mohammad at British insistence—further demonstrate the interaction 
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between the two spheres and underline the importance of the private sphere in driving 
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People rose up; some came with guns, 
some with knives, some with sticks; we 




Why Helmand? The Angrez could 







As part of a NATO expansion around the country, the British deployed forces to Helmand in 
2006 to support the government and offer reconstruction and development to the population. 
During this period, the overarching public narrative of the conflict focused on the fierce 
fighting between ISAF and Afghan government troops, and the resurgent Taliban—the 
‘insurgency narrative’. The government forces, and the British, were seen to be protecting 
and advancing democracy, women’s rights and countering the growth of narcotics. The 
Taliban, still considered a unitary actor, were opposed to the government and the British and 
fought in the name of Islam. 
 
5.1 - Why Helmand? 
Publicly, the British mission, as part of the expanded NATO/ISAF mission, was to bring 
increased security and stability to the province and to check the narcotics trade.1194 As the 
lead nation in the coalition for counter-narcotics, it was felt appropriate by Tony Blair, then 
Prime Minister, that Britain deployed troops to Helmand.1195 However, the most important 
deciding factor in the selection of Helmand was alliance politics between the Canadians, the 
British and the Dutch: namely that the Canadians wanted Kandahar, and the Dutch 
Uruzgan.1196 The mission was intended to last for three years at a cost of £808m1197 and the 
British began to deploy in numbers in May 2006. The initial plan was to secure a ‘lozenge’ 
around Gereshk and Lashkar Gah and demonstrate their reconstruction efforts to the 
population.1198 US special forces were still to remain in the province under their 
counterterrorist Operation Enduring Freedom mission. 
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Unaware of these decisions and machinations, the Helmandis heard on the radio that the 
British were returning after one hundred and twenty-six years. What they heard seemed 
incongruous to what they knew of the British.1199 Even in the Afghan ‘government’, there was 
confusion. A Helmandi Senator asked me, ‘Why Helmand? The Angrez could have gone to 
any province’.1200 On a more personal level, a senior (well-educated) provincial official 
remembers sitting on his grandfather’s knee as he was told stories about Maiwand where his 
grandfather had fought. ‘People rose up; some came with guns, some with knives, some 
with sticks; we went to defeat them’, he said.1201 He then recalled a meeting with British 
officers in early 2006. A young intelligence officer asked him what the Helmandis thought of 
the British in light of their shared history. The provincial official replied that the Helmandis 
hated them, and the Britisher went red, embarrassed. Not wishing to offend his guest, the 
official continued, ‘but that was then, and this is now…now you have come to help’. He later 
explained to me that because he was a government man, and that was the government 
policy, he followed it. Yet he was thinking ‘why are they here?’  
 
The British troops focussed on three issues as they toured the province to explain their 
public narrative. Firstly, security; the incoming three thousand British troops and a further 
Afghan National Army (ANA) brigade would ensure security, including patrolling the border 
with Pakistan to stop Taliban and supplies coming into the province. Secondly, development; 
in contrast to the US who had directly implemented projects themselves, the British would be 
channelling development money through the provincial government in order to strengthen its 
mechanisms and its relationship with the population. Thirdly was counter-narcotics. This was 
an acute concern for Helmandis. As the British were touring the province, the 2006 
eradication campaign was in full swing. The British line was a fudge: ‘no UK military 
personnel will be eradicating poppy; however, part of the UK mission is to support the 
[Afghan] government in its counter-narcotics efforts’.1202 
 
It is hard to judge now what the majority of Helmandis thought about the return of the British 
at the time. My interviewees discussed it in a universally bad light, focussing on revenge for 
Maiwand, and traditional British perfidy, however much has happened since 2006, and oral 
history is the ‘facts’ of the past retold through the lens of the present. Contemporaneous US 
diplomatic cables mention a good reception for the British as they arrived, and an 
atmosphere of hope that the British were going to help solve some of the very serious 
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problems in the province.1203 ‘It is true’, the US diplomat wrote, ‘that Afghans have a long 
memory for history, and a few Afghans even comment on the (unfortunate) British colonial 
history. In general, however, the great majority of Afghans understand and support the 
modern-day British role here’.1204 It is, of course, impossible to know how astute the writer of 
those cables was or whether the Afghan words of welcome were hiding other thoughts. I 
tentatively suggest that there were differences between the public sphere of the intervention 
and what the Helmandis privately thought. 
 
5.2 - Collapse 
The British entered a situation spiralling out of control. Even before taking over responsibility 
from the Americans on May 1st, a British reconnaissance patrol was attacked in Now Zad in 
early April. Their attackers turned out to be ‘policemen’, and there was question as to 
whether the attack occurred because the ‘police’ thought that the British soldiers had arrived 
to confiscate their opium stocks.1205 Patrolling began in Gereshk at the end of April and was 
met neutrally.1206 Elsewhere in the province the situation continued to deteriorate: Baghran 
‘fell’ to the ‘Taliban’ on April 29th.1207 Concurrently, there was a large amount of other military 
activity. US special forces were still based in the province and highly active, although 
uncoordinated with the British.1208 In mid-May, a large US-led operation was launched to put 
pressure on the Taliban (the public sphere described the Taliban as being a cohesive 
organisation) to ease the entry of the British and other coalition troops into the South. It had 
the reverse effect. Similar to a Soviet sweep operation, and replete with large amounts of 
airpower, it had the effect of massively ‘stirring things up’ in Helmand.1209 To the Helmandis, 
the development promised in the British public narrative seemed oddly juxtaposed with the 
massive military operations that they could see occurring.1210 
  
Seen from the public sphere, it appeared that northern Helmand was about to revert to 
Taliban control. Governor Daud told the British that the towns in northern Helmand were 
under attack by the Taliban. The British had to deploy there to stop the Taliban from 
capturing a District Centre and ‘raising the Taliban’s black flag’.1211 In the private sphere 
though, the shadow of the previous Helmandi government loomed. For example, in Musa 
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Qala the police were under the command of Abdul Wali Koka (Alizai/Hassanzai)1212 and the 
District Governor was Mohammad Wali, whose brother was Bismillah, still in Guantanamo 
(see section 4.8)—both were heavily linked to Sher Mohammad, and their bad behaviour 
caused the spark of uprising for most of the ‘Taliban’.1213 They came under attack on May 
18th. In response, British troops deployed to Musa Qala, with Amir Mohammad, the Deputy 
Governor, and his militia. After securing the town they headed north to Baghran. Amir 
Mohammad had told the British that the ‘Taliban’ had come from there.1214 This may have 
been ‘true’, but in reality he was targeting his old enemy, Rais Baghrani. The conflict was 
being shaped by their feud, a private cleavage, being overlaid with the abstract government-
Taliban public cleavage. It appeared that the British did not know they were being 
manipulated. 
 
A few days later Now Zad was to come under attack. Sarwar Jan (Noorzai), a relative of 
Abdul Rahman Jan, was the District Chief of Police, and represented the old warlords’ 
rapaciousness.1215 He was described as a ‘very, very cruel man’.1216 Now Zad was an 
important area for the Taliban due to the fact that major commanders like Abdul Salam 
(Noorzai) and Rahim (Ishaqzai), the Taliban Provincial Governor at the time, came from the 
district.1217 By May 22nd, a small number of British troops had deployed to the hukomat to 
reinforce the ‘police’.1218 At the beginning of July, locals began to leave Now Zad and the 
British began to be attacked there also.1219  
 
In Sangin a similar pattern had prevailed. The District Chief of Police in Sangin was an ally of 
Sher Mohammad, Khan Mohammad (Barakzai, ex-Harakat).1220 Gul Mohammad, Dad 
Mohammad’s brother, was the ex-District Governor,1221 but still an ‘official’ in Sangin.1222 In 
mid-June, he was murdered by the Ishaqzai ‘Taliban’ (see section 4.18).1223 The family 
response exploited the public sphere. Dad Mohammad, at that point an MP, insisted that the 
remaining members of his family were rescued from the ‘Taliban’. Moreover, warning that it 
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was about to be overrun by Taliban, President Karzai and Governor Daud insisted that the 
British deployed to the District Centre.1224  
 
Taking advantage, Khan Mohammad also insisted that he be extracted—the Sanginites had 
accused him of raping a little girl and were trying to kill him.1225 Very reluctantly the British 
moved in on June 21st. They were not keen to be involved in what they understood to be a 
private feud.1226 When they got there they held a shura with the locals who told them that 
they were not wanted and asked them to leave. The British spent the next few days building 
their defences, until, in response to a special forces operation to the south of the District 
Centre, they began to come under attack at the end of the month, allegedly by Ishaqzai 
tribesmen.1227 Concurrently, an American convoy was ambushed to the south of Musa Qala 
District Centre, resulting in another large battle—the British also began to come under attack 
there.1228  
 
While the provincial government and the British were distracted in the north of the province, 
another group of militants from Pakistan crossed the border and captured the Garmsir 
hukomat on July 16th. According to the Afghan government and two interviewees, they 
raised the flag of the Jamiat-e Ulema, a Pakistani political party with close links to the 
Taliban. Pakistan refuted this and the Taliban claimed it as their victory. A deal was struck to 
allow the police to leave.1229 It is not known what role Naim, the ex-Taliban Governor for 
Garmsir, played in this odd adjunct to what was occurring in the province. On July 18th 
government officials and police fled Nawa, which the Taliban also claimed as a victory.1230 
Both hukomats were swiftly taken back by the ANA with ISAF air support.1231 The District 
Centres experienced government collapse in the same order as they had in 1978 (see 
section 2.4). And as with the collapse of the communist administration, there was no major 
fighting in Gereshk, Nad-e Ali and Lashkar Gah that year.1232 
 
The insertion of British troops into Helmand had not gone as intended. Despite the removal 
of the biggest four rapacious commanders in 2004–6 (Abdul Rahman was finally removed on 
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5 June 2006),1233 they still managed to maintain significant patronage networks of sub-
commanders within the organisations and areas that they used to control. However, these 
networks had been weakened significantly by their removal. This meant that the groups and 
commanders that they used to predate upon, interacted with increased Taliban patronage, 
and took the opportunity to attack them.1234 Overlaid was the British factor.  
 
The British knew that they had come to Helmand to support the government and fight the 
Taliban, but did not have enough knowledge about Helmand’s private sphere to understand 
exactly who the ‘government’ were and who the ‘Taliban’ were. For example, when they 
arrived in Sangin they were immediately told where the ‘Taliban’ were by the ‘government’, 
but luckily the local ANA commander warned the British platoon commander that they were 
being used to settle a private feud.1235 In the eyes of the Ishaqzai in Sangin, the Pirzai and 
the Khalozai in Musa Qala and almost everyone in Now Zad the British had arrived and 
immediately started supporting the topak salaran (warlords).1236  
 
When they deployed to the north, the communities had no knowledge of why there were 
British soldiers arriving in their villages1237 and the British had no idea as to who their friends 
or enemies were.1238 These factors combined with no evidence of reconstruction1239 and very 
heavy use of airpower to defend their isolated positions resulting in civilian casualties. For 
example, the British dropped 18,000lbs of explosive (say, twenty-five airstrikes) on Now Zad 
that summer and flattened the bazaar.1240 Thus, from the perspective of the population, the 
British public narrative did not match their actions, particularly in terms of supporting the 
warlords’ sub-commanders, with whom the population had private cleavages. By this point 
the Helmandis were twenty-eight years into their conflict and there was no patience for a 
historical enemy.  
 
People began to leave northern Helmand for safer areas1241 and the ‘police’ (militiamen of 
the warlords) began to leave or switch sides—even though they were loathed by the 
population, they hated the British more, and the warlords could no longer pay them.1242 
Governor Daud was to complain repeatedly that year about the private ‘tribal wars’ in the 
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north of the province,1243 but to the British the problem was interpreted through the public 
sphere and the Taliban-government cleavage. There were ominous signs, though, that ISAF 
were inciting the same general resistance that the Soviets had incited. For example, when a 
joint French-ANA patrol was attacked north of Sangin in May, they reported being ambushed 
along a 7km long stretch of road as ‘every man and woman [came] out of their compounds 
to fire at them’.1244 In many cases, the local population assumed that ISAF were deploying in 
order to stop them growing poppy.1245 See figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Children’s graffiti in Lashkar Gah, 2008, depicting UK involvement in Helmand (note 
‘Chinook’ helicopters). 
 
5.3 - Quetta Shura 
The situation in Helmand was brilliantly taken advantage of by the Taliban leadership in Pakistan 
(hereafter the ‘Quetta Shura’). A Taliban spokesman stated that ‘we are here to destroy the British. 
We will hunt and kill them. We will not let them go back to England and say that they have 
defeated the Afghans’.1246 It was an evocative, capping, public narrative that explained how 
the northern Helmandi private cleavages were part of a wider more important struggle, in 
other words, how they interacted with the public sphere. This was exactly what the British 
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failed to do with their public reconstruction and counter-narcotics narrative. Jihadi 
publications published in Pakistan extolled the same narrative and stated that ‘the British 
had not generated a hand span’s worth of security for the people at the same time that they 
brought the dirty slogans of democracy’.1247  
 
The past echoed strongly, particularly amongst the Alizai:1248 ‘we gained our freedom one 
hundred and sixty years ago [sic] and we shall remain free…we do not accept the claim that 
they are here to rebuild our country…they have done nothing for us’,1249 said one Taliban 
commander in Musa Qala. Much later on, I was at a shura of three hundred Alizai elders in 
Lashkar Gah, and I circulated at the back conversing: the anti-British exploits of Akhtur Khan 
and Abu Bakr Khan during the 1800s were remembered with a proud twinkle in their 
eyes.1250 This was an example of a historical private narrative driving violence, yet 
interacting with and drawing funding from an extant public organisation, the Taliban in 
Quetta.  
 
The fighting was becoming unsustainable for the British—they were not equipped to maintain 
isolated outposts under constant attack.1251 The population too wanted an end to the 
violence. The original uprising was attracting fighters from other areas, which was leading to 
more and more violence. As well as taking advantage of the situation the Quetta Shura had 
begun to send a stream of Pakistani Pushtun to northern Helmand to fight the British. 
Dadullah, the most important mahaz commander in the South, had gone to Waziristan in 
May 2006 and negotiated for militants to come to Helmand and fight NATO and the 
British.1252 Correspondingly, British sources describe the arrival of Pakistani fighters in 
northern Helmand towards the end of June and the beginning of July, particularly acting as 
mentoring teams.1253 This was the much vaunted Taliban offensive in the summer of 2006 
led by Dadullah.1254 This stream of foreigners in 2006 was to become a flood in Garmsir in 
2008.1255 
 
So far, I have described the British entry to the province and the reaction of the population. 
The violence can partly be explained by the Helmandi narrative of resistance to the Angrez, 
however many also fought the British because they affiliated themselves unwittingly with the 
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appalling ex-provincial government. Now, I discuss both the public and private spheres of 
the Musa Qala accords, showing how the public government-Taliban cleavage fails 
adequately to describe events. It was driven by an interaction and what is more, all the 
private actors were adept at manipulating public narratives to strengthen their private 
positions. 
 
5.4 - The accords 
Musa Qala elders, led by Haji Shah Agha, approached the British to negotiate a ceasefire. 
They publicly stated that this was because they were weary of seeing their district destroyed 
by fighting between the British and the Taliban.1256 Their private aim was to finally eject the 
Sher Mohammad-linked Police Chief and District Governor.1257 British forces and the Taliban 
would withdraw from the district and allow the elders to maintain security with a militia 
comprised of their ‘sons’.1258 In return, the Afghan government would offer development 
projects in the area. The elders particularly wanted a canal, like the US-sponsored canal 
projects that had been given to central Helmand. (Northern Helmand is desertifying and this 
is a recurrent demand of the northern Helmandis).1259 The agreement was signed in 
September and the British pulled out in October, handing the hukomat over to the elders. 
The Afghan national flag would continue to fly,1260 however the deal was not supported by 
the US who saw it as a retreat for ISAF and the international community. Governor Daud 
retorted that the British were a provocation that had now been removed.1261  
 
Taliban media in Pakistan painted British actions as a retreat and noted the differences in 
the US and British positions. They also seized on British statements to the effect that ‘if us 
leaving generates stability in an area, then we will do it elsewhere’ and pointing out that this 
made it very clear who was generating instability in Helmand. According to the public Taliban 
narrative, the withdrawal of the British from Musa Qala was one step to ‘freeing’ their 
country.1262 The argument that it is the British and not the Taliban that generate instability in 
Helmand is a constant refrain among most Helmandis that I have spoken to, and the deal 
proved popular among elders in other northern districts. Ceasefires, with British troops 
remaining in place but not patrolling, were struck in Now Zad and Sangin.1263 
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Immediately, Sher Mohammad began to lobby against the deal, as he had lost influence 
through the removal of his officials. When I later interviewed him, he was vehement, 
accusing the British of handing the town over to the Taliban. Shortly after the deal, he had 
sent delegations to meet with the newly enlarged Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Lashkar Gah. One delegation included Koka, the erstwhile Musa Qala Chief of Police, who 
brazenly complained that the elders’ shura was comprised of drug dealers and Taliban. He 
said that he hoped that ISAF could return, but of course, US troops, not British ones (he was 
speaking to a US officer and would have been aware that the US was not supportive of the 
British deal). On the same delegation was a female MP, who pointed out that now that the 
deal was in force girls could no longer go to school.1264 She was using ISAF’s public 
narratives of the war, even though girls have rarely gone to school in Musa Qala.  
 
There was too much pressure on the deals and ultimately they collapsed leading to more 
fighting. Now Zad’s took about three weeks, Musa Qala’s collapsed in February and Sangin 
remained peaceful until March 2007.1265 The collapse of the Musa Qala deal has been 
blamed on the Americans killing a ‘Taliban’ commander in/near the exclusion zone 
surrounding the hukomat. The ‘Taliban’ claimed he was within in the negotiated exclusion 
zone and the Americans that he was without. To understand who the ‘Taliban’ were at that 
stage is hard, but two interviewees point to the fact that Sher Mohammad’s men were 
continually probing across the exclusion zone’s boundary in attempts to scupper the deal.1266 
Once it collapsed however, Haji Shah Agha was murdered and Musa Qala went back to 
‘Taliban’ control. 1267 
 
In Now Zad, fighting resumed throughout 2006 and 2007. Once the deal in Sangin broke 
down in March, there was a large British operation in an attempt to ‘clear it once and for all’, 
seemingly reminiscent of the 1988 Soviet operation (see section 2.17). The town was 
reported as ‘utterly devastated’ after British troops attacked and then blew up compounds 
that they had been fired at from—somewhat different from the reconstruction mission that 
they had promised publicly.1268  
 
Through the period of the winter of 2006/7, central Helmand remained peaceful whilst the 
fighting continued in the north and the south of the province.1269 The British did not have 
nearly enough troops to garrison the province, as with the Soviets before them. Both, 
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however, conducted massive clear operations. The operations were not linked to any 
political objectives apart from killing ‘Taliban’,1270 much like the Soviet operations. The main 
difference was that the Soviets did very strong political work through Khad, which was 
entirely absent during the early British period.1271 
 
One such British operation occurred over the summer of 2007. Direct parallels were drawn 
between this operation and the experience of being in the area when a Soviet operation 
moved through.1272 The aim was to clear the ground between Gereshk and Sangin and to 
‘push the Taliban north’,1273 which demonstrated a poor lack of understanding about the 
nature of the ‘Taliban’.1274 It did, however, follow the public sphere of the conflict very well. 
But, the critical part of misunderstanding an enemy force as cohesive is misunderstanding 
the effects that your operations will have on it. By now, the fighting was largely fuelled by 
resistance to the British more than anything else.1275 For this, Helmandis use the terms 
‘mukowmat’, which means ‘resistance’, but also ‘be-tasleemeduna’, which translates more 
poetically as ‘without submission’.  
 
5.5 - Central Helmand calm 
Lashkar Gah and Gereshk were still under central government control. 2007 was the period 
during which the specialporce was supporting police Sergeant Raziq, enabling him to be the 
de facto Chief of Police (the US were supporting him with so many resources that he was 
able to dictate to the Nahr-e Saraj Chief of Police—see section 4.14).1276 The ring road was 
being guarded by the Highway Police under Ezmarai.1277 To the south-west towards Nad-e 
Ali, Haji Kadus, Mir Wali’s old deputy, had reinvented himself as a ‘police’ commander of 
three hundred men after being asked by some Barakzai elders in Malgir to defend them.1278 
He established a series of check points running through the centre of Malgir all the way to 
Loy Mandah.1279 Haji Kadus had appealed to Assadullah Wafa, the Provincial Governor, for 
funding against the Taliban (the public narrative), but privately he was protecting the 
Barakzai against mixed communities to the north, and those elements in the Barakzai 
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community opposed to him (see section 4.18). The Governor gave him a stipend under a 
(now unknown) militia programme. This funding was supplemented by the specialporce.1280  
 
Nad-e Ali also remained secure. Although Abdul Rahman had been removed from the 
Provincial Chief of Police position in June 2006, his cousins Tor Jan and Haji Lal Jan 
remained in the police in Nad-e Ali (Chief and Deputy, respectively). They were funded 
largely through drug interests and kidnapping,1281 meaning that they were able to supress 
whatever movements the ‘Taliban’ made, whilst at the same time sowing the seeds for future 
Taliban dominance. ‘Police’ control of the road network, through checkpoints, allowed control 
of drugs transportation through the area. Most people in Nad-e Ali, apart from those directly 
linked to him, agree that Tor Jan’s tenure was marked by exceptional brutality and a 
widening of the targeting of predation to everyone in the community (see section 4.12).1282  
 
The practice of kidnapping individuals for ransom was of particular note. For example, Abdul 
Khaleq’s (Mulakhel) father was taken to a prison in the desert and later freed for 600,000 
kaldars (Pakistani rupees: about $6300). Mohammad Fahim and his father Juma Gul 
(Daftani) were later kidnapped. Because they resisted ‘arrest’ their ransom was two and a 
half times as much (1.5m kaldars). After the Murtaza incidents (see section 4.12), the 
Kharoti had started patrolling their village at night for protection so the police did not target 
them. The kidnaps were conducted at night, by ‘policemen’ out of uniform and the practice 
reached such proportions that a shura was called by a Kharoti elder, Atta Mohammad, 
where he demanded that the kidnappings cease and threatened to take the complaints to 
the ‘provincial government, to Kabul, to ISAF’.1283  
 
Later on, in August 2008, Tor Jan was killed by a suicide bomber sent from Pakistan, the 
first that Nad-e Ali had ever seen.1284 It was described as ‘a gift from the Taliban’.1285 When I 
arrived in Nad-e Ali that December as a British Army officer, we had no information about 
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5.6 - The three Mullah Salams 
By December 2007, the Afghan government and the British had decided that Musa Qala had 
been under ‘Taliban’ control for too long and a joint operation was planned to retake the 
town. The Afghan public blamed the Angrez for its fall to the ‘Taliban’ in the first place.1287 
For the first time some political work, similar to Khad operations, was carried out by the 
British. They identified a Taliban commander called Mullah Salam (Alizai/Pirzai) who was 
ready to switch sides. There was also a concerted effort to selectively kill or capture ‘Taliban’ 
commanders using special forces’ raids in order that the coordination of the defence of Musa 
Qala would be impaired.1288 Afterwards, ‘Mullah Salam’ would then be made District 
Governor of Musa Qala. President Karzai saw the deal as a ‘grand alliance’ that would 
privately unite two of the three warring sub-tribes of the Alizai in northern Helmand and also 
bridge the government-Taliban public cleavage.1289  
 
The operation was completed successfully with Afghan government forces occupying the 
town and installing Mullah Salam, but it then emerged that not everything was quite as 
appeared in the public sphere. There was some confusion over which of the three Mullah 
Salams who came from northern Helmand was involved. One was the petty Alizai/Pirzai 
commander with thirty men, discussed here, from Shah Karez village. Another Salam was 
an Alizai/Khalozai ex-Rais Baghrani commander, and the brother of Zakir, who had gone to 
madrassa with Sher Mohammad and was in Guantanamo. The third Salam, a Noorzai, from 
Tizne village in Now Zad, had been the Taliban Corps Commander for Herat during the 
Taliban government.1290 
 
There is strong evidence that President Karzai thought that the Mullah Salam in question 
was the Alizai/Khalozai commander.1291 By an astonishing coincidence that is too strong to 
ignore, Zakir, his brother, had just been processed for release from Guantanamo. He and 
Rauf Khadim had maintained their cover stories and it appears that the American 
interrogators had no idea how senior they were, and so they were released on the same 
day.1292 Their transfer date was 12 December 2007—the same day that Afghan and ISAF 
forces occupied Musa Qala.1293 It is not known if Karzai both knew of Zakir’s imminent 
release and tied it up with the fact that, as far as he knew, his brother was attempting to 
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switch sides. Reportedly, Karzai was talking to a ‘Salam’ before the deal went through,1294 
but it is not clear whether he was talking to the petty commander Mullah Salam who was 
pretending to Zakir’s brother, or whether he spoke to Zakir’s brother, who played along 
because he thought that it might help his brother’s release. Karzai may not have linked these 
two events at all, or may not have known what he was doing, but the coincidence is still 
stark. The private sphere of events bears no resemblance to the public narrative of ‘Taliban’ 
reconciliation.1295 
 
What of Sher Mohammad’s role? When I asked him if Karzai had got the wrong Salam he 
smiled, surprised, and nodded, muttering ‘maybe, maybe’ under his breath. From his 
reaction, I was under no doubt that that was what had occurred, but that Sher Mohammad’s 
links to Zakir meant that he was not going to discuss it with me. Sher Mohammad had 
pushed Karzai to accept the deal: this was a perfect opportunity for him to remove the 
‘Taliban’ administration in Musa Qala and have commander Koka, his man, reinstated.1296 In 
a final twist to the tale, Zakir and Rauf were later released from Afghan detention—allegedly 
because Sher Mohammad and Baghrani, respectively, paid their release ‘fees’.1297 Zakir had 
been strongly influenced by Guantanamo and said, ‘I have strong feelings of revenge in my 
heart…until this fire of revenge is quenched, the jihad will continue’.1298 
 
Mullah Salam, the petty Pirzai commander, was appointed District Governor. He quickly 
proved ineffective and spent much of his time feuding with the Hassanzai Koka.1299 Their 
militias clashed regularly, and even though it was inappropriate for Salam to have a militia as 
District Governor, it became very difficult to remove him as he was such a high profile 
reconciled ‘Talib’.1300 That he was actually the ‘wrong’ Mullah Salam was quickly forgotten 
amongst the western community, but not the Helmandis.1301  
 
Judging by Sher Mohammad’s reaction to the Musa Qala accords, he lost power to the anti-
Sher Mohammad Pirzai group. The retaking of Musa Qala in December 2007 led to the 
reinstatement of Koka (Hassanzai) and the reconciliation of Salam (Pirzai), both with their 
militias. Thus, the Pirzai-Hassanzai cleavage still reigned in Musa Qala, just that both sides 
had representatives on the ‘Taliban’ side and the ‘government’ side, with the British stuck in 
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the middle. We know that there were clashes between Salam’s militia and Koka’s ‘police’,1302 
but ‘Taliban’ commanders also point to clashes between groups controlled by different 
mahazes in Musa Qala1303—this may be due to Hassanzai and Pirzai groups joining different 
mahaz commanders (affiliating with different public organisations) due to their own private 
cleavages. Thus, in this highly complex environment the government-government clashes, 
combined with the Taliban-Taliban clashes show that they private sphere was dominating 
the interaction that generated conflict. 
 
To complicate matters further, Sher Mohammad is also considered a mahaz commander by 
some Taliban commanders, at the same time that he is a Senator in the Kabul 
government.1304 He interacts with both sides of the public cleavage at the same time. One 
Alizai elder told me seriously that, ‘he was not scared of [Mullah] Omar’s Taliban, but he was 
very scared of Sher Mohammad’s Taliban’.1305 The echoes of the situation during the jihad 
with the Noorzai and Kharoti leaders in Nad-e Ali, who held senior positions in the 
‘government’ at the same time as waging war on the ‘government’ though their family 
networks, are strong. Here, though, Sher Mohammad affiliated with both the Taliban and 
government actors in order to protect his private interests, that is, his drugs network.1306 
 
The dealings over Musa Qala had shown to many perceptive Helmandis that the British, the 
Americans and the Afghan government were not acting in concert, and there were divisions 
that could be exploited.1307 The British, as the historical enemy, lost out to this dynamic and 
ended up becoming the ‘whipping boy’ for wider dynamics that were not their fault. This was 
to become patently obvious with the soon-to-come declaration by Karzai that the Irishman 
Michael Semple was persona non grata. Never mind that he was Irish, to Helmandis he was 
British. Even Jabbar Qahraman, an MP for Helmand and heavily involved with Semple in the 
events that led to his expulsion said, ‘of course he was British’. Hafizullah Khan agrees. 
 
In summary, I have discussed the arrival of the British in the province in 2006 and the 
response of the population and the Taliban. I then explored the events surrounding Musa 
Qala in 2006/7, illustrating the private sphere describing the conflict. I will now briefly explain 
the failed reintegration of some ex-93rd division fighters before discussing in detail how the 
Taliban in Quetta were organised.  
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5.7 - Persona non grata 
Semple was the Deputy to the European Union Special Representative to Afghanistan. He 
and Jabbar Qahraman, in concert with the British in Helmand, understood partly the private 
sphere in Nahr-e Saraj i.e. that many ‘Taliban’ there were ex-93rd Division ‘Hizb’ fighters and 
commanders. As Qahraman said, ‘it was all about ex-mujahidin in Qala-e Gaz, Shurakay 
and Zumbelay…so I helped them out’. Starting with just two groups of fighters led by ex-93rd 
commanders, a scheme was designed whereby the fighters would train briefly at a desert 
camp. They would then begin joint patrolling with the police (who in many cases were also 
ex-93rd/ex-‘Hizb’ fighters). If these two groups were successful others would follow. The 
central government in Kabul was kept fully informed though liaison meetings with the NDS.  
 
Unfortunately, Assadullah Wafa, Daud’s replacement as Provincial Governor, found out 
about the deal at the last minute and told President Karzai that the British were cutting a deal 
with the Taliban—he was annoyed that he was not going to be able to take a cut from the 
large amounts of money involved.1308 Semple was expelled and the deal was off. Karzai 
raged against the British, further encouraging their position as a recipient of ‘rightful’ 
blame.1309 One of the longer-term more depressing aspects of the deal for the British was 
that the understanding of the overlap between ‘Hizb’ and the ‘Taliban’ in Nahr-e Saraj was 
forgotten and had to be rediscovered in 2010.1310 See sections 6.10. 
 
5.8 - Taliban structures 
The British intervention had been a godsend for the Taliban movement.1311 The presence of 
foreigners, particularly the British, who engaged in judicious use of firepower reminiscent of 
the Soviet military, made funding and recruitment non-issues for them.1312 The British 
deployment helped the Taliban with their public narrative. In the early days of 2006, like in 
1978, the funding was local, provided for by religious donations from the population: 
zakat.1313 Almost all of the individual fighters came from the local villages and fought to 
defend their own homes.1314 Fighters were replaced by the community if they were wounded 
or killed.1315 An individual’s position within the ‘Taliban’ was dependent on his position in 
Helmandi society, and so the best person to replace a commander or fighter would often be 
his brother, for example, rather than his second-in-command.  
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The Taliban’s rootedness in Helmandi society is something that ISAF have consistently 
failed to understand, or have deceived themselves over. ISAF understand the Taliban in 
institutional terms without understanding the interactions between public and private that 
sustain the public organisation. Mahaz commanders operate through a series of personal 
relationships with local elders and a certain commander’s group would only be able to 
operate in the area with the permission of the local community.1316 Delgai (group/squad) 
commanders too, in 2006, were often local, although as time progressed, commanders 
began to rotate into different areas as the Quetta Shura attempted to gain control over the 
unwieldy resistance organisation(s).1317 The key position at this stage was the mahaz 
commander: as he was the channel through which outside funding flowed, he was the 
interaction between the public and private spheres. For example in Nad-e Ali, a joint decision 
was made in the early years between the district elders and the mahaz commanders not to 
attack the British. This, apparently, was reversed once the ‘bad behaviour’ of the British was 
observed.1318 
 
The individual motivations to fight the British were legion and well-known: fighting 
foreigners,1319 defending the opium crop,1320 history,1321 cultural insensitivity,1322 righting 
perceived slights,1323 enjoyment and, particularly, revenge.1324 Every man had private 
reasons for fighting, but in a society where the threshold to violence was low, many men 
were fighting. In many cases people were fighting because of private feuds or inter-
community violence, often generated or exacerbated by the warlords. Taliban commanders 
specifically mention the fact that the British were affiliated with the communities or 
commanders who had been previously oppressing them.1325 From the public British point of 
view they were not affiliated with anyone apart from the government, but it took time for them 
to realise just how partisan and non-cohesive the ‘government’ was in Helmand.  
 
This was further worsened by the Afghan ‘officials’ that the British were working with. As I 
noted earlier, local ‘officials’ were manipulating the British, telling them that that village, those 
people, those fighters were ‘all Taliban’. British intelligence gathering was manipulated by 
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false reporting, just as the Soviet’s had been decades before: the society was just too 
opaque to be understood by outsiders.1326  
 
The Quetta Shura and the ISI encapsulated well the multiplicity of private motivations for 
fighting in a strong public narrative that resonated with the population.1327 This narrative was 
personified by Dadullah, their strongest commander. When he came into an area his 
presence alone would increase the attacks against the government and the British.1328 He 
also galvanised funding through his exploits and through links with Al-Qaeda.1329 Such an 
icon of the resistance became a target for ISAF and he was killed in May 2007.1330 His killing 
exposed dangerous fractures within the Quetta Shura Taliban—Dadullah, who was Kakar, 
had been in competition for fighters, commanders and funding with Osmani, who was 
Ishaqzai.  
 
Rumours soon began to circulate that the intelligence that led to Dadullah’s death was 
provided by an Ishaqzai tribesman. This followed on from Osmani’s death, at the end of 
2006, which was blamed on intelligence provided by the Kakars.1331 At the time, there were 
huge discussion within the ISAF community about whether to kill or capture Dadullah, or 
not—perhaps he could be useful as a negotiating intermediary. Ultimately, however, the fact 
that he was so iconic and had played a unique role in the cohering of multiple different 
uprisings, combined with his links to Al-Qaeda, and to the contemporaneous Iraqi resistance 
(mainly for road-side bomb technology), meant that he was killed.1332  
 
Whilst Dadullah was effective, the fractures that he provoked were problematic for the ISI—
this was exemplified none more so than in the rumours surrounding Osmani’s and 
Dadullah’s deaths. Starting at around the time of Dadullah’s death, the Quetta Shura 
attempted to centralise their funding structure to one patronage chain away from the 
previous mahaz system.1333 Their aim was several-fold. Primarily, they wished to stop 
destructive infighting between the mahazes, but also further centralisation, through the 
control of funding, allowed the Quetta Shura and the ISI to be able to make a greater claim 
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to be responsible for the resistance.1334 They were attempting to subsume the complexities 
of the private sphere in their public narrative. 
 
As the fighting grew in scale (as more British, and later American, troops deployed to 
Helmand) more resources were needed—more than zakat was able to provide—and this 
gave the Quetta Shura a chance to dictate its terms through patronage. As part of this 
centralisation drive,1335 the Taliban reissued its code of conduct or Layeha in 2009 (the 
original was released in 2006, and consisted mainly of behavioural rules rather than 
structural ones).1336 This was a reinforcement of its public narrative. The 2009 Layeha set 
out the existence of a central treasury and banned the creation of new mahazes or groups, 
instead placing the emphasis on a series of provincial and district-level nezami commissions 
(discussed in detail in section 6.5). Additionally, other non-military councils (religious, 
financial, political, cultural, educational and so on) were outlined.1337 The Quetta Shura was 
trying to move over to a more institutional form of organisation as opposed to a patronage 
form,1338 similar to that which the international community were trying to institute in the 
Afghan ‘government’. The Taliban were actually trying to remould the ‘Taliban’ into what the 
public sphere described them as. 
 
5.9 - The British reassessment 
It became clear to the British at the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008 that their tactics 
had to change. They began to attempt to operate in a different way, with less violence and a 
greater focus on the reconstruction that comprised their public narrative.1339 However, the 
British realised that they could not generate enough troops to operate in this way—less 
reliance on force (particularly airpower), meant that greater numbers of troops were required 
(there were about eight thousand five hundred British troops in Helmand in mid-2008).1340 To 
help, the US deployed over two thousand marines to Helmand. Many went to Garmsir to 
secure the District Centre. They also started mentoring the police in five districts across the 
province and patrolling the border with Pakistan.1341 Previously in 2007, the Danish had also 
taken over responsibility for Gereshk and Nahr-e Saraj with a further seven hundred and fifty 
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soldiers.1342 Increases were eventually to see ISAF troop numbers go up ten-fold from the 
original deployment of three thousand. 
 
In March 2008, Governor Wafa was removed and replaced with Gulabuddin Mangal. An ex-
communist technocrat, Mangal was considered a great improvement over Wafa by ISAF,1343 
however many Helmandis focused negatively on his communist past.1344 In one of his last 
acts as Governor, Assadullah Wafa appointed Habibullah District Governor of Nad-e Ali, 
recalling him from retirement in Garmsir. The last time an (ex-) communist had held any kind 
of government post in Nad-e Ali was, in fact, when Habibullah had been evicted by the 
mujahidin in the early 1990s, when he was District Chief of Police.1345 The situation in Nad-e 
Ali in early 2008 was fractious, but nowhere near as bad as Habibullah’s previous posting 
there (see section 3.2).  
 
In the spring of 2008 central Helmand was still stable and that stability meant that ISAF 
concentrated on other areas in Helmand. Whether because of the American deployment to 
Garmsir or as a result of it, the district was flooded with ‘Punjabis’ and ‘ISI’.1346 One 
interviewee even recounts meeting an ISI colonel in Quetta, whom he knew from the jihad 
days: the colonel was ebullient as he had ‘just been across the border…doing a little 
jihad’.1347 British journalists in Garmsir also commented on the high proportion of foreigners 
fighting that summer.1348 The British, however, were focussed on Kajaki, where they were 
trying to transport a third turbine to the dam so as to increase its output. This was considered 
important for of the reconstruction of southern Afghanistan by ISAF: a key part of their public 
narrative. The Alizai of northern Helmand, however, privately wanted an irrigation canal (see 
section 6.2). 
 
Here, I have discussed the events of 2006/7 and the Taliban organisation surrounding those 
events. I then discussed British attempts to reform their approach in Helmand. I now discuss 
events in Nad-e Ali and Lashkar Gah, where Abdul Rahman switched sides, changing his 
public-private interaction, because his poppy fields (private interests) were eradicated. I then 
explore how private cleavages within Shin Kalay led to what appeared to be an overt, public 
‘Taliban’ action. 
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5.10 - Abdul Rahman Jan’s poppy 
Poppy eradication was still continuing in Helmand, as it had done almost every year since 
2002. During the 2008 eradication season, Abdul Rahman’s poppy was targeted because he 
was no longer in the ‘government’: it was estimated that he lost twenty per cent of his 
‘extensive’ crop.1349 As his poppy was eradicated Abdul Rahman contacted Rahim Ishaqzai, 
the Taliban Governor for Helmand and a fellow Now Zadi, and negotiated a deal whereby 
the ‘policemen’ guarding the checkpoints in Marjeh would become ‘Taliban’ and other 
Taliban would be allowed into Marjeh.1350 His relatives still controlled the ‘police’ because he 
had done an excellent job of shaping the organisation to be supportive of his interests during 
his tenure. I consider the side-switching of Abdul Rahman described below as a key piece of 
evidence in support of my thesis. 
 
It was a very similar position to that taken by Mir Wali and Sher Mohammad before him (see 
sections 4.18 and 4.20). However, the British understood it in terms of the public sphere: the 
police had abandoned their checkpoints to the Taliban.1351 Abdul Rahman supported this 
public sphere vociferously when I spoke to him later and stated, ‘there was no deal; we were 
so few; they surrounded us…they were not local Taliban…they were…Punjabi, Arab, 
Chechen…they were not Helmandis’. Abdul Rahman consistently refutes the idea that most 
‘Taliban’ are local and maintains that they are ‘all foreigners and Al-Qaeda’. This adherence 
to the public sphere is partly because he was used to dealing with westerners before 2006, 
when westerners only understood the public sphere. Helmandis who currently deal with 
westerners have dropped that public narrative and now talk of local ‘Taliban’. Thus, as the 
westerners have improved their understanding of the private sphere, the Helmandis have 
mirrored them, matching their understanding. 
 
Gradually, over the summer of 2008, Marjeh became a no-go area for the government and 
for ISAF. By August, it was fully in the hands of the ‘Taliban’.1352 Abdul Rahman maintained 
a dialogue in the public sphere with Mangal, the new Governor, throughout the events. He 
told him that he was worried because the ‘Taliban’ were growing in influence in Marjeh and 
there was nothing that he could do: Mangal should deploy more troops.1353 Eventually, the 
ANA were sent to Nad-e Ali in mid-August to shore up its defences, as Marjeh had ‘fallen’ on 
the seventh of the month. This was based on the public sphere’s understanding of who the 
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‘Taliban’ were. Tor Jan however, who was the Chief of Police in Nad-e Ali, was a relative-by-
marriage of Abdul Rahman—if they had wanted Nad-e Ali to ‘fall’, it would have as well.  
 
The ANA, supported by British mentoring teams, deployed to the district school building that 
was to become their base for the next year. They were able to move up to seven kilometres 
from the District Centre. Very quickly the ANA suspected that the local police were ‘Taliban’ 
supporters, and in a sense, those that were closely linked to Abdul Rahman were. Shortly 
after, the hukomat was then attacked from the west, that is, from Shin Kalay, by ‘Taliban’, 
although this was probably the Kharoti militia that had been established to protect the village 
from the predations of the police.1354 Dr Jailani, the old Hizb commander, gave up his clinic 
in-between the hukomat and Shin Kalay for the ‘Taliban’ to use as a meeting room and 
checkpoint.1355 
 
The private sphere was hyper-complex, involved several factions within the ‘police’, and 
multiple private cleavages and alliances.1356 The first faction was that linked to Tor Jan, the 
Chief, and Abdul Rahman: they were linked to the ‘police’-cum-‘Taliban’ in Marjeh. Another 
faction, linked to Haji Lal Jan, the Deputy Chief, were virulently anti-‘Taliban’ as they had 
been forced out of their village by Arab, a nephew of Lal Jan, who had joined the ‘Taliban’ to 
gain ascendency in a sub-village private cleavage.1357 This second faction had partly been 
the cause of the Kharoti tribal militia’s founding, which was affiliated with the ‘Taliban’ (see 
section 4.12).1358 Presumably, the ‘Taliban’ attacked the District Centre due to the presence 
of the ANA and the British—Murtaza the Kharoti commander, was quoted by Abdul Rahman 
as giving the Taliban public narrative and saying, ‘you have brought foreigners, kaffirs; we 
are obliged to do jihad’—although it could have been because of the Manan-Murtaza feud 
(see section 4.12). To complete the circle, Abdul Rahman Jan and Haji Lal Jan were 
cousins-by-marriage.1359  
 
The public sphere’s description of a government-Taliban cleavage did not match this 
extraordinary milieu. Once the British had deployed the situation was soon dominated by the 
fighting between the mainly-Kharoti ‘Taliban’, based in Shin Kalay, and the mainly-Noorzai 
‘police’ based in the District Centre. This continued until December, by which time the British 
had reinforced their troops in Nad-e Ali, but were unable to leave the hukomat due to the 
resistance that their presence generated. The British were like a magnet to those locals who 
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were linked to the Taliban, and represented the same allergic reaction that had occurred in 
1980 with the Soviets, and 2006 with the British in northern Helmand.  
 
For Habibullah, being trapped in the District Centre and surrounded on all sides by Taliban, 
or mujahidin as they called themselves, was nothing new.1360 However, it was not the 
deteriorating situation that was the primary prompt for the British to do something about Nad 
Ali, but an audacious attack on Lashkar Gah occurring on the 11 October 2008. The attack 
targeted the Provincial Governor’s compound. It began when the British received intelligence 
that one thousand ‘Taliban’ were planning to attack Lashkar Gah. This translated to three 
hundred ‘Taliban’ seen moving north through Nawa, along the right bank of the Helmand 
towards Bolan, opposite Lashkar Gah. These were intercepted with helicopters and around 
one hundred and fifty were killed. The ‘Taliban’ escaped back to Nad-e Ali. Having been 
repulsed, Lashkar Gah came under rocket attack four days later, but from a police check 
point in Bolan which was then destroyed with an airstrike. The ‘Taliban’ activity stopped.1361  
 
The public sphere’s descriptions of a Taliban attack on Lashkar Gah,1362 and the tracing of 
the militants back to Nad-e Ali, were the casus belli for the ramped up British intervention in 
the district. The British press was clear: this was a Taliban attack on Lashkar Gah.1363 
However, things were not as appeared and the private sphere was very different. The 
attacks had been organised and financed by Sher Mohammad and Abdul Rahman.1364 Even 
Habibullah, a long-term Abdul Rahman ally admitted to me, ‘that attack…was [Sher 
Mohammad] and [Abdul Rahman]…the aim was to create chaos and prove they were the 
only people who could lead the province’. I asked Abdul Rahman about who had organised 
the attack on Lashkar Gah and he began to guffaw before becoming serious. ‘I was in 
Kabul’, he said ‘I don’t know anything about it’. This is an interesting admission from 
someone who claims to be among the only people who can solve the security issues in 
Helmand as ‘only we know who the Taliban are’. I asked if it could possibly be something to 
do with Sher Mohammad. ‘Sher Mohammad has no links with the Taliban’, he said, despite 
earlier pointing out that he had many, many links with the Taliban. ‘It is Mangal propaganda’ 
he added. When I challenged Sher Mohammad, he immediately said that ‘it wasn’t me…it 
was the Taliban…my police helped defeat it’. 
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In the terms of this thesis, the ‘Taliban’ takeover of Nad-e Ali and Marjeh and the ‘Taliban’ 
attack on Lashkar Gah are key events. Both appeared to have very strong public sphere’s 
describing them. Yet the British, and Mangal the Provincial Governor, did not understand 
that Abdul Rahman Jan and Sher Mohammad were manipulating events for their own gain. 
These two events caused the British deployment to Nad-e Ali in December 2008, which 
hugely affected the shape of the conflict as it began the British focus on central Helmand at 
the expense of northern Helmand. Thus, opacity of the private sphere to outsiders allowed it 
to drive the interaction between public and private that shapes conflict. 
 
5.11 - De Shin Kalay Maktab1365 
In an unrelated but concurrent incident, the school in Shin Kalay was pulled to the ground 
with a mechanical digger. Unlike the other schools in Nad-e Ali, the school had been built 
privately by a western charity run by a former villager who now lives in the US.1366 When I 
arrived in Nad-e Ali shortly after, the clear public narrative was that the Taliban had done it. 
We were even shown around the ruined school by the elders who were lamenting Taliban 
cruelty. Habibullah said, ‘[the residents of Shin Kalay] are not up for education…they are all 
Talibs’, implying that they had pulled their own school down. In many respects he was right. 
 
Other schools in the district had also been pulled down or heavily damaged by the Taliban in 
the preceding twelve months, excepting two. Firstly, the school in Saidabad which served 
the Shia Hazara community, because Iran’s support for insurgent groups in Helmand was 
predicated on the protection of Shia communities, and those Taliban groups that were 
involved in burning schools down were more likely to be directly foreign-sponsored (see 
section 5.8 for discussion of types of Taliban).1367 Loy Bagh’s school also escaped 
destruction as Mullah Karim, a prominent Noorzai in Loy Bagh, was a key Taliban 
interlocutor in the district.1368 However, the school in Shin Kalay represented a special case, 
and whilst probably not a metaphor for school burning, this story demonstrates the difficulties 
with public sphere of development in Helmand. 
 
The school was built in 2004 by Green Village Schools (Shin Kalay means Green Village), a 
US charity run by Dr Mohammad Khan Kharoti.1369 It had had twelve hundred pupils, one 
third of whom were girls. The school had been built on the land of Habib, Dr Kharoti’s 
brother, in the northern half of Shin Kalay. The next-door plot of land was owned by Daria 
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Khan, a distant relative of Dr Kharoti’s. Daria was jealous of the prestige that the school 
brought to Dr Kharoti and Habib in the village and sought to have it destroyed, framing his 
actions in the public sphere. He was eventually killed in a battle near Khwashal Kalay with 
British forces in the spring of 2009. 
 
When another person from the village was in Quetta in 2007, he heard that Daria had been 
there and spoken to the ISI saying, ‘girls with big breasts are going to school in Shin Kalay 
and this is shameful’. Daria was using the Taliban’s public narrative to manipulate the ISI. He 
had previously threatened the teachers with death if they continued teaching at the school, 
but this was brushed off—Daria’s nieces and nephews go to the school and his mother tries 
to restrain him. According to an interviewee, Daria publicly stated that the school brought 
western influence and that this was something that should be stopped.  
 
Later, in the summer of 2008, people came to the school and filmed it. The villagers said that 
they had been sent by the ISI. By this point the ‘Taliban’ were in control of the village, but it 
was a mixture of village ‘Talibs’ and Talibs who were working together against the 
government in a franchise-esque relationship.1370 Two days before the school was 
destroyed, two Punjabi speaking gentlemen came and toured the school. They returned the 
next day with a much larger group of men, condemned the school as a ‘Bush nest’ (referring 
to the US President) and began to destroy what they could with their hands. The teachers 
fled for their own safety.  
 
The next day, the group of ‘Punjabis’ returned with a bulldozer and began to destroy the 
school, looting what they wished over the next two days to take south with them. 
Unfortunately at the time, and probably due to the on-going events in Lashkar Gah, ISAF 
helicopters were overhead for some of the destruction of the school, but did not intervene, 
giving the impression to those villagers who would have wanted ISAF help that they did not 
care. That evening, once the Punjabis had gone, the villagers themselves further looted the 
school.  
 
No-one knows definitively who the Punjabis were, or even whether Daria was involved. 
These are the suspicions and rumours of the villagers, when they are not too scared to talk 
about it due to the factions and trust-deficit extant in the village. People did not fight back 
because they were scared of being publicly labelled pro-government: ‘no-one is united in the 
village at all; everyone has connections going in every direction’. However, all interviewees 
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confirmed the private sphere dynamic that this was an act that was driven by jealousy and 
cleavages within the village, rather than an external, public ‘Taliban’ sponsored operation. As 
one interviewee said, ‘[Dr Kharoti] is a good man, but the [Kharoti of Shin Kalay] are such 
sons of bitches…he got no support from the community’. See figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7: Shin Kalay school in December 2008 
 
The conclusion that many villagers have come to privately is that there is a faction within the 
village that went directly to the hardliners in the ISI. The ISI then sent a team over and 
commandeered Afghan government equipment in Marjeh to pull it down, even whilst the 
village was in the hands of the Kharoti ‘Taliban’. That is, the ISI were manipulated by an 
internal village feud due to a lack of on-the-ground knowledge. Even the tribal leadership 
was not that bothered by the events: they were able to access education elsewhere for their 
children and, as is fairly common in Helmand, ‘were not interested in the poor people’s 
children learning to read as that would undermine [the tribal leaders’] position’.  
 
After these events, an elder from the village who was amenable to the school rang a contact 
in the Taliban’s Quetta leadership and asked why the Taliban had committed this crime. 
They denied knowing anything about it and pointed to their policy which was against school 
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destruction.1371 The leadership rang Malem, the Taliban Governor for Nad-e Ali. He 
confirmed that it had happened, but claimed not to know who had done it. That is, even the 
local representative of the Taliban organisation was ignorant of the events: this is what 
allowed the private, internal feud to drive the school destruction in a public-private interaction 
with the ISI. Malem was sacked by the leadership for allowing it to happen. In a final twist, 
twenty or thirty village teenagers began to work with the ‘Taliban’ groups within the village 
because they had nothing to do during the day with no school to go to. Some of these were 
killed when British and Afghan government forces took the village in December. 
 
Events in Nad-e Ali—both Abdul Rahman’s side-switching and the school in Shin Kalay—
demonstrate the importance of the private sphere. In both cases the multiplicity different 
actors, groups and narratives that make up the ‘Taliban’ are exposed and this demonstrates 
well how ‘government’ and ‘Taliban’ are labels and nothing more. Moreover, a variety of 
private actors demonstrated the ability to manipulate different public organisations. In the 
next section, I am going to cover the increased British focus on central Helmand. 
 
5.12 - The British in Nad-e Ali 
The British-led operation in Nad-e Ali in December 2008 was the end of the British focus on 
northern Helmand and the start of a focus on central Helmand. The public sphere was clear: 
Nad-e Ali had fallen into the hands of the Taliban and the government, supported by ISAF, 
was going to get it back.1372 It comprised fifteen hundred soldiers, and led to the 
establishment of three British bases surrounding the district: in Trekh Nawar, to the west of 
Khwashal Kalay and in Maat-e Que. During operation the British attempted to sequentially 
attack and defeat the ‘Taliban’ in the villages of the District. Initially focussing on Shin Kalay, 
and ‘egged on’ by Habibullah the District Governor, the British troops faced initially stiff 
resistance from the mainly Kharoti defenders under commanders like Ibrahim and 
Murtaza.1373  
 
Very quickly it became clear that the British had the intention of assaulting the village this 
time, rather than the probing that they had often done before. The tribal elders in the village 
told their men to stand down to avoid further destruction, but not before they had suffered 
seventeen dead.1374 The recruitment for the defence of the village was spread across the 
different clans (see Appendix 4). So too were the casualties: one from the Saleekhel, five 
from Shabakhel (Murtaza’s clan), one from the Toreekhel (Wakil Safar’s clan), for example. 
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This casualty spread caused many of the clan heads to send sons to the ‘Taliban’, because 
of the nature of how fighting men are replaced by Helmandis. One elder closely involved with 
the resistance used a proverb to describe the recruitment: ‘from drops of rain comes a flood’, 
that is, everyone contributed what they could and the resistance was strong.1375 Interestingly, 
the casualties from, and possibly the recruitment to, the ‘Taliban’ are concentrated in the 
poorer, less influential clans in Shin Kalay.1376 
 
When the British troops entered Shin Kalay they spoke with the villagers. The British 
adhered to the public narratives surrounding the conflict and looked to see where they could 
help. Part of this sphere was that they were there to support the Afghan government. This 
meant that they had entered the village with Noorzai police in tow, but the residents of Shin 
Kalay were appalled. They had been fighting to keep the police out. The British public 
narrative—that they stood for good governance, fairness and reconstruction—did not chime 
with the private Kharoti cleavage with the police who had just arrived with the British. Still, 
the villagers thanked the British for ‘liberating’ them from Taliban dominion, which had 
destroyed their school, even taking them to the site and giving them a tour (see figure 7). 
The British were later to find out, from Habibullah, that their colonel had been poured tea 
throughout the meeting by one of the Kharoti Taliban commanders.1377  
 
Several days later, the British assaulted Zhargoun Kalay. The intervening period allowed the 
‘mujahidin-Taliban’ (an interviewee had a Freudian slip when describing this to me) to 
prepare the defences of the town along the same lines as during the Soviet-era. A shout 
went out to other communities across central Helmand that the Angrez were coming and the 
village needed help defending itself.1378 Groups came from as far afield as Nawa and the 
fighting was chaotic with many commanders operating against the British. These included 
Mullah Haji Ibrahim Akhund, Malem, Mullah Abdullah Akhund, Haji Lala, Mullah Mohammad 
Khan, Mullah Ghulam Mohammad Akhund, Mullah Mohammad Haq Akhund, Qari Awal 
Khan, Mullah Toofan Akhund, Mullah Abdullah Akhund and Mulawi Farouq.1379 ‘Taliban’ 
casualties were heavy. From just one group four fighters were killed and another two 
wounded. The British also felt forced to use artillery and drop a bomb on the village during 
the course of the battle, which resulted in civilian casualties including the death several 
members of a family.1380 The British also took casualties that day.1381 
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After two days of fighting the British entered the village with the Afghan police. The police 
quickly demonstrated why the population hated them. I personally witnessed the District 
Chief of Police Abdul Sattar and his chaiboy loading a fine looking dog onto the back of his 
truck with a group of sullen villagers looking on. Walking over, we gently asked the Chief 
about the dog and he answered that he had just found it and was going to keep it and take it 
back to his HQ. We nodded towards the villagers and suggested that perhaps this would not 
be appropriate. His response suggested that he simply could not understand what we were 
trying to explain to him; as far as he was concerned, he had just taken this village and he 
was entitled to what he wanted. The dog was given back to the villagers. 
 
Concurrently to the battle for Zhargoun Kalay, the British moved an Estonian company up to 
Chah-e Anjir. In the public sphere, the Estonians were a valuable part of the NATO coalition 
in Afghanistan.1382 In the private sphere, the Estonians were Soviets. In fact, some of the 
Estonian soldiers had actually served in Helmand during the 1980s with the limited 
contingent.1383 When the Estonians got to Chah-e Anjir, they found a small band of 
policemen under Rahmatullah, keeping the ‘Taliban’ (mainly Kharoti from Naqilabad) out of 
the town. ISAF were puzzled as to how the town could be kept in government hands with 
such a small group of policemen.  
 
They were not aware, however, of the private groups that cut across the ‘government’-
‘Taliban’ public cleavage. Rahmatullah was from the Noorzai/Aghezai clan from Loy Bagh—
Khano’s clan. His paternal uncle was Abdul Sattar, the District Chief of Police, and 
Assadullah Sherzad, the new Provincial Chief of Police, was his cousin: a solidly 
‘government’ family. However, Abdul Karim, the Aghezai ‘member’ of Hizb during the 1980s 
was now on the Taliban shura for the district. This meant he was able to manipulate the 
patterns of conflict in the district. The family wanted to maintain control of Chah-e Anjir 
because of the lucrative drugs market there.1384 It was the old game. 
 
After Zhargoun Kalay and Chah-e Anjir, the British moved quickly to Chah-e Mirza. There 
was no resistance and the British set up camp in a field opposite the mosque in Zorabad. 
Soon, Haji Manan, Haji Lal Jan’s nephew, presented himself to the British as the police 
commander for the area (the British had not shared the operational details with the police 
beforehand because they did not trust them). Manan had not been back to the area since 
the ‘Taliban’, led by Arab, his relative, had evicted him and Haji Lal Jan (see section 4.17). 
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The British had absolutely no idea who he was, or any knowledge of the private sphere 
surrounding Manan and the persecution of the population in Nad-e Ali. From the public point 
of view, however, he was dressed smartly in his uniform, something of a rarity within the 
police.1385 
 
The British held a shura in the village. The villagers were openly and vociferously disgusted 
with Manan, something that is unusual in a society which places a high emphasis on not 
insulting people in public, and particularly people who are known to be cruel and vindictive. 
The elders stated they were keen to have ISAF ensuring security together with the ANA, but 
not the police. By now, the British were beginning to understand how the local population felt 
about the ‘police’, but they were trapped between the public and private spheres. The public 
sphere dictated that they had to work with the police in order to improve them, yet in the 
private sphere that provoked resistance from the locals. It wasn’t just that there were some 
problems with the ‘police’ that were causing frictions with the local population—the ‘police’, 
or rather the individuals comprised therein, were the raison d'être for the population’s 
resistance. It was proving very hard for the British to balance the public and private spheres 
of their mission. 
 
The British were further confused the next day, when the elders reversed position and 
retracted their comments on Manan. They added that ‘for cultural reasons’ they would not be 
able to accept the British in the area, but they would be happy to have Manan ensuring the 
security of the village. They were attempting to manipulate the British by using the public 
narrative that was emerging at the time that ISAF troops were ‘culturally insensitive’.1386 The 
British ignored them and later found out that Haji Manan had privately spoken to the elders 
and told them that the British had arrived to eradicate next year’s poppy crop, but that he 
could protect them.1387 Finally, the elders approached the British discretely and tried to bribe 
them to leave. The British ignored them again and continued with their original plan of 
establishing a base on the canal crossing point at Maat-e Que.1388  
 
These private spheres are instructive of the British deployment to Helmand. For their part, 
the British had a very clear public narrative. They were there to support the legitimate 
Afghan Government defeat the Taliban insurgency that had taken over the district and was 
oppressing the population. However, in the private sphere, the original opposition to the 
government in Nad-e Ali had mostly been caused by ‘police’ brutality. The population was 
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largely incredulous when the ‘police’ turned up on the heels of the British assaults, and 
enjoyed their support. It confirmed their worst fears, and confirmed what they knew from 
history about the Angrez. The population, in many cases, affiliated with the Taliban in order 
to protect themselves from the ‘government’.  
 
For many in the population, the ‘Taliban’ were resisting British aggression. Many of my 
interviewees estimate that around ninety-five per cent of the fighters in the ‘Taliban’ in Nad-e 
Ali were local fighters1389 and one gentleman, well acquainted with the fighting in Nad-e Ali, 
listed a ‘hatred of outsiders interfering’ coupled with ‘boredom…through unemployment’ as 
the primary recruitment motivations.1390 The paradoxes were the same as that in Musa Qala 
in 2006—the ‘police’ are linked to the ‘Taliban’, but the population are also working with the 
‘Taliban’ to keep the ‘police’ out. ‘Taliban’ and ‘police’ are just public labels for private actors. 
The public sphere does not adequately describe the conflict, which can only be explained 
when the private cleavages within the ‘police’, the ‘Taliban’ and the society are explored. 
Public organisations do not generally have this level of knowledge of the private sphere, and 
the British certainly did not in Nad-e Ali in 2008, resulting in their manipulation.  
 
5.13 - A new approach 
The beginning of 2009 ushered in a new approach from the British, pioneered in Nad-e Ali. A 
community council was formed that comprised notables from the district that would carry out 
some government functions such as basic justice, allocation of development money and 
security advice for the District Governor. The council was to be elected from a shortlist 
vetted by the NDS. The NDS, in consort with Habibullah, wanted to strike people off the list 
like Pir Mohammad Sadat (Kharoti, ex-Hizb, from Naqilabad), because he was ‘Taliban’. The 
British insisted that he should be included for exactly that reason: they wanted both the 
‘government’ and the ‘Taliban’ public organisations represented. In the final deliberation, the 
council was considered by the population ‘a commanders’ council’, comprised of the 
mujahidin commanders who had survived the jihad and leveraged their position to become 
community leaders.1391 It fairly reflected the society in Nad-e Ali, even though there was 
extensive manipulation by Abdul Ahad from Loy Bagh to get more of his Noorzai supporters 
on the council. 
 
The commanders were all commanders that had ejected Habibullah from Nad-e Ali in the 
early 1990s. These included Dr Jailani: he was appointed to the security sub-committee 
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despite having a son fighting with the Taliban against the British.1392  Others, such as Abdul 
Malik (Popalzai), were sent to the council as representation for powerful ex-Taliban figures, 
in this case, Haji Mullah Paslow, his uncle.1393 There was, however, some representation 
from the old tribal leadership: Mirwais Khan (Kharoti) was Wakil Safar’s son and Abdul Ahad 
was the nephew of Shah Nazar Khan, the murdered Najibullah-era Provincial Governor. 
Habibullah was allowed to nominate someone from the community as the twenty-fifth 
member and, in an as-yet unexplained move, appointed Abdul Karim from Loy Bagh, despite 
knowing that he was a local representative of the Taliban movement.1394  
 
The British gradually came to understand better the private sphere in Nad-e Ali. They 
persevered in the expectation that it would be better if community representatives and the 
‘Taliban’ had a dialogue with the government. The British very strongly believed that there 
would have to be a political outcome to the conflict.1395 The council also managed the 
interface between institutional and patronage government: the district administration would 
be organised along institutional lines and the shura would be a patronage mechanism, 
distributing development funding through the elders. Overall, many of the community leaders 
were confused about the purpose of the shura: the leaders would meet anyway, if they 
needed to. They went along though, because this way they were able to ensure their cut of 
development funding.1396 
 
The Nad-e Ali district shura represents an interesting turning point in the British approach to 
Helmand. Prima facia, they were extolling a more inclusive counterinsurgency-style 
approach, where political work would provide the framework within which development and 
military force would be used. This was what their public narrative had been since 2006, but it 
was really only during 2009 that the British began to match their actions to the public sphere. 
Thus, once an area had been cleared of insurgents, development work would begin and 
attempts would be made to improve the Afghan government to make it more responsive to 
the needs of the population.1397 
 
Conceptually, it was based on the ISAF public counterinsurgency narrative that the 
population was a mass that was stuck between the two competing ‘offers’ of the Afghan 
government and the Taliban. ISAF defined the ‘government’ and the ‘Taliban’ as separate, 
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albeit factionalised, organisations. This, in a sense, was implicit in ISAF’s role: their mandate 
was to support the Afghan government, and so they defined the situation through the prism 
of their own existence, much like the Soviets had before them. ISAF hoped to win the 
population over by improving the Afghan government and building, for example, schools and 
clinics.1398 Although this was an improvement on previous British understanding and 
behaviour, it still did not take into account enough the private sphere of conflict. 
 
5.14 - British expansion 
Once the British operation was over, most of the troops who had promised that they would 
not leave Nad-e Ali, left Nad-e Ali. A very small number of troops remained in the district. 
(Even though the Americans had started to increase their troop numbers in Helmand, the 
British were still stretched). Within weeks, the British were hemmed in in their bases. Shin 
Kalay became a no-go-zone for the government and the British. With fighting around the 
village once again, some of the tribal leadership negotiated with, or told, Ibrahim, the main 
Kharoti ‘Taliban’ commander at the time, to position his group to the south of the Kharoti 
tribal lands and fire on the British when they went south from the village towards the ‘tribal 
boundary’. This meant that when the British used artillery or other heavy weapons it would 
not affect the Kharoti: the demarcation was marked by a canal lined by a road.1399  
 
Whilst the leadership was dealing with Ibrahim, they were also negotiating secretly with the 
British, who were trying to secure Kharoti tribal guarantees of security for a potential 
rebuilding of the destroyed school. The elders negotiated in good faith, asserting that they 
would not be able to protect the school as they were scared of the ‘Taliban’. What they did 
not tell the British was the real reason—that with the private cleavages in the village there 
was no way that they could guarantee the school’s safety. At the same time, the same elders 
were also negotiating with the NDS, passing information on booby traps set by other non-
Kharoti Taliban groupings.1400 There were multiple public-private interactions. 
 
Ibrahim’s activities convinced the British that they needed to expand to the south of Shin 
Kalay and retake Khwashal Kalay. It had previously been ‘taken’ in the operation in 
December. By now, the British were beginning to understand that the population and the 
‘Taliban’ were not as far apart as they had previously considered. They were starting to get 
to grips with the private sphere. Not wishing to fight the population, British officers 
deliberately leaked the plan to select elders, safe in the knowledge that the ‘Taliban’, many 
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of whom came from the communities that the elders represented, would hear about it. In the 
event, there was barely a shot fired, and the fighters withdrew to the south and set up 
another defensive line.  
 
Meeting with the villagers afterwards, it was clear that there were two issues. The villagers 
were terrified that their poppy was about to be eradicated, and incensed that a US special 
forces raid had killed several members of a family the night before—an operation that the 
British troops had only been informed about minutes before it was due to occur and could 
not control.1401 The British were also told at the shura that Assadullah Karimi, the Hazara 
leader from Saidabad had been kidnapped by the ‘Taliban’. Publicly this looked like another 
government-Taliban fight, but it was later discovered to have been facilitated by Ishaqzai 
tribesmen from Jangal—they had manipulated the Taliban to settle some scores.1402  
 
The Hazara and the Ishaqzai/Popalzai had been in a long-running private feud in the south 
of Nad-e Ali over land and water rights. Since the arrival of the Ishaqzai community and 
more Popalzai families during the jihad, the Hazara had been forced to live in their ‘dirty’ 
water, affecting their yields. This was because they were downstream on the canal network. 
Although solved by a shura during the Rabbani government, the issue was a constant 
source of tension and would occasionally flare up, with raids and kidnapping. The Popalzai 
and the Ishaqzai in the south were closer to the Taliban than the Shia Hazara (Paslow, the 
Popalzai leader, was an official during the Taliban government). Eventually, Assadullah 
Karimi was released two months later on payment of a ransom to Abdul Bari, the Taliban 
District Governor, mediated by Qasim, an Alizai elder from Zhargoun Kalay.1403 
 
5.15 – The ‘retaking’ of Malgir 
In Spin Masjid, Malgir and Babaji, the Haji Kadus militia had collapsed in mid-2008, because 
the provincial government had stopped paying their stipend. Kadus claimed that he had 
supported it himself for as long as possible until running out of money.1404 The militia then 
splintered and some of the groups continued defending their own villages in Babaji. The 
‘Taliban’ in this case came from the north of the tribal divide between Babaji and eastern 
Nad-e Ali district (see map 10). Previously, however, the Barakzai militia had over-taxed the 
(non-Barakzai) locals north of the divide. But they were less able to defend themselves 
without the Governor’s stipend, and so the Barakzai villages collected money to keep them 
supplied with ammunition. The line eventually collapsed when two of the militia 
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commanders, Malem Anwar and Hamid Gul, fell victim to a private feud. Some of Anwar’s 
men accidentally shot and wounded Hamid Gul’s son. They were not able to maintain unity 
even in the face of the ‘Taliban’ threat and had to flee to Lashkar Gah.1405 
 
Once it became clear that the militia was beginning to crumble, Qari Hazrat, the Ishaqzai 
Taliban commander, originally in the 93rd Division, contacted Haji Kadus and they discussed 
how to divide up Malgir between them, with Qari Hazrat protecting the ‘Hizb’ communities. 
Publicly, however, Haji Kadus was still working with the specialporce who were actively 
trying to kill or capture Qari Hazrat. Mir Wali was in stuck in the middle. He wanted the 
control, and negotiating potential, that Qari Hazrat could give him in the area, yet did not 
want Haji Kadus to gain anything.1406 When I asked Mir Wali about this, he denied 
everything, including ever having met Qari Hazrat, which stretches the bounds of credulity. 
In the public sphere, the events in Spin Masjid, Malgir and Babaji looked like a Taliban 
takeover, similar to that which had occurred in Nad-e Ali. 
 
Such a public sphere necessitated action from the British. Privately, they were worried that 
the influx of US troops to Helmand was diminishing their ‘influence’ in the province 
‘particularly with the Governor’.1407 They were also worried about the reputation of the British 
military in light of the public narrative that the US was having to help them out again, which it 
was perceived that they had done recently in Basra, Iraq.1408 Thus, they planned an 
operation to retake Malgir and publicly linked it to the forthcoming Afghan presidential 
elections. If they could secure more territory for the Afghan government, then more people 
would be able to vote, thus legitimising the election. In the event, just one hundred and fifty 
people voted from Spin Masjid, Malgir and Babaji.1409 Here the British were driven by their 
own private sphere rather than the public sphere of the Helmandi conflict. 
 
Before the operation commenced, the British conducted a private deal with Haji Kadus. They 
were unaware of his links to Qari Hazrat and arranged that Kadus would join the police, 
taking the rank of major, and would become responsible for the Parchow area close to 
Gereshk after the operation. He would, once again, be mentored by US special forces.1410 
During the operation, for an unknown reason, but potentially linked to the British deal, the 
‘Taliban’ groups controlled by the Sattar and Naim Barich mahazes did not fight. To some 
Taliban commanders this looked like deal had been struck between the British and the 
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Taliban: their mahaz commanders had ordered them not to fight. Sher Mohammad’s mahaz, 
however—whether through ignorance of the deal or hatred of the British—continued to fight. 
This caused a rift between Sher Mohammad and the other mahaz commanders that had to 
be mediated by Zakir.1411  
 
During the operation, the furthest the British got west from Gereshk was Haji Gul Ehktiar 
Kalay. They established their base in Gul Ehktiar’s house, because it was the most 
defensible building around, not aware that his nephew, Sur Gul, was a senior ‘Taliban’ 
commander.1412 Sur Gul had even been arrested by the British in 2006, but had pretended 
his name was Asir, and was released to the NDS. Mir Wali then paid a bribe to secure his 
freedom. Operating in the public sphere, the British wished to be seen as fair and so began 
to pay Gul Ehktiar rent. The rent money had two consequences. Firstly, it inflated Gul 
Ehktiar’s importance in the area. Secondly, some of the money soon found its way, through 
Sur Gul, back to the bombs that were blowing up British soldiers.1413 This issue was never 
resolved, despite British suspicions, and the British pulled out three years later. This private 
sphere highly confused the locals, to whom it was obvious, and they assumed that the 
British must be working with the ‘Taliban’.1414 
 
Concurrently to the Malgir operation, the Americans moved into Nawa in massive force. By 
the autumn of 2009, both the British and the Americans had ten thousand soldiers each in 
the province, with the British holding the centre and the north, less Now Zad, and the 
Americans in control of Garmsir, Nawa, Marjeh and Now Zad.1415 This increase in US troops 
created friction between the US and the British over modus operandi, and particularly over 
the geographical areas in which development money was spent.1416 This tension was picked 
up much earlier by the Helmandis, over issues such as the Musa Qala accords, but now that 
there were more US troops in the province the divisions became very easy to read.  
 
The ISAF public narrative of unity was not believed by the Helmandis and they tried to take 
advantage of private cleavages. Helmandi leaders would often tell Americans that the British 
were this or that, and that the Americans were much better. The same leaders would then 
tell the British that it was terrible that the Americans had come and they would much prefer 
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to carry on working with the British.1417 Unfortunately, many British and American officers fell 
for these ploys. 
 
5.16 - Conclusions 
During this period the public sphere, of supporting the Afghan government and bringing 
development to Helmand, fails to describe adequately the complexity of the private Helmandi 
sphere. The evidence presented here, particularly that surrounding Sher Mohammad’s 
dealings with the Taliban and the government, Abdul Rahman’s side switching and the 
multiplicity of hues of ‘Taliban’ in Nad-e Ali, and the events surround the destruction of Shin 
Kalay’s school, all provide strong support for my thesis that the private sphere has primacy 
in describing what is driving conflict dynamics when public organisations involved in the 
conflict do not understand the private sphere. Interestingly, it was not just the British who did 
not understand the private sphere. Abdul Rahman Jan manipulated the Provincial Governor, 
Mangal, and individuals in Shin Kalay manipulated the ISI and the Taliban: all public 
organisations involved in the conflict failed to adequately understand the private sphere of 
events. 
 
However, the British understanding of the private sphere gradually grew, and they tried to 
better align their actions (less firepower) with their own public narrative (reconstruction). 
Moreover, British commanders tried to use their newfound knowledge of the private sphere 
to achieve what they wanted without fighting. But this was with limited success: they were 
more often than not duped by both local ‘officials’ and Helmandi notables, although they 
were better able to shape the interaction between public and private. Part of their failure can 
be attributed to the fact that they were trapped between the public and private spheres. This 
is best exemplified by the fact that they had to work with the police in order to improve them, 
yet police brutality was a cause célèbre for the resistance. These conclusions will be 
explored further in chapter seven. 
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Most people who think about Helmand develop mental problems, because the 
politics are so strange and complicated. 
 




Surely you could have solved this by now? 






The public sphere of this final period echoes that of the last chapter—a legitimate 
government, backed by western forces, fighting a Taliban insurgency. The key difference is 
that the British and Americans have reinvigorated their understanding and application of 
counterinsurgency theory, the precepts of which were based on the public sphere of the 
conflict. To an extent, and outlined in the last chapter, they also began to understand better 
the private sphere. To implement the new approach, ISAF troop numbers rose to about thirty 
thousand in mid-2010.  
 
Unlike the previous chapters, this one is organised thematically. Using examples, I consider 
the public and private spheres of several aspects of the Helmandi counterinsurgency: ISAF 
operations, Afghan operations, special forces targeting, Taliban organisation, corruption, 
aspects of Helmandi politics and ISAF’s withdrawal from Helmand. These aspects cover 
loosely the three themes of security, development and politics (although there is crossover in 
some of the aspects). I examine any discordances and whether the public organisations 
understood well the private sphere of events. I conclude by exploring fully what I consider to 
be a key understanding in the private sphere. This is the narrative that the British are 
working with the Taliban to destroy Helmand. I treat this narrative as a manifestation of what 
may occur when public organisations fail to understand adequately the private sphere and 
define their behaviour according to the public sphere, when that public sphere has little 
relevance in the private sphere. It is the final triumph of the private sphere over the public. 
 
6.1 - ISAF operations  
By the beginning of 2010, the British were consolidating in central Helmand. Since the Nad-e 
Ali operation in 2008 (see section 5.12), they had slowly expanded the area under British 
and Afghan government control. Their public narrative of counterinsurgency dictated that 
they ‘needed’ to be living amongst the population in order to protect them. In-line with the 
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same narrative, they also began to reduce their use of violence.1420 Finally, they were 
marrying their actions with the rhetoric of the public sphere and were beginning to initiate 
development projects, open schools and refurbish clinics. This was welcomed by the 
population.1421  
 
In February 2010, British, American and Afghan troops launched a large-scale operation to 
establish an Afghan government presence in Babaji, Naqilabad and Showal, for the British, 
and Marjeh for the Americans. This was predicated on the tenets of counterinsurgency, with 
the US general in command asserting that he would have ‘government in a box’ ready to 
deliver services in Marjeh.1422 In addition to a high rate of special forces raids targeting 
individual ‘Taliban’ commanders, the British deliberately leaked operational information to 
specific elders. At that time, the British understood the government and the Taliban as 
having separate ‘offers’ to which individuals and groups could subscribe. They used their 
improved understanding of the private sphere and appropriately contextualized the leaks for 
each community.1423 
 
Therefore, when dealing with the Kharoti of Naqilabad and Showal, communities that 
interacted more with the Taliban, the information was delivered in the form of a threat, 
whereby resistance would be met with violence. In communities that were seen to be closer 
to the government, for instance the Barakzai of Babaji, the information was delivered in the 
form of a series of meetings planning for post-operational development of the area. Either 
way, the result was the same: the ‘Taliban’ would know roughly when the British were 
coming and might choose not to fight. In the event this is what happened. The British were 
trying to manipulate the private sphere as they saw it. This later backfired when the leaks 
were interpreted as the British working with the Taliban (see section 6.12).1424 
 
In Babaji, the British aim was to re-establish bases along the same line as the Haji Kadus 
militia checkpoints (see map 10). They understood that the old militia checkpoints had 
managed to keep the ‘Taliban’ from attacking from the north, and thought that replacing and 
reinforcing them would be beneficial (see section 5.15). However, the private sphere in 
Babaji was of inter-community mistrust and violence between the Barakzai and non-Barakzai 
communities.1425 The British had unwittingly affiliated themselves with the Barakzai 
communities in this inter-community conflict. They even used Barakzai men previously 
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associated with the militia as guides for their troops. This was an old mistake: the elders 
from the mixed tribal communities to the north of the militia were appalled that the British 
were affiliating themselves with the Barakzai community that they were fighting.1426 One of 
the guides, in particular, was notoriously cruel.1427 Yet, the British were not only attacked by 
the mixed communities to the north. Shortly after, and in resistance to the ‘foreign 
occupation’, the British were also being attacked by elements from the Barakzai 
communities:1428 their ignorance of the private sphere had allowed the local feuds and 
narratives to drive the conflict. 
 
6.2 - The Kajaki dam 
In 2010 the Americans took over Sangin, Musa Qala and Kajaki to allow the British to 
consolidate in central Helmand. Towards the end of 2011, the US began to conduct 
operations to clear the road between Sangin and Kajaki. For them, the US$266m contract to 
refurbish the dam was a lynchpin of their strategy in southern Afghanistan.1429 In a sense the 
operation to restore the dam was emblematic of everything that ISAF did in Helmand. It 
exemplified the public sphere, in that it was visible development for the people delivered by 
the Afghan government in partnership with international forces. Internally to the coalition 
however, there was a turf war between USAID and the military about who could deliver more 
aid: the US were driven by their private cleavages just as much as the Helmandis.1430 
 
The private sphere was different for the Helmandis. The Alizai who lived around the dam 
would not benefit from that development (the residents of Kandahar would instead). Instead, 
many Alizai wanted an irrigation canal.1431 They also had no interest in foreign forces 
working in their area, as where the foreigners were the eradication would follow.1432 A well-
connected, ex-Khad operative pointed out that almost everyone fighting in Kajaki against the 
Americans was a daakhelee Talib—a resistance fighter. When fighters were killed, local 
people would collect money for the family.1433 The day after the Americans arrived in force 
Mullah Salam, Zakir’s brother, was walking around the Kajaki bazaar talking to shopkeepers 
and collecting food offerings for his fighters.1434 This private narrative of resistance formed 
an interaction with another element of the public sphere, namely, Iran. 
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Iran considers Kajaki a strategic interest and it seeks to influence the flow of the River 
Helmand through the dam. This is because water from the Helmand is ecologically essential 
for the Iranian Sistani region.1435 However, according to the ISAF narrative, the development 
of the south of Afghanistan relies heavily on the Kajaki dam generating power for, especially, 
Kandahar. They seek to ‘boost the supply of water and electric power to both provinces’.1436 
This, importantly, means that there will be less water available for Iran, potentially in 
contravention of the 1972/3 agreement between the two countries.1437  
 
Iran sees the halting of the reconstruction of the Kajaki dam as very important. For that 
reason they sponsor fighting groups to target any international or Afghan government 
presence.1438 This also allows Iran to give the ‘Great and Little Satans’ (the US and Britain, 
respectively) a bloody nose,1439 and maintaining proxy groups allows them increased 
freedom of action in a very uncertain future.1440 It probably seemed paradoxical that the 
Americans were having to fight their way through the locals in order to spend $266m on 
generating electricity for millions of Afghans, however, a legacy of ‘not wanting government’ 
interacting with Iranian support meant that the resistance was strong. 
 
Almost as soon as the operation in Kajaki was over, the Americans began to pull out of 
Helmand. The US ‘surge’ of troops was being withdrawn after just two years. The speed of 
the drawdown was blistering, and by the end of the summer of 2012, there were only small 
numbers of US troops still based in northern Helmand. At the time of research, it was not 
certain whether the US would achieve its aims in Kajaki because of ‘security concerns’.1441 
The US relied heavily on its narrative of reconstructing the Kajaki dam, without 
understanding the private narratives surrounding poppy eradication, resistance and the 
desire for a canal in Zamindawar. Partly, for these reasons Iran was able to sponsor 
interactions with fighting groups to achieve its aims in Kajaki. These interactions, and the 
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6.3 - Afghan operations 
During 2010, the British and the Americans redoubled their attention on the army and police 
in Helmand. According to their public narrative, the only way to succeed in 
counterinsurgency was to train indigenous forces.1442 In early 2010, the British had 
established a provincial training centre for police recruits in an attempt to standardise the 
force and break the links to the patrimonial powerbrokers. Additionally, more of the British 
and American forces were diverted to mentoring and training, rather than conducting their 
own operations. Now, the only large-scale operations were those where the majority of the 
planning and effort was divested by the Afghan forces themselves.1443  
 
These operations would typically be into areas like Yakhchal, south of Gereshk, or in the 
desert to the west of Nad-e Ali. Both areas had high rates of poppy growth. This was done 
deliberately: these were communities that nobody in the government cared about and that 
did not have connections in the provincial capital or in Kabul.1444 The Afghan government 
public narrative was that the desert was full of ‘Taliban’ and under an official Afghan 
government scheme, Governor Mangal received a cash bonus for his ‘administration’ that 
was tied to how much opium was eradicated in each growing season.1445  
 
The increased government control within the canal-zone had enabled eradication, and so 
many rich landowners in Nad-e Ali merely set up farms in the desert and farmed them using 
refugees from the north of Helmand.1446 Some of the ‘desert’ community was formed of 
those people who had bought the land that was partitioned up by ‘government’ commanders, 
such as Haji Lal Jan, in the early 2000s. He allegedly still ‘taxes’ that community.1447 All sank 
tubewells, and as no ecological survey has been conducted of the area, it is unknown what 
the long-term effects will be. Travelling over the area by helicopter in the summer of 2012, it 
was clear to me that large areas had been recently marked out for cultivation. I saw a very 
large-scale operation, with perfectly straight lines running for hundreds of metres.  
 
Much of the eradication and the resulting operations were blamed by Helmandi poppy 
farmers on Mangal and the foreigners—the Americans, the British—for paying him to destroy 
their livelihoods.1448 There was also tentative evidence of a tribal divide between those within 
the canal-zone and those without. Within, the settlers were majority non-Helmandi Ghilzai, 
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whereas the desert dwellers were Helmandi Durrani, mostly from the north.1449 This is 
currently unexplained, although may be due to acute water stress in northern Helmand, 
forcing migration south.1450 One gentleman likened it to tribal war, where Mangal was 
attacking Durrani people and eradicating their poppy over Ghilzai people who were the 
majority inside the canal-zone of Nad-e Ali. It is the sharecropping Durrani in the desert who 
currently suffer the worst effects of eradication and conflict.1451 
 
In reality, the ‘Taliban’ in the desert were farmers defending their poppy crop. This was 
admitted to me by senior district police officers one evening over a meal. During the day, two 
‘Talibs’ had been brought in dead, killed in battle when they attacked the poppy eradication 
operation. I had inspected the bodies and noticed that, from the state of their hands, it 
appeared that they had been involved in agriculture for most of their lives. They were 
dressed in opium-stained clothes and were brought in with single shot, ancient rifles. One 
had been run over rather than shot. As we discussed the event that evening, the senior 
officers were unhappy. What can we do, they shrugged. The government [publicly] tells us 
these people are Taliban, but we can [privately] see that they are farmers, they lamented. It 
would have been rude, as a guest, to point out that treating them as Taliban was a self-
fulfilling prophesy. But they knew anyway and were paid large amounts of money from 
Mangal’s eradication bonuses to subscribe to the public narrative; this was up to 
US$1000/day according to receipts and cash that I witnessed.  
 
6.4 - Capture or kill 
The major piece of the ISAF strategy was individually killing or capturing Taliban 
commanders.1452 Pre-2009 in southern Afghanistan, ISAF had attempted to use special 
forces to capture or kill individual members of the Taliban. ISAF thought that killing or 
capturing specific people, coupled with a deep knowledge of their social networks and 
Taliban structure, would allow manipulation of the Taliban movement. The strategy was 
efficacious. For example, Rahim (Ishaqzai, Now Zad), the Taliban Provincial Governor for 
Helmand was convinced to give himself up after several of his colleagues were deliberately 
killed in quick succession in 2008.1453 Because of the Iraq war, however, this programme 
was very poorly resourced.  
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In 2009, two things changed. First, more special forces units and assets like satellite cover 
were deployed to Afghanistan as they were withdrawn from Iraq. Second, there was a 
redoubled focus on capturing or killing road-side bomb layers and ‘facilitators’ as these were 
causing most of the casualties to ISAF forces.1454 This occurred concurrently to General 
McChrystal (who was ex-head of US Special Operations Forces) taking over command of 
ISAF troops in Afghanistan and heralding the refocus on counterinsurgency. Publicly, 
targeting was a key mechanism allowing the government and ISAF to better protect the 
people.1455  
 
Increased resources meant that Taliban leaders began to be more heavily targeted. The new 
system was designed on ‘tempo’ and ‘accessibility’ rather than the bespoke arrangement 
that existed previously. This meant striking ever-lower individuals in the ‘Taliban’ hierarchy, 
which had very little strategic effect on the Taliban movement as a whole. The increase in 
tempo meant that ISAF was unable to devote the resources to understanding how the 
movement worked holistically. The heavy focus on the road-side bomb threat was based on 
limiting casualty figures as much as possible, but the opportunity cost was that they were 
unable to manipulate the Taliban movement.1456  
 
The targeting strategy was based on the public sphere, that is, a Taliban movement that was 
inflicting cruelty on the Helmandi population. Privately though, these raids often killed 
‘Taliban’ fighters who were no more than resistance figures for their communities.1457 For 
example, Murtaza, the Kharoti commander from Shin Kalay, was arrested at the end of 
2009. Shakir, his subordinate commander from Shin Kalay, was killed in a separate incident. 
They were both resistance figures and Kharoti villagers turned Shakir’s car into a shrine. 
This was situated close to a recently British-built bridge, and was draped with the green flags 
bestowed on a martyr’s grave.1458  
 
In another example, Akhtur Mohammad, the nephew of Haji Mullah Paslow, the leader of the 
Popalzai in Nad-e Ali was killed. The clan had previously sent Abdul Malik, another nephew, 
to the community council in order to maintain a channel to the government. ISAF were 
completely correct in that he was a ‘Talib’, however the killing of Akhtur Mohammad 
completely closed the door to working with that community.1459 Operations to kill or capture 
‘Taliban’ were often completely divorced from the private sphere that shapes the conflict in 
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Helmand. Capturing or killing ‘Taliban’, whilst ignoring/not knowing their position within the 
private sphere, meant that ISAF was not as able to shape the conflict as it thought it was. In 
reality, the raids caused reconfigurations between public-private interactions with both the 
Taliban and the government, which in turn shaped the conflict (for example, by pushing 
clans away from the government and towards the Taliban). 
 
In Kabul, President Karzai continuously upbraided the US, insisting that the raids caused 
civilian casualties.1460 A senior US general had privately to assure Karzai that ‘categorically 
[they] had confidence in [their] intelligence and believed [they] knew who the enemy was’.1461 
However, several times I was witness to the ‘wrong’ people being killed by raids in Helmand, 
almost always as a result of faulty intelligence, and people using ISAF to settle their feuds. 
Several times, Helmandis attempted to manipulate me to have their enemies killed. On one 
occasion, two American soldiers had been killed by a bomb. Shortly after, a Helmandi 
gentleman that I was in contact with began to explain to me that the components for that 
bomb had been stored in so-and-so’s house. It turned out that the other man was a 
neighbour with whom he had a land dispute.1462 
 
So far, I have discussed aspects of ISAF and Afghan operations. These were predicated on 
the public narratives of counterinsurgency theory which stresses that the population must be 
protected from the insurgent. This public narrative was not how the Helmandis perceived 
ISAF and Afghan government operations. I will now discuss Taliban attempts to cohere their 
organisation. 
 
6.5 - Taliban consolidation 
The public narratives surrounding the Taliban are straightforward. They are a movement of 
Islamic fundamentalists who seek to oppress women, and fight democracy. Within this 
description, there are divisions between those Taliban who are ideologically committed or 
those who are merely fighting for money, or revenge. The Taliban is described as coherent 
and centralised.1463 In terms of terminology, this is similar to how Helmandis describe the 
Taliban and we will begin by exploring these narratives. 
 
Firstly: the aslee (real) Taliban. These are the group commanders and above—that is, those 
who have links to the Quetta Shura. They are sometimes also called akidawee (ideological) 
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Taliban, although these would be more properly considered a subset of the aslee Taliban, as 
not all of them will be fighting because of jihad obligations.1464 The aslee Taliban are most 
closely linked to the ISI and they provide ‘professional’ skills such as bomb construction and 
facilitiating the movements of suicide bombers. They also commit acts that local Taliban 
would not usually countenance, like burning schools.1465  
 
Daakhelee (internal Helmandi) Taliban comprise the vast majority of the ‘movement’. Most 
estimates put their strength at ninety-five per cent of the manpower of the ‘Taliban’ and they 
are fighting variously for revenge, evicting foreigners, boredom, unemployment, feuds and 
other grievance factors.1466 Onto this basic construct many others attach themselves and 
operate as ‘Taliban’, or are painted as ‘Taliban’ by the Afghan government and international 
forces. These can be farmers defending their poppy crop, criminals, smugglers, militias, or 
patronage-seeking fighters who used to work for the government, and so on. They often get 
conflated under the Mullah Omar Taliban banner; as an interviewee put it, ‘they do the 
[crime] and Omar gets the blame’.1467 This is the accepted Helmandi generic view of the 
Taliban. 
 
The more nuanced view shows a struggle between internal and external, private and public, 
spheres for control of the ‘movement’.1468 The Taliban in 2006 was based on a mahaz 
system (see section 4.16). This is a patronage system that maintains figureheads in Quetta 
to source and distribute military supplies. These mahaz commanders will have a number of 
fighting groups. These, however, will not always be in the same area, and could be across 
the whole of southern Afghanistan (see figure 5, section 4.16).1469   
 
The most important element of the mahaz system is its personal links to particular 
commanders and areas. This is analogous to commanders in 1978/9 using links to those 
who could fund them. The standing of a commander depends on his standing in the society: 
vide Qari Hazrat who was Abdul Khaleq’s, the famous Hizb commander’s, son. This societal 
standing argument explains why replacements for killed fighters and commanders will be 
drawn from the same family, starting with the closest male relative. Publicly, this is called 
revenge, but the key reason why the Taliban movement seek out and offer jobs to close 
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relatives of killed fighters is this exceptionally close link between the Taliban at ground-level 
and the society. The Taliban are harnessing revenge as a motivator.1470  
 
In a similar way, some mahazes and commanders will have different relationships with the 
ISI. This too can be a source of friction, particularly the provision of foreign Pakistan 
fighters.1471 Pakistani fighters, previously identified in northern Helmand in 2006/7 and 
Garmsir during the summer of 2008, would previously be either given to, or arranged by, 
individual mahaz commanders to use as they saw fit. Since 2008, however, the numbers of 
Pakistani fighters has dropped massively.1472 In addition, each mahaz has its own ISI mentor 
and military trainers,1473 but this should not be seen as Pakistani endorsement of the mahaz 
system, merely that they are accepting its existence and attempting to exert what leverage 
they can—some mahazes and groups have refused ISI mentoring.1474  
 
These multi-focal public-private interactions created a very confused system with several 
fighting groups operating in the same area but answering to different leaderships and 
funding. This can be considered analogous to the different jihadi parties operating in 
contiguous space during the 1980s. And just like the inter-mujahidin group fighting that 
occurred in the 1980s, this too occurs now with different Taliban commanders who belong to 
different mahazes.1475 This infighting caused the Taliban central leadership to decide to 
enact a centralised nezami—meaning military or organised—system in 2008.1476 This was 
eventually led by Zakir. Funding was diverted down this single chain in order to decrease 
factionalisation: the Taliban is a patronage organisation and they were attempting to enforce 
one patron. The nezami system (and Zakir) would choose which fighting groups received 
weapons and funding.1477 
 
The mahaz system should be seen as the (private) Helmandis reaching out for (public) 
patronage in order to help them fight their private enemies. By contrast, the nezami system 
should be seen as outsiders reaching in and trying to influence the situation using 
patronage. In the context of this thesis, this dynamic can be interpreted as whether the 
public organisation (nezami system) understands well enough the private sphere to shape 
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the interaction between the two. The two systems have been competing with each other for 
the past four years.1478  
 
The Quetta Shura Taliban plan for a centralised structure was laid out in their 2009 and 2010 
Layehas. New mahazes were banned and a clear command hierarchy was articulated, with 
more detail given on the rules and responsibilities of the military commissions—the 
embodiment of the nezami system at district and provincial-levels.1479 The nezami system is 
mainly funded by charitable donations from individuals in the Middle East.1480 This is routed 
through ISI mentors that sit on the Quetta Shura.1481 Supply for this system is handled by the 
Pakistani military until it reaches the Pakistani border ‘overtly’.1482 From there it is moved by 
smugglers to the groups operating in Helmand. This is the same as the mahaz system 
except that the mahaz commanders will also have other sources of supply.1483 Outside of 
Helmand and some other southern provinces, the implementation of the nezami system has 
been successful. Helmand, however, has managed to resist the system’s 
implementation.1484  
 
This is the result of two distinct factors. Firstly, Helmand generates vast sources of private 
income: through drugs, and ISAF supply contracts and development funding. The mahaz 
system, better integrated with society, is more able to use this income to maintain a degree 
of independence (vide the Ishaqzai or Kharoti interests and reasons for working with the 
Taliban). A key part of this dynamic is represented by those ‘government’ commanders who 
altered their public-private interactions and became ‘Taliban’ commanders.1485 The best 
example is Sher Mohammad who plays a role in funding the ‘Taliban’.1486 Several 
interviewees even went as far as to identify him as a mahaz commander.1487 Secondly, 
Helmand’s social structure—the rutbavi (hierarchical) Pushtun tribal system—is highly 
commensurate with the mahaz system. The rutbavi system is based upon land ownership 
and the cycling of resources up and down a hierarchy to maintain social cohesion.1488 This is 
mediated by key individuals, who usually pass on their position through family links: so too, 
the mahaz system.  
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The resilience of the Helmandi mahaz system means that a strange hybrid system currently 
exists that is neither mahaz nor nezami (see figure 8).1489 This hybrid situation creates a 
confused Taliban command system in Helmand. As the Quetta Taliban have attempted to 
centralise their supply, and hence the fighting, the mahaz commanders have attempted to 
co-opt that system. Conceptually, as the Taliban have tried to reinforce their public 
narratives with the nezami system the Helmandis have privately fought back with the mahaz 
system. This is similar to how individuals co-opt the Afghan government system in Helmand. 
Further, if an order comes down either the mahaz or nezami systems, it must be checked 
with the other system before it is carried out.1490 This is exactly analogous to the nations in 
the ISAF coalition having to check their ISAF orders with their national chain of command. 
The situation is nowhere better illustrated than with Zakir.  
 
 
Figure 8: the hybrid mahaz-nezami system.1491 Note in the hybrid system some 
commanders receive only funding from nezami system, however most are ‘dual-hatted’. 
Mahaz commanders receive money from the Quetta Shura nezami head (i.e. Zakir) as well 
as having independent sources of money. This means that commanders on the ground 
have to liaise up two chains of command before following orders. 
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Once Zakir was released from Guantanamo and the Afghan prison system in 2007/8,1492 he 
stepped into a Taliban that was beginning to implement the nezami system. Now, in 2012, 
he appears to occupy a position both as a mahaz commander and as the leader of the 
Taliban military commission, that is, the head of the nezami system.1493 This is particularly 
the case where the Zakir mahaz is most prevalent: in Sangin,1494 Musa Qala1495 and 
Kajaki1496 districts. In those districts, Mullah Salam,1497 Zakir’s brother, was both his mahaz 
commander and his nezami commander.1498 Interviewees were often keen point out that 
they came under the Zakir mahaz system, rather than the (Zakir) nezami system: the 
‘Taliban’ is an organisation based on personal relationships.1499  
 
In central Helmand the situation was different and highly complex. In Nad-e Ali and Marjeh, 
Naim was considered the most powerful mahaz commander.1500 He was the Taliban 
Provincial Governor as well—a vestige of the pre-nezami governance system. Sher 
Mohammad was also seen as a mahaz commander,1501 alongside Motassimbillah Agha, 
Noor Ali, Mansour, Baradar, Zakir and Sattar.1502 This plethora of mahaz commanders 
should be seen as analogous to the multiplicity of jihadi parties during the 1980s in Nad-e 
Ali, which was in turn reflective of the social structure. To further complicate matters, the 
nezami commander in Nad-e Ali was Juma Khan, but he was also a member of Tayib 
Agha’s mahaz.1503 In Nahr-e Saraj, Sattar and Janan were seen as the most active mahaz 
commanders.1504 Sher Mohammad was also seen as a mahaz commander there1505 as well 
as Dadullah, Mansour, Baradar and Zakir.1506 There were only one or two groups that come 
under the nezami system in Nahr-e Saraj,1507 which is commensurate with the findings of the 
Gereshk model (see section 6.7). Here, the ‘Taliban’ groups chose to act as private groups: 
they could make more money privately out of the Gereshk dynamic than publicly from the 
nezami system. 
 
                                                          
1492
 105. Chandrasekaran, Little America: 289. 
1493
 215, 234, 246. 
1494
 204, 216, 234, 238. 
1495
 215, 217, 221, 246. 
1496
 239, 241, 242. 
1497
 Until he died on the 3 June 2012 (SMA). 
1498
 e.g. 215, 234, 242. 
1499
 212, 234. 
1500





 202, 211, 212, 243, 245. 
1503
 202, 213. 
1504
 223, 229, 230. 
1505
 223, 230. 
1506





© Mike Martin 2013 
A conclusion from this complex situation is that the private sphere dictates where the 
particular mahazes have fighting groups. For example, Zakir’s mahazes and overall control 
predominate in areas where there were American troops based until the summer of 2012. It 
was he who said that he had ‘a strong feeling of revenge in his heart’ after his experiences in 
Guantanamo.1508 Likewise, Sher Mohammad’s mahaz, despite his substantial links to 
northern Helmand, has groups in Nad-e Ali and Nahr-e Saraj, where the British are 
deployed. It was he who told me that ‘the British are so stupid…when they go, we will still be 
here…I hate the British’ after being removed as Provincial Governor at British insistence. 
Tentatively, because Zakir’s men consistently point out that they follow him in his ‘mahaz’ 
capacity rather than his ‘nezami’ capacity (contrary to what the Taliban/ISI desire), it can be 
argued either that the Taliban Quetta Shura (and the ISI) do not have good enough 
knowledge of the private sphere to enact the nezami system of control, or that the private, 
mahaz system is too ingrained in ‘Taliban’ organisation in Helmand, or both.  
 
During 2011, it appeared that elements of the Quetta Shura were attempting to pursue 
negotiations with the Americans. A result was the opening of a Taliban ‘office’ in the gulf 
state of Qatar.1509 Tentative investigations show that the ISI were not aware of this. As a 
result, they diverted funding and support away from the Quetta Shura, towards another 
Taliban shura in Peshawar. The Taliban Peshawar shura has been long standing, but as a 
result of the Qatar negotiations has now established a leadership position over the Quetta 
Shura. The only big commander in the south still receiving money from Peshawar and 
Quetta is Zakir.1510 This is because Zakir is the head of the Taliban military commission; 
however the interviews cited above show that Zakir’s commanders see themselves as part 
of his mahaz rather than his nezami system. There is a possibility that Zakir is using the 
Taliban funding to support his own private power interests in northern Helmand, and 
generate his own patronage organisation.  
 
The Taliban is evolving (see figure 8). The Peshawar shura, staffed by young ‘professional’ 
(military) individuals who are not known to the international community, provides the 
interaction with the ISI and the foreign backers of the Taliban.1511 The top of the nezami 
system is represented in Peshawar, and this links to Zakir in the Quetta Shura, who controls 
the nezami system for southern Afghanistan. The old mahaz commanders now have to 
come to Zakir for money, as head of the nezami system.1512 However, on the ground, the 
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mahazes are still independently active, as well as fighting for Zakir. And at the top, because 
funding only travels down the nezami channel, everyone else is side-lined, including old 
Taliban government figures.1513 ‘Quetta is just not providing as much money anymore’.1514 
This lack of funding has contributed to decreasing violence in some areas of Helmand.1515 
 
The ISI’s redoubled focus on the Peshawar shura and the nezami structure has allowed Iran 
to strengthen its interactions with other mahaz commanders as they become 
disenfranchised by the ISI.1516 As one public-private interaction weakens, another public 
organisation steps in to fill the void. Just as Pakistan has strategic interests in Afghanistan, 
so too does Iran, thus Iran supports elements of the ‘Taliban’ as a way of achieving those 
interests.1517 In addition to the Kajaki dam dynamic outlined above, Iran also seeks to protect 
and aid Shia communities in Helmand. A good example of this is the protection of the (Shia) 
Hazara school in Saidabad.1518  
 
Finally, some Taliban commanders point to a deal between Sher Mohammad and Iran to 
supply resistance groups in Kajaki that are attacking the Americans.1519 There are additional, 
tentative rumours that Sher Mohammad and his childhood friend Zakir1520 have been 
discussing how to ‘split Helmand’ between them once the foreigners have left.1521 Thus, 
there is potentially a private deal between Zakir and Sher Mohammad that interfaces the two 
public-private interactions between Sher Mohammad and Iran, and Zakir and Pakistan. If 
true, it is this that will dictate the future of, particularly northern, Helmand rather than the 
Afghan government or ISAF.1522 It merits further investigation. 
 
In summary, I have discussed the public and private spheres surrounding ISAF and Afghan 
operations and attempts by the Taliban to re-organise themselves. I will now discuss the 
public and private spheres of corruption in Helmand. A detailed study of corruption in 
Gereshk shows that ‘political’ violence is driven by the dynamics between private actors 
rather than public organisations, yet those same private actors abuse their membership of 
ignorant public organisations in order to further prosecute their private goals. 
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6.6 - Dollar, dollar, dollar 
The most significant outcome of the increase in American attention in Helmand was an 
astronomical rise in development spending in the province.1523 This, automatically, led to an 
increase in corruption, even though ‘corruption’, or patronage, or baksheesh (‘gift’), has been 
a large part of patronage societies like Helmand for a long time.1524 According to the 
narratives of public organisations (i.e. ISAF), corruption is seen as an Afghan problem, 
mostly caused by the drugs trade,1525 however, Helmandis blame ISAF and the international 
community: ‘the foreigners don’t know how to get things done; [and] the people who sort 
things out for them take all the money and put it in their pockets’.1526  
 
There was definitely a shift in ‘corruption’ over the period 2008–12. When I first arrived in 
Helmand in 2008, many elders had learnt very quickly that the claims process, where they 
could claim for damage from ISAF due to military operations, represented an easy way of 
making small amounts of money, say, five hundred dollars. Those very same elders, in 
conversation with me in 2012, all tried to press upon me how good their new construction 
company was, and implored me to use my contacts in the PRT to help them gain contracts. 
Another young man related how his family used to ring their relatives in Europe for money to 
help with weddings and other living costs; now their relatives in Europe were ringing them to 
gain contracts.1527  
 
Corruption is seen by Helmandis as starting in Kabul. It is driven by a vacuum effect, 
whereby more senior people in a patronage chain would demand payment from their 
subordinates in order to guarantee the tenure of said subordinates.1528 The foreigners 
provided poorly targeted money at the bottom, it moved upwards until it reached someone 
whom the international community protected, or supported in their post in Kabul, thence it 
left the country to Dubai.1529 As a very old man (by Helmandi standards) pointed out to me 
with a sigh, ‘before 2001, Afghans didn’t understand how the outside world worked; now they 
have all got bank accounts in Dubai’.1530 Helmandis estimated that the bribes they had to 
pay in 2010/1 were thrice what they were under the Sher Mohammad government of 2002–
5.1531  
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This growth in corruption was exacerbated by ISAF vastly overpaying for contracts due to 
not knowing the local costs. For example, in 2009, the British were paying six hundred and 
fifty dollars per dumper truck-load of gravel in Nad-e Ali. The contractor had scooped this out 
of the River Helmand and transported it some ten kilometres:1532 I estimate this cost thirty 
dollars. The top policeman in the province explained to me that many Helmandis viewed this 
lack of prudence as stupidity, and an invitation to pilfer more.1533 In any case, the PRT had 
such a bad picture of the private sphere that projects often went to contractors from the 
wrong communities.1534 
 
Lastly, the district councils, established by ISAF, became significant foci of corruption. The 
public narrative of empowering Helmandis to decide their own development projects1535 did 
not match how the Helmandis saw the councils privately. To them, the ‘representative’ elders 
stole from their own ‘communities’, or attacked other elders’ projects with the ‘Taliban’ in 
order to dissuade them from taking on more projects.1536 These dynamics fed jealousy in 
such a fractured society.1537 The speed at which development money was spent meant that 
it was often not targeted at specific communities, or linked to particular political objectives, 
as it should be in a counterinsurgency.1538 The public narrative of the development projects 
was that if enough of them were done, they would buy the loyalty of the Helmandis. In 
reality, and this has been explored well in the literature by Stuart Gordon, development 
spending created more of the instability that it was meant to reduce.1539 
 
For example, Mirwais Khan, son of Wakil Safar, stole the wheat seed meant for his 
community and sold it. For this, Mirwais then spent a year in jail.1540 This gap in leadership 
allowed Haji Barakzai to move into a greater leadership position amongst the Kharoti.1541 In 
another example, Karim, one of the Nad-e Ali council members most closely linked with the 
Taliban, was also head of the development sub-committee. He used his positions to make 
money by manipulating security and refused to allow the road to be resurfaced between Loy 
Bagh and Lashkar Gah unless he received a cut. If not, he would get the ‘Taliban’ to destroy 
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it.1542 This is clear evidence that private actors interacted with public organisations, and that 
this interaction shaped the conflict in Nad-e Ali. 
 
6.7 - The Gereshk model 
Gereshk is a perennial concern for President Karzai because it sits on the strategic Herat-
Kandahar highway.1543 This means that the city generates vast income, and so public 
organisations and private actors seek to control the city. In the ISAF-era, this has taken on 
further importance because it is the only route through which supplies can pass from 
Karachi, the main ISAF seaport, to Camp Bastion, the main ISAF logistics base in Helmand. 
Thus, since 2001, Gereshk has had a vast array of different officials, particularly chiefs of 
police, partly because the position allows private factional interests to legitimise their militias 
in public ‘government’ structures. This is sometimes exacerbated by ISAF’s unwilling or 
unknowing connivance. I treat the following evidence as key support for my thesis. 
 
The model shown in figure 9a shows the movement of money in Gereshk.1544 It 
demonstrates the interaction between the public and private spheres: development funding, 
control of the security landscape and the purchase of ‘government’ positions. Stability, 
defined as an absence of factional violence, is generated by the uninterrupted flow of money 
through the model. This money flow is publicly defined as corruption. The model has three 
main money making activities (or inputs). These are drugs money, development money and 
the money from ISAF supply contracts. There are a number of other subsidiary inputs, for 
example, corruption of the wheat seed distribution. In the pre-ISAF era, drug money formed 
the bulk of inputs into the system as per the public sphere.1545 However, in the post-surge 
era, with thirty thousand troops being supplied through Bastion, it can be argued that ISAF 
supply contracts form the majority of the monetary inputs to the system.1546 It is exceptionally 
difficult to quantify these figures, however.1547 
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Figure 9a: The Gereshk model. Petal-shaped structure is half-in/half-out model of de 
jure/de facto militia positioning. Blue=money input; Purple, yellow, orange=political layers; 
Clear=security layer. 
 
Conceptually arrayed above the income generating layer is a level of security actors. These 
are men like Haji Kadus, Khan Mohammad, or Ezmarai who control(led) major factions in the 
‘police’. Many, for example Haji Kadus, rose to power by leading US special forces-
sponsored militias during the decade 2002–12 (see sections 4.8, 4.10 and 4.14). The 
relationship between de facto factional interests (private) and de jure security forces (public) 
can be considered like the petal-shaped structure within figure 9a. Private actors and groups 
will try and gain a position within the ‘police’ in order to further their own interests. This 
allows them to interact with the state and gain ‘legitimacy’ and funding. Often they will 
maintain a half-in/half-out policy, giving them maximum scope for action. Membership of the 
‘police’ simply denotes a public label to enable other activities, rather than any form of 
ideological attachment to the public government narrative. 
 
The private security actors gain income from the money making activities. The mechanism is 
usually a mafia-style operation (‘mafia’ is another word that has been adopted into Pushtu 
during the ISAF intervention). For example, the private actor approaches a contractor who is 
responsible for building a village school. They might inform him that it costs twenty thousand 
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dollars for the school to be protected from the ‘Taliban’. In the case of Haji Kadus, he might 
tell the contractor that he must use a particular type of aggregate. This is because Kadus 
has ‘retired’ from the security business and now owns an aggregate mine two hundred 
metres north of Camp Price. The mine is protected by the same militia force that protects 
Camp Price: he is still skilled at signalling to the locals that he is linked to the foreigners.  
 
The same dynamic occurs when ISAF supply convoys are delivered to Bastion by Afghan 
contractors.1548 In this case, control of the ‘police’ checkpoint through which the convoys 
must pass is vital. For example, Abdul Sattar (Barakzai, ex-Hizb, ex-Kadus militia) who 
controlled the Abhashak checkpoint made ten thousand dollars a day from ISAF trucking 
(gross).  When Shadi Khan took over as Chief of Police in 2011, his first visit was to Abdul 
Sattar in his checkpoint. This is the reverse of what one would expect from Helmandi 
decorum. ISAF later found out that Abdul Sattar was not even on the police payroll. For over 
two years, a deal had ensued where he would remain ‘checkpoint commander’, as he had 
been when he controlled it in the days of the specialporce and the Kadus militia. In return for 
a ‘cut’, the Chief of Police would maintain the public narrative to the British and Danish that 
Sattar was part of the ‘police’. Sattar was eventually removed in 2012.1549 This clearly shows 
public organisation ignorance allowing the private, inter-personal sphere to drive events. 
 
The most telling aspect of the Gereshk model is the absence of the ‘Taliban’. In many other 
areas private actors and groups opt to interact with the Taliban narrative (and funding) 
because that is what best enhances their interests. In Gereshk, however, there is so much 
money available that the best option is almost always some sort of private money-making 
activity similar to those outlined here. Because most are related to control of the road, it is 
usually more beneficial to interact with the government (who control the road). What ‘Taliban’ 
there were, were no different to other security actors, and in many cases were paid by big 
players in Gereshk to carry out attacks in order to manipulate public narratives and allow 
those actors to present themselves as a solution to security problems. Mir Wali is the most 
obvious example of this. The Taliban public narrative and ‘groups’ were just tools for hire. 
 
Above the security layer is arrayed a ‘political’ layer. In the model this is split between the 
district-, provincial- or capital- (Kabul) levels. The role of the political layer is to receive 
money from the security layer (that extracted it from the income generators), and in return, 
provide political protection to them through politicking, appointments and acquittals. The 
relationship between Abdul Sattar and the Gereshk Chief of Police described above is one 
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example. This money would then pass through the Provincial Chief of Police, through to the 
Minister of Interior, thence to Dubai.  
 
Other examples include Mir Ahmad (Barakzai), on the Provincial Council, who supported 
many former Hizb figures and Mir Wali, an MP, who supported militia commander Mirza 
Khan (see section 4.14).1550 Abdul Raziq, the jailed, drug-dealing US militia commander, was 
supported by his brother on the District Council.1551 This upwards chain of payments 
combined with the repeated outsourcing of development contracts through chains of sub-
contractors. This resulted in situations where of the $1m paid by ISAF to build a police 
station in Rahim Kalay (east of Deh Adam Khan) only $100,000 was actually spent on the 
bricks, mortar and labour—the rest had gone on kickbacks and dilutions.1552  
 
As perceived by Helmandis, the role of ISAF is critical. Much of the money entering this 
model comes from ISAF projects and contracts in Nahr-e Saraj district. That money will 
travel upwards through the model until it reaches someone considered to be ‘immune’. This 
immunity will often rest on interactions with the international community. The best example 
of this is President Karzai, who was widely seen to have committed electoral fraud in the 
2009 presidential elections, yet who with international support remained president.1553 From 
the Helmandi perspective, the dynamic of ISAF putting money in at the bottom and 
protecting the people who extract it at the top is money laundering: ISAF is laundering its 
own money. See figure 9b. 
 
Moreover, in many cases ISAF officials know that an Afghan official is corrupt, and other 
Afghan officials know that ISAF know that he is corrupt. The reasoning of the ‘internationals’ 
is that it is better to keep an official whose foibles they are aware of, however to the 
Helmandis it is double standards. From their perspective, they know that ISAF knows about 
specific instances of corruption, yet choses to do nothing about it.1554 The ‘open secret’ in 
Helmand of ISAF being ‘complicit’ in corruption is very damaging to Helmandi perceptions of 
the government and ISAF.1555  Furthermore, there is often denial amongst some ISAF 
officials about ISAF’s own role in corruption. Their public narrative is that ‘Afghan’ corruption 
is caused mainly by the drugs trade.1556 This shows that in addition to my thesis (that the 
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opacity of private sphere dynamics to public organisations allows the private sphere to 
shape conflict) wilful ignorance of those private dynamics can have the same effect. 
 
 
Figure 9b: The Gereshk model (i2 modelling). Blue=money input; Purple, yellow, 
orange=political layers; Red=security layer; Green=ISAF. Although impossible to read at 
this scale, I have included it to demonstrate the interconnectivity present between the 
layers and the central role of ISAF and the specialporce (shown as two green circles near 
centre). In addition, the bottom-left blue circle represents the monetary input from ISAF 
convoys. The number of lines leaving it shows how important it is as a source of money 
for the model. 
 
So far, I have discussed both private and public spheres of money flow, or corruption in 
Helmand. In conclusion, the mismatch between the private Helmandi understanding of 
‘corruption’ and the public ISAF sphere is stark: public narratives of corruption being caused 
by drugs money do not chime with how Helmandis see the issue. They see competing 
private actors interacting with and manipulating the public sphere: this drives the violence or 
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non-violence, rather than the government-Taliban cleavage. I am now going to discuss 
‘corruption’ in relation to Governor Mangal. 
 
6.8 - Governor Mangal 
The greatest divorce between the public and private spheres in describing corruption occurs 
with Governor Mangal. Publicly, Mangal was a great technocrat, who was reforming 
institutional government in Helmand and bringing much needed development to 
Helmandis.1557 Privately, the Helmandi stories surrounding land-theft, an age-old pastime of 
Helmandi governors, were rife.1558 According to these stories, undeveloped land would either 
be stolen, or residents would be evicted from ‘government’ land. According to Helmandis, 
this corruption was because of, and not in spite of, his closeness to firstly, the British, and 
secondly, the Americans. Interviewees stated that Mangal used the public sphere of 
‘development projects’ to evict people from their land.1559  
 
According to Helmandis, Mangal’s senior staff were heavily involved.1560 Most important in 
Lashkar Gah was Mohammad Daud.1561 As mayor, he oversaw land allocation in Lashkar 
Gah, particularly for shops, housing and projects commissioned by the PRT. In an example 
given to me, the land opposite the west gate of the PRT was divided and sold by Mangal and 
Daud for bribes.1562 A Helmandi MP complained that, ‘Mangal has sold all of the land in 
Helmand…the whole of Lashkar Gah has been divided up for shops…each one costs a 
$50,000 bribe to [Daud]…it was all a deal with Mangal’.1563 Further to Daud, Mangal’s 
deputy, Abdul Sattar Merzakhwal was heavily involved as a facilitator.1564 The two other key 
people were Daud Ahmadi, his media advisor and Shamsi, his security advisor: these were 
his extra-Helmand and intra-Helmand deal makers respectively.1565  
 
Land theft was not the only way in which Mangal was considered corrupt by many 
Helmandis. The flood of development money was alleged to create opportunities for graft. 
For example, Mangal was said to have acted as a channel for ISAF compensation for the 
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Nawa road that went across private land, taking a cut.1566 Another allegation centred on the 
land on which Camp Leatherneck, the US extension to Bastion, was built. The US allegedly 
gave him upwards of $1m in order to compensate the tribal leaders, whose land the camp 
was built on. It was alleged to me that this money went straight into a bank account in 
Kuwait.1567  
 
Kabul became interested in Mangal’s wealth and sent a parliamentary commission down to 
Helmand to investigate. Mangal reportedly paid the commission, $200,0001568 to produce a 
favourable report. Jabbar Qahraman, an MP for Helmand, explained that Mangal was very 
media-astute; indeed, he is lampooned as the ‘media governor’ by Helmandis. He told me 
that Mangal made sure that his relationship with the foreigners was excellent and used his 
money wisely to block negative publicity—in one instance, Jabbar said, the manager of a 
national television channel was paid $40,000 to not show footage of a five hundred-man 
protest in Lashkar Gah. Eventually, the land accusations became too great and Daud and 
Merzakhwal were sacked after Mangal accused them repeatedly of being responsible for the 
land thefts.1569 Daud Ahmadi and Shamsi remained in-post for several years more.  
 
The public sphere contrasted that of the private Helmandi one. British, and later American, 
officials focussed on Mangal’s technical abilities and his ability to operate in an ‘institutional’ 
way in comparison to some of his predecessors.1570 For ISAF, ‘service delivery’ was seen as 
a key part of what the government of Afghanistan could offer the populace.1571 However, 
Wikileaks cables show that ISAF became aware of allegations surrounding Mangal in around 
October 2009, yet did nothing. The cable stated that: ‘it would be surprising if this type of 
corruption occurred without Mangal's knowledge or perhaps even his complicity’.1572 Sir 
Sherard Cowper-Coles, at that time the UK Special Representative to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, concurs: ‘we did nothing [publicly] when we began to receive indications that 
Mangal wasn’t as clean as we liked to believe’. ‘We realised late’, said Sir Sherard to me, 
‘and by then it was too late … we were invested’.  
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Mangal was finally removed in September 2012.1573 This was potentially linked to another 
series of protests in Kabul in May/June about Mangal’s ‘corruption’. At that time, there were 
also television talk show discussions,1574 press conferences1575 and newspaper articles.1576 
Although reflecting Helmandi narratives, these events were organised and financed by Sher 
Mohammad and Jabbar Qahraman. By this point, Mangal had allied himself with the ‘Hizb’ 
figures in the province as a bulwark against Sher Mohammad, and counted figures like Mir 
Wali and Hafizullah Khan as allies. This was clever political manoeuvring: Mangal even 
‘advised’ ISAF not to target a close relative of Hafizullah who was responsible for moving 
‘Taliban’ bomb components around central Helmand. This can be considered a reverse-
denunciation: ISAF’s ignorance in this case allowed Mangal’s personal politicking to dictate 
which members of the Taliban lived and died. Perhaps Mangal’s legacy was best summed 
up by a Helmandi senator: ‘he seems to be better than the others have been…but Mangal is 
British’.1577  
 
6.9 - Politics 
The ISAF inactivity over Mangal was partly due to his brilliant manipulation of the public 
sphere. From the beginning of his tenure, Mangal maintained the position that if he was 
removed, then Sher Mohammad would replace him.1578 Particularly for the British, who had 
insisted on his removal, this would be an unacceptable loss of face. It would also damage 
their public narrative of working with the Afghan government against the Taliban whilst 
combatting narcotics: two things that Sher Mohammad was deeply involved in. The 
appointment of Sher Mohammad would force to the surface the issue of whether the public 
government-Taliban cleavage was the correct way to understand the Helmandi conflict. 
Mangal realised this very early on, and brilliantly played on it, manipulating the British and 
Americans, but particularly the British.1579 ISAF were blinded by Mangal playing up his 
institutional side. 
 
President Karzai played an important role between Sher Mohammad, Mangal and ISAF. He 
regretted removing Sher Mohammad in 20051580 and was incandescent with rage when 
Gordon Brown, the British Prime Minister, visited him and lobbied for Mangal forcefully, 
saying that he would pull British troops out of Afghanistan if Mangal was removed. ‘Mangal is 
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not your governor, he is ours’, Brown reportedly said.1581 Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles also 
confirmed that Brown lobbied President Karzai several times but suggested that it was 
Karzai who repeatedly pointed out that Mangal was Britain’s governor, rather than Brown.  
 
This continued for several years with Mangal reporting to the British and Americans that he 
was desperately worried that Sher Mohammad would take over his position if he was 
sacked. The British were ‘deeply concerned’ that Sher Mohammad would come back to the 
province.1582 Karzai did keep Mangal in place, but detested the British, and the Americans, 
for the interference: he preferred Sher Mohammad in post, not least because as part of 
Karzai’s southern tribal coalition he could deliver electoral votes.1583 Karzai also detested 
Mangal for his closeness to the Americans and the British.1584 For his part, Sher Mohammad 
repeatedly organised schemes and protests in an attempt to unseat Mangal. While these 
public politics continued, the foreigners missed the point that the Helmandis were making 
privately: ‘Mangal is corrupt and he is stealing our land’.1585  
 
District-level politics were similarly complex. For example in Nad-e Ali, fresh elections for the 
district council were held in 2010 to take advantage of the new areas that were now under 
government control (see section 6.1). The disenfranchised communities living in the previous 
deserts surrounding Nad-e Ali in Bolan and the Bowri to the west were included in the 
electoral areas. This was a sensible move in terms of enfranchising the population, one of 
the aims of counterinsurgency. However, it incensed the population of ‘central’ Nad-e Ali 
who were ‘legal’ land holders with documents issued by Zahir Shah. They considered the 
desert dwellers as be-rasmiat (unofficial).  
 
In the elections there were few changes in who was elected. The two most notable were that 
Helmandwal, the nephew of Shah Nazar Khan the erstwhile Provincial Governor, was 
removed from the Chair. He was replaced by Haji Barakzai (Kharoti), the nephew of Haji 
Jamalzai, the ex-Harakat commander from Noor Mohammad Khan Kalay. The space 
opened up by death of Wakil Safar, and the arrest of his son Mirwais Khan, meant that 
different power centres in the Kharoti were able to rise to the fore.  
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The other change was that Pir Mohammad Sadat was voted out by his community in 
Naqilabad. This was ostensibly because, the community said to the British, he was too close 
to the ‘Taliban’. This manipulation of the public sphere was later shown to be untrue—he had 
tried to dominate the agricultural cooperative in the village over another candidate.1586 
Overall the elections were seen by Nad-e Ali’s population as a positive outcome. This was 
especially true of the fact that a Kharoti man was elected to a government position of power 
within the district.  
 
So far in this chapter, I have broadly discussed several aspects of security control in the 
province. I then followed this with a discussion of Taliban organisation, corruption and 
Helmandi (government) politics. I now conclude this section of the chapter by discussing the 
public and private spheres of ISAF’s withdrawal from Helmand, still on-going at the time of 
writing. Lastly, I will consider the Helmandi narrative that the British are working with the 
Taliban.  
 
6.10 - Withdrawal and more militias 
In July 2010, twenty-six years after a similar Soviet announcement, ISAF announced that it 
would be withdrawing its forces by 2014.1587 As with the Soviets, they based the public 
narratives of their withdrawal on reconciliation with the Taliban, the growth of militias and 
increasing the competence of the army and the police. The militia programme was 
predicated on groups of roughly thirty men protecting their own villages from outside 
insurgents. This reflected the public narrative that the Taliban were outsiders oppressing 
defenceless villagers. Yet, the ISAF public narrative was inconsistent. They sought to 
strengthen the Afghan ‘government’, yet giving guns and training to people outside the 
‘government’ did exactly the opposite. However in the private sphere, because of the high 
percentage of local ‘Talibs’ the programme has succeeded in reintegrating lots of previous 
daakhelee ‘Taliban’ fighters. 
 
The Afghan Local Police (ALP) programme was first established in Helmand by British 
forces in January 2011.1588 The programme came after a long line of other militia 
programmes in Helmand.1589 Under law, the ALPs were to report to the District Chief of 
Police. They were recruited from the local communities and ‘vetted’ by the elders and the 
NDS. They would only operate in their local area. After a year, ALP soldiers were 
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encouraged to join the police, thus linking the communities to the police.1590 Many1591 
considered them analogous to the Najibullah militias (see section 2.16). However, ALPs are 
much smaller and more poorly armed. A more considered view is that they were very similar 
to the depaye militias under Zahir Shah (see section 2.2), in fact in one case, the same 
group of people who had joined the Soviet-era depaye in Deh Adam Khan, later became 
members of the ALP there.1592 Conceptually, the militias are a clear interaction between 
public (arms, weapons, funding, membership of the government) and private (men, local 
commanders and groups) spheres. 
 
In the two main districts under British control (there were no ALPs in Lashkar Gah), ALP 
development was pursued differently, leading to different results and different problems. 
There were, however, two shared characteristics. Firstly, there was a lack of British ‘due 
diligence’ in investigating exactly who it was who was forming these militias that they were 
arming. Secondly, the British sought militias on individual sites within each district separately 
in the hope that they would contribute to micro-security gains. The British did not consider 
how to divide the limited ALP establishment across the district in order to pursue a holistic 
security effect, in concert with the established Afghan army and police presence.1593 This 
meant that different groups of local elders (and different British officers) were competing for 
an ever decreasing establishment. 
 
In Nad-e Ali, the community council was strongly opposed to ALPs.1594 They all voiced the 
same reasons: that, in such a heterogeneous district, once one community received 
permission to raise an ALP, everyone would want one. Then, people would not be able to 
travel outside of their own villages and communities.1595 Habibullah, the District Governor, 
could see that the programme formed a key part of the public sphere, and so overruled the 
private objections of the locals. He forced it through the district council by appealing to 
minority interests. For example, in Loy Bagh, an ALP commander from the minority Achakzai 
was empowered over the heads of the majority Noorzai: Habibullah had long had problems 
with Loy Bagh Noorzai figures such as Abdul Ahad Helmandwal and Mullahs Karim and 
Zakiri.1596 He reportedly said, ‘if you don’t get the men to do it, I will get them from 
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somewhere else’. Habibullah eventually had to bring men from Musa Qala, where his brother 
was District Governor.1597  
 
As a senior Noorzai tribal leader said to me, ‘[they are] not with the support of the 
community’.1598 Officially, this is a prerequisite for the establishment of an ALP site. In the 
south of the district, both the Hazaras and the Ishaqzai were allowed to establish their own 
ALP militias, thus arming both sides in the long running water dispute. The dispute’s main 
protagonist on the Hazara side—Assadullah Karimi—was made the commander of the 
Hazara militia.1599 In Loy Mandah, the family of the district education director dominated the 
ALP: he was able to get it established because his family had been previously targeted 
before by another local community and the ALP offered his best form of defence.1600 In short, 
British ignorance of the private dynamics allowed these local politics to dominate the 
formation of the ALPs, rather than have their creation reinforce the Afghan government 
organisation. 
 
Moreover, the ALP programme conceptually took the place of the reintegration programme. 
A large number of interviewees from across the social spectrum agreed that one of the main 
reasons that Nad-e Ali became more peaceful during 2011 was the roll out of the ALP 
programme. Many local ‘Taliban’ enrolled as militia fighters.1601 In addition, in those areas 
where there were still ‘Taliban’ active, deals were struck between the former insurgents and 
their now reintegrated brethren.1602 There was a great paradox in the British actions though. 
On the advice of Habibullah, the Kharoti were not allowed to participate in the programme. 
Thus, in line with the public sphere, the greatest historical ‘supporters’ of the Taliban in the 
district were not allowed an ALP. As Habibullah put it, again: ‘they are all Taliban’.  
 
Two prominent ex-Hizb Kharoti commanders explained wearily to me that they had seen this 
all before. The government didn’t trust them, otherwise they would have an ALP; the police 
still thought of them as Talibs.1603 Other communities joked that there was no point in having 
a Kharoti ALP and that the government might as well arm the Taliban.1604 But these were the 
same people who pointed out to me privately that the other ALPs were all ex-‘Taliban’. One 
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Helmandi MP looked ruefully at the situation and wondered if it would spark the Kharoti to 
form their own militias for defence, much as they had done in 2007/8.1605  
 
The final result of the ALP programme in Nad-e Ali was that it allowed Abdul Rahman Jan an 
increase in control. Haji Lal Jan, his cousin, managed to present himself as the police officer 
in charge of the Nad-e Ali ALPs,1606 and the District Chief of Police, Haji Omar Jan, was a 
key acolyte of his. Haji Omar Jan’s brother controlled all the militias in Marjeh. As Abdul 
Rahman said, ‘all the [militias] are my people; that is why there is security’. The ISAF public 
narrative of bringing good governance in the wake of the rapacious warlords was somewhat 
contradicted by the private sphere where those same warlords regained security control 
through the ALP programme. 
 
The ALP militias were grown differently in Nahr-e Saraj district. Immediately the scheme was 
announced, the specialporce converted their militias into ALPs, accepting the new public 
labels. This meant that the previous militia commanders—Sarai Mama and Jan 
Mohammad—become the ALP commanders. Jan Mohammad also ran the militia which was 
guarding Camp Price and was the commander of the District Response Team, which was 
similar in concept to the original militias raised by the specialporce.1607 Publicly they were 
part of the ALP programme; however the US continued to supplement their wages and 
supplies, but actually they were still considered specialporce militias.1608 Jan Mohammad, for 
instance, used to visit the Chief of Police, as a subordinate commander should, but always 
turned up in US uniform to make an unsubtle point about who was in charge. ‘Joining’ the 
ALP was a rebranding exercise, like the many times before that the specialporce militias had 
been rebadged.1609  
 
Elsewhere, in Spin Masjid and Malgir, the militia commanders were largely ex-93rd division. 
Many of them were also (most recent) ex-Talibs, for example, Lal Mohammad, who was a 
relative-by-marriage of Sur Gul, the Taliban District Governor for Washir. Interestingly, the 
elders from the community only offered them as appropriate for militia leadership late in the 
process: originally they had said that there was no-one appropriate. According to the public 
narrative, it took time for their confidence to be raised sufficiently for them to risk supporting 
the ALP programme. Privately, the elders were managing a reintegration process using the 
ALP programme. For example, Lal Mohammad had, by this point, worked under Taliban, 
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93rd Division, Taliban and ALP patronage networks, and some of this side changing was 
dictated by a land dispute with a Noorzai tribesman, Dad Gul.1610  
 
The ALP programme was entirely to Mir Wali’s benefit, as he bragged to me when I met with 
him. He equated the security that existed during the tenure of the 93rd Division with the 
security that had been generated by the ALP militias. The programme recycled some of the 
private actors’ armed interests away from the ‘Taliban’ public organisation and temporarily 
towards the ‘government’ organisation: they changed their public-private interactions. Whilst 
beneficial for overall security, the provincial police hierarchy was solidly ex-communist by 
this time and they had problems exerting their control over the new militias that they were 
meant to command. From the point of view of the individual communities the public sphere 
may have changed, but the same private actors were still wielding guns in their villages (viz 
Lal Mohammad). It did not matter whether they were ‘Taliban’ or ‘government’.1611 
 
The overall reaction to the ALP programme in Helmand was mixed. Many were concerned 
about the ability of the government to control the militias: ‘the radio says that in Ghazni the 
[ALP] are going wild. So far in Nad-e Ali they are behaving, but that is because ISAF are 
here…we will see’.1612 The injection of yet more weapons into the society was also not 
always viewed favourably.1613 Others stressed to me the importance of more training for the 
militias. This would make them more professional and accountable to the Afghan state.1614 
Publicly, the ALP programme had contributed to an increase in overall security where they 
were deployed, by keeping ‘Taliban’ out of local communities. Privately, this was at the cost 
of paying many ‘Talibs’ not to fight.1615 The old warlords won the most out of the 
programme.1616 Many considered the ALP programme as an ISAF bet that Helmandis may 
yet have to pick up the consequences for.1617  
 
Over the summer of 2012, the British began to look more closely at the ALP militias. They 
began a more intensive training and mentoring programme for them, in an attempt to bind 
them to the Afghan ‘government’ and minimise the potential of them ‘going wild’. There had 
been chronic problems with Afghan government pay for the individual militias and, upon the 
realisation that they were paying their enemies not to attack them, the British made big 
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efforts to encourage the Afghan system to pay up.1618 Whether or not pay was the cause, 
some of the militias started to switch public-private interactions again, starting with Lal 
Mohammad in Torghai: he simply went back to working with Sur Gul taking two men, a PKM 
machine gun, five Kalashnikovs and two motorbikes.1619 Later on, another ALP militia 
‘defected’ in Musa Qala.1620 For this, and other, reasons training and recruitment of new 
ALPs was halted nationwide in September 2012.1621  
 
6.11 - The three transitions 
The growth of ALP militias and the increased attention given to army and police training was 
part of a framework of transition to Afghan control. Lashkar Gah, which had de facto been 
controlled by the Afghan security forces for years, was the first to officially ‘transfer’ in July 
2011.1622 Most of Nad-e Ali had transferred by December of the same year. Most of Nahr-e 
Saraj is transferring lead security control in the autumn of 2012.1623 Transition was a public 
sign that the British forces that had generated such resistance over the previous five years 
were finally leaving, but many Helmandis were not sure if they could believe it.1624  
 
Many were convinced that the ‘real’ reason for the British presence was different to the 
stated one and assumed that this would be another trick. If the British did leave, many 
assumed that the security forces (less the army) would splinter and dissolve back to their 
communities, pointing to the fact that ISAF patronage was the binding factor.1625 Others were 
convinced that there would be further inter-group warfare as they competed for water and 
poppy.1626 The most pessimistic suggested that the ‘government would last an hour once the 
foreigners leave’.1627  
 
Alongside this primarily ISAF-driven process, the Afghan government was also carrying out 
its own parallel transition process by appointing local power brokers or their proxies into 
government positions (this is analogous to what the Soviet-era: see section 2.14). For 
example, over 2010-12 they appointed relatives of Sher Mohammad as District Chiefs of 
Police in Kajaki, Washir and Baghran (Faisullah, Mirdel and Hayat Khan respectively).1628 
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Koka still remained in Musa Qala.1629 Sher Mohammad’s brother, the erstwhile Deputy 
Provincial Governor, Amir Mohammad, was made Provincial Governor of Uruzgan, a 
neighbouring province.1630 Interestingly, in a mirror, Abdul Rauf, a major Alizai Taliban 
commander, and originally Zakir’s boss when both were in Rais Baghrani’s 93rd Division in 
1994, was appointed the Taliban Governor for the same province.1631 Further west, Mir 
Wali’s son, Hekmatullah, was appointed Chief of Police in Sangin. This was probably a 
stopgap on his way to becoming the Gereshk Chief: a role that his father has lobbied hard 
for him for.1632 Mir Wali denied this when I met him, indicating the peeling paint in his house 
as a sign of his poverty: ‘there was no way I could afford the bribes’, he said.  
 
The Helmandi population have considered these changes wrought by the public ISAF and 
government transitions. They are wary of the future, as the past has taught them to be. 
During 2012, the tribal leaderships in Helmand began to invite their members to a series of 
tribal shuras. These were a repeat of those shuras held in 1992 and 2002, when the 
communist and Taliban governments were overthrown. The format was similar. Members 
from both ‘sides’ of the public cleavage (in this case the ‘Taliban’ and the ‘government’) sat 
down together and reaffirmed the private sphere: that they were all Noorzai, or Barakzai, or 
Kharoti, or Alikozai, and that they should work together. In many cases this reached an 
impressive level of complexity, with the shuras opening offices in Lashkar Gah and Kabul, 
and producing manifestos with positions on such things as women’s rights, relations with 
other tribes and, most importantly, positions on reconciling ‘Talibs’. The shuras were a 
formalisation of a time-honoured process: individuals subsuming themselves within the mass 
of the tribe in an uncertain future. They represent the third ‘transition’ process.1633  
 
So far, I have discussed several themes of transition. These have been loosely organised 
around security, development and politics. I showed, as in the preceding chapters, that the 
private sphere of the conflict has primacy in explaining its dynamics, when the public 
organisations do not understand the private sphere’s dynamics. I now go on to discuss the 
Helmandi narrative that the British were working with the Taliban to destroy Helmand. I do 
not consider this a theme as above, rather, a product of my thesis—it is a manifestation of 
what happens when public organisations in civil wars construct a public narrative without 
understanding, or taking into account, the private sphere.  
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6.12 - The British are supplying the Taliban 
Elsewhere in Afghanistan there are well established narratives about ISAF, and particularly 
the Americans, supplying the Taliban. Two main mechanisms are offered. Firstly: American 
sponsorship of the ISI which, in turn, supports the Taliban. Secondly, profligacy associated 
with the indigenous supply contracts that are used to supply ISAF bases.1634  In Helmand, 
the rumours take on a different angle: that the British are supporting the Taliban and the US 
are fighting the Taliban. At its most extreme this leads to some claims of a American-British 
civil war being enacted in Helmand. I have found these views to be widely held, from 
Helmandi Senators,1635 to educated tribal leaders who have often dealt with the British,1636 to 
senior members of the Afghan police and army who are working with the British.1637 The 
overwhelming majority of Helmandis that I asked strongly believe this to be true.1638  
 
One of the most profound moments of my research came when interviewing a member of 
the Helmandi diaspora in London. He explained to me that when he first heard the ‘rumours’ 
he considered them true. Furthermore, the rumour threatened to unseat his identity as a 
Helmandi refugee, who had been living happily, prosperously and legally in the UK for some 
years. He could not countenance one of his countries purposefully destroying the other, and 
set out to investigate the matter himself. He found no ‘evidence’ in Helmand that would lead 
him to believe that the British were not working with the Taliban. Only the internal UK debate 
conducted in the media, involving images such as the corteges moving through Royal 
Wootton Bassett, allayed his fears. The majority of Helmandis have no access to that 
debate.1639 
 
The belief gained currency in Helmand in mid-2009, the same time that the US began to 
increase their presence in the province. It partly replaced the earlier belief that the British 
had only come to Helmand for revenge, although the ideas co-exist to some degree.1640 The 
core of the narrative is that the US fight the Taliban more aggressively than the British, ergo, 
they must be more ‘serious’ about the Taliban than the British.1641 This is reflected by 
Taliban commanders who comment on the fondness of British troops for talking rather than 
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fighting.1642 The British would be able to rebut these accusations. To them, the conflict was 
an insurgency, and so politics rather than force should be at the forefront; when the US 
arrived they had vast resources concentrated in a small area and so were able to do much 
more; and, privately, the British would point to the ‘gung-ho’ attitude of American troops.1643 
In-line with the ISAF public narrative, the British were using ‘courageous restraint’ to protect 
the population.1644 
 
However, the basis of the rumour created by the arrival of the US troops was much further 
back in history. Here, I discuss the historical factors which I argue have led to the Helmandis 
interpreting the mismatched ISAF public and Helmandi private spheres as evidence for the 
British working with the Taliban. In the discussion below, when I use the word Taliban, I am 
referring to what the Helmandis would call aslee, or real, Taliban—that is, those members of 
the Taliban with close links to the Quetta Shura leadership involving funding and direction. 
For the Helmandis, it is considered obvious that the Quetta Shura Taliban are controlled and 
directed by the ISI.1645  
 
Primarily, this belief has as its basis a profound hatred of the Angrez. This is one of the 
commonest private Helmandi narratives. Jean Mackenzie, an intrepid American journalist 
who worked for the respected Institute for War and Peace Reporting training Helmandi 
journalists in Lashkar Gah from 2006–8 put it thus:  
 
In Afghanistan, word of mouth is everything, and Helmandis appear to have a 
deep, visceral aversion toward the British that defies rational explanation. The 
constant and abiding rumors [sic] that the British are supporting the Taliban with 




I, too, can attest to this from personal experience when I spent time in Kabul socialising with 
Helmandis that I know well. I felt deeply humbled when I experienced the strength of the 
antipathy reserved for the Angrez. Mackenzie is right, but it is only the foundation.  
 
Helmandis currently hold the belief that the British never gave up colonial control of Pakistan 
after the partition of British India in 1947. To them, it was a charade, designed to mask 
British power in the region. ‘Why would they voluntarily give up power?’ they ask rhetorically. 
This is irrefutable proof that the British control the ISI and the ISI control the Taliban. I was 
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not able to discern whether this belief was strongly held at the time of partition, or whether it 
has been unconsciously created or reinforced by recent events.  
 
Moreover, the Pakistani Army is modelled on the British Army; ‘in fact’ the Pakistani state is 
little changed since the British left it. To Helmandis, it is also well-known that Britain gives aid 
to Pakistan, which frees up Pakistani state spending to be cycled to the Taliban, which 
comes back across the border in the form of lethal aid.1647 In this, the Helmandis are 
factually correct. What is interesting that the US are not accused as much of similar perfidies 
in Helmand, as they are in the rest of Afghanistan, but I conclude this comes from 
Mackenzie’s ‘deep well of historical hatred’. 
 
More recently, the Helmandis have been brutalised by thirty-four years of war, during which 
their own government paid them to kill each other on a large scale (see sections 2.7 and 
2.15). This has led to a gradual breakdown of even the most basic trust, with one man 
describing pathetically to me that, ‘I don’t know who my friends are, and haven’t for 
years’.1648 From the Helmandi perspective, this was followed by a period where the US 
spoke with the highest of ideals about rebuilding Afghanistan, only to beat people to death in 
custody, send children to Guantanamo and allow some of the most despicable people in 
Helmandi society to rise to the top through their sponsorship and ignorance. Then came the 
British intervention where the rhetoric of development did not match the reality of violence.  
 
Specifically, Helmandis point to the deal in Musa Qala between the British, the elders and 
the ‘Taliban’. This was followed shortly after by the arrest of Michael Semple for talking to 
the Taliban and organising training camps for them.1649 As Hafizullah Khan, a not uninformed 
individual put it, ‘How could Semple work safely all over Helmand? And now he lives in 
Pakistan’. Soon the rumours were well established and had reached President Karzai. He 
claimed that unidentified foreign helicopters (reportedly British) had been transporting 
Taliban fighters from Helmand to the north of Afghanistan.  
 
The ‘helicopter’ rumours were the first to reach the international press1650 and I think marked 
a turning point. The reports were both reflective of underlying feelings, but also the genesis 
of further rumours. They were further exploited by the Iranians and the Pakistanis. The 
Iranians quoted ‘unnamed’ diplomats saying that British helicopters were involved. They also 
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alleged that the British had executed one of their Afghan interpreters who was 
knowledgeable about the operation.1651 The ISI played a much subtler game, telling the 
Taliban commanders they supplied that the money and weapons originally came from the 
British.1652  
 
Others realised that this was a profitable narrative that could deflect attention away from 
their own inadequacies. Mullah Salam, the reconciled District Governor of Musa Qala, stated 
that the British had been moving Taliban around Musa Qala in helicopters because they 
were seeking revenge for Maiwand and were interested in the mineral riches of the 
province.1653 As Jabbar Qahraman (who doesn’t believe the rumours) said, ‘of course it is a 
lie…but it is a useful lie…even Karzai believes it!’ The rumours were helped by the Helmandi 
perception that British rhetoric did not match the reality of their intervention in the province.  
 
Events and dynamics that could be put down to British incompetence were attributed to 
Angrez perfidy. The Haji Gul Ehktiar story discussed in section 5.15 is illustrative. Only long 
after the British began paying rent to Gul Ehktiar did they realise that the money was finding 
its way into armaments that were killing its soldiers. During this time period, Sur Gul, 
Ehktiar’s Talib nephew, had been bragging that he had got the money from the British!1654  
 
Everyone I spoke to has an (usually) eyewitness story. A twenty-something Noorzai 
tribesman in Nad-e Ali, who has some friends fighting the British, told me that he himself had 
seen British troops dropping an ISO container full of supplies in Marjeh. Later, a Talib friend 
of his had shown him a mobile phone video depicting a weapons cache full of ‘British’ 
weapons that had been given to the Taliban.1655 In another example, there were a set of ISI 
‘Punjabi’ operatives in Nad-e Ali conducting a resupply of some Taliban fighting groups in 
broad daylight. Whilst this was going on, there were British helicopters overhead, but nothing 
was done.1656  
 
Hafizullah Khan told me that ‘a friend’ had seen the British occupy a compound. Shortly 
after, they vacated it leaving it full of ammunition for the Taliban. A Helmandi senator insisted 
that he had seen the Taliban passing by British vehicles and didn’t understand why they 
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didn’t fire.1657 An elder claimed that a Talib had shown him a video of British officers talking 
with Taliban commanders, offering them $200,000 if they would not attack. The Talib then 
asked for $3000 for the video; the elder tried to broker a deal with ‘Channel 4’ for them to 
buy the video but they refused saying it was ‘too dangerous’.1658 I have many more 
examples.  
 
Of course, not everyone believes these stories.1659 Jabbar Qahraman snorted when I asked 
him about it. Sher Mohammad, Mir Wali and Abdul Rahman all affirmed that it was 
ridiculous, which are interesting comments when contextualised in light of their ‘Taliban’ 
links. Their double-dealing has probably contributed to the Helmandi understanding of how 
people with lots of power act. Habibullah Khan, who has worked with British troops for the 
last four years, also thinks it is untrue. But they can all understand why the majority of 
Helmandis believe this narrative. ‘It is like a white and a black man walking together’ said 
Abdul Rahman, talking of the fact that both ISAF and Taliban supplies come through 
Pakistan.  
 
These powerful Helmandis can understand how international and British actions could be 
misconstrued by the populace. But they are also more aware of the potential for 
incompetence of international forces. They do not suffer so much from the ‘man on the 
moon’ effect, whereby incredulity follows from the world’s most powerful nations being 
unable to defeat a ‘couple of Talibs’.1660 Even President Karzai used to say to Sir Sherard 
Cowper-Coles, the British Ambassador, ‘surely you could have solved this by now?’1661 
 
What those individuals who do follow the narrative are doing is reinterpreting ‘evidence’ in 
light of their understanding of the strategic environment. This eventually snowballs as 
evidence is found, based on the original assumptions, which then becomes proof for the 
original assumption, and so on. For the many that do subscribe to the narrative it is strong: a 
man in Nawa recounted to me how the police in Babaji had driven some distance to hand 
their Taliban prisoners over to the Americans rather than to the British, who they felt would 
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6.13 - ‘Of course they are working with the Taliban!’ 
Helmandis have a strong narrative behind why the British would support the Taliban at the 
same time that they are deploying troops to ‘fight’ said Taliban. An educated mullah who 
worked for the Taliban government was convinced that the British and the ISI wanted an 
‘Islamic civil war’ in Afghanistan, so that Islam in Afghanistan was ‘weak’. ‘They think that if 
there is an alliance between groups in Afghanistan then there will be bombs in London’.1663 A 
degree-educated Helmandi gentleman tried to explain to me very patiently that this stemmed 
from history and the desire of the British to avenge their previous defeats in Afghanistan, 
against the will of the US. This was leading to a civil war ‘within NATO’, with the British 
wanting NATO to break up. With Afghanistan weak, the British could re-establish their 
empire. I submitted that the British public were unlikely to stand for such deceit with the 
casualties and costs that it would entail. He responded that the British public were in on it 
and that they saw it as a reasonable cost of the war against NATO, if they could regain the 
empire.1664 
 
There are still parts of this narrative that take extra explanation. For example, why do the 
Afghan security forces continue to work with their British mentors? Two interviewees pointed 
to the fact that the war in Helmand was between roshan-fikran (progressives) and Taliban—
if the roshan-fikran did not accept the help of the British then the Taliban would win. The 
police and army hated it, but had little choice.1665 The strongest paradox is this. If, as I have 
argued extensively, the ‘Taliban’ are part of Helmandi society, rather than an external 
organisation trying to impose itself, then surely the population would know that the British 
were not supplying the Taliban (because the Taliban and the ‘Taliban’ are closely linked)?  
 
It is hard to answer. Some ‘Taliban’ commanders even believe that there is a deal with 
British forces and are rather piqued when the British break ‘the deal’ and attack them.1666 In 
an extreme case, a ‘Talib’ had been given a claims card (to allow him to claim money from 
the British for damage to his house). He believed, and boasted to his ‘Talib’ friends, that as 
the card allowed him to enter the British base and have conversations about money: he was 
being recruited by the British. Later on, his house was searched by very polite British troops, 
who failed to find his Kalashnikov. This reinforced his belief. He now believed that he was an 
agent: the British would soon be along to de-brief him. Shortly after, British special forces 
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killed him, whilst he still believed that he was working for them. His group of fighters then 
interpreted their friend’s death as a US strike, against a British asset.1667 
 
I am unable to fully explain the paradox that I identified above. I think that the difference 
comes down to one of perspective. To Helmandis, when they use the word Taliban, they 
mean aslee (real) Taliban—those with substantive links to the Quetta Shura and/or the ISI. 
For aslee Taliban, spreading the narrative that the British are supplying them is part of their 
job, because it marginalises their enemy and erodes the links between British and Afghan 
government forces. So, an aslee Talib who is in charge of a delgai will tell his local fighters 
that the British are working with them in the knowledge that this will get out into the society. 
This was made worse by the British telling elders about their military operations in order to 
reduce fighting, in the knowledge that it would get back to the Taliban.1668  
 
For their sake, individual ‘Talibs’ feel rather pleased with themselves that they are using 
‘British’ weaponry and ammunition against British soldiers.1669 It is a variation on the 
apocryphal Afghan saying: that they are going to use the Pakistanis [the Taliban] to get rid of 
the Americans, and then they are going to deal with the Pakistanis. Are they ‘using’ the 
British and Pakistan to fight the roshan-fikran, the Americans and the British themselves, 
before moving onto the Pakistanis? This issue, more than any other in this thesis, makes me 
think of what one of the interviewees most aptly stated: ‘most people who think about 
Helmand develop mental problems, because the politics are so strange and complicated’.1670 
 
6.14 - Conclusions 
This chapter has explored several themes surrounding the American and British 
counterinsurgency in Helmand during the period 2009–12. This was a counterinsurgency 
based on the elements of the public sphere. All of the themes here illustrated demonstrate 
the primacy of the private sphere in describing what is driving the conflict dynamics, in the 
face of the opacity of the private sphere to outside, public organisations. Key examples 
include the Gereshk model and its absence of ‘Taliban’ and the shifting public-private 
interactions with the roll-out of the ALP militia programme. The final section—covering the 
rumours that the British are working with the Taliban—describe what happens if public 
organisations do not understand the private sphere.  
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This central lens of understanding for the Helmandis—that the British and the Taliban were 
working together to destroy Helmand—was caused, I argue, by the adherence of public 
organisations to the public sphere in their narratives. This caused the Helmandis to seek to 
explain the elements of the public sphere through their worldview—dominated by the last 
thirty-four years of conflict, side-switching and ignorant public organisations—and one that 
emphasised the differences between the public and private spheres. That is, whilst the 
British might be saying that their motive for being in Helmand is to defeat the Taliban, they 
must have a private reason for being here as well (that is, to destroy Helmand or exacerbate 
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Our main difficulty is with ourselves...no Afghan regime or political 
party will ever be very much different from the Afghan society to 













7.1 - Thesis and approach 
This thesis has used phenomenological oral history techniques,1673 historical reconstruction 
of secondary sources1674 and anthropological literature on Afghanistan to construct a 
historical narrative of the last thirty-four years of conflict in Helmand province. This narrative 
was then tested against a theoretical framework based upon Stathis Kalyvas’ work 
describing the different spheres of conflict. That is, both public and private spheres can used 
to describe conflict in Helmand. The public sphere is that which describes the conflict in 
terms of macro-dynamics; the private, micro-dynamics. Habitually, the public sphere is 
dominant in explaining conflict dynamics, and the private sphere is treated as subsidiary. My 
thesis is that it is the interaction between the public and private spheres that shapes the 
conflict dynamics in Helmand. Furthermore, I posit that where the private sphere is opaque 
to outside, public organisations, it will have primacy in the interaction between public and 
private in shaping conflict dynamics.1675  
 
The final chapter of this thesis will summarise findings, offer conclusions both for policy 
makers (including extrapolation of findings to the Afghan national level) and for theorists, 
before finally discussing the future direction of conflict in Helmand province. 
 
7.2 – Summary of findings 
Chapters two to seven describe the conflict in Helmand province from April 1978, the Afghan 
communist coup, until the summer of 2012, when the primary research for this thesis was 
completed. That historical narrative will here be summarised with respect to the theoretical 
framework outlined above: does the historical narrative support the thesis? 
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Once the Khalqi communists had taken over control of the government in Kabul they 
instituted a massive program of ideological change in Afghanistan. Most critically for 
Helmand, this focussed on land reform and the arbitrary cut-off for redistribution was set 
(inadvertently) at the amount of land that the canal projects had given to each family settling 
during the 1950s to the 1970s. Thus, the population’s rebellion was located in northern and 
southern Helmand, outside the canal zone, where land redistribution was carried out: this 
shows a clear interaction between an ideological government policy and local private 
elements of land control.  
 
The northern and southern districts fell from government control during 1979 as government 
officials were assassinated or forced to leave by rebel groups of men who coalesced around 
local leaders—be they military, religious or tribal. This process was reflected nationally, and 
at the end of 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan to support the government in 
its attempts to secure the main cities and road network.1676 It was this national-level 
intervention, not the land reforms, which caused the canal zone in Helmand to fall from 
government control. This, in turn, precipitated Soviet intervention to Lashkar Gah in an 
attempt to secure the city and the immediately surrounding countryside.  
 
Concurrently, the rebel leaders began reaching out to the nascent mujahidin political parties 
based in Peshawar in a clear interaction between the public and private spheres: the rebel 
leaders personified this interaction and provided men and intelligence to the political parties. 
In return, they received funding and ideological legitimacy. This helped them label their war 
as a fight to free their homeland in the name of Islam: ‘they were not fighting to usurp local 
political power’ (local seats or chowkai, “chairs”, as the Helmandis call them). This is a clear 
reflection of Kalyvas’ interaction.1677 Furthermore, the local rebel leaders (or mujahidin 
commanders as they had become) dictated the shape of the conflict to a much greater 
degree than the political parties: ultimately the local leaders controlled the information 
stream to the parties, and this allowed them to achieve their local aims, at the expense of the 
parties’ aims. This can clearly be seen when one extrapolates that interaction through to the 
present day: many of the same leaders, families or clans are still interacting with the current 
public organisations (i.e. the Taliban or the government), yet the seven political parties (bar 
perhaps Hizb-e Islami-e Gulbuddin) no longer exist, and certainly did not achieve their aims 
on a national scale. 
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Shortly after the Soviet deployment to Lashkar Gah, northern Helmand erupted in civil war. 
Ostensibly, this has been portrayed as a war between Hizb and Harakat.1678 Certainly, those 
parties were supplying belligerents on-the-ground, as was Khad, the government security 
service. However, there is significant evidence that local feuds and machinations were also 
driving the conflict. It was both: it was an interaction between outside funding and local 
dynamics. Yet interestingly, there was a lack of understanding from both the mujahidin 
parties and Khad—Khad was only to gain a detailed understanding of different ‘mujahidin’ 
groups in the second half of the decade. This enabled the protagonists to fight for control of 
the local area: many of those leaders, or their sons, are still in control of those local areas. 
 
Central Helmand experienced a different dynamic due to the presence of government and 
Soviet troops and installations. This proximity to the government kept the plethora of 
mujahidin groups allied to a greater extent. However, there was another dynamic also at 
play: local groups and families would be deliberately split across different public 
organisations (i.e. across the government and the mujahidin). In Nawa, for example, the 
‘government’ militias and the Jamiat ‘mujahidin’ groups were extensively intermarried: there 
was no serious fighting between them during the conflict. Similarly, in Nad-e Ali, the Kharoti 
tribe were split across two mujahidin groups and elements of the government, all the while 
maintaining a shura for dialogue between the ‘opposed’ groups. The opacity of local 
dynamics to the government and the mujahidin parties in Peshawar made it very difficult for 
them to shape the conflict to their liking. In further support for the thesis, in areas where the 
inverse was true (i.e. the government had good knowledge of the situation), for example Loy 
Bagh, the private sphere was unable to shape the conflict to its will: Loy Bagh was destroyed 
by fighting. 
 
The Soviet drawdown ushered in the weakening and eventual disappearance of the public 
sphere in Helmand. It was also during this period that actors in the private sphere became 
much more powerful through the opium trade. To facilitate their exit, the Soviets began to 
raise militias from the local population at the same time as massively increasing the funding 
available to Nasim Akhundzada, the Alizai warlord from Musa Qala. This had several 
consequences. Firstly, it put ‘Hizb’ groups in the province under pressure, and that forced 
many to join the government under the auspices of the militia program. However, Nasim also 
used the government funding to attack his many personal enemies. Nasim was then 
assassinated, probably by someone linked to Abdul Rahman Khan. Rasoul, his brother, 
immediately took over the dynasty and put Abdul Rahman under so much pressure that he 
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was forced to leave the province. In many respects, the government achieved its short term 
aims over this period as many of the mujahidin groups in central Helmand joined the 
government and established militias, or were wiped out by Nasim/Rasoul. This could only 
have been achieved with the government’s increased knowledge of the cleavages within the 
‘mujahidin’.  
 
When the Soviets left in 1989, the institutional power of the government (i.e. the public 
sphere) weakened further before completely disappearing in 1992 when the Najibullah 
government collapsed.1679  This, by definition, allowed the private sphere to dominate. 
However, before completely collapsing, the government’s main interaction with the private 
sphere in Helmand was through the militia program. This was drastically expanded in 1990 
after the Tanai coup in March, alongside a commensurate reduction in size of the 
professional police. In Helmand, many of the police commanders simply left the police and 
became militia leaders, demonstrating the importance of the private sphere. This occurred at 
the same as ‘Hizb’ and ‘Khalq’ joined in a secret (ideological) alliance in Helmand: they 
became the ‘government’. Yet on a national level, the Khalqis were purged from the 
government and Hizb were very much the opposition.1680 The lack of unitary, institutional 
coherence at a national level in the government allowed an alternative set of alliances to 
flourish in Helmand: the national government was forced to accept these facts on-the-
ground.  
 
This dynamic only became more pronounced when the Najibullah government totally 
collapsed. At this point Helmand effectively became self-governed by local groups and 
leaders in a shifting mosaic of anti-Rasoul alliances. The collapse of the public sphere leads 
to a very important private sphere dynamic in Helmand: the cyclical, private sphere tribal 
shuras. Each tribe comes together, discusses a way forward, and facilitates reconciliation 
between those members who have previously been on ‘opposite’ sides during conflict (in this 
case, the jihad). It was the reassertion of the private sphere, in the face of the collapse of the 
public. However, peace was not to come: in-fighting between different mujahidin groups 
occurred, including between mujahidin and communist commanders who were together part 
of the Rabbani-led mujahidin ‘government’ (e.g. Khano, Akhwaendi and Ismail Khan). That 
is, the public, unitary nature of the government had completely broken down. Yet, one of the 
few things that the Rabbani government did in an institutional, bureaucratic way was to issue 
land documents, legitimising many land thefts of the previous decade: these documents (and 
the interaction that they represent) are still causing conflict now. Eventually, these anti-
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Rasoul alliances collapsed and Rasoul became ‘Provincial Governor’ for a brief sojourn, 
before dying and handing over to his brother, Ghaffour.  
 
Shortly after, in 1994, the rise of the Taliban movement represented the reassertion of the 
public sphere in the Helmandi story. The Taliban were a public organisation with a strong 
ideology, based upon social order and Islam.1681 But, that ideology was combined with an 
excellent knowledge of local politics. For example, before coming to Helmand, they arranged 
secret meetings with Rais Baghrani (an element of Ghaffour’s coalition ‘government’) in 
order to arrange his defection. Once implemented, and control of Gereshk ensued, Ghaffour 
was approached and offered autonomy in Musa Qala in return for vacating Lashkar Gah. He 
was then pushed out of Musa Qala. These tactics were repeated all over Helmand, until the 
major mujahidin commanders were either disarmed and subdued, or forced into exile.  
 
Once established in power, the Taliban’s knowledge of the private sphere allowed them to 
construct a subtle, intelligent political framework that kept Helmand relatively conflict-free for 
almost seven years. In some districts, for example Nahr-e Saraj, previous Harakat networks 
were empowered at the expense of Hizb ones, yet in other areas (Garmsir, for instance) 
Hizb commanders and networks (minority ones at that) were empowered to enable the 
control that was appropriate in that district. What is more, individuals were recruited into the 
Taliban even from those communities that were not well represented in the movement. For 
instance, Murtaza from the Kharoti in Shin Kalay was recruited. He came from one of the 
smallest of the six clans in the village thus allowing the Taliban a loyal member in a village 
that had been previously dominated by either Hizb or the communists. These dynamics 
demonstrate a clear interaction between the public and private spheres, but demonstrate 
that when a public organisation has good knowledge of the private sphere, it is able to 
manipulate the conflict dynamics (in this case, supress them—a key tenet of Taliban 
policy).1682 
 
The collapse of the Taliban movement in the face of US bombing marked another twist in the 
Helmandi narrative and represents the assertion of a different public sphere based on a very 
different ideology. The new Karzai-led government was based upon (among other things) 
democracy, human rights and equality for women.1683 The Helmandi tribes marked the 
change by re-enacting tribal shuras. As before, these focussed on reconciliation and the 
unity of the tribe (the private group) in the face of a massive change in the public sphere.  
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The new government in Helmand, ‘led’ by Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, was in reality a 
loose coalition of local power-brokers, some of whom were antagonistic. Whilst the 
government in Kabul was (very) slowly institutionalising with international help,1684 the 
government in Helmand was dominated by private individuals and interests. The four major 
powerbrokers who made up the government in Helmand—Sher Mohammad, Mir Wali, Abdul 
Rahman Jan and Dad Mohammad—all relied on their interaction with the government and 
the US, who in Helmand were represented by the US special forces. The specialporce, as 
they were known by the Helmandis, acted in a highly institutional way. In the terms of this 
thesis, they understood Helmand through the public sphere—that is, a conflict between the 
government and the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This reliance on the public 
sphere was coupled with a very poor knowledge of the private political dynamics in 
Helmand. The specialporce was repeatedly manipulated by the four powerbrokers into 
attacking their local enemies (including each other), but each action was framed using the 
labels of the public sphere.  
 
This was shown nowhere clearer than the evidence surrounding the arrest of several 
Helmandis and their rendition to Guantanamo Bay prison camp in Cuba. Many of these 
cases were driven by petty denunciations of personal enemies; in some cases people were 
even handed over to US special forces purely so the bounty offered could be collected. This 
is a direct echo of Kalyvas’ focus on denunciations driving conflict.1685 But there were further 
interactions between the public sphere (the US special forces) and the private (the Helmandi 
powerbrokers) in the form of the raising of local militias. These too were guided by local 
‘intelligence’ and resulted in communities outside of the government patronage network 
being targeted and harassed—often with the US’ unknowing support. The behaviour of the 
US special forces, driven by their high levels of ignorance of Helmandi society allowed the 
local powerbrokers to shape the conflict for the first decade of the new millennium and 
demonstrates clear support for this thesis.  
 
Yet other elements of the international intervention were seriously manipulated by the private 
politics of Helmand. The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process, for 
instance, heavily targeted Mir Wali (at the instigation of Sher Mohammad). This process was 
yet further corrupted when Haji Kadus manipulated the US to gain their support—thus 
pushing the larger side of the tribal divide in Malgir over towards the Taliban. In sum, the 
DDR process was meant to strengthen the government by removing armed groups and 
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replacing them with a national army,1686 but local actors, who needed the support of at least 
one public organisation, simply switched sides and ‘joined’ the Taliban. The Taliban 
resurgence was a clear public-private interaction. This dynamic was broadened when Sher 
Mohammad’s commanders and men ‘joined’ the Taliban in 2006 and Abdul Rahman’s in 
2008. In reality, they were simply fighting the coalition under the excuse of the ‘Taliban’. The 
private dynamics dictated the conflict: Sher Mohammad was fighting because he had been 
removed from the governorship and Abdul Rahman because his poppy had been eradicated. 
Labelling their men ‘Taliban’ does not explain their actions in terms of an ideological 
attachment to, say, the sharia law that was offered by the Taliban. It is also worthy of note 
that Sher Mohammad and Abdul Rahman did not only manipulate the foreigners; they also 
deceived the Afghan government as to their positioning and intentions.  
 
The manipulation of public organisations who did not understand the private sphere 
continued with the arrival of the British in 2006. The private sphere of Helmandi politics was 
virtually unknown to the British when they arrived.1687 Their deployment to the north of the 
province, in contradiction to their original plan,1688 was at the insistence of President Karzai 
and Provincial Governor Daud, who were, in turn, gaining their information from local 
powerbrokers—it appears highly likely that the national-level government in Afghanistan was 
poorly informed and as a result, manipulated. A key example here is the accord signed in 
Musa Qala to allow for the withdrawal of British troops, and their replacement by a local 
security force. This local force was composed of anti-Sher Mohammad elements, thus he 
attempted to derail the deal. Eventually, the ‘Taliban’ took over and when the opportunity 
arose to accept the defection of a Taliban commander, Abdul Salam, both Karzai and the 
British were keen. Unfortunately, there was some confusion as to which Abdul Salam was 
attempting to defect, and certainly the British and most probably Karzai did not have the 
local knowledge required to dominate the interaction between public and private. This 
allowed local personal interests to dominate the deal, rather than it representing the switch 
from Taliban control to Afghan government control that was painted in the press.1689 
 
It was at this point that it started to become clear that Sher Mohammad was playing both 
sides. As well as being a presidentially-appointed Senator in Kabul, he was also heavily 
supporting the Taliban—leading some Taliban delgai commanders to paint him as a mahaz 
commander. Clearly the Taliban were aware that Sher Mohammad was a Senator, but was 
Karzai aware of the degree to which Sher Mohammad was supporting the ‘Taliban’ in 
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Helmand? Either way, the thesis is proven: if he was not aware, that represents the private 
sphere’s opacity allowing it to shape the conflict. On the other hand, if Karzai was aware of 
Sher Mohammad’s perfidy, yet chose to ignore it because Sher Mohammad is part of 
Karzai’s tribal coalition in the south, conceptually it is the same as if Karzai were not aware 
of it. 
 
Slowly, elements of the public sphere began to understand Helmand. Perhaps the earliest 
attempt was made by Michael Semple, an Irishman, who was acting as a representative for 
the EU in Afghanistan. Working with MP Jabbar Qahraman and the British in Helmand, he 
understood that many of the ‘Taliban’ in Nahr-e Saraj were actually unemployed fighters 
from the disbanded 93rd division (as were many of the ‘police’). A deal was constructed that 
would allow reintegration of those ‘Taliban’ into the ‘police’—in reality reuniting them with 
their former colleagues. Unfortunately, another element of the private sphere—the Provincial 
Governor’s greed—scuppered the deal. Depressingly, this knowledge of the dynamics in 
Nahr-e Saraj was forgotten and had to be rediscovered in 2010: even efficient ‘first-world’ 
institutions find it hard to retain knowledge of the private sphere (i.e. about people) when 
there are regular changes in their own personal.1690 
 
The British slowly began to switch their focus to central Helmand, starting with Nad-e Ali. 
After a military operation in December 2008 that was little-informed by the private sphere, 
they slowly began to understand the different private groups and actors in that district. This 
was reinforced by the District Community Council where both ‘Taliban’ communities and 
‘government’ communities were brought together. The improved British knowledge allowed 
them to ‘play’ the private sphere to a degree, but their knowledge was never quite good 
enough. For example, the British adopted a practice of leaking information to certain elders 
so that it would get back to the ‘Taliban’. This was so that they could move into an area; 
begin strengthening the Afghan government institutions and start developing the 
infrastructure and services. This was unfortunately interpreted by Helmandis as evidence 
that the UK were working with the Taliban. On other occasions, the British unwittingly allied 
themselves with one community against another. 
 
The Taliban too have attempted to reform themselves. Starting in 2008/9 the organisation 
began to further institutionalise itself under its nezami—meaning military or organised—
system. This failed to achieve its full aims, and the Helmandi Taliban has remained stuck in 
a hybrid between its two organisational systems (nezami and mahaz). This can be put down 
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to the strength of the Helmandi private sphere, which has been particularly reinforced by 
money from the opium trade. But, more importantly for this thesis, there is tentative evidence 
that even the ISI and the Taliban do not fully understand the private sphere of conflict in 
Afghanistan. This is supported by other evidence in the thesis: namely the destruction of 
Shin Kalay school discussed in chapter 5. 
 
The British eventually began to reach the limit of what they could do with their limited force 
(even though it was eventually to rise to ten thousand troops in Helmand). This led a vast 
increase in the number of US troops in the province, mostly as part of the US ‘surge’.1691 As 
with each new force that comes into the province, the new US forces understood the conflict 
in terms of the public sphere—that is, the government versus the Taliban. By this point, both 
US and British forces were following counterinsurgency doctrine that understands the 
population as a prize to be won by two competing ideologies.1692 However, as this thesis has 
extensively shown, the private sphere of interpersonal dynamics, rather than the public 
sphere of competing ideologies, shapes and drives conflict—particularly in the face of less 
than perfect knowledge of the private sphere by the public organisations involved. This is 
well exemplified by the US aim of renovating the Kajaki dam in order to demonstrate to the 
Afghan population that the Afghan government could provide for them. Unfortunately, local 
Alizai politics, concerns about poppy eradication, and longing for their own ‘Zamindawar’ 
canal, interacted with Iranian desires to keep the Helmand’s waters flowing to the Iranian 
Sistan region, to drive resistance to the American plans.  
 
Another major aspect of the ‘counterinsurgency surge’ was the targeting program—attempts 
to capture or kill ‘Taliban’ commanders.1693 This was based on the concept of ‘decapitating 
the Taliban on the battlefield by removing their commanders’ who were ‘terrorising’ the 
Afghan population.1694 However, US and British ignorance about the position of these 
Taliban commanders in the private sphere of Helmandi politics meant that they often drove 
communities away from the government or the coalition, or precluded any potential 
reconciliations or defections.  
 
In 2010, the western allies announced that they would be leaving Afghanistan in 2014.1695 
Conceptually similar to the Soviet withdrawal, militias were organised across the country, 
including Helmand. These were established alongside a reintegration program and an 
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enhanced effort to train the Afghan police and army. The allies were wary of the Soviet 
experience of militias, and limited them in size and number: they were more akin to a village 
defence force. Conceptually however, they took the place of the reintegration program—
many of the militia ‘troopers’ were actually former ‘Taliban’. This repeated formation of 
different militias in Helmand represents a key interaction between the public and the private 
spheres. All of these changes ushered in the third round of Helmandi tribal shuras, which 
were continuing at the time of research (summer 2012). The outcome of these, and whether 
they will be more successful than their previous incarnations in 1991/2 and 2002, is yet to be 
determined.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis has analysed last thirty-four years of conflict in Helmand. 
Throughout, it has shown that the interaction between the public and private spheres has 
shaped the conflict dynamics. Further it has demonstrated that when the private sphere is 
opaque to the public sphere, or public organisations choose to ignore what they understand 
of the private sphere, the private sphere has primacy in dictating the interaction between 
public and private.  
 
7.3a - Implications for policy 
The main implication for policy makers contained here is to understand the private, 
interpersonal dynamics in any society in which they choose to intervene. Without this 
understanding, no amount of equipment or manpower will suffice: the intervention will fail to 
achieve its aims. Above all else, and to paraphrase Clausewitz, the sine qua non of fighting 
is to understand the war in which one is engaged.  
 
The West operates in an institutional manner: that is one of its great strengths. The evidence 
presented here suggests that some of the most professional, institutional organisations in 
the West have lost their ability to operate in the interpersonal, private sphere, particularly in 
foreign countries. How to support those institutions, or more accurately the people within 
those institutions, to understand the private sphere of conflict in foreign countries is an 
exceptionally difficult challenge. That is, institutions are designed to de-personalise 
politics,1696 but the ability to understand interpersonal dynamics is exactly what those 
institutions are now required to foster if they wish to be able to shape conflict dynamics in 
places like in Helmand. 
 
                                                          
1696
 Douglas North et al., Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the Problems of 
Development, Policy Research Working Paper Series (New York, 2007): 21-4. 
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Beyond these conceptual issues there are also several practical difficulties. Language ability 
in esoteric, local languages has long been recognised as the key enabling function that 
allows external institutions to interact with the private sphere.1697 The depth of this research, 
for example, rests more than anything else on the author’s Pushtu language ability. That 
language ability, in turn, rested on extended periods in Afghanistan (twenty months spread 
over three and a half years). It seems reasonable that the best way around the problems of 
‘institutional memory’ described by Sarah Chayes are to leave individuals in post for the 
longest periods of time possible.1698 The most obvious example of this being successful is 
that of the British Indian Political Service’s Officers, who would remain in-post for ten years, 
before their first period of extra-country leave, during which they were expected to find a 
wife. They would then return, with her, for a further ten years’ service.1699 The British Army, 
however, currently operates on six month tours. A balance probably needs to be struck 
between these two extremes.  
 
In addition to the requirement for language skills, there is a need to make sure that the right 
people within those organisations learn the local languages: those who speak the local 
languages must be empowered to shape and influence understanding and policy. In the 
British Army, this requires a change to the career profiles of its professionals: officers and 
soldiers with language skills do not operate in high-level command appointments. To 
rephrase, those individuals who take the time to learn difficult languages are deemed to 
have taken too much time out of their career stream to promote to high levels of command. 
Policymakers who deem these recommendations too onerous should reconsider the 
evidence presented here that the Afghan government, the ISI and the post-2001 Taliban all 
had problems understanding the private sphere of conflict in Helmand leading to their 
inability to shape it. 
 
Helmandi politics is highly stochastic and rests on multiple, fractured, inter-personal 
dynamics. Yet, there are several dynamics that wind their way through the narrative 
presented here. Section 1.2—Pushtun society at war—described the timeless quality of 
some of the dynamics inherent in Pashtun society, and the evidence presented in this thesis 
supports that analysis. Leaders and groups regularly aggregate and dissociate in a reflection 
of the processes of fusion and fission recognised by Louis Dupree.1700 This dynamic is also 
reflected in the extensive and repetitive side-switching that occurs in Helmand: perhaps the 
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 Charles Allen, Soldier Sahibs: The Men Who Made the North-West Frontier (London, 2001): 264. 
1698
 Chayes, Punishment: 180. 
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most extreme example of this is Rais Baghrani, who has gone from ‘being’1701 Khalqi, 
Harakat, Hizb, Jamiat, non-affiliated, Taliban, Karzai and Karzai/Taliban at the same time. 
What is so strange is not that Helmandis forsake ideology as a way of organising 
themselves, but that outsiders persist in using ideology to categorise them in the face of its 
obvious limitations! 
 
Moreover, the evidence presented here describing the same lineages locked into feuds over 
different public spheres—for example, Habibullah, the communist-now-democrat official and 
Dr Jailani, the Hizb-now-Talib leader—show the weakness of ideology and the strength of 
the private sphere. The private sphere is rooted in Helmandi society and has a much more 
timeless quality than the shifting, contextual public sphere. Finally, the cyclical tribal 
shuras—in 1992, 2002 and 2012—marking significant changes in the public, ideological 
environment are one of the most important dynamics within this thesis as they demonstrate 
with the utmost clarity that the extant public sphere will pass, and will be replaced with 
another one, but the private sphere will remain very similar. In sum, there are elements of 
Helmandi society that could have been studied in advance of any intervention, as a guide to 
what may have been likely to occur. 
 
7.3b – Beyond Helmand: general findings 
This thesis was deliberately focussed on Helmand. Indeed, it was only by focussing on one, 
relatively small area that the required depth of understanding about the private sphere of 
conflict could be generated. A key question remains as to whether the findings can be 
generalised to the Afghan national level, or even to conflicts elsewhere in the world.  
 
The evidence presented here suggests that the basis for the Helmandi conflict is tripartite. 
Firstly, it is a significantly factionalised society (by tribe, jihadi affiliation(s), land ownership, 
settler-indigenous dynamics, desertification status, access to government 
patronage/protection, position with respect to the first Taliban movement, and so on). This is 
exacerbated by the presence of significant resources (i.e. opium) at ground level that are 
available to many or most of these factions. The third causal factor is repeated interference 
in this internal conflict by external, public actors (e.g. the Soviets, the Pakistanis and 
Westerners). I have termed this tripartite division the ‘groups—resources—external 
influence’ dynamic in previous published work: almost all acts of conflict in Helmand over the 
last thirty-four years can be traced to a combination of these three factors, or lenses.1702  
 
                                                          
1701
 In the Spanish sense of ‘estar’ rather than ‘ser’. 
1702
 Martin, Brief history: 7-8. 
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Although an un-scaled qualitative framework, this can be used as a ‘rule of thumb’ to assess 
whether the Afghan national conflict or other international conflicts will exhibit the 
characteristics identified in this thesis. The framework also has the advantage of having a 
basis in much of the civil war scholarship outlined in section 1.1d. This includes work on 
ancient hatreds and the importance of groups,1703 Collier and Hoeffler’s work on greed 
(resources) and grievance (group factionalisation)1704 and their relationship to external 
intervention.1705 Clearly however, the following extrapolations need to be theorised and 
tested robustly by future scholars.  
 
Thus, for Afghanistan, it is widely recognised that at the national level there is significant 
factionalisation,1706 as well as the presence of significant resources spread throughout the 
country1707 and the repeated interventions of foreigners are well known.1708 Therefore, it can 
be argued that whilst Helmand may represent an extreme case of the concepts and 
dynamics described here, extrapolation of these findings to the Afghan national level is valid. 
Similarly, at the international level, there are several examples that conform to the groups, 
resources, external influence dynamic: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the 
most obvious example. There, all three factors exist in abundance: a significantly tribally-
fractured society,1709 vast resources1710 and repeated interference from neighbouring 
countries.1711 In fact, a recent study by Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 
identifies very similar dynamics to those identified in this study.1712 These generalisations 
need to be tested repeatedly to ensure their robustness: if shown not to be disproven, it is 
hoped that they act as a guide for states considering intervening in internal wars in other 
countries. 
 
7.4 – Implications for theory 
To the nations that comprise NATO, the Afghan campaign centres on countering an 
insurgency.1713 The evidence presented here strongly supports the conclusion that 
Afghanistan is still suffering from a highly local, multi-focal civil war. However, NATO 
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 Gat, War: 50. 
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 Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War: 565-72. 
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 Berdal, Beyond Greed and Grievance: 688. 
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counterinsurgency doctrine heavily emphasises the Mao-style insurgency, or classic 
insurgency—that is, the importance of ideology to insurgent groups in allowing them to take 
the offensive.1714 For example, the British Army definition of an insurgency is ‘an organised, 
violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established 
authority’.1715 The evidence presented here suggests that most of the ‘insurgents’ that fought 
the British and US armies in Helmand were not infused with revolutionary ideology; rather, 
they were defending their homes, or their interests (e.g. drugs, land), or simply aligning 
themselves with an outside public organisation in order to protect themselves from local 
feuds. Furthermore, both US and British counterinsurgency doctrines treat concepts of 
factionalisation as peripheral rather than central. Yet in Helmand, the opposite appears to be 
true. Factionalism is a defining feature of the conflict, on both the ‘government’ and the ‘non-
government’ side. Ignorance of these issues, the importance of which was highlighted two 
and half thousand years ago, is shown by Sun Tzu who wrote, ‘if you know the enemy and 
know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles’.1716  
 
This thesis has offered significant primary data in support of Kaylvas’ argument that violence 
in civil wars is caused by an interaction between the public and private spheres.1717 Kalyvas, 
too, emphasises the importance of the local, and the private, because it is lacking from the 
literature on civil wars.1718 This data demonstrate clearly the vital nature of local knowledge 
in a civil war. Kalyvas clearly identifies a bias towards the importance of ideology in macro-
historical accounts.1719 When one compares the vast body of literature of Afghanistan1720 to 
the data presented here, it can be demonstrated that the same bias, exacerbated by western 
categorisation of the conflict discussed above, is occurring in our descriptions of this war. 
However here, one might offer an avenue for theoretical enquiry. How should future scholars 
categorise and investigate those individuals in public organisations who are acting according 
to (and motivated by) their own private interests, versus those who are acting (and 
motivated) in-line with the espoused ideology of that organisation? This idea is at the core of 
the findings presented here and merits further empirical investigation. 
 
Moreover, Kalyvas focusses on denunciations as a main mechanism of interaction between 
the public and the private.1721 The data here presented shows that there are a significant 
number of varied interactions between the public and private spheres. This is a clear 
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extension of Kalyvas’ work. Scholars must now identify and categorise different types of 
interaction and investigate how they shape conflict. How does, for example, the buying of 
votes in a flawed election impact on conflict as compared to the raising of local militias? 
Does bribery cause more violence than misdirected development funding? How much 
understanding of the private sphere do external interveners need in order to protect 
themselves from being manipulated? These are some of the questions that must be 
answered by future scholars. 
 
Finally, it is pertinent to focus on the presence of what the West might term conspiracy and 
rumour. The narrative described in chapter 6—that of the British working with the Taliban to 
destroy Helmand—is vital to understanding Helmand perspectives on the conflict. It was 
argued that it is a key manifestation of a public narrative that does not match the private 
understanding of their conflict that the Helmandis have.  Rumours have already been 
identified by scholars as important in Afghanistan:1722 understanding how rumours shape 
conflict, or reflect conflict, is a highly worthy avenue for future study. For future interveners, 
they must discern how to integrate rumours into their understanding and plans. Do they 
represent an ‘early warning system’ that the discordance between the public and the private 
is so great that the intervention is likely to fail? Do they demonstrate that the public 
organisation may not be having the effect on the conflict that they think they might be 
having? These questions offer a promising, if difficult, line of future study. 
 
7.5 - The future of conflict in Helmand 
Violence in some districts in Helmand, such as Nad Ali, has seen a massive drop over 2011 
and 2012,1723 even if overall levels of violence in the country are much higher than they were 
prior to the US surge.1724 In many cases, and pointed out to me by my interviewees, this is a 
numbers game. In some areas of Nad-e Ali there was an ISAF base on every road 
junction—in other words, the vast increase in ISAF forces treated very well the symptoms of 
the conflict, but it is yet to be seen whether this will translate into a similar treatment of the 
causes. Another key factor was recruitment of former ‘Taliban’ into the ALP, but this will work 
only so long as the ALPs are paid. There were less supplies too coming from Quetta, 
because of the switch to routing funds through the Peshawar shura. But perhaps the most 
important reason for the current drop in violence is that ISAF are going: the Helmandis have 
achieved their aim in a triumph of the private sphere due to ‘public’ ignorance. They are now 
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preparing for the next round, in what has so far proved to be a cyclical conflict of remarkable 
robustness. 
 
As when the Najibullah government was collapsing and the Taliban government was ousted, 
the Helmandis are looking to their tribal leadership to provide stability into the next era. 
Outside, public actors tend to separate groups of Helmandis and leaders by using patronage 
power, although they often think that this implies ideological loyalty. Now that those outsiders 
are moving on, it is time for the Helmand polity to morph back into its natural units, just as 
before, and reinforce kinship groups. This will continue until the next public organisation or 
narrative is able to coalesce groups of Helmandis around an ideological, and more 
importantly a patronage, banner. Then, as before, Helmandis will split and send their sons to 
the different sides, often to fight each other. This is the only way to ensure that the lineage, 
and the land associated with it, remains intact.  
 
Some outside observers—especially the Indian government—are worried that the Taliban 
will take over (or be given by ISAF and the Afghan government) areas like Helmand.1725 
They are only right to be worried if they mean by Taliban that Helmandis will begin once 
again to exert more control over their local areas. As shown here, the ‘Taliban’ are largely 
local, mainly motivated by fighting other Helmandis or resisting foreigners. Once the 
foreigners have left Helmand, many of those fighting them will go home, their work done. 
The underlying dynamics, however, will continue.  
 
The majority of the issues that drive the conflict have been de-prioritised by ISAF and will 
continue to drive low-level conflict for years to come: what is required is long-sighted, low-
level, comprehensive and fair dispute resolution. Beyond that, some issues whose roots lie 
in hundreds of years of complicated history—the Barakzai-Alizai power balance, for 
example—require yet further attention. Iran will continue to interfere in northern Helmand, as 
long as its concerns over the River Helmand’s water are ignored.  
 
The theft of desert land and the creation of a two-tier community inside and outside the 
canal-zone is a new dichotomy that has been created by this revolution of the Helmandi 
conflict. The thousands of tubewells that have been sunk in the desert are most probably 
lowering the water table. Judging by the continued complaints of Alizai leaders, there are 
already tens of thousands of people in northern Helmand who do not have enough water to 
survive comfortably. 
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Overall ISAF sought to strengthen the government in Helmand. They believed they were 
strengthening it against the Taliban, with the population stuck in-between, but unfortunately 
they were buffering the government against the population. The big players or families who 
have run the province over the last thirty years, largely those who rose to prominence during 
the jihad, are still running the province. The choice that the Afghan government now has, as 
every Afghan government has had over the last two hundred and fifty years, is whether to 
co-opt them or take them on.  
 
The ISAF intervention has shown that in the presence of another patronage network—the 
Taliban—they will just rearrange themselves on the ‘other’ side according to their local 
disputes. Now that ISAF is going, and the Afghan government is about to lose much of its 
combat power, co-option has already begun with, for example, the appointment of people 
such as Amir Mohammad Akhundzada as Governor of Uruzgan, or Hekmat, the son of Mir 
Wali to be Chief of Police in Sangin. A further, key question remains over what will happen 
with the Zakir-Sher Mohammad contacts, and whether this is a drive to assert their 
dominance over the south of Afghanistan. I see their negotiations as analogous to the 
‘Parcham’/‘Harakat’ and the ‘Hizb’/‘Khalq’ alignments in the early 1990s. An indicator of their 
intent would be whether they have arranged marriages between their families. Many of my 
interviewees felt that Helmand was heading for the third round of mujahidin ‘unity’ 
government.  
 
However, with the recent signing of strategic agreements with the western powers, India and 
China, it appears that the Afghan government will survive nationally once NATO withdraws 
most of its combat forces. Using the 1989–92 Najibullah government as a guide, as long as 
the funding remains the government will survive. But what will this look like in Helmand? A 
lot depends on the presidential election, currently scheduled for 2014. If the winner is 
another southern Pushtun, but from a different tribe to Karzai, then the tribal alliances 
currently in play in the south will shift, creating new dynamics. That aside, the Afghan 
government will have mostly the same interests in Helmand as before: Gereshk and Lashkar 
Gah must stay under government control, for trade and legitimacy, respectively. Outside 
those areas there will be different bespoke levels of control.  
 
In areas like Nad-e Ali, Marjeh and Nawa that, because of the canal system, prefer some 
input from the government, there will be government control in the District Centres and along 
the main roads; however, the villages will govern themselves, as they always have done. If 
they require anything from the government, they will go to it in the District Centre (not for 
nothing is the District Centre literally known as the hukomat or ‘government’ in Helmand). 
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They do not want the government to come to them. As before, the main service that they 
require from government is fair, impartial dispute resolution. Northern Helmand, by contrast, 
will be de facto independent with local district governors and police chiefs. They will fly the 
flag of the Afghan government and will swear nominal loyalty to the Afghan government, but 
it will be meaningless.  
 
These arrangements will last until the next injection of funds and ideology to Helmand 
causes the actors and groups to divide, once again, according to their private sphere: 
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Appendix 1: Interviewee descriptions 
 
1.1 On-the-record interviews 
 
These interviews were conducted with six prominent figures in the Helmandi story and one 
key British individual. They were conducted in Helmand, London and Kabul and their 
purpose was to gain an understanding of how these key protagonists felt and thought at 
particular junctures in Helmandi history. Here follows a brief self-reported biography of the 
individuals in question. Where appropriate I have added comments. 
 
Malem Mir Wali (Barakzai/Bayezai) — ‘MMW’ 
Mir Wali is fifty-eight from Malgir, Nahr-e Saraj. He went to primary school in Spin Masjid and 
then the ‘Lycee’ secondary in Lashkar Gah. He then went to teacher training college in 
Kandahar during which the Taraki revolution occurred. He completed a year of conscripted 
army service and then returned to Spin Masjid to teach at his old primary school. He taught 
for six months during which time the Soviets invaded. He began to fight under Shaed 
Mansour (Hizb). Shaed was martyred and he became commander, before rising to be in 
charge of Hizb in Malgir and the surrounds. In 1987 he accepted an offer from the Najib 
government and became a government militia commander. This was partly because he was 
under such pressure from Nasim Akhundzada. He stayed in the ‘government’ through the 
collapse of Hizb and then left when the ‘Hizb’/‘Khalq’ coalition fell apart in Lashkar Gah. He 
then worked with Rasoul, his erstwhile enemy, to defeat the Akhwaendi/Khano coalition and 
became Director of Culture and Information for Helmand. Was evicted by the Taliban in 1994 
and spent the next seven years fighting them all over the country. In 2001, managed to 
become the commander of the 93rd Division, Afghan Military Forces in Gereshk, with 
significant US special forces’ patronage. The division was disarmed and Mir Wali became a 
member of parliament in 2005. He ran for re-election in 2010, was disqualified for fraud, and 
managed to retain his seat through the intervention of Karzai. Currently lives in Kabul. 
 
Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (Alizai/Hassanzai) — ‘SMA’ 
Sher Mohammad is forty and from Nachai village, Kajaki. He spent his childhood in northern 
Helmand and attended a madrasah in Zamindawar. Other than that he is not that well 
educated (literate, but not very numerate). His first battle was against the Taliban when they 
took over Kajaki in 1994/5. He was twenty-two. After various attempts to regain Helmand, 
the family fled to Quetta, where they befriended Hamid Karzai. He was appointed Helmand’s 
Provincial Governor in 2001-5, when he was removed at British insistence before their 
deployment. His governorship was characterised by a turf war between the other major 
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commanders who made up the Helmandi government, and by predation on communities 
who had no way of defending themselves. Once removed by Karzai in 2005, he was 
appointed to the Senate in Kabul, where he has remained since. As well as being a senator 
he is a major supporter of the ‘Taliban’ in Helmand and he manipulates both government 
and Taliban actors to enhance his own drugs and power interests.  
 
Abdul Rahman Jan (Noorzai/Darzai/Parozai) — ‘ARJ’ 
Abdul Rahman is sixty. Born in Washir sub-district, he went to Shaepista school. When he 
was sixteen the family moved to Marjeh – they were one of the few families to move from 
within Helmand to the canal-zone. Upon completing school, he then served his conscription 
period during Daud’s era in the police in Shah-e Now, Kabul. At the Saur revolution he was 
imprisoned for four months, was freed and immediately began working under Mullah Baz 
Mohammad in ‘Harakat’. According to himself, when the ‘Hizb’-‘Harakat’ war began, he was 
disgusted and joined Etihad. Others comment that he spent the jihad swapping one party for 
another because he was able to get better supplies or more money. Two years later, he 
switched to Jamiat. At the time he was a petty commander with about fifteen men. He fought 
in several different alliances with other groups in the ‘government’ against Rasoul before 
switching to be on Rasoul’s side against the ‘government’. As that ‘government’ collapsed, 
he managed to take over some of its heavy weapons (from Khano) and established himself 
as the Deputy Chief of Police for Helmand. He fled when the Taliban came and eventually 
settled in Iran, from where he came in 2001 to retake Marjeh. He then became the provincial 
Chief of Police. During this tenure he became (in)famous for fighting the other commanders 
in government and oppressing defenceless communities in Helmand. Removed in 2005, 
Captain-General Abdul Rahman (as he is now), lives in Kabul. 
 
Hafizullah Khan (Barakzai/Omarkhanzai) — ‘Hafizullah’ 
Hafizullah is sixty and from Bolan. He went to school in Lashkar Gah and thence to study 
engineering at Kabul University, where he heard about Hekmatyar. Once the Saur revolution 
occurred he immediately went to Peshawar and met Hekmatyar. After training he returned to 
Helmand as the Hizb-e Islami Amir. Most people comment that he did not fight much, but 
preferred to ‘organise’. Once the communist state collapsed in 1992 Hafizullah went into 
partnership with Khano and became Provincial Governor. This soon collapsed and 
represents the highpoint in his ‘career’: he has never managed to attain a ‘government’ 
position since. He left Helmand during the Taliban period and was one of the first to re-
occupy Lashkar Gah once the Taliban left at the end of 2001. He was soon evicted by Sher 
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Jabbar Qahraman (Noorzai/Daudzai) — ‘Jabbar’ 
Jabbar is fifty-two. He finished school in 1980 and joined Hizb-e Islami for a year. Then he 
‘decided to join the government for the growth of Afghanistan…[he] could see that Pakistan 
just wanted to ruin Afghanistan’. He then went through army officer training and was sent to 
Maiwand as a platoon commander. He spent the entire war in Maiwand and was made a 
Qahraman, or hero, of Afghanistan in 1986 for having the highest amount of government 
control in a district in the whole of Afghanistan. Many say that this was because he cut deals 
with all of his mujahidin opponents, and supported them with government patronage. As the 
Soviets left, he was then made a Captain-General and given control of most of the south. A 
close ally of Najib, he then joined Hizb when the government collapsed. Shortly after he went 
to Russian and worked in a market as a stall holder. During the Karzai-era, he worked for 
UNAMA for four years, during which time he allegedly smuggled weapons into Afghanistan 
from Russia. He was then elected to parliament where he remains. He currently lives in 
Kabul. 
 
Habibullah Khan (Noorzai/Ghorezai) — ‘Habibullah’ 
Habibullah is sixty-one and from Garmsir. He served in the army around the time of Daud’s 
revolution (1973) and then returned to Garmsir to become a teacher. He claims he never 
joined the PDPA, which others contest. Joining the police in 1988, he served as the Nawa 
District Deputy Chief of Police. He then served as a battalion second-in-command in Lashkar 
Gah and as the District Chief of Police for Khan Eshin. During this period he visited Russia 
several times for training. Once the Soviets left in 1988/9 he served as Chief of Police in 
Nad-e Ali, which he describes as the worst period in his life. They were under constant 
attack. He eventually was forced to abandon his post and reinvented himself as a militia 
commander. As the mujahidin progressively took control he fled to Pakistan, returning only 
once the Karzai government was in power. He immediately joined the police and served as 
Chief of Police in Garmsir and Gereshk, before retiring. Called out of retirement he was 
made District Governor in Nad-e Ali in 2008, a position that he still holds. He currently lives 
in Lashkar Gah. 
 
Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles KCMG LVO (English) — ‘SCC’ 
Sherard is fifty-seven and was born in London. Educated in Classics at Oxford University, he 
was a career British diplomat. He speaks Arabic, Hebrew and French. He has served in 
Egypt, the United States, Hong Kong, France, Israel and Saudi Arabia. He then became UK 
ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2007 to April 2009 and served as UK Special 
Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan from mid-2009 to mid-2010. He now works for 
BAE systems as International Business Development Director. He currently lives in London. 
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A1.2 Anonymous ‘notable’ interviews (conducted by me either in Helmand, Kabul or 
London) 
 
001 District Governor Nahr-e Saraj, Karzai-era 
002 Ex-Mahaz commander, Lashkar Gah 
003 Barakzai ex-Mahaz commander, Lashkar Gah 
004 Alizai Helmand government official, Karzai-era 
005 Ex-Jamiat commander, Nawa 
006 Chief of Police Helmand Province, Karzai-era 
007 Kharoti ex-Hizb-e Islami commander, Nad-e Ali 
008 Noorzai businessman, Nad-e Ali 
009 Son of communist-era Helmand Khad Chief 
010 ANP Lt Col, Helmand 
011 Ex-Harakat commander 
012 Chief of Police, Nahr-Saraj, Karzai-era 
013 Alizai elder 
014 Provincial council member, Karzai-era 
015 Ex-Harakat commander, Nad-e Ali 
016 Ex-Jamiat commander, Marjeh 
017 Ex-Hizb-e Islami commander, Nad-e Ali 
018 Barakzai ex-militia leader, Babaji 
019 ANP major, Karzai-era 
020 Member of Khad, communist era 
021 Barakzai notable, Bolan 
022 Barakzai ex-Hizb-e Islami commander, Lashkar Gah 
023 Kharoti tribal leader 
024 Ex-communist police officer, Nahr-e Saraj 
025 Sayed from Now Zad 
026 Jailor, Helmand 
027 Barakzai tribesman, Nahr-e Saraj 
028 Alizai shopkeeper from Now Zad 
029 Noorzai ex-Khalqi, Nahr-e Saraj 
030 Chief of Police, Nahr-Saraj, Karzai-era 
031 Alikozai businessman, Gereshk 
032 Kharoti ex-Hizb-e Islami commander 
033 Noorzai tribesman 
034 Ishaqzai village chief  
035 Kharoti ex-Khalqi official 
036 Chief of Police, Nahr-e Saraj, Karzai-era 
037 NDS officer, Helmand 
038 NDS officer, Helmand 
039 Senior Noorzai tribal leader 
040 ALP commander, Nahr-e Saraj 
041 Noorzai ex-Etihad commander, central Helmand 
042 Chief of Police, Nad-e Ali, Karzai era 
043 Ex-Khalqi militia commander 
044 Head of HAVA, communist-era 
045 Parchami cadre 
046 Achakzai shopkeeper, Lashkar Gah 
047 NGO worker 
048 Ex-Khalqi police commander 
049 Ex-Khalqi police commander 
050 Kharoti elder, Nad-e Ali 
051 Nejad fighter, Nad-e Ali 
052 Mahaz fighter, Nahr-e Saraj 
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053 Baluch elder, Garmsir 
054 Provincial Chief of Police, Karzai-era 
055 Barakzai village elder, Nahr-e Saraj 
056 Ex-Mahaz commander, Now Zad 
057 Ex-professional army officer in 93rd Division 
058 Schoolteacher, Nad-e Ali 
059 Landowner, Marjeh 
060 Hotak elder, Garmsir 
061 Ishaqzai ex-Mahaz commander 
062 Prominent USSOF militia leader, Nahr-e Saraj 
063 Former engineer on the canal projects. Spoke good English 
064 Ex-Etihad commander 
065 Kharoti professional, Nad-e Ali 
066 Former Taliban mullah (1996–2001 government) 
067 ALP commander, Nad-e Ali 
068 Ex-Hizb-e Islami commander, Nahr-e Saraj 
069 Alikozai scribe, Sangin 
070 Alizai ex-Harakat commander 
071 Ex-Harakat commander, Nad-e Ali 
072 Noorzai tribesman, Nad-e Ali 
073 Former USSOF militia leader, Nahr-e Saraj 
074 Scion of important Barakzai family 
075 Barakzai mullah, Nahr-e Saraj 
076 Chief of Police of Helmand, Karzai-era 
077 Junior ANP officer, Helmand 
078 ANA officer with five years’ experience in Helmand 
079 USSOF militia commander, Nahr-e Saraj 
080 Member of Khad, communist-era 
081 Helmandi MP 
082 Helmandi senator 
083 Helmandi MP 
084 Senior Noorzai tribal leader 




A1.3 Anonymous ‘notable’ interviews (conducted by Afghan researchers in Helmand) 
 
086 Ex-jihadi commander (Nad-e Ali) 
087 Alizai/Khalozai elder (Musa Qala) 
088 Achakzai elder (Nahr-e Saraj) 
089 Popalzai elder (Now Zad) 
090 Elder (Now Zad) 
091 Educated person (Garmsir) 
092 Elder (Sangin) 
093 Alizai elder (Musa Qala) 
094 Elder (Nad-e Ali) 
095 Alikozai elder (Sangin) 
096 Hassanzai elder (Musa Qala) 
097 Hassanzai elder (Musa Qala) 
098 Suleimankhel elder (Nad-e Ali) 
099 Madrassa teacher (Sangin) 
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A1.4 Anonymous ISAF interviews (conducted by me in Helmand or London) 
 
101 ISAF civilian advisor 
102 ISAF intelligence officer 
103 ISAF officer 
104 ISAF civilian advisor 
105 ISAF intelligence officer 
106 ISAF officer 
107 ISAF infantry officer 
108 ISAF intelligence officer 
109 ISAF ISTAR officer 
110 ISAF battlegroup officer 
111 ISAF officer 
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A1.5 Anonymous ‘Taliban’ (TB) interviews (conducted by Afghan researchers in 
Helmand) 
 
201 TB commander in Nad-e Ali 
202 TB commander in Nad-e Ali 
203 TB commander in Marjeh 
204 Alikozai TB commander in Sangin 
205 TB fighter in Garmsir 
206 TB council member 
207 Mil trainer of TB in Garmsir 
208 TB fighter in Garmsir 
209 Alizai TB commander in Nad-e Ali 
210 Barakzai TB fighter/facilitator in Marjeh 
211 Ishaqzai TB commander in Marjeh 
212 Barakzai TB commander in Marjeh 
213 TB commander in Marjeh 
214 TB commander in Sangin 
215 Alizai TB commander in Musa Qala 
216 TB commander in Sangin 
217 Alizai TB commander in Musa Qala 
218 Alizai TB commander in Kajaki 
219 Noorzai TB sub-commander in Kajaki 
220 Ishaqzai TB commander in Now Zad 
221 Alizai TB commander in Musa Qala 
222 Kharoti TB commander in Nad-e Ali 
223 Alikozai TB commander in Nahr-e Saraj 
224 Noorzai TB commander in Musa Qala 
225 Alizai TB commander in Musa Qala 
226 Ishaqzai TB commander in Sangin 
227 Barakzai TB commander in Sangin 
228 Kharoti TB commander in Nad-e Ali 
229 Barakzai TB commander in Nahr-e Saraj 
230 Noorzai TB commander in Nahr-e Saraj 
231 Alizai TB commander in Now Zad 
232 Alizai TB commander in Nahr-e Saraj 
233 Alizai TB commander in Garmsir 
234 Popalzai TB commander in Sangin 
235 Popalzai TB commander in Now Zad 
236 Ishaqzai TB commander in Garmsir 
237 TB commander in Marjeh 
238 Barakzai TB commander in Sangin 
239 Alizai TB commander in Kajaki 
240 Alizai TB commander in Garmsir 
241 Alizai TB commander in Kajaki 
242 TB commander in Kajaki 
243 Noorzai TB commander in Marjeh 
244 TB commander in Nad-e Ali 
245 Ishaqzai TB commander in Marjeh 
246 Alizai TB commander in Musa Qala 
247 Ishaqzai TB commander in Now Zad 
248 Popalzai TB commander in Now Zad 
249 Noorzai TB commander in Nahr-e Saraj 
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 Division Afghan army division based in Gereshk 
during the Soviet period and headquartered on Artillery 
Hill. This then became a mujahidin organisation with the 
collapse of the government. The term fell into disuse 
during the Taliban-era. The division was revived under 
the Karzai-era, with the same designation, and part of 
the Afghan Militia Forces, before being disbanded again 
under DDR. See Appendix 5 for commanders. 
 
Abdul Agha (Haji) Head of the slightly smaller Barakzai 
clan confederation in Malgir. This confederation 
consisted of the Shamezai, Nekazai, Yedarzai and 
Masezai. They were generally allied with Harakat during 
the jihad, the Taliban during the Taliban government, but 
then the government in the Karzai-era. 
 
Abdul Ahad (Mullah) Leader of the Ishaqzai in Now Zad 
during the jihad. They were allied with Harakat and then 
the Taliban. Helmand’s Chief of Police under Rasoul 
(1993-4). 
 
Abdul Ahad Helmandwal Noorzai/Gurg. From Loy 
Bagh. Is Shah Nazar Helmandwal’s nephew. Fought 
under Etihad’s label during the jihad, but the family was 
split across the government/mujahidin divide. First 
leader of Nad-e Ali District Council in 2009. See 
Appendix 4 for family tree.  
 
Abdul Khaleq Leader of Ishaqzai/Mistereekhel. From 
Qala-e Gaz. Was killed during the jihad, but his sons 
Qari Hazrat, Lala Jan and Mamouk led the clan, fought 
ISAF and smuggled opium. 
 
Abdul Qayoum Zakir Alizai/Khalozai/Arabzai. Rais 
Baghrani sub-commander when Baghrani was 93
rd
 
Division commander. Joined Taliban with Baghrani, rose 
up the ranks. Eventually captured by Americans and 
spent six years in Guantanamo (G008). At time of writing 
is head of the Taliban nezami system for the south of 
Afghanistan. See Appendix 6. 
 
Abdul Rahman Jan Noorzai/Darzai/Parozai. Petty 
commander during the jihad. Originally in Harakat, he 
then worked under Jamiat, and possibly Hizb along the 
way. Born in Now Zad from a non-prestigious blood line; 
gained prominence through cutting a deal with Khano 
when he surrendered, accepting his heavy weapons. 
Helmand Deputy Chief of Police under Rasoul/Abdul 
Ahad. Chief of Police from 2001-5, where he was 
rumoured to have stolen up to 20,000 jereebs of land in 
Marjeh. Not to be confused with Abdul Rahman Khan 
(Alizai). See Appendix 1. 
 
Abdul Rahman Khan Alizai/Khalozai. Originally from 
Kajaki. Began allied to Mahaz then switched to Hizb for 
more funding. Forced out of Kajaki in 1987 by Nasim 
Akhundzada, and then from Malgir by Nasim’s brother, 
Rasoul. Eventually settled in exile in Norway, where he 
was still living in 2012. Not to be confused with Abdul 
Rahman Jan (Noorzai). 
 
Abdul Raziq Barakzai. Hizb commander during jihad. 
Was then a commander in the 93
rd
 Division and became 
a militia commander. When the division was DDR’d 
managed to enter the police and, with American 
patronage, became the head of the District Response 
Team (a US SF ‘SWAT’ team). This patronage allowed 
him, despite being only a sergeant, to become the de 
facto head of the Nahr-e Saraj police in the mid-2000s. 
  
Abdul Salam (Mullah) Alizai/Khalozai. Brother of Zakir. 
Was responsible for the Taliban nezami system in 
northern Helmand until killed on 3 June 2012. Not to be 
confused with Abdul Salam (Noorzai) and Mullah Salam 
(Alizai/Pirzai). 
 
Abdul Salam Noorzai. From Now Zad. Hizb commander 
and the major Taliban commander. Rose to become 
commander of the Herat Corps during the Taliban-era. 
Not to be confused with Abdul Salam (Alizai/Khalozai) 
and Mullah Salam (Alizai/Pirzai). 
 
Abdul Wali Koka Alizai/Hassanzai. Musa Qala Chief of 
Police for most of the Karzai-era. One of Sher 
Mohammad’s commanders and hated by the non-
Hassanzai community.  
 
Abdullah Jan (Haji) Noorzai. From Now Zad. Major 
Hizb commander. Abdul Rahman Jan comes from his 
clan (Noorzai/Darzai/Parozai). 
  
Abu Bakr Alizai. Leader of the 3-4000 man Zamindawari 
/ Alizai uprising against the British/Afghan(Barakzai) 
government in 1879. His forces almost certainly swung 
the Battle of Maiwand against the British. 
 
Achakzai Tribe that is part of the Zirak branch of the 
Durrani tribal confederation. Said to have been split from 
the Barakzai (of which they were a sub-tribe) by Ahmad 
Shah Durrani (a Popalzai) as he feared the power of the 
Barakzai. In Afghanistan, they mainly live in Spin Boldak 
in Kandahar. 
 
Aghezai Noorzai clan from Loy Bagh. Deliberately split 
itself across the government-mujahidin divide and the 
government-Taliban divide in the two eras. (In)famous 
members include Khano, Assadullah Sherzad, Abdul 
Sattar and Mullah Karim. 
 
Ahmad Shah Durrani Popalzai. Reign 1747 – 1772. 
Seen as the founding father of the Afghan nation by the 
Pushtun. Forged and held a vast empire including 
Peshawar and Delhi. Direct descendants form the 
monarchical lineage of Afghanistan from 1747 – 1818: 
the Saddozais. Re-granted the Durrani tribes the land, in 
return for military service, that they are (largely) still living 
on in Helmand. 
 
Ahmad Wali Karzai  Half-brother of Hamid Karzai, the 
current Afghan President. Extensive rumours circulated 
that he was involved in the narcotics business. Killed by 
one of his own aides in July 2011. 
 
Akhtur Khan Alizai. Leader of the 3000 man 
Zamindawari / Alizai uprising against the British / Afghan 
government in 1841. At national-level the government 
was Popalzai led, however in the South it was still 
dominated by the Barakzai.  
 
Akhtur Mohammad Osmani Ishaqzai/Chowkazai. From 
Sangin. Head of Kandahar Corps during Taliban-era. 
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Taliban mahaz commander during Karzai-era. Killed by 
ISAF in 2006. 
 
Akhwaendi Barakzai. Jamiat Amir for Helmand. Related 
to Allah Noor. Provincial Governor in 1993.  
 
Akidawee Used to describe ideological Taliban in the 
Karzai-era. 
 
Alikozai Tribe of the Zirak Branch of the Durrani tribal 
confederation. Related in ancestry to the Barakzai and 
Popalzai (Barak, Alik and Popal were bothers in 
antiquity). Mainly located in the Arghandab river valley in 
Kandahar province. The indigenous Helmandi Alikozai 
are in Sarwan Qala north of Sangin. 
 
Alizai Major tribe of the Panjpai branch of the Durrani 
tribal confederation. One of the three biggest tribes in 
Helmand (see Noorzai and Barakzai for others). Apart 
from the first Taliban government (1995-2001), have 
provided Helmand’s Provincial Governors 1993 - 2005. 
Live in the north of Helmand, in the ancient district of 
Zamindawar (modern districts of Baghran, Musa Qala, 
Kajaki and northern Sangin). 
 
Allah Noor (Barakzai). Khalqi militia leader. Commander 
of the 93
rd
 Division once Najib’s government collapsed. 
Since 2001, he has been commander of the outer 
(militia) defence of Kandahar Air Field and a highway 
policeman under USPI. He is now the commander of the 
Afghan Border Police regiment in Helmand. 
 
Amir lit. leader. The term used to designate the person 
in overall control of a mujahidin party’s activities in a 
province. Effectively the head of the mujahidin patronage 
organisation. 
 
Amir Mohammad Akhundzada Alizai. Sher Mohammad 
Akhundzada’s younger brother. District Governor of 
Musa Qala in the post-2001 period, and Deputy 
Provincial Governor in 2005/6. Currently Governor of 
Uruzgan. 
 
Andiwal/andiwali lit. friend. The term used to denote the 
mujahidin style of government. The nearest British 
equivalent would be sofa-government (obviously 
nowhere as bad as andiwali government!).  
 
Angrez lit. English. Used as a derogatory term for 
people in Afghanistan (like ‘the Hun’ in British English). 
Still used to describe the British during the ISAF 
intervention. 
 
Arab Noorzai. From Noorzo Kalay. A relative of Haji Lal 
Jan, the leader of the community. Allied himself with the 
‘Taliban’ in order to attempt to take over leadership of 
the community from Haji Lal Jan.  
 
Arif Noorzai Noorzai. Related to Hamid Karzai, Sher 
Mohammad and Israel (Mahmad Ashem’s family). See 
family tree in Appendix 4.  
 
Artillery Hill (taapuh) Soviet military HQ on the hill 
south of Gereshk.  
 
Aslee The ‘real’ Taliban. Generally taken to be those 
who have a close link to the Quetta Shura (those above 
group commanders). 
 
Assadullah Karimi The leader of the Hazara in 
Saidabad, southern Nad-e Ali. Also their head teacher. 
Had many feuds with the Popalzai and Ishaqzai over the 
water for his community.. 
 
Assadullah Sherzad Noorzai/Aghezai. Worked in 
Khano’s militia. Involved in the ejection of ‘Hizb’ from 
Lashkar Gah in 1992. Chief of Police of Helmand in 
2008/9.  
 
Assadullah Wafa (Governor) Achakzai. Provincial 
Governor of Helmand from December 2006 to March 
2008. Not considered effective by the British. 
 
Atta Mohammad Ishaqzai/Chowkazai. Mujahidin 
commander in Sangin in the 1980s. Originally affiliated 
with Harakat, he later switched to Jamiat and then re-
allied himself with Harakat again. Most of this was driven 
by fighting with Dad Mohammad and Abdul Khaleq.  
Died in Quetta in the late 1990s. 
 
Ayub (Khan) Noorzai. From Now Zad. Deputy Chief of 
Police of Helmand during the early Karzai-era. See 
Appendix 4 for family tree. 
 
Baghrani Alizai. Known as Rais Baghrani - ‘King of 
Baghran’. From the Khalozai sub-tribe of the Alizai. Has 
fought under Hizb, Jamiat, Taliban and Harakat 
franchises, before reconciling with the Karzai 
government in 2005. There is no post-2001 government 
presence in Baghran, save for Baghrani. 
 
Barakzai One of the three biggest tribes in Helmand 
(see Alizai and Noorzai). Mohammadzai branch provided 
the royal lineage from 1826-1973. Concentrated in 
central Helmand, they control Gereshk. Generally fought 
under the Hizb franchise during the jihad in central 
Helmand. 
 
Baz Mohammad (Mullah) Taraki. From Marjeh. Most 
senior Harakat commander in Nad-e Ali and Marjeh 
during the jihad. 
 
Bismillah (Haji) Alizai. G968. Arrested after Mir Wali 
and Kadus played the US special forces in Gereshk. See 
Appendix 6 for more details. 
 
Bughra See Nahr-e Bughra. 
 
Chaiboy A man of even medium status will have a 
young boy to fetch tea and generally tend to his guests. 
Depending on their master, the boys are sometimes 
used for sex.  
 
Charwaki(an) lit. (government) official. The rapacious 
nature of the government in Helmand over the past three 
decades has rendered other meanings onto charwaki 
including tax collector, policeman, bandit and robber. 
 
Communist See PDPA. 
 
Cumberband  lit. belt. Used to denote the Soviet 
defensive lines around Lashkar Gah and Gereshk. See 
map 5. 
 
Daakhelee Internal Taliban. Used to refer to those 
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Dad Mohammad Alikozai. Jamiat Mujahidin commander 
in Sangin in the 1980s, fought Atta Mohammad for 
years, worked with the Akhundzadas, the Taliban and 
the Karzai government when he became head of the 
Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS). Infamous 
for his continued mistreatment of the Ishaqzai. 
Eventually killed (probably by the Ishaqzai) in 2009. His 
brother, Juma Gul, was District Governor of Sangin 
under the early Karzai administration. 
 
Dadullah Kakar. Pre-2001 Taliban commander and 
post-2001 was the most iconic Taliban mahaz 
commander in the South. Killed in 2007 by ISAF.  
 
Daud (Governor) Safi. Governor of Helmand from Dec 
2005 – Dec 2006. A settler in Helmand during the canal 
projects, educated technocrat, spoke some English.  
 
Daud (Mullah) Brother of Haji Kadus and Idris. Guarded 
Camp Price from 2007-10(?). When removed, Camp 
Price came under attack every day. Was reinstated.  
 
Depaye Zahir Shah-era militias raised in every district 
and usually led by the district head teacher. Their use 
continued sporadically into the communist-era, alongside 
a plethora of other militias. 
 
Dostum Major Najibullah militia commander based in 
Mazar-e Sharif. Declared independence from Najibullah 
causing his administration’s collapse. Supported Khano 
and the other ‘communist’ militia commanders post-
Najib. Eventually arranged for their escape when their 
administration collapsed and Rasoul took over.  
 
Durrani Eminent Pushtun tribal confederation in 
Afghanistan centred on Helmand, Uruzgan and 
Kandahar. Named after Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was 
titled Durr-e Durran (Pearl of pearls) upon his 
enthronement in 1747.  
 
Etihad Mujahidin party led by Sayaaf. Formed in 1981 
as an alliance of all the parties. Split up immediately and 
became one of the seven mujahidin parties. Out of the 
seven parties, Etihad was the closest to Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE guaranteeing him the lion’s share of their 
funding. 
 
Ezmarai  Barakzai. Former Khalqi police commander; 
father (also a Khalqi policeman in Gereshk) was killed by 
Hizb. Squad commander during Taliban government. 
Made his money as a highway policeman under a USPI 
contract. Chief of Police of Gereshk 2009-11.  
 
Fatah Mohammad Ishaqzai/Chowkazai. Major drug 
smuggler originally from Sangin, but now living in 
Quetta. Funds various aspects of the Taliban resistance 
including a hospital in Quetta in which ‘Taliban’ fighters 
can receive treatment. 
 
Ghaffour Akhundzada Alizai/Hassanzai. Brother of 
Nasim and Rasoul Akhundzada. Was Provincial 
Governor for less than a year after Rasoul’s death in 
1994 and before the Taliban chased the Akhundzadas 
out at the beginning of 1995. Eventually shot, 
supposedly by the Taliban, in Quetta in March 2000. 
 
Ghilzai The second biggest Pushtun tribal confederation 
in Afghanistan after the Durrani. Lands between 
Kandahar and Kabul, but have fought against the 
Durrani for control of Kandahar over the ages, creating 
enmity. Not native to Helmand, however thousands of 
families settled during the canal projects.  
 
Girdi Jangal Refugee camp in Baluchistan province, 
Pakistan (opposite Helmand). Supposedly closed by the 
Pakistani government in 2007, it still has 40,000 people 
in it. Since its formation after the 1979 Soviet invasion, it 
has provided a safe area for Helmandis from the 
violence in the province, as well as a ‘rear area’ to equip, 
rest and relax. 
 
Gul Agha Shirzai Barakzai. Leader of the Barakzai in 
Kandahar and son of famous mujahidin commander. 
Worked with US special forces in the 2001 attack on the 
Taliban in Kandahar and then closely with them in the 
early Karzai years when he was Kandahar’s Governor. 
Rival of Karzai, and posted to Nangahar province. 
Supported Malem Mir Wali. 
 
Gul Ehktiar (Haji) Land owner in Western Malgir / 
Eastern Babaji. ISAF patrol base is on his land, for which 
he receives rent. His nephew Sur Gul is a Talib and was 
recently (at time of writing) the Taliban District Governor 
for Washir.  
 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Kharoti. The leader of Hizb-e 
Islami (Gulbuddin). One of the few mujahidin party 
leaders who is still alive and leading his party. 
Occasionally rumours surface that he is holding talks 
with Karzai about reconciliation. He still ‘leads’ a major 
part of the post-2001 insurgency.  
 
Gurg Noorzai clan southern Afghanistan, but prominent 
in Loy Bagh. Important members include Shah Nazar 
Helmandwal, Provincial Governor during the Najib-era, 
and Abdul Ahad Helmandwal, Etihad commander and 
first chairman of the Nad-e Ali community council in 
2009. 
 
Habibullah (Khan) Noorzai. Soviet-era police 
commander and Nad-e Ali District Governor 2008-
present. See Appendix 1. 
 
Hafizullah Amin Kharoti. Ruled for a few months in 
1979. Extreme left wing Khalqi President of Afghanistan. 
Killed by the Soviets when they invaded. 
 
Hafizullah Khan Barakzai. Hizb-e Islami Amir for 
Helmand. See Appendix 1. 
 
Hamid Karzai Popalzai. President of Afghanistan 2001-
present.  
 
Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami (Harakat) Traditionalist 
Afghan mujahidin group fighting against Soviet forces. 
Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi was leader. Operated 
across southern Afghanistan. Was part of the 'Peshawar 
Seven' coalition of mujahidin parties. In Helmand, most 
important commander was Nasim Akhundzada. 
 
Hassanzai. Currently, the preeminent sub-tribe of the 
Alizai in Helmand and led by Sher Mohammad 
Akhundzada. Notorious for feuding with the Pirzai and 
Khalozai sub-tribes. 
 
Hazara. Ethnic group that populates the mountainous 
central area of Afghanistan. Said to be descended from 
Genghis Khan’s men. Overwhelmingly Shia (as opposed 
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to the mainly Sunni Pushtun). Small pockets of Hazara 
live in Helmand, a legacy of the canal project. ~10% of 
the Afghan population. 
 
Hekmatullah Barakzai. Malem Mir Wali’s son and heir. 
Chief of Police in Sangin in 2012.  
 
Hekmatyar See Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 
 
Hizb-e Islami (Hizb) Two factions: Khales and 
Gulbuddin. Gulbuddin faction prominent in Helmand. 
Most well-funded mujahidin party, but was dropped by 
Pakistan upon the rise of the Taliban in 1994. One of the 
two major mujahidin parties represented in Helmand 
alongside Harakat. Prominent commanders include 
Malem Mir Wali, Abdul Rahman Khan and Hafizullah 
Khan.  
 
Hukomat lit. government. Term used to describe the 
physical government buildings that comprise a District 
Centre.  
 
Ibrahim (Mullah) AKA Shakir. Kharoti. Local Taliban 
commander. Kharoti say he re-joined Taliban due to 
police brutality. Killed by ISAF in 2009/10. His car was 
turned into a shrine by the Kharoti. 
 
Idris Brother of Haji Kadus and Mullah Daud. Killed by 
Badr, the Chief of Police, when trying to take over 
Gereshk’s security (supported by the specialporce). 
 
Ikhwan lit. brothers (Arabic). As in Muslim Brotherhood. 
Term (usually derogatory) used to describe members of 
Hizb and Jamiat. 
 
Ishaqzai. The most marginalised of the Durrani tribes in 
Helmand. Important under the Taliban during 1995 – 
2001, they provided senior commanders for the 
movement. Heavily persecuted by the Alikozai post-
2001. Mainly live south of Sangin, Now Zad and Garmsir 
although there are some in Nad-e Ali, where they moved 
(illegally) during the jihad. 
 
ISI - Inter-services Intelligence Pakistan's premier 
intelligence agency. Responsible for channeling US and 
Saudi funding to the mujahidin during the jihad. Heavily 
financed the Taliban during 1995 – 2001; strong 
evidence that they are currently providing assistance to 
the Taliban Quetta Shura.  
 
Ismail Khan Tajik. Originally an army officer who played 
a key role in the initial rebellion against the Soviets in 
Herat. Was a major Jamiat commander during the jihad 
becoming the ruler of western Afghanistan from 1992 – 
1995. Became Governor of Herat under Karzai and in 
2005 was made a minister in Kabul. Despite differences 
in mujahidin franchise, was allied to the Akhundzadas in 
Helmand and helped them capture Lashkar Gah from 
the militias (who were also allied with Jamiat). 
 
Israel Noorzai. Patriarch of Mahmad Ashem’s important 
Now Zadi family. Important mediator during ‘Hizb’ and 
‘Harakat’ war in the north of Helmand. Negotiated hand 
over from Taliban when they fled in 2001. Respected by 
many. See Appendix 4 for family tree. 
  
Jabbar Qahraman. Noorzai. Originally an army officer 
and then a commander of a very effective militia that 
was used by the government in other parts of the 
country as a mobile division. Jabbar Khan was 
appointed a hero, or ‘Qahraman’ of the communist 
government. Currently a Helmand MP. See Appendix 1 
for description.  
 
Jailani (Dr) Kharoti. Hizb commander from Shin Kalay. 
Supports Taliban narrative in the post-2001 era. Gave 
his ‘clinic’ over to the ‘Taliban’ during 2008, to enable 
them to keep the government out of Shin Kalay. Has a 
son in the ‘Taliban’. Was on the security committee on 
the Nad-e Ali community council at the same time. 
 
Jalalzai (Haji) Kharoti. Harakat commander from Noor 
Mohammad Khan Kalay. Haji Barakzai’s uncle. 
 
Jamiat-e Islami (Jamiat) Islamic political party in 
Afghanistan similar to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. 
Oldest Islamic political party in Afghanistan. 
Communitarian ideology based on Islamic law but is also 
considered moderately progressive. From 1968-2011 the 
official leader of Jamiat was Burhanuddin Rabbani. 
Major commanders include Ahmad Shah Masoud and 
Ismail Khan. Akhwaendi was the Amir in Helmand.  
 
Jan Mohammad Barakzai. US special forces militia 
commander. Currently ALP commander, runs militia 
defending Camp Price and is on the US-led district 
response team.  
 
Jereeb  Afghan unit of measure equivalent to 0.2 
hectare or ½ acre. Approximately 40m x 40m. 
 
Jihad lit. struggle (Arabic). Like the religious terms of 
any religion this is open to different interpretations. 
Appears in the Koran as ‘striving in the way of God’ [as 
in a mental struggle], however can be interpreted to 
mean physical fighting. Used as a shorthand in 
Afghanistan to mean the period of resistance to the 
Soviet (1979 – 1989) and, depending upon your 
viewpoint, the current struggle against the western 
backed Karzai government. 
 
Jirga See also Shura. Traditional Pushtun method of 
dispute resolution where male elders sit and discuss a 
problem until a solution is reached in a consensus 
manner as opposed to an adversarial manner. Younger 
children will sit and watch, but not participate. Male 
adults are all allowed to speak. Anyone may come. 
Sometime used interchangeably with Shura. 
 
Kudos (Haji) Barakzai. Militia leader who was Mir Wali’s 
second in command. Controlled the Barakzai area from 
Gereshk westwards towards Nad-e Ali. Militia funded by 
Assadullah Wafa and US special forces, however the 
funding stopped in 2007/8. The area previously occupied 
by his militia fell to the ‘Taliban’. Now runs an aggregate 
mine near Camp Price. 
 
Kakar A tribe from which families were settled during the 
canal projects, particularly in Garmsir and Nad-e Ali. Key 
member of this tribe was Mullah Dadullah – an infamous 
Taliban commander who was killed by ISAF in 2007. 
Predated upon by the provincial government during 
2001-5. 
 
Karez Underground water channel used for irrigation, 
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Karim (Mullah) Noorzai/Aghezai. From Loy Bagh. Hizb 
commander and then worked with Taliban during 1994-
2001. Continued to ‘sit’ on Taliban ‘shura’ in Nad-e Ali 
post-2001 as well as the district community council. 
 
Karmal, Babrak. President 1979 – 1986. Installed by 
the Soviets, and was never more than a client of theirs. 
Probably mixed ethnicity. Later seen by the Soviets as 
not able to achieve their aims and was moved to 
retirement in Moscow. 
 
Karzai See Hamid Karzai. 
 
Khad Later called Ministry of State Security (WAD) or 
the National Directorate of Security (NDS). Unsavoury 
organisation under the control of the KGB until the 
Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989. One of its major roles is 
to watch over the other security services to make sure 
that they remain loyal to the state. Helmandis still often 
call the NDS Khad. 
 
Khalifa Shirin Khan (Haji) Barakzai. Leader of the 
stronger side of the Barakzai tribal coalitions in Malgir. 
This comprised the Akhundzadakhel, the Utmanzai, the 
Bayezai and the Sardarzai clans. They generally allied 
with Hizb and later that the Taliban. 
 
Khalozai Khankhel of the Alizai tribe. Located mainly in 
Baghran. Important members include Rais Baghrani and 
Abdul Rahman Khan. 
 
Khalq / Khalqi More extreme of the two factions of the 
PDPA. Was in power in Kabul in 1978/9, however the 
army remained Khalqi dominated right through the 
1980s. Ideologically defined the militias in Lashkar Gah 
at the end of the 1980s. Important leaders include Taraki 
and Amin. 
 
Khan lit. Landowner. Also used as an honorific like 
‘Esquire’ in English. 
 
Khan Mohammad Barakzai. Harakat commander. 
Fought with Rasoul against Mir Wali when he was in the 
government. First to occupy Gereshk in 2001 when the 
Taliban left. First Chief of Police in Gereshk in Karzai-
era. Massive smuggler, now in jail for drugs offenses.  
 
Khano (Khan Mohammad) Noorzai/Aghezai. Militia 
commander who controlled Lashkar Gah in the early 
1990s. Real name Khan Mohammad, originally from 
Farah, he became a militia commander because his 
brother was a well-connected member of the Khalq 
faction. Settled back in Lashkar Gah post-2001 and 
became a businessman with a small militia, but was 
eventually disarmed by Abdul Rahman Jan. 
 
Kharoti Important Ghilzai tribe. Very prominent in Nad-e 
Ali, where they compete with the Noorzai for district 
leadership.  Important members include Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar (leader of Hizb) and Hafizullah Amin 
(President 1979). Closely allied to Taliban narrative in 
Nad-e Ali. 
 
Koka See Abdul Wali Koka. 
 
Kuchi lit. nomadic.  
 
Lal Jan (Haji) Noorzai. Elder/militia leader of Noorzo 
Kalay in northern Nad-e Ali and he represents one of the 
communities of Noorzai who settled from Now Zad and 
Washir during the 1990s; during the post-2001 period he 
controlled the Nahr-e Bughra from Chah-e Mirza to Loy 
Mandah. By 2008, his militia had been rolled into the 
Nad-e Ali police. 
 
Lal Mohammad Barakzai. From Torghai. Petty 
commander, who has worked for the Taliban, the 93
rd
 
Division, the Taliban again, ISAF (ALP) and finally the 
Taliban again. A ‘Torghai nationalist’, he will go with 
whoever will guarantee Torghai’s security.  
 
Madrasah  lit. school (Arabic). Generally considered in 
the context of Afghanistan and Pakistan to mean a 
religious school with a focus on Quranic education. 
Many groups within the region also use them to train 
young men for battle. 
 
Mahaz Mujahidin party led by Pir Gailani. Probably the 
most poorly funded party because they represented the 
old moderate (Royal) order which the ISI did not wish to 
re-empower. Many commanders in Helmand allied with 
Mahaz and then switched when it was unable to provide 
them with enough weapons and funding.  
 
Mahaz system c.f. nezami system. Channelled, 
patronage model of Taliban supply and organisation. 
Very similar to how the jihad was organised with the 
different parties being analogous to the different 
mahazes.  
 
Maidan lit. field. Used by Helmandis for the airfield to the 
south of Lashkar Gah that was the Soviet HQ in 
Helmand.  
 
Maiwand, Battle of A serious defeat suffered by British 
forces at Kush-e Nakud in what is now Maiwand district, 
Kandahar province in 1880. The battle was won by Ayub 
Khan with support from Alizai tribesmen led by Abu Bakr 
Khan. 
 
Malem Mir Wali See Mir Wali. 
 
Malem Yusof Barakzai. Hizb commander from Now 
Zad. 
 
Manan (Haji) Noorzai. Nephew of Haji Lal Jan. Police 
commander who was seen as particularly cruel by the 
population of Nad-e Ali. 
 
Mangal (Governor) Mangal. From Paktika. Appointed 
Governor of Helmand in 2008 and moved on in 2012. 
Strong evidence that he is corrupt.  
 
Mir Wali Barakzai. Previous Hizb commander during the 
jihad, then joined the government in 1987. Became the 
93
rd
 Division Commander in early Karzai-era. Now MP. 
See Appendix 1 for more details. 
 
Miraw Water manager. Sets out how much water each 
family can have from the canals and is the first person 
who arbitrates water disputes. Can either be selected by 
the community or appointed by the landowner, or a 
combination of the two. Usually paid in kind by the 
farmers. There are some government employed miraws 
in the canal-zone areas. 
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Mirza (Khan) Barakzai. Hizb commander during the 
jihad who became a commander in the 93
rd
 Division. 
Stole some land in Gereshk and set his militia up with 
housing in early 2000s. Area now called Mirza Khan 
Kalay. 
 
Mohammad Wali Alizai. Brother of Bismillah (G968). 
Was close ally of Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, 
Governor of Musa Qala when British first came, now MP. 
Not ally of Sher Mohammad anymore. 
 
Mohammadzai Khankhel (chief lineage) of the Barakzai 
tribe and produced the lineage that ruled Afghanistan 
from 1826 – 1978. Concentrations of Mohammadzai 
around Gereshk as it was a seat of the sub-tribe. 
 
Mujahidin lit. holy warriors. In the context of Afghanistan 
it means those who fought in the anti-communist 
resistance, but the fighters currently fighting the 
government also call themselves mujahidin. 
 
Mullah Prayer leader. Usually one per village, 
responsible for the mosque, life rites and some religious 
education of children. 
 
Murtaza Kharoti. G361. See Appendix 6. 
 
Nahr-e Bughra Canal. The original and most extensive 
of the canals from the canal project. Construction started 
in 1936. Provides water for at least 100,000 people in 
Marjeh, Nad-e Ali and parts of Nahr-e Saraj. 
 
Naim (Mullah) Alizai. From Garmsir. District Governor 
during Taliban-era. Led ‘Taliban’ resurgence in 2005 in 
Garmsir. 
 
Najibullah, Mohammad President 1987-92. Previously 
had been head of Khad. Instituted a reconciliation and 
national solidarity programme and expanded militias in 
preparation for the Soviet withdrawal. Made many 
conciliations to the mujahidin not consistent with 
communism (for example, using Islam and its precepts 
much more in governing), however the fighting 
continued. Against all predictions, managed to remain in 
power for three years after the Soviet exit. 
 
Nasim Akhundzada (Mullah) Alizai. Most (in)famous of 
the Helmandi jihadi commanders who led the Alizai and 
fought under the Harakat franchise. Accepted money 
from Khad throughout. Was so successful that many 
other commanders swore allegiance to him. He was 
killed by Hizb in 1990. His brothers (Rasoul and 
Ghaffour) succeeded him, becoming Provincial 
Governors of Helmand, as did his nephew, Sher 
Mohammad. 
 
NDS See Khad. The Karzai-era Afghan internal security 
service.  
 
Nejad Mujahidin party led by Mujaddidi. Not very 
prominent in Helmand.  
 
Nezami system lit. organised or military. c.f. mahaz 
system. A more institutional, centralised form of supply 
and organisation instituted in 2009 by the Taliban. Not 
fully implemented in Helmand. 
 
Noorzai. One of the big three Helmandi tribes (see Alizai 
and Barakzai). Previously, they were marginalised from 
Helmandi politics due to their location in Now Zad, 
Washir and Garmsir, however during the 1990s they 
occupied abandoned land in Nad-e Ali and Marjeh, as 
they were in control of the Helmandi police in the post-
2001 era. Also significant in Kandahar province.  
 
Omar (Mullah) Hotak. Leader of the Taliban movement. 
Ruled Afghanistan from 1996 – 2001. Probably currently 
living in Quetta. 
 
Osmani See Akhtur Mohammad Osmani. 
 
Parcham / Parchami Less extreme faction of the PDPA 
(see Khalq). Ruled from 1979 until 1992. Dominated 
Khad (and its successor organisations) during that time. 
Important leaders include Karmal and Najibullah.  
 
Paslow (Haji Mullah) Popalzai leader and Harakat 
commander in the south of Nad-e Ali. Taliban 
commander. Prominent family with several links to the 
post-2001 Taliban movement.  
 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 
PDPA was split into two factions, Khalq and Parcham, 
roughly split along tribal and ethnic lines, rural Pushtun 
(particularly Ghilzai) and Urban Pushtun/Tajik 
respectively. The PDPA was formed in 1965, split into its 
constituent factions in 1967, which were re-coalesced 
under Soviet pressure in 1977. The more extreme left 
wing Khalq faction seized power in the 1978 coup, but 
were replaced by the more moderate Parcham faction in 
1979 upon the Soviet intervention. Due to Khalq purges 
during its time in power the Afghan Army was dominated 
by Khalq officers throughout the 1980s, yet the massive 
state internal security apparatus (Khad, or later, WAD) 
rapidly became Parcham dominated after 1979. 
 
Pir Mohammad Sadat Kharoti. From Naqilabad. 
(In)famous Hizb commander. Was 93
rd
 commander, then 
worked closely with the Taliban post-2005. Sat on the 
Nad-e Ali council 2009-10. 
 
Pirzai One of the three main sub-tribes of the Alizai (see 
Hassanzai and Khalozai). 
 
Popalzai Major Pushtun tribe in the Durrani 
confederation. President Karzai’s tribe. Outside of Nawa, 
not very populous in Helmand.  
 
Pushtun Ethnic group in the south of Afghanistan and 
the west of Pakistan. Split by the countries’ borders (the 
Durand Line). ~40% of the Afghan population. 
 
Qari Hazrat  Ishaqzai/Mistereekhel. Son of Abdul 
Khaleq. Major ‘Taliban’ commander post-2005. Killed by 
ISAF 2010. Said to have been allied to Hizb and the 
Taliban at the same time in order to protect his clan’s 
drug interests.  
 
Quetta Shura The leadership shura of the Taliban in 
Baluchistan, Pakistan. Supported by the ISI. Allegedly 
surpassed in importance by the Peshawar Shura in 
2011/2. 
 
Rabbani, Burhanuddin Tajik leader of Jamiat. Also 
President of Afghanistan from 1992-96 and briefly in 
2001. Killed by a suicide bomber in 2011. 
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Rahim Ishaqzai. From Now Zad. Major Taliban 
commander during Taliban-era. Taliban Provincial 
Governor 2001–8.  
 
Rahmattiar Ishaqzai. Most prominent Hizb commander 
in the south of Nad-e Ali. From Jangal. 
 
Rais Baghrani See Baghrani. 
 
Rasoul Akhundzada Alizai. Brother of Nasim and 
Ghaffour. Helmand’s Governor briefly in 1993/4 when he 
captured it with Ismail Khan’s help from the ex-
communist militias led by Khano. Father of Sher 
Mohammad Akhundzada. 
 
Rauf Khadim (Mullah) One of Baghrani’s sub-
commanders in the 93
rd
 Division in 1993/4. Became 
Taliban commander in movement (was Zakir’s boss), 
spent time in Guantanamo. Released and re-joined the 
Taliban movement. Now Taliban Governor for Uruzgan. 
 
Rauf Khan Ishaqzai. Mahaz Amir for Helmand. Joined 
government and became militia commander in 1987. 
 
Safar (Khan) See Wakil Mohammad Safar. 
 
Salam (Mullah) Alizai/Pirzai. Petty Taliban commander 
in post-2001 period. Had been Taliban Governor of 
Kajaki during Taliban-era. Made government District 
Governor of Musa Qala in 2007. Not to be confused with 
Abdul Salam (Noorzai) or Abdul Salam (Alizai/Khalozai). 
 
Sardar Baghwani Allegedly Iranian intelligence officer. 
Crops up three times in the narrative: firstly in 1993 
talking to Khano and Abdul Rahman Jan, secondly in 
2002 inciting people to rise up against the Americans 
and then in 2006 to incite people to raise up against the 
British.  
 
Shah Nazar Helmandwal Also Shah Nazar. 
Noorzai/Gurg. Allied with Mahaz. Then Provincial 
Governor during Najib period. Murdered, probably by 
Hizb, in the early 1990s. Nephew, Abdul Ahad 
Helmandwal, prominent Noorzai leader in Nad-e Ali who 
was first community council chair in 2009. 
 
Shakir See Mullah Ibrahim. 
 
Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (Alizai). Son of Rasoul 
Mohammad Akhundzada. Helmand’s Governor from 
2001–5. Very close to Karzai with intermarriages 
between the clans. Sacked in 2005 at British insistence 
due to his links to the narcotics trade. Now a Senator. 
See Appendix 1.  
 
Shirzai See Gul Agha Shirzai. 
 
Shura. See also Jirga. Meeting, less egalitarian / 
consensual than a jirga. In a strict sense, people should 
be invited to speak at a shura. 
 
Specialporce The word that has entered the Helmandi 
lexicon to describe the US special forces in the post-
2001 period. The Pushtun find it difficult to distinguish 
the sound of the letter ‘f’ from the letter ‘p’ hence 
‘…porce’. 
 
Sur Gul Barakzai. Nephew of Haji Gul Ehktiar. 93
rd
 
commander and then Taliban commander. Taliban 
District Governor for Washir until 2012.  
 
Tajik Ethnic group in the north east of Afghanistan. 
Predominantly formed the Northern Alliance, which 
overthrew the Taliban with US support in 2001. ~30% of 
the Afghan population. Significant leaders include 
Masoud and Rabbani. 
 
Tanai (General) Khalqi general who led a coup against 
Najib in 1990. Then began working with Hizb and led a 
‘Hizb’/‘Khalq’ rapprochement in Helmand between 
Hafizullah and Khano. 
 
Taraki, Noor Mohammad Taraki. Afghan President from 
1978-9. A member of the more extreme Khalq faction of 
the PDPA, he was ousted by Amin. Responsible for the 
reforms (esp. land reforms) that caused so much 
damage and resentment in Helmandi society. Also a 
tribe. 
 
Topak salaran lit. warlords. 
 
Tor Jan Noorzai. Cousin by marriage of Abdul Rahman 
Jan. Nad-e Ali Chief of Police 2006-8. Killed by a suicide 
bomber, which was described by some locals as a gift 
from the Taliban because he had been so cruel. 
Accused of being behind a spate of kidnappings for 
ransom of rich individuals in the district. 
 
Ushr 10% agricultural Islamic tithe. 
 
Wakil Mohammad Safar Kharoti. Led the Kharoti into 
Nad-e Ali in 1954. Highly respected leader. Also MP 
during Soviet period. Died in March 2009. 
 
Yahya Noorzai. Etihad commander from Marjeh. Fought 
Nasim for control of the Garmsir bridge in 1989.  
 
Zahir Shah Barakzai. Reign 1933 – 1973. Was very 
young in 1933 and so only exerted influence towards the 
end of his reign. Keen to advance Afghanistan, he wrote 
the 1964 Constitution which enshrined hitherto unseen 
rights, but was deposed by his cousin Mohammad Daud 
in 1973. Lived in exile in Italy during the communist-, 
mujahidin- and Taliban-eras before being invited back to 
an honorary position, The Father of the Nation,  under 
Karzai. Died 2007. 
 
-zai (suffix) Meaning sons of. 
 
Zakat Annual Islamic tax on assets. Different rates, but 
e.g. 2.5% on money held over one lunar year. 
Redistributed to the poor and needy. 
 
Zakir See Abdul Qayoum Zakir. 
 
Zamindawar One of the four ancient districts of Pusht-e 
rud (ancient Helmand). Zamindawari is used 
interchangeably with Alizai. 
  
Appendix 3: Timeline of key events affecting Helmand 
1978 – April Saur Revolution. 
1978 – October Baghran District falls. 
1979 – January Land redistribution begins; Musa Qala falls. 
1979 – June Now Zad, Sangin and Washir fall. 
1979 – December Soviets invade. 
Mid–1980 Remaining central districts of Helmand have fallen; rebels on 
outskirts of Lashkar Gah; Soviets deploy 500 men to stabilise 
Lashkar Gah. 
1981 ‘Mujahidin’ start to fall out all over Helmand, particularly the north. 
Khad exacerbates this and offers them money to attack each other. 
1980–83  Defensive cumberband established around Lashkar Gah and 
Gereshk. District centres re-established in Nad-e Ali, Nawa, Garmsir 
& Kahn Eshin. 
1987 Najibullah becomes president. Militia programme starts. Shah Nazar 
Khan becomes Provincial Governor; ‘Hizb’-‘Harakat’ war in the north 
sponsored by Khad peaks. 
1988/9 Soviets leave Helmand. District Centres outside of Nad-e Ali, Nawa, 
Lashkar Gah and Gereshk abandoned. Final Soviet operation in 
Sangin. 
1991 Nad-e Ali District Centre falls. Tribes begin to have a series of tribal 
shuras to reconcile their members in the post-communist era. 
1992 Najibullah falls, Hafizullah becomes Provincial Governor. Khano 
becomes Chief of Police; Allah Noor becomes 93rd commander; 
much fighting. 
Late 1992 Hafizullah ejected; Akhwaendi become Provincial Governor; much 
fighting. 
1993 Rasoul takes over Lashkar Gah; Khano and co. escape; some 
stability. 
1994 Rasoul dies of natural causes; Ghaffour takes over. 
Late 1994 Taliban approach Helmand; Rais Baghrani switches sides; Ghaffour 
and other jihadis evicted. 
1995 Several failed attempts to retake Helmand by the jihadis. Taliban 
establish control. Helmand stable. 
1997 Conscription begins. 
2000 Taliban opium ban. 
  
309 
© Mike Martin 2013 
Late 2001 Taliban leave Helmand as other cities in the country fall from Taliban 
control; Hafizullah Khan takes over control of Lashkar Gah; Abdul 
Rahman and Sher Mohammad then take over and become Chief of 
Police and Provincial Governor respectively. Dad Mohammad 
appointed NDS Chief and Mir Wali 93rd Division commander. 
2002 Tribes hold a series of tribal shuras to reconcile their members in the 
post-Taliban-era; US special forces deploy to Helmand; raise militias 
and arrest people and send them to Guantanamo. 
2004 Malem Mir Wali disarmed by UN-sponsored DDR process; many 
former 93rd groups ally themselves with the Taliban for protection; US 
PRT deploys to Lashkar Gah. 
2005 Dad Mohammad and Sher Mohammad removed from posts (at 
British insistence). ISI-supported, Taliban-led, series of 
assassinations to remove remaining government officials.  
2006 Government continues to collapse; British deploy brigade to 
‘stabilise’ the province; outbreaks of fierce fighting as they move to 
the north of the Province; British in small numbers forced to use 
airpower to defend themselves; Sher Mohammad sends his men to 
work with the ‘Taliban’. 
2006 – April Baghran falls / attacked. 
2006 – 
May/June/July 
Musa Qala, Now Zad and Sangin attacked.  
2006 – Autumn British pull out of Musa Qala; central Helmand still stable; Governor 
Daud removed and replaced by Assadullah Wafa. 
2007 British conduct operations all over the north of the province 
particularly around Sangin. Described by some locals as like Soviet 
operations. 
2008 US marines begin to deploy to bolster numbers of coalition troops; 
Governor Mangal appointed; British transport third turbine up to the 
Kajaki dam; Marjeh and Nad-e Ali ‘fall’ after Abdul Rahman’s crops 
are eradicated; British launch operation to retake Nad-e Ali. 
2009 Numbers of US troops continue to increase; British attempt to 
consolidate in Nad-e Ali; launch community shura in an attempt to 
channel development and develop governance. 
2010 US surge announced. US troop numbers begin to increase and they 
expand into Khan Eshin and Now Zad; take over control of Musa 
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Qala, Sangin and Kajaki from British. British consolidate in central 
Helmand; ISAF withdrawal announced for 2014. 
2011 ISAF militia programme launched (ALP); Lashkar Gah handed over 
to Afghan control in July; British and Americans begin to close bases 
and hand them over to the Afghans; Nad-e Ali almost completely 
handed over by Dec. 
2012 Problems with ALP programme causing it to be suspended; 
ISAF/Afghan operations continue into the desert, but generally stay 
away from the heavily populated areas; Governor Mangal sacked; 
Tribes begin a series of tribal shuras to reconcile their members in 
the post-ISAF era. 
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Appendix 4: Tribal diagrams and family trees 




Figure 10: Diagram of the major tribes in Helmand 
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Figure 16: Israel’s family tree (Noorzai/Darzai/Hassanzai) 
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Appendix 5: Lists of Helmandi provincial, district and military officials 
 
Provincial Governors 
~1978 Majid Serbilard (Barakzai, Parchami, from Kandahar) 
~1979 Fazal Jan Jahesh (Khalqi, from Paktia) 
~1980 Mama Rasoul (Shinwari, Khalqi, from Nangahar) 
1981-3 Khan Jan (Alikozai, Khalqi, from Kunar) 
1984 (very 
short) 
Zeyarmal (Barakzai, Parchami, from Kandahar) 
1984/5-? Gul Mahmad Khwashal (Noorzai, Khalqi, from Farah) 
1987-91/2? Shah Nazar Helmandwal (Noorzai/Gurg, Mahaz, from Loy Bagh) 
1991/2? Gul Mahmad Khwashal (Noorzai, Khalqi, from Farah) 
1992 (6 months) Hafizullah (Barakzai, Hizb, from Bolan) 
1992-3 Akhwaendi (Barakzai, Jamiat, Nawa) 
1993-4 Rasoul Akhundzada (Alizai, Harakat, Musa Qala) 
1994 Ghaffour Akhundzada (Alizai, Harakat, Musa Qala) 
1994-5? Mullah Mahmad Karim (Noorzai, Talib, from Kandahar) 
1995-2001 Mullah Abdul Bari (Alikozai, Talib, from Uruzgan) 
2001-5 Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (Alizai, Harakat, from Kajaki) 
2005-6 Daud (Safi, technocrat, from Gereshk)  
2006-8 Assadullah Wafa (Achakzai, ?, from Kandahar) 
2008-12 Gulabuddin Mangal (Mangal, Khalqi/Hizb, from Paktika) 
2012- General Naim (?, ?, ?) 
 
Nad-e Ali District Governors 
1978-1989 ? 
1989?-1991? Mahmad Razer (Barakzai, ?, from Chah-e Anjir) 
? Rahman Jan? (Noorzai/Gurg, Etihad, from Now Zad) 
1992-? Khalifa Khwashkea (Noorzai, Jamiat, from Loy Bagh) 
1993-4? Mullah Said Gul (Alizai/Khalozai, Baghrani sub-commander, from ?) 
1994-5 Mullah Ibrahim (Laghmani, Talib, from Garmsir) 
~1995 Mullah Abdul Rahman (Noorzai, Talib, from Now Zad) 
1995-6 Mawlana Sahib (?, Talib, from Uruzgan) 
? Mullah Abdul Rahim (Ishaqzai, Talib, from Uruzgan) 
? Mullah Sharwali (Daftani, Talib, from Nahr-e Saraj) 
? Mullah Abdul Haq (Daftani, Talib, from Waziristan) 
?-2001 Mullah Saifullah (Alizai, Talib, from Uruzgan) 
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2002-4? Mira Jan (Noorzai, Harakat, from Chah-e Anjir) 
2004-7? Mullah Qasam (Noorzai, Jamiat, from Sangin) 
2007/8- Habibullah (Noorzai, Khalqi, from Garmsir) 
 
Nahr-e Saraj District Governors 
1978-? Zahir Khan (Barakzai, ?, Malgir) 
?-1981 Malem Muskinyar (Barakzai, Khalqi, ?) 
1981-7 Marg (Noorzai, Khalqi, from Uruzgan) 
1987-92  Abdul Sangar (Barakzai, Parchami, ?) 
1992 (briefly) Saran Sahab (Barakzai, Khalqi, from Farah) 
1992-1994 Khalifa Shirin Khan (Barakzai, Hizb, from Malgir) 
1994-2001 Mullah Mir Hamza (Noorzai, Talib, Uruzgan) 
2001-?(brief) Khalifa Shirin Khan (Barakzai, Hizb, from Malgir) 
2002 Mullah Qadoos (Alizai, Harakat, from Musa Qala) 
2002-3 Mahmad Lal (Popalzai, Etihad, ?) 
2004-6 Nabi Khan (Barakzai, Jamiat, from Nawa) 
?2006-8 Manab Khan (Barakzai, Hizb, from Bolan) 
?2008-10 Abdul Ahad Khan (Alizai, Khalqi, from Kajaki) 
2010 Jan Gul (Barakzai, Khalqi, Lashkar Gah) 
2010-1 Mohayadin (Alizai, ?, Kajaki) 
2011 Amir Jan (Popalzai, Khalqi, ?) 
2011- Salem Rodi (Alizai, Harakat, ?) 
 
Provincial Chiefs of Police 
1978-80 ? 
1980-? Musa Ensanmal (?, Parchami, from Allahabad) 
?-1987 Ayub Khan (Tajik, ?, ?) 
1987-1989 Karim Payekh (Alizai, ?, from Zamindawar) 
1989-91 Mulakhel (Mulakhel, ?, from Ghazni) 
1991-2 Hussein Khan Andiwal (Barakzai, Khalqi, from Babaji) 
1992-3 Khano (Noorzai, ?, from Loy Bagh) 
1993-4 Abdul Ahad (Ishaqzai, Harakat, from Now Zad) 
1995-01 ?Taliban era? 
2001-6 Abdul Rahman Jan (Noorzai, various, from Marjeh) 
2006-2007 Hussein Khan Andiwal (Barakzai, Khalqi, from Babaji) 
2008 Mulakhel (Mulakhel, ?, from Ghazni) 
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2008-9 Assadullah Sherzad (Noorzai/Aghezai, various, from Loy Bagh) 
2009-2012 Angar (Alikozai, ?, from Kandahar) 
2012- Nabi Elham (Tokhi, Khalqi, from Uruzgan) 
 
Nad-e Ali Chiefs of Police 
1978-89 ? 
1989-91 Habibullah (Noorzai, Khalqi, from Garmsir) 
1991-5 ?Andiwal government? 
1995-2001 ?Taliban-era? 
2001-2 Haji Jalalzai (Kharoti, Harakat, from Noor Mohammad Khan Kalay) 
2002-4 Hakim Khan (Daftani, Jamiat, from Marjeh) 
2004-5 Haji Twoyeb (Noorzai, ?, ?) 
2005-8 Tor Jan (Noorzai/Darzai/Parozai, ?, ?) 
2008-9 Abdul Sattar (Noorzai/Aghezai, ?, from Loy Bagh) 
2009 Sheryar (Tajik, ?, ?) 
2009-11 Shadi Khan (Popalzai, Khalqi, from Garmsir) 
2011- Haji Omar Jan (Andar, ?, from Marjeh) 
 
Nahr-e Saraj Chiefs of Police 
1978-92?  
1992-3? Wali Mohammad (Barakzai, ?, ?) 
1994-2001 ?Taliban-era? 
2001-3 Khan Mohammad (Barakzai, Harakat, from Deh Adam Khan) 
2004 Badr (Popalzai, ?, from Uruzgan) 
?2004 Amanullah (Noorzai, ?, ?) 
? ?Khan Mohammad 
? Haji Dil Jan (?, Hizb, from Kandahar) 
2005? Haji Kadus (Barakzai, USSF, from Charkandaz) 
2006? Habibullah (Noorzai, Khalqi, from Garmsir) 
? Rafiq Sheryar (Noorzai, Khalqi, ?) 
2008-10 Shuja (?, Khalqi, ?) 
Farouq (Barakzai, Khalqi, from Deh Adam Khan) 
Shuja (?, Khalqi, ?) 
Farouq (Barakzai, Khalqi, from Deh Adam Khan) 
NB Abdul Raziq (Barakzai, Hizb, from Malgir) de facto Chief of Police 
2010-11 Ezmarai (Barakzai, various, from Gereshk) 
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2011 Saifullah (Alikozai, Khalqi, ?) 
2011-12 Shadi Khan (Popalzai, Khalqi, ?) 
2012- Gulie Khan (Baluch, Khalqi, from Garmsir) 
 
Commanders of the 93rd Division 
?-1989 Baba Tapa 
1989- Jenat Gul 
? Saber 
? Wardak 
1992-3 Allah Noor (Barakzai, ?, Nawa) 
1993-5/6? Rais Baghrani (Alizai, various, from Baghran) 
?-2001 ?Talib 
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Appendix 6: Selected Helmandi Guantanamo prisoners 
 
The purpose of the appendix is to discuss some of the Helmandi Guantanamo prisoners’ 
cases in the context of the information contained in this thesis. Reading the documents it is 
clear that the Guantanamo personnel believe in the unitary nature of organisations like the 
Taliban and believe the public narratives surrounding them. The information contained in this 
appendix can be found in either deliberately released Guantanamo files (http://projects. 
nytimes.com/guantanamo) or leaked Guantanamo files (http://wikileaks.org/gitmo/—both 
accessed 21 November 2012). Also of great use was Andy Worthington’s The Guantánamo 
Files. This appendix considers the following prisoners (followed by prisoner number if 
available): 
 
 Abdul Wahid (no prisoner number as died in Camp Price). 
 Hamidullah / Janat gul – 953. 
 Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul (actually Abdul Qayoum Zakir) – 008. 
 Abdul Rauf Khadim – 108. 
 Abdul Rahman – 118. 
 Murtaza – 361. 
 Amanullah Alikozai – 538. 
 Qari Hassanullah Pirzai – 562. 
 Haji Bismillah – 968. 
 Abdul Razaq (Achakzai) – 942. 
 Haji Jalil – 1117. 
 Abdul Wahab – 961. 
 Rahmatullah – 964. 
 Hafizullah – 965. 
 Baridad – 966. 
 Nasirullah – 967. 
 Abdul Baghi – 963. 
 Kushky Yar – 971. 
 Akhtur Mohammad – 969. 
 Arif Mohammad – 972. 
 Abdul Kadus – 929. 
 Mohammad Ismail – 930. 
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Abdul Wahid 
Very little is known about Abdul Wahid. It appears that he was tortured by the Afghan Militia 
Forces in Gereshk (i.e. Mir Wali’s men) before being handed over to US special forces in 
Camp Price, where he died (on 6 November 2003). His autopsy recognised ‘multiple blunt 
force injuries to head, torso and extremities’.1726 Here follows a US investigation report into 
his death. One can conclude from this document that the US special forces were aware of 
the use of torture by their Afghan allies but did nothing about it. 
 
                                                          
1726
 Worthington, Guantanamo: 245. 
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Hamidullah / Janat Gul - 953 
Arrested 30 January 2003 in Lashkar Gah. Transferred to Afghan custody 18 April 2005. 
(Although the JTF-GITMO Assessment states that he was transferred to Guantanamo on 22 
March 2002). He was arrested because he was President of Ariana Airlines (Afghanistan’s 
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flag carrier) during the Taliban period. Evidence against him included the facts that the 
Ariana office was located in an area of Kabul near Taliban and Al-Qaeda offices and that 
three previous employees of the airline had been located at an early 2002 Hizb-e Islami 
meeting: ‘this indicates that the airline was not only supporting the Taliban, but also the [sic] 
Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin’. Reading the transcripts it is clear that the Tribunal members are 
not aware that there is a separate date system in operation in Afghanistan. An educated 
man, he claims he joined Ariana to escape Taliban conscription. Assessed as having a high 
intelligence value. 
 
Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul (actually Abdul Qayoum Zakir) – 008. 
Arrested in the North at the end of 2001. Transferred to Afghan custody on 12 December 
2007. Zakir gave his father’s name during his detention and claimed that he was a foot 
soldier. The US interrogators thought that he might have been a bodyguard for a high 
ranking Talib (he was actually a deputy corps commander under Rauf—see below). What is 
clear is that the Americans are not sure why Dostum, who originally captured him, included 
him in a group of prisoners given over to the Americans. He was accused of owning a Casio 
‘wrist watch’, which could be used as a ‘possible explosive device’. He admitted that it was 
‘fine to wage jihad against Americans, Jews or Israelis if they were in his country’. He was 
assessed as having a medium intelligence value. When released to Afghan custody, Zakir 
quickly rose to become the head of the Taliban military (nezami) commission.  
 
Abdul Rauf Khadim – 108.  
Arrested in the North at the end of 2001. Transferred to Afghan custody on 12 December 
2007. Claimed he was a bread deliverer (was actually a Taliban corps commander). 
Assessed as having a medium intelligence value. The Tribunal President correctly identified 
him as Alizai and then asked if that tribe was associated with the Taliban. The next question 
made clear that the questioner though that the Northern Alliance (NA) was a Pushtun 
organisation: he was confused that the detainee did not join the NA. Even though Rauf 
provides conflicting stories about when he lost his leg, the US releases him. He quickly 
begins working with the Taliban and is currently the Taliban Governor for Uruzgan. 
 
Abdul Rahman – 118. 
Abdul Rahman was arrested in the North at the end of 2001. Transferred to Afghan custody 
15 December 2006. He was severely mentally ill with schizoaffective disorder, depressive 
disorder and major depressive disorder with psychotic features. He was assessed as a 
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Murtaza – 361. 
Arrested at the end of 2001 in the North. Transferred to Afghan custody on 23 March 2003. 
He claimed he was a Taliban driver and was assessed as a low intelligence value. Upon 
release he was harassed by Haji Manan, a Noorzai ‘police’ officer, based on the accusation 
that he had been in Guantanamo.1727 This continued for some time and included having his 
house raided several time and his opium stolen. He then went to Washir and formed links 
with the Taliban for his own protection from the police (see section 4.12). The Kharoti claim 
that he fought to defend them from the police, but he also fought British forces in 2008/9. He 
was eventually arrested by ISAF in 2009.  
 
Amanullah Alikozai – 538. 
Arrested in early 2002 by Mohammad Jan, Karzai’s appointee as Governor of Uruzgan. 
Released to Afghan custody on 14 March 2004. Amanullah was the cousin of Abdul Bari, the 
Taliban Governor of Helmand. Bari stayed in Amanullah’s house briefly in January 2002, but 
not while Amanullah was there. The US assessed him as a low threat. 
 
Qari Hassanullah Pirzai – 562. 
Arrested on 24 February 2002. Transferred to Afghan custody on 25 August 2006. 
Hassanullah was actually working for Karzai’s government in Kajaki as Sherafuddin’s clerk 
(Sherafuddin was a relative of Sher Mohammad). It appears that he tried to turn in two 
former members of the Taliban who had been harassing him. It then appears that 
Sherafuddin turned him into the US (that is a feud and a counter-feud). His mental health 
problems meant that he was incorrectly assessed by US interrogators as using incoherence 
as a counter-interrogation technique. Accusations include that he spoke with an Iranian 
accent (he had spent nine years in an Iranian prison for smuggling drugs) and was an Iranian 
spy (he was captured with some ‘code’ books, that were later shown to be religious 
talismans). Several accusations referred to incidents that occurred after he was arrested and 
in US custody. He was also accused of working with Al Qaeda, at the same time that he was 
an Iranian spy. He was assessed as a medium risk to the US. Hassanullah told the US 
interrogators that their beliefs were ‘too far from reality’.  
 
Haji Bismillah – 968. 
Arrested in Lashkar Gah on 12 February 2003. Transferred to Afghan authority on 17 
January 2009. Bismillah was appointed Director of Transport in Gereshk by Sher 
Mohammad. Bismillah’s brother, Mohammad Wali, was Sher Mohammad’s driver and is now 
                                                          
1727
 007, 015. 
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an MP for Helmand. During the course of his duties he had contact with both the Helmandi 
government and US forces. On the day of his arrest he was actually trying to help US forces 
and Amir Mohammad resolve an issue regarding weapons permits. Accused of being a 
member of the Taliban and of ‘Fedayeen Islam’ (not heard used in the context of Helmand, 
supposedly the ‘combined effort of Hizb-e Islami and active Taliban’). Bismillah’s US 
interrogators accuse him both of being with Sher Mohammad (‘number two in the Taliban 
organisation in Helmand’ and someone who ‘[alerted] his insurgent counterparts by satellite 
phone’ about US troop movements) and Rais Baghrani (‘leader of forty-man terrorist unit’), 
yet the most basic knowledge about Helmand would have shown that these two families 
have been feuding for decades. The US rated him as a high threat to their interests. 
 
Bismillah’s brother claims that Bismillah was given to US special forces by Haji Kadus and 
brothers because he ran the government transportation department road tolls in Gereshk, 
whose revenue Haji Kadus coveted (a point that Bismillah and his brother make 
independently in their respective testimonies). On the day of his arrest, Sher Mohammad, 
Dad Mohammad and Abdul Rahman all pointed out to the US that it was almost certainly a 
false denunciation. In 2006, his brother signed a sworn affidavit to this effect and took Donald 
Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, to court on behalf of Bismillah. Bismillah had 
previously requested his brother’s testimony during his Combatant Status Review, as was his 
‘right’. Yet the US and Afghan government claimed they could not find his brother despite 
him making repeated representations to the US and Afghan authorities and actually working 
for the Afghan government. Mohammad Wali also confirmed in his affidavit that he had not 
been contacted. Meanwhile, Mohammad Wali had been appointed District Governor of Musa 
Qala, a prospect that US officials found ‘least appealing [among a series of corrupt 
appointments]’. One of the reasons given was that Mohammad Wali had a brother in 
Guantanamo.1728 
 
Abdul Razaq – 942. 
Arrested in Lashkar Gah on 21 January 2003. Died in Guantanamo on 30 December 2007 of 
cancer. Was Rais Baghrani’s driver during the jihad and was involved in freeing Ismail Khan 
from Taliban custody in Kandahar in March 2000 (for which the Taliban and Al Qaeda put a 
bounty on his head). He was assessed as a high threat to US interests. Much of the 
evidence against Abdul Razaq seems to come from another detainee.1729 This included being 
a member of Al Qaeda and the infamous forty-man Taliban and Al Qaeda unit, whose 
existence has not been discussed outside of Guantanamo files. The US also claimed that he 
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had started as a driver for the Taliban in 1992 (before the movement was formed). The 
interrogator accused him of being a member of Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (a Pakistani political 
party with links to the Taliban), rather than Jamiat-e Islami (what he said), which was a group 
supplied by the US during the jihad. He was kept in custody so that he could provide 
information on Rais Baghrani who reconciled with the government (again) during his period 
of detention. He was also accused of things that happened after he was arrested. He claims 
he was arrested by a former Taliban commander who had reconciled with, and was working 
for, Sher Mohammad (this was because he was a Baghrani acolyte). Of him, Abdul Raziq 
said ‘I’ll put a horse’s penis in his wife’s vagina’. 
 
Haji Jalil – 1117. 
Haji Jalil was handed over to US forces by Dad Mohammad in response to the deaths of the 
two US soldiers in March 2003 (section 4.8). He was transferred to Afghan custody on 11 
March 2005. There were multiple reports surrounding this incident as Sher Mohammad, Mir 
Wali and Dad Mohammad all gave names to the US of those they claimed were responsible. 
In this case the US realised and wrote ‘it appears that his capture by AMF and subsequent 
handover to US forces was based on fraudulent claims given by AMF personnel themselves’. 
The US authorities then go on to state in the documents that they believe that Dad 
Mohammad may have been involved in the ambush and that Haji Jalil was offered as a way 
of escaping culpability. US forces on the ground in Helmand, however, continued to work 
with Dad Mohammad. This is one of the few Guantanamo reports where it can be shown that 
US personnel were aware of the fact that they were being manipulated. 
 
Abdul Wahab – 961. 
Abdul Wahab was one of the ten Helmandis rounded up after the Lajay incident in Feb 2003 
(section 4.8). He was transferred to Afghan custody on 31 August 2008. He had voluntarily 
passed through a nearby US checkpoint after the incident to do some shopping. His crimes 
included wearing a green jacket (common in the area), that the ambushers had used. He 
was accused of hearing loss at the time of the incident but there is no evidence of the US 
testing his hearing. Abdul Wahab repeatedly pointed this out. The US special forces 
interpreters were Hazaras (who speak Dari) and it is possible that the miscommunication 
between the special forces and Abdul Wahab was misinterpreted as hearing loss. When it 
was pointed out that he had a watch that was used for making bombs, he pointed at the 
Presiding Officer, who was wearing the same watch. The tribunal also confused Bagram and 
Baghran, and Jamiat-e Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e Islami. This second confusion was further 
compounded when the US officer stated that because his brother had fought in ‘Jamiat’ that 
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was valid grounds for Abdul Wahab’s incarceration. Abdul Wahab described the accusations 
as ‘nonsense’. 
 
Rahmatullah – 964. 
Rahmatullah was also arrested after the Lajay incident. He was transferred to Afghan 
custody on 15 December 2006. Many of the same accusations about hearing loss and 
jackets surface in his documentation as well. Unfortunately, one of the tribunal members did 
not know where Helmand was and so was unable to judge some of the evidence in front of 
him. He asks the detainee who thinks it is a trick question, swears he doesn’t know and that 
it is near to Kandahar. He was accused of having blood and powder burns on his clothes, but 
it appears that these items did not survive the detainee processing chain. Aged twenty-two, 
he was asked if he had ever fought the Russians. ‘No, I was just a little boy’, he replied. 
When asked what he thought of the US, he replied ‘I don’t know. I don’t understand’.  
 
Hafizullah – 965. 
Arrested in same incident and transferred on same date as 964, above. Similar accusations. 
He asks to see the evidence against him, but this is refused because it is classified. He 
repeatedly points out that it is very important that the US makes efforts to find the witnesses 
that he nominated. There is some confusion over the name of an uncle who is allegedly a 
member of the Taliban. In the secret detainee assessment Sher Mohammad and Rais 
Baghrani (they also got his tribe wrong) are both assessed as supporting the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda. There is no mention of Sher Mohammad being the Provincial Governor. These facts 
were both used as part of the justification over his imprisonment. The detainee claims to 
have never left his village and not to have known what Kabul was before he came to 
Guantanamo. He was assessed as a medium risk to the US. 
 
Baridad – 966. 
Same dates and same accusations as 964 and 965. 
 
Nasirullah – 967. 
Arrested at the time of the Lajay incident but transferred to Afghan custody on 2 November 
2007. He was accused of being a member of the forty-man unit that provided security for 
Osama Bin Laden. However, Nasirullah worked for Sher Mohammad at the Lashkar Gah 
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Abdul Baghi – 963. 
Arrested at the time of the Lajay incident and transferred to Afghan custody on 8 February 
2006. He was arrested with his uncle, 971, discussed below. Same accusations about green 
jackets. He was also accused of being a member of the forty-man group that Rais Baghrani 
led out of Musa Qala (which would have been difficult as it was Sher Mohammad’s 
stronghold). His documents are littered with inconsistencies about whether he was arrested 
with a weapon, whether he had recently cached it (never recovered) or whether he didn’t 
have a weapon. ‘It cannot be confirmed detainee was involved in insurgent operations…his 
denial seems to be plausible’. He was in custody for just under three years. 
 
Kushky Yar – 971. 
Uncle of 963, above, and has the same arrest and transfer dates. Same accusations. He 
attempted to hang himself in Guantanamo. He was accused of having a signalling mirror, but 
this was a snuff box carried by most males in Helmand. He pointed out that he was wearing 
a brown jacket rather than a green one, but their personal items do not seem to have made it 
to Guantanamo with them. An American officer accuses that the green jackets were the 
‘uniform’ of the Taliban. A poor villager, he was asked what date he was captured. ‘I don’t 
know dates…it was daytime when I was captured’. Much of the evidence against him is 
based on things that he ‘said himself’, yet in the review documents he denies ever saying 
them and there is no proof available that he did ever say them. Kushky Yar points out several 
times that there had been problems with the interpreters misinterpreting. The Presiding 
Officer admits that the only sources of evidence to their guilt that they have are Kushky Yar 
and his nephew, Abdul Baghi. 
 
Akhtur Mohammad – 969. 
Arrested in the Lajay incident and transferred to Afghan custody on 14 March 2004. He was 
arrested because his name was similar to Rais Baghrani’s driver (Akhtur Mohammad is a 
common name in Afghanistan, like Dave Jones in Britain).  
 
Arif Mohammad – 972. 
Arif Mohammad was in his sixties at the time of his detention. He was captured on the day of 
the Lajay incident. He was transferred to Afghan custody on 15 Dec 2006. Same accusations 
about the green jackets. There is some confusion over his capture. He was either armed, in 
Baghrani’s compound, or washing himself in a stream outside (unarmed), or trying to escape 
with weapons and ammunition. Guantanamo personnel are unable to resolve these 
inconsistencies, presumably because the evidence for one assertion or another (e.g. 
statements) are not available. He was assessed as a medium risk to the US. The secret 
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assessments make the deduction that the residents of Baghran often defend the valley from 
‘invaders’ and with his mujahidin experience (he fought for Nasim Akhundzada) it is likely 
that he would have picked up a weapon. This is a very poor standard of evidence.  
 
Arif claims that he has a blood feud with Baghrani, who the US claims that he works for. He 
also claims that the Hazara interpreters at the Lajay incident caused him to be arrested. 
Factual inaccuracies include the fact that Nasim (who the US supported as a mujahed almost 
until he died in 1990) was the Taliban Director of Transportation for Bamian Province. Nasim 
had been dead for six years when the Taliban took Bamian. Nasim was also linked to Hizb 
by Guantanamo personnel, but he actually spent the 1980s fighting them (and they 
eventually killed him). Baghrani is ‘linked’ in the evidence to Sher Mohammad even though 
they have a decades old family feud. Sher Mohammad is also said to be part of the 
‘insurgent infrastructure’ (which was not true at that point). The most basic knowledge about 
Helmand would have dismissed this evidence, irrespective of whether it had any relevance to 
the detainee.  
 
Abdul Kadus – 929. 
Abdul Kadus was approximately fifteen when he was arrested in Gereshk by (probably) Mir 
Wali’s men in early Jan 2003 (the date is not clear from his files, it could have been Dec 
2002 due to his detainee number). He was transferred to Afghan custody on 18 April 2005. 
He claims that he was travelling to Gereshk to visit his uncle and spent the night in a military 
checkpoint (‘soldiers in a tent’). The next morning he tried to leave and they stopped him, told 
him that he had to take a weapon and then fight the Americans. He said that he wanted to go 
to his uncle’s house. They took him to jail. In the secret assessment of Abdul Kadus, it is 
claimed that he went to the soldiers and asked them for a weapon to fight the Americans. 
Reading the transcript one gets the impression of a child who has no idea what is going on. It 
appears that this could be a ‘sting operation’ to have him arrested for the bounty money. See 
also 930. 
 
Mohammad Ismail – 930. 
Mohammad was approximately sixteen when he was arrested in December 2002. He was 
transferred to Afghan custody on 28 Jan 2004. He and a friend were travelling to Gereshk to 
look for work and found some ‘soldiers in a tent’. They asked if they could work with them on 
a ditch digging project they were engaged on, but they were offered the chance to fight the 
Americans. They agreed but were apprehensive. The next day they were turned over to 
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Mohammad Nasim – 958. 
Mohammad was arrested on the 11 February 2003. He was transferred to Afghan custody on 
18 April 2005. He was arrested because he had the same ‘last name’ as a Taliban 
commander heard on an intercepted communication regarding US troop movements (‘Mullah 
Nasim’ was overheard, in a radio transmission in the north of Afghanistan). However, in 
Afghanistan people do not have last names. Everyone is given two ‘first’ names, and is 
identified by their father’s name (and their tribe if they are Pushtun). Mohammad claimed he 
had never left Helmand, did not know where Lashkar Gah was (he was from Baghran) and 
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